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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation traces the socio-economic problem spaces and afterlives of the 1990 
currency and economic union between West and East Germany, and the parallel process 
of creating the European single currency. Based on two and half years of full-time multi-
sited (geographically and institutionally) fieldwork in Frankfurt am Main (West) and 
Leipzig (East) Germany, I show the pragmatic challenges of defining, enacting, and 
materializing relations of solidarity and obligation through new forms of monetary 
relations. I argue that the long and fraught histories of harmonizing east and west German 
regions offer critical insights for analyzing the new fault lines emerging between ‘core’ 
and ‘periphery’ nations in the euro-zone. My project therefore makes a contribution in 
narrating currency unions as emergent technical and social relationships, through which 
expert and lay understandings about money and economy are unwound and remade over 
time. In pursuing this line of inquiry, a key focus of my research included participatory 
research on the communications work of the German Central Bank (Deutsche 
Bundesbank) in Frankfurt am Main and Leipzig.  
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Chapter 1: 
Introduction 
 
“The question is not whether to remember or to forget, but what to remember and to 
forget, when and in what context”(Grosz 2004) 
 
In 2008 I met with Herr Schultz at his apartment in Leipzig-Gohlis, (former East 
Germany). Herr Schultz was speaking about the euro long before the beginnings of the 
present euro crisis (2013 at the time of this writing). Yet his articulate analysis by now 
resonates within multiple temporalities of currency shifts and economic crisis.   
 Schultz worked as underground engineer drilling natural gas in the GDR. He 
wanted to study at university. He was not allowed to do so because his father had been a 
private businessman (long into the socialist period). As Herr Schultz noted ironically, I 
was labeled a “capitalist” child.  He became a small-business entrepreneur himself after 
unification, opening the first joint West-East tourism office with Lufthansa sponsorship: 
at the time a new business concept. Within the space of four years he and his wife had 
opened four different offices. Business was going well. Herr Schultz even had the chance 
to travel to exotic parts of the world, a dearly held dream of most East Germans trapped 
by the wall dividing East and West.   
Little did Herr Schulz imagine, but the seeds of failure had already been sown in 
the credit arrangements for his new entrepreneurial venture. Little did he know at the 
time that the demise of his venture was one of many other examples in which the 
currency union would contribute to a contradictory logics in which monetary value could 
be represented as absent, yet exploited at the same time (I will return to this problem in 
later chapters). Herr Schulz received a loan from one of Germany’s large 
Geschäftsbanken (investment bank). As a small entrepreneur, he had arranged a 50% 
partnership with Lufthansa to ensure capital for his business. He submitted the paperwork 
to the bank on time. However, the bank did not process the paperwork until eight months 
later, after Herr Schultz had already opened his business. Unbeknownst to Herr S. or the 
local tax accounting office (Steuerkanzlei), the bank had already begun proceedings 
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against him, charging 17,5% on his loan. His troubles did not end there. The bank broke 
bank privacy laws by disclosing his business plans to a competing firm. Even though 
Herr Schultz had a strong case against the bank, by the time he learned of the bank’s 
missteps, the window of time in which it was legally possible to file charges against the 
bank had run out. He was advised to transfer to his wife’s separate bank account all of his 
capital for the business or risk having it seized by the bank. Upon transferring the funds, 
however, his wife left him, taking the cash with her. With a twinge of irony, Herr Schulz 
explained he had been married once before, during the GDR period. This also ended 
badly when someone—his wife or a member of her family—reported his wish to commit 
Republikflucht (escape to West Germany). Herr Schultz’s application to teach with aid 
services in a developing country (with political ties to the GDR) was turned down. Herr 
Schultz joked: I lost my first wife for political reasons, and my second wife because of 
money! 
  Herr Schultz now works as a motivational instructor for hard-to-employ youth.  
He draws on his many work experiences in different fields to show youth how it is 
possible to gain valuable knowledge and work skills even in the hardest of circumstances. 
Such experiences have also given S. a certain insight into the meanings of money and the 
particular problems of economic integration on the ground. I asked him if he saw 
differences and parallels between the German and European currency unions. He 
surprised me, not only by having quite a lot to say on the matter, but also confirming to 
me in certain terms that there was something lurking behind the usual reluctance of 
interviewees to make the comparison at all. He described the complex entanglements 
through which two currency unions, separated in time, and each having their own sets of 
narratives and logics, take on their ambiguous status in post-unification Germany. East 
Germans’ dissatisfaction with the euro “is a two-fold problem,” Schultz explained, 
“because we have German unification”: 
    
German Unification also brought a social reordering, and this reordering of 
society remains incomplete, both economically and socially. And the second point 
is that the East German Mark became the Deutsch Mark because many held the 
view that the Deutsch Mark was the most stable currency after the Dollar. So 
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since 1990 we have this social breach (change) and new strategies for society, that 
are still not fully developed. And in this process of uniting Europe, which had 
already been taking place in the Federal Republic for several decades, we (the 
GDR) were abruptly part of this European community, and then parallel to this, 
the changeover to the euro. As you know in the US, the euro is a very interesting, 
stable currency,1 but because of the economic problems in East Germany that 
have yet to be overcome, it has hit us with grave consequences. The reason is as 
follows. In East Germany we have double the unemployment because many did 
not understand the economic consequences of the rapid unification process.” 
 
Herr Schultz then reiterated a dominant narrative in Germany about the role of 
Chancellor Kohl in shaping the outcome of Unification. Unique factors allowed Kohl to 
take advantage of the small window of opportunity to re-unify Germany, economic 
arguments to the contrary. As Schultz explained it, the economic aspects of unification 
have yet to be clarified, or effectively implemented: 
  
While many factories and business did not work efficiently, others did but these 
were simultaneously potential competition for West German businesses and thus 
these unwanted competitors had to be eliminated. So there was never a chance to 
recover. The Treuhand (Privatization Trust) also opened the doors to criminal 
activity, or at least could not prevent such activities from occurring. The European 
currency union, on top of an already unstable context with few capital resources, 
little investment, and absence of industry, has created social discord and 
uncertainty among the public. The changeover to the euro at first divided the 
prices in half, but with the rate of rising prices, the DM and euro are in a one-to-
one relationship. Even I find myself converting between the euro and the DM. 
The euro is stable and will probably be the leading currency over the dollar... 
Globalization has brought many good things, but there is a lot to critique. Here in 
Germany, we don’t speak about the free market but rather the social market 
economy. But this market is no longer social, particularly with rates of childhood 
poverty at 1,5 million... 
 
So, it is not possible to separate the European currency union from the problems 
of German unification. Other former socialist countries such as Poland or 
Hungary also experienced these historical shifts, but they don’t have the problem 
of unification, involving large monetary transfers. A lot of money has been 
transferred from West Germany to the East in order to create an economic 
balance, and this has created a range of problems that remain unresolved.  
 
                                                 
1
 This was during the US financial crisis, but before the euro debt crisis.  
  4 
No matter the “exchange value of a currency,” Herr S.’s experiences underscore 
how monetary value is subject to multiple registers, and its reconfiguration not without 
consequences. Arguments about the relationship between money and labor productivity, 
between earned pension funds and work biographies are an ongoing problematic of 
German unification, specifically the translations of value that occurred with the currency 
union. One could argue that socialist money became more real after the fact: at the 
moment of its devaluation the East German Mark was understood not in terms of its 
value in the capitalist west, but within the context of work, consumption, and savings as it 
was defined and lived in the GDR.  
When I asked one close friend and respondent about her memories of the currency 
union, she said, “What do I remember? Back then everything was new. Back then it was 
impossible to make any real judgment about it. I knew what money was worth in the 
GDR, how much everything cost—rent, bread, the everyday things one needed had stable 
prices that seldom changed. But then everything was suddenly different. Not just prices, 
but everything: work, professional qualifications, insurance —money was only part of it.” 
The socio-economic ruptures of German unification get enfolded in calculations of gain, 
loss, and misunderstanding in complex ways, not all of which are immediately at the 
surface of public discourse. Calculations of cost and benefit, of new possibilities but also 
lost hopes are share by, but also distinguish East and West German experiences of 
economic transformation in EU-Germany. 
My dissertation examines the meanings and effects of two currency union 
projects: the 1990 currency union between West and East Germany, and the European 
Monetary Union, marked most viscerally by the introduction of euro notes and bills as 
legal tender in January of 2002, in Germany2. In examining how money is understood to 
be a particular mediating agent and form in these projects, it has been my concern not to 
accept at face value money’s universalizing features. Rather, I have been interested in 
how money, as a particular currency embodying both economic and socio-historical 
agency, shows how monetary projects might be apprehended as something more than 
                                                 
2
 The euro was introduced as book money in 1999. Thus, 1999 is the official beginning of the 
euro.  
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formal agreements in technocratic language and rule-bound regulations. If, as many 
scholars of money remind us, money is not a thing but a social relationship, then how do 
people understand the new relationships that money mediates in these arrangements? In 
my understanding, the reconfiguration of monetary relations is not simply a substitution 
of one currency for another, but is at once a new set of social, institutional, political and 
economic relations mediated by money.   
I trace the socio-economic problem spaces and afterlives of these projects. I show 
the pragmatic challenges of defining, enacting, and materializing relations of solidarity 
and obligation through new forms of monetary relations. I argue that the long and fraught 
histories of harmonizing east and west German regions offer critical insights for 
analyzing the new fault lines emerging between ‘core’ and ‘periphery’ nations in the 
euro-zone. My project therefore makes a contribution in narrating currency unions as 
emergent technical and social relationships, through which expert and lay understandings 
about money and economy are unwound and remade over time. 
In Germany currency unions have been at the center of two unifying projects: 
German Unification and European ‘integration. While an almost mythic story highlights 
their interconnection, it is far more common to differentiate them. My project has been 
concerned with understanding how and in what ways these projects are thought to be 
entangled and mutually constitutive. Just as important, I have tracked some of the ways in 
which these are understood to be radically different and temporally bounded endeavors. 
What work do re-definitions and displacements do, and to what ends?  The 1990 currency 
union was both a re-founding of the German state and a settling of accounts with multiple 
and morally fraught ‘pasts’.  
Monetary unions shape and impinge upon multiple domains of daily life.  
From consumer and banking practices to the crossing of borders, and ultimately faith and 
trust in new monetary entanglements of obligation, the introduction of the euro reaches 
into people’s lives in ways that exceed the changing of interest rates or ‘regulating’ the 
money supply (or inflation targeting). My study is thus an effort to place macro-economic 
narratives and assumptions and the experiences of the broad public into the same 
analytical frame. Given the particular collective and visceral dimensions of these events 
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and their ‘afterlives’ I wanted to understand how alternative modes of understanding the 
meanings and effects of ‘distant monetary policy’ could offer a frame of reference that is 
reworked in the different readings of its effects over time, and in light of new historical 
conjunctures of transformation and crisis.  
 This dissertation argues that the process of legitimizing the new euro currency 
aims to inscribe it with the collective meaning of national currency but simultaneously 
hold ‘national’ meanings at a distance. The technical knowledge, language, and practices 
of creating and managing a stable currency become effective but fragile and contested 
forms through which trust is built. The afterlives of other monetary arrangements, re-
orderings, and revalorizations are actively remembered, forgotten, and reworked. This is 
an effort to trace the historicity of money as monetary events with reverberations that 
exceed the instance of transformation. 
 
Methods/Sites/Problem-Spaces 
 
I examine experiences of German and European economic integration in Germany 
since 1989. Based on two and half years of full-time multi-sited (geographically and 
institutionally) fieldwork in Frankfurt am Main (West) and Leipzig (East) Germany, I 
chose these sites to understand how currency shifts and economic transformation have 
been experienced in different, yet interconnected ways in West and East Germany by 
experts and the public. I suggest that the currency union between socialist and capitalist 
German economies in 1990 prefigured and haunts the instabilities now emerging at the 
euro’s moment of crisis.  
My research shows that the economic effects of the German monetary, economic 
and social union over twenty years ago remain unresolved issues within Germany. This 
stands in stark contrast to German responses to the current euro crisis where failures of 
integration are framed as lying outside Germany’s borders. Within Germany, however, 
laments about the financial burdens of paying for the East have occluded how 
deindustrialization, dispossession, and demographic decline shape and also erase East 
German contributions, work biographies and economic futures. I argue that the failures 
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and violent ruptures of German economic integration must be understood through, and 
not apart from, the currency union with West Germany. It is precisely here that 
paradoxes and dilemmas faced by both West and East German experts, institutions, and 
the public are viscerally evident.  
The technical measures that underlie such currency union projects are not value-
neutral and outside culture as experts claim. My project has thus been concerned not only 
with the social effects of this currency union, but also the technical problems of 
conversion through which it has been understood. The German currency union is 
predominantly viewed as an exceptional case of monetary union, an anomaly that renders 
the logics of value it inscribed invisible. For instance, by framing East German money as 
without value, it appears as if no economic value was lost in the conversion. But 
measures of equivalence do not transparently represent the economic difference between 
capitalism and socialism; they are instead moral arguments about the radical 
incommensurability of the political-economic Other. The technical details of these 
monetary conversions must therefore be understood as moral forms through which power 
and inequality have been differently recognized, disavowed, and mobilized in the 
complete social reorganization of East Germany. Currency unions thus re-figure and are 
also shaped by cultural logics of exclusion, even as they are predicated on unifying 
difference. By reframing currency unions as ongoing problems of translation and unruly 
accounting acts, I demonstrate how public contestations of the euro and EU integration 
can likewise be analyzed as a crucial interface through which expert practices are re-
defined. 
Methodologically, I organized my fieldwork around participant observation of 
peripheral work within a powerful institution (the German Central Bank/Deutsche 
Bundesbank), and movement between the financial center of Germany and its East 
German periphery. My approach was purposely multifaceted and eclectic in order to pry 
open the cultural logics and lived contexts of German and European currency projects. 
First, I conducted ethnographic research on the public relations work of the German 
Central Bank to show how the introduction of the euro necessitated an opening up of 
financial technical expertise. The Bundesbank considers this work to be important 
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because of its commitment to transparency and communication with the public, guarding 
carefully what can be said, but it also considers this work secondary to the technical 
matters of monetary policy. Communication staff thus negotiated multiple hierarchies 
within and outside the institution in their work. Simultaneously, my ethnographic 
research in Leipzig included local institutions and events in which Europeanization and 
the historical process of division, dictatorship and transformations since 1989 are 
represented and publically debated. Respondents working in and interacting with these 
institutions were caught up in dominant efforts to re-define and process (work through) 
the East German past. But this form of political commemoration often negates and 
delegitimizes easterners’ lives during socialism, often placing subjects and institutions in 
a double bind in addressing problems of Unification. Through participant observation, 
interviews, and informal conversations I have traced personal histories and their 
interconnections with the broader macro-economic processes that currency unions reflect. 
Respondents in both cities come from all walks of life, from financial and scholarly 
experts, to key witnesses and participants of the transformations before and after 
unification, to grandmothers and their grandchildren visiting the Geldmuseum (visitor’s 
center) of the Deutsche Bundesbank. The historical actors, experts, and ordinary Germans 
who participated in my research are themselves crosscut by institutional hierarchies, 
east/west asymmetries, and differently valued life histories and avenues of influence. 
With these multiple and differently positioned sites and subjects, then, I show how 
monetary policy depends upon public perceptions and people’s daily money repertoires. 
My research contributes to the ethnography of financial institutions and is the first 
ethnographic study of the Bundesbank’s communications work with the public. 
The 1990 currency union seems to be a matter of the past, the euro is understood 
to be an ongoing, emergent and—according to many—an irreversible project facilitating 
every deeper integration in Europe. My research has been concerned with the remainders 
and ‘afterlives’ of the 1990 union as it sometimes erupts in and unsettles the certainties of 
present European agendas and claims surrounding the euro.   
My queries into the interconnections between currency shifts, new forms of 
monetary relationships, and the project of European and German integration were both 
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timely and untimely at once. Untimely in the sense that the main action of both had 
already passed. Though the euro was only a few years old by the time of my fieldwork, it 
was already assumed by most academics and elites to be a done deal, no longer worthy of 
much scrutiny. The monetary changes of German unification were further removed in 
time and space, with the physical walls and fences that had once divided east and west no 
longer visible on the landscape. Yet in both cases, there continued to be so-called mental 
conversions and obduracies. If the euro continued to be met by repeated price 
comparisons with its D-Mark predecessor, then unification more broadly could often be 
subject to complaint via the ever-resistant “wall in people’s heads.” If the euro was 
imposed on the German public by its visionary elites in concert with other European 
technocrats, then the introduction of the West German mark to the former GDR was the 
result of popular demands from the streets of Leipzig, Dresden, and Berlin. Ostensibly 
the euro would bring new and more transparent consumer possibilities while the granting 
of the D-Mark to the east in the 1990 currency union and its subsequent substitution by 
the euro would be the political price for a unified Germany.  
Because I wanted to think through the logics, claims, and pragmatics of the 
European monetary project this dissertation asks how the ‘intra-German’ experience 
might offer parallels into the long-term effects and meanings of ostensibly technical 
matters. In posing this question I do not mean to imply that the technical is outside, or 
separate from cultural meanings, discourses, and beliefs. Rather, I am interested to 
understand how diverse subjects enacted, re-worked, internalized or contested the 
technical matters presumably beyond their control. Given that the euro has been widely 
perceived in Germany and beyond as a technocratic vision and monetary regime designed 
by political, economic and technocratic elites, and imposed on ordinary citizens who, in 
Germany, were not eligible to voice their acceptance and/or rejection in a national 
referendum, I wanted to understand why public critiques and discontent about the euro 
were taken so seriously by many of my respondents at the Bundesbank.  
In both projects, the transformative effects of shifting currency regimes have been 
the subject of immense, if uneven and contradictory expressions of solidarity, belonging, 
and obligation.  
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While ‘ordinary people’ are ascribed extraordinary agency in ‘demanding’ the 
1990 currency union, the euro is perceived as the outcome of decisions and plans 
imposed from above—a matter about which the public has little ‘choice.’ This is ironic 
given that the benefits of the euro are conveyed in terms of consumer freedoms and 
choice. The Bundesbank was anxious about public critiques of the euro. On the other 
hand, the project could be displaced as a project of the politicians, which the Bundesbank 
must manage. There was a concern to cordon off monetary policy and the tasks of central 
banks from other financial matters. The Bundesbank should have a uniform institutional 
message (hence, no privileging of the East). It should also emphasize its role as only part 
of the European system of central banks. At the same time, by sticking to the technical 
modalities of price stability, but maintaining particular German concerns, differences 
between the Bundesbank and the ECB seem to be a means of defending a particularly 
German stance in the euro project, and more recently, in sometimes differentiating 
Bundesbank priorities from those of the ECB during the euro crisis.  
The euro is a binding relationship between member nations that use it and part of 
an unprecedented (some would now say flawed) “architecture” in which monetary policy 
is disconnected from fiscal and political union that supra-national level. That is, there are 
no mechanisms for transferring funds via taxes or social transfers between member states 
in the event of unequal developments or economic shocks within particular regions (or 
nation-states). 
An important aim of my project has been to imagine technical, macro-projects in 
concrete ethnographic terms. I do so in a number of interconnecting ways that suggest but 
also exceed any ambition to identify these as inevitable networks that can be traced 
straightforwardly. In many respects, my study is an effort to place macro-economic 
narratives and assumptions and the experiences of the broad public into the same 
analytical frame. In doing so I do not mean to imply that one can simply connect the dots. 
This would be to ignore the complex and multiple forms of mediation on the one hand, 
and take particular abstractions as ‘really real’ on the other (an irresolvable and contested 
endeavor to say the least). Instead, given the particular collective and visceral dimensions 
of these events and their ‘afterlives’ I wanted to understand how alternative modes of 
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understanding the meanings and effects of ‘distant monetary policy’ could offer a frame 
of reference that is reworked in the different readings of its effects.   
Money is understood to be a generality that transcends particularities and which, 
as a universal equivalent, is the very agent of substitutability for, and exchange of, 
incommensurable things. My impulse, then, has been to understand the ways in which it 
is particularized in German and European projects of monetary integration. This does not 
mean that the D-Mark or the euro are not also and perhaps overwhelmingly, apprehended 
as currencies not unlike others. Nor do I wish to overemphasize the strategic ways in 
which currencies are essentialized in the dominant national or European discourses that 
circulate throughout the politics that my project seeks to unpack. Instead, my concern is 
to reflect upon what work currency does and does not do in particular claims about the 
integrations of markets and persons. If many authors emphasize that money/currency is a 
social relationship and not a ‘thing,’ then it is all the more important to concretize the 
ways in which monetary systems depend upon and are intelligible only as social 
relationships. In what ways, then, do the technical frames through which these projects 
are explained and understood emphasize some forms of relations over others? How are 
concepts such as stability, solidarity and obligation enacted and or occluded? In what 
varied and contradictory ways are differently positioned subjects making sense of these 
technical ‘arrangements’ in their daily lives, and in the temporal horizons in which 
futures are planned for and pasts revisited?    
Critical analyses of development projects, which is a register through which the 
1990 currency union can be read, may wish to highlight the multiple and unintended 
factors contributing to what is deemed a failed or successful project. In this study, 
however, I have been concerned to trace the specific ways in which monetary integration 
and revaluation have been ascribed agency and affect. In tracing this thread I do not wish 
to then offer a singular or causal explanation, nor do I ignore other factors. Indeed, the 
cause and effect relationships read through such projects are always already contested, 
and claims to knowledge of these relations used to discipline or neutralize other relevant 
critiques. For my purposes, though, I argue that it is nonetheless productive and necessary 
to trace and analyze the possible afterlives of the beginnings and ongoing (emergent) 
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relations of currency union projects. In this way, it is possible to understand how 
particular explanations are naturalized and how processes of subjectification unfold and 
are immanent to these processes (Balibar 1995; Read 2003), and the possibilities for 
alternative and critical reflections.  
 
Pedagogy of (price) stability 
 
The Bundesbank understands the value of currency to be absolutely dependent 
upon trust. Its interactive ‘Geldmuseum,’ which opened in 1999 in Frankfurt, has become 
a significant means to communicate this to the public. One underlying goal behind the 
creation of this center was the anticipation of the Euro and the need to explain the 
rationale and goals of the new monetary policy that would accompany this. Visitors of 
different ages from all over Germany visit the center including: school groups and 
teachers, tourists, employees’ families and officials from central banks across the globe, 
providing an ideal space to theorize the relationship between expertise and practical 
repertoires of economic experience. The museum is also unprecedented in its systematic 
representation and explanation of the key elements of monetary policy, the 
responsibilities of a central bank, and the historical experiences of money.  Staffed by 
specialists who explain the practices of ensuring the euro’s value, the center provides a 
dynamic vantage point from which to examine ongoing experiences with the euro and its 
connection with other economic processes and actors.  Language and media used in 
exhibits present different arguments for, and definitions of, the value of currency in 
affirmation of the center’s mission of eschewing dogmatism in its commitment to 
transparency. 
Bundesbank employees3 are very much invested in the efforts of their work.  The 
use of statistical data for them is a validation of why things are working and public 
mistrust of these measures is a source of frustration. As many commentators have noted, 
economics is often called the dismal science—or as it is stated in the guide to the 
Geldmuseum, the topic of monetary policy is “dry as dust.”  While currency is concrete 
                                                 
3
 The names of all respondents in this study have been changed, unless otherwise noted.  
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to people and part of their daily experiences, the abstract theories that inform monetary 
practice seem far from comprehensible for the majority of the public.  There is a desire 
on the part of museum staff to make this approachable, yet there is an abiding sense of 
frustration with the language and methods one has available to do this—particularly 
because changes to exhibits or the language and definitions used to explain key concepts 
“become quasi political decisions,” as the Museum director told me in an interview in 
2006.  
The European currency union is an unprecedented economic and historical 
experiment whose outcome is far from certain.  This is evidenced by the fact that some 
member states have elected not to adopt the euro and that indeed the “economic” 
arguments for maintaining a single currency remain open to debate as both experts and 
the public question the economic, political and social implications of membership in such 
a complex and diverse economic configuration. Many skeptics from diverse political 
camps continue to question how and to what extent a single economic institution such as 
the European Central Bank, which has oversight for the entire euro zone and whose 
members are appointed rather than elected, can be transparent and democratic.  Thus, 
money specialists (central bankers) in particular are tasked with the particular challenge 
of working to make the euro appear to be inevitable and necessary to the political project 
of European integration, even if the specificities and technical arrangements of making 
this work are continually in flux.  The question of whether the euro makes more political 
than economic sense is one that requires money specialists to continually move beyond 
the safety of technical language and forms of argument in order to remain in dialogue 
with a non-specialist public.  Moreover, as public servants, (not employees of private 
financial institutions), Bundesbank staff navigate on a daily basis what are often 
categorized as separate “financial” and “public” domains.  As professionals and members 
of the public, monetary experts must continually revisit the question of how economic 
value and stability is defined, justified, and maintained. 
Historical experiences of monetary crisis and economic instability have shaped 
institutional and cultural understandings of stable money in Germany (Widdig 2001b).  
The economy has long been a visible, powerful agent in Germany’s problematic path 
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toward democracy.  The qualities and structures of monetary policy take on explanatory 
power in these histories, whether to link bad, exploitative money decisions to particular 
banking, market, and political agents during the two World Wars (WWI and WWII), or 
to highlight the power of sound financial practices during the post-WWII era of the DM 
and the independent Central Bank in West Germany. Since the late 1940s, the 
Bundesbank has tried to reinforce scientific understandings of monetary policy (Peebles 
2003), i.e., it has tried to separate the idea of money as a neutral instrument that enables 
economic and political stability from the concept of money as a political tool.  Historical 
memories of financial crises in Germany also legitimize the scientific status of monetary 
policy. This separation made the DM stable, while the East German Mark embodied 
instability because it was (perceived as) both economic and political (Zatlin 2007a). Yet 
the contradictory effects of German Unification have once again produced negative 
linkages between monetary policy and currency because it did not result in the hoped for 
‘second German economic miracle.’ Unlike the historical link between the DM and 
Ludwig Erhard’s dictum of ‘prosperity for all,’ the euro just as easily slips into 
symbolizing ‘stability for a few.’ Many Germans continually worry that the financial 
commitments of European economic integration will come at the expense of the local 
economic concerns they face daily.  Thus public relations work is, at its core, about 
reconnecting monetary policy with public trust in their economic expertise.  I would 
argue that money specialists and the public are mutually engaged in narrowing and 
opening up the euro to multiple framings of agency and effect.   
Bundesbank staff charged with explaining the single currency and monetary policy 
to the public on the basis of trans-European concerns for safeguarding the stability of a 
shared currency occupy the somewhat ironic position of selling the stability of the euro in 
part on the basis of West German experiences with the Deutsch Mark. At the same 
moment that the Bundesbank is coming to terms with its new position within the EU 
landscape, (and its notable loss of power to determine monetary policy), the Bundesbank 
occupies in growing intensity the position of teacher and nurturer of the new currency.  
Yet the Bundesbank must convey the euro in part though national memories of money, 
financial crisis, and institutional success attached to the very currency, the Deutsch Mark, 
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they are urging citizens to leave behind.  Though historical documents and newsreels also 
remind those who care to look back that the economic reforms attached to the Deutsch 
Mark and Ludwig Erhard’s vision of the social market economy did not win public 
acceptance in the beginning—arguably only after the economic upturn was experienced 
across different levels of society—the task of conveying a similar link between the euro 
and economic well-being across the vastly different economic and national contexts of 
member states will likely remain an ongoing challenge. 
Why do popular complaints about the euro matter?  No matter what critiques the 
German public may have, these will not change the fact that the euro has been 
introduced, that the European Central Bank will make its decisions about interest rates 
even as politicians argue about how to reform the welfare state and reduce public 
spending.  From the vantage point of the central bank, maintaining the value of the euro 
is ultimately only possible through a relationship of trust with the public.  There is a great 
concern that without this trust, the public will not understand or support the policy 
decisions made by the central bank. A lack of trust is seen as potentially undermining the 
value of the euro. Paradoxically, many ordinary people would be surprised to discover 
that that they had any power at all to exert pressure on a powerful and influential 
institution such as a central bank.  Critiques about the euro and the state of the German 
(and European) economy tend to be directed at politicians rather than the ECB or 
Bundesbank.  My use of the term “public” includes multiple subject positions and 
interests and encompasses a wide range of opinions about and experiences of European 
economic integration.  Even for those individuals trained in economics or business, the 
responsibilities and meanings of a central bank may nevertheless be illusive.  
Since macro-economic theory and policy seem beyond the comprehension and/or 
interest of most non-specialists, why make an effort to explain this in “lay terms”?  If the 
popular sentiment is one that sees institutions such as central banks as impervious to daily 
concerns, why are trust-building activities necessary?  As the museum director said in 
response to my question about the significance of the Geldmuseum for Bundesbank 
employees, ‘Monetary policy functions without the museum.’  On the other hand, she 
noted that colleagues could also be envious of the opportunity to work in the visitor’s 
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center because it is nicht so ganz Bank (not only or just bank).’  In other words, the 
visitors’ center could be understood as a site that privileges interaction with the public 
and that emphasizes the work of the bank as a public institution.   
 
Background of the German and European currency unions 
 
The European monetary union has predominantly been framed as dominated by 
the relationship between France and Germany in particular. This has to do with the 
aftermath, rivalries, and atrocities of two world wars. It has also been informed by 
competing and different ideas about economy and monetary stability specifically. The 
origins of the EU in coal and steel were about limiting Germany’s ability to control what 
in the past had been key military resources. More broadly, the size and strength of the 
German economy has animated political leaders’ negotiations over exchange rates, 
monetary policy, and the goals set for the order of establishing the EU more broadly. This 
concerns what has been termed the monetarist and economist positions. The monetarists 
(France) preferred the establishment of a monetary union first as a “catalyst” for further 
political and fiscal integration of member states. The economist position (Germany) 
privileged above all an independent central bank and insisted, in contrast to the former 
position, on close convergence of economies and political mandates first, to be concluded 
only then by monetary union (the so-called “coronation theory”). According to several 
scholars, this had been the 30-year stance of the German government and the independent 
Bundesbank. Precisely this stance, so it is argued, was reversed in 1989/1990 with the 
rapid unification of West and East Germany (more precisely, the accession of East 
German ‘regions’ to the Federal Republic (Bundesrepublik).  
More broadly, France and Germany have been characterized by their very 
different monetary “cultures” with France less concerned about spending and inflation 
than Germany. In Germany, like nowhere else, the stability of monetary value is 
understood as upheld by the separation of political and monetary policy, and low 
inflation. It is not an exaggeration to say that the experience of the Hyperinflation and 
other monetary crises are easily and frequently called forth as a founding trauma, a 
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central cause of Hitler’s rise to power, and as an authorizing underpinning for austerity 
and saving repertoires. There is much evidence that financial crises have been 
internalized in families who experienced it, with affective and pragmatic strategies passed 
down to subsequent generations. This is so not only through narratives, but also in the un-
commented practices many children would have observed and responded to in household 
practices surrounding money.   
Attending to the logics, contingencies, epistemologies and temporalities that 
particularize money in the context of currency unions suggests how such projects exceed 
formal economic models in which these are framed. In social science theories of money 
the euro is more commonly thought of as just one currency among others (which it is). 
This leaves open, however, what work the euro does as the medium that links different 
economies and subjects across multiple “boundaries”: such as national, cultural, 
linguistic, institutional. In order to take euro as a narrow entrée to revisiting long-
standing scholarship on economy, money and value, it is thus important to work with but 
also bracket such categories. I don’t mean to take them for granted, or to fill them in any 
essential manner. Rather, they are provisional constructs that get destabilized and 
mobilized in the debates and interactions that are the focus of my study.  
During my fieldwork I thought of each currency union as separate projects. I did 
so because this is how it was understood by many of my expert respondents. The 
scholarly analysis also segregates the two projects, not only because of their temporal and 
spatial difference, but because one came to be understood as an internal project and the 
other as external (with other member nations). The 1990 currency union entailed a social 
and economic union, followed by a formal political union. The European monetary union 
was limited to a currency union and the establishment of a European central bank 
comprised of national central banks to form what is termed the European system of 
central banks. The 1990 currency union is understood as a singular, exceptional event 
that marked the end of German division and the dissolution of the planned economy 
(socialism) in the GDR. Unification has predominantly been framed as a restoration of a 
prior unity, even if the status of sameness and difference has been a significant aspect of 
deliberations and identity politics in the post unification context. The European monetary 
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union, in its planning, inception, and negotiations had been underway long before 
unification could have been anticipated.   
Conceptual ambiguity is a fruitful mode of thinking with and against different 
notions of monetary value (and how these are understood as relating to some real, or even 
different perceptions of the real). More importantly, I draw on Hiro Miyazaki’s 
(Miyazaki 2013) insights about the conceptual ambiguity that emerges from the dual 
positions of arbitrage to consider how doubt and crises of reference might become the 
object of intense purification and justification practices in a context of hegemonic 
‘responsibility.’ My question is to what extent the conceptual and epistemological 
problems of unwinding the GDR economy, and the ethics and affective tensions attached 
to that (that it activated), explain the perpetual need to subject the socialist past to 
renewed symbolic and rhetorical dismissal and condemnation.   
 What is the link between German and European currency unions? Such a question 
is typically asked and answered as a historical question about political actors and policy 
decisions. Because the plans for the European Monetary Union were already underway, 
Unification seems at best an interruption or a propelling forward of what was already in 
motion. In this light, one of the “myths” as it is deemed by subscribers and skeptics alike 
is that Chancellor Kohl bargained for Unification by agreeing to the relinquishment of the 
D-Mark and the full commitment to proceeding with EMU. Whether true or not, its 
salience as an explanatory narrative for commenting on the state of things in Germany by 
differently situated actors is interesting. It joins a larger repertoire of sacrificial 
metaphors that seem to pop up in critiques of the euro in German media, and among the 
public.  
But is it possible to think of the interconnection and mutual constitution of these 
projects beyond particular empirical coordinates? Is it conceivable that the Germany 
currency union refracted back and even destabilized the European project underway? If 
key actors were negotiating European level decisions at the same time that they faced 
immense and unanticipated problems in efforts to privatize and reconfigure the East 
German economy, were the two logics always distinct in their categorical referents? 
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German Unification in 1990 ended the Cold War and propelled the European 
project of integration forward. The currency union that effectively joined Capitalist West 
and Socialist East German economies has been narrated as a singular event. Politically it 
signified Germany’s redemption and re-inclusion into the community of European 
nations. From an economic standpoint, the 1990 currency union is Unification’s most 
profound failure. The West German Mark embodied economic stability and a neutral 
substitute for a discredited national identity. East German desire for the Deutsch Mark 
served as a powerful recognition of the West German success story and its superior 
economic status. However, many in the West anticipated the introduction of the Deutsch 
Mark to the East would be a destructive force, since it exposed a closed economy to the 
world market “overnight.” The currency union set into motion an economic shock from 
which the East has not recovered, more than 20 years later. It erased the very basis 
through which a locally sustainable recovery would be possible. The 1:1 exchange rate of 
the German currency union has marked failure and success simultaneously. Different 
valuations of wages, pensions, and debts are the traces of these monetary conversions. As 
moral forms4 these continue to mark East and West German difference. Thus, the 
Deutsch Mark revalorized post-war German identity, but it also paradoxically repeated 
the history of monetary trauma for which it was the remedy.  
Only by tracking the remainders of translating an entire economy—from financial 
obligations of people-owned factories to bank deposits and wages—is it possible to 
examine how currency unions exceed any narrow accounting of some economic real. The 
German currency and economic union escapes celebratory and ambivalent 
commemorations alike. Precisely because a currency union must (temporarily) settle such 
accounts, it offers analytical insight into how differently positioned subjects exploit these 
gaps. Reading against the grain of technical definitions, I therefore theorize currency 
unions as ongoing rather than circumscribed events. In the following section I trace the 
gaps and silences in which currency shifts and material upheaval inform and also 
complicate their further iteration. 
                                                 
4
 Bill Maurer (2005) Mutual Life Limited: Islamic Banking, Alternative Currencies, Lateral 
Reason. Princeton: Princeton University Press.   
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Approaches to money and economy 
 
Attention to the ‘how’ or the pragmatics of money is crucial for opening up the 
‘black boxes’ of techniques, modalities, and practices that make and unmake money at a 
particular point in time, and at historical conjunctures.   
Anthropologists have urged for more attention to money’s pragmatics rather than 
its meaning (semiotics). For instance, Bill Maurer has pointed out that finance does not 
necessarily only or substantially draw on the logics of exchange or commensuration; it is 
not only about calculation. A payment, he argues, is different from exchange (2007: 129). 
Bill Maurer (Maurer 2002), Karen Ho (Ho 2012), and most recently, Janet Roitman argue 
that analyses of the instruments and professional worlds of financial institutions and 
practices must be studied ethnographically, not black-boxed as abstractions rendered 
powerful in their opaqueness and supposed complexity (Roitman 2014). For some, 
critique itself can pose a problem, a blind spot for understanding how institutions and 
techniques are used, understood, and reflexively produced by bankers, technocrats, legal 
analysts and policy-makers. This has led some anthropologists to align themselves quite 
closely with expert interlocutors in order to capture shared modalities of analysis and 
practice (Holmes 2014). Others have critically engaged the habitus of financial 
professionals from within the system to expose the shortsighted strategies of walls-street 
beliefs and practices, and to argue for a different morality of long-term financial 
sustainability. My approach is to apply the micro-political pragmatic approach to 
monetary relations of credit/debt and value to the macro-logics through which the euro is 
more commonly analyzed and narrated. 
The introduction of the euro in Germany and other member states was not simply 
a change in the designator of the currency. Nor was it merely that different banknotes and 
coins filled wallets and ATM machines, though as I will show, these material signs were 
important. Rather, the euro constituted a new set of relations around money. As a new 
material form it represents and also constitutes the promises and obligations that bind 
citizens within a particular ‘monetary’ territory and regime.  
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For many economists, money is simply a tool, a thing. For this reason it is often 
stated that money is a veil, masking underlying economic fundamentals (North 2007). As 
work across the social sciences has underscored, however, money is a social relation, a 
social construction.  That is, money can only serve as a meaningful medium of market 
exchange through the collective actions and beliefs of people who use it. It is also a 
regulatory and disciplining form of governing social and political life.   
Arguments about both currency unions make use of, and depend upon an 
opposition between the political and the economic. Often, this takes the form of playing 
one off the other to highlight either where error lies, or that some intent beyond the 
economic is at work. For instance, it may be claimed that a decision was a “political” 
necessity or grand accomplishment, but an “economic” disaster. More recently in what is 
sometimes called the euro crisis, it is argued that only political will is holding the 
incomplete or faulty “economic” architecture of the monetary union together. Thus, the 
political is often foregrounded to show why the economics either fail or are ignored. 
Conversely, it is often also argued that what makes good economic sense cannot find 
political acceptance or legitimacy. Thus, in my research I have tracked how these 
oppositions are deployed and to what ends rather than trying to dissolve these 
distinctions. Yet it is also clear that many arguments depend upon and leave unquestioned 
on what the distinctions of these categories depend, how precisely the boundaries are 
drawn. The deeper I seemed to probe, the more likely the distinctions dissolved and 
blurred in what seemed to be confusing contradictions.  
The 1990 currency union and the introduction of the euro are encompassing 
projects, which shape and impinge upon multiple domains of daily life. From consumer 
and banking practices to the crossing of borders, and ultimately faith and trust in new 
monetary entanglements of obligation, the introduction of the euro reaches into people’s 
lives in ways that exceed the changing of interest rates or ‘regulating’ the money supply 
(or inflation targeting). 
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Fieldwork 
 
I was often told that monetary policy is diffuse. It is something quite distant and 
far removed from micro-practices on the ground that could be traced back to or through 
it.  My concern, however, is not to connect the dots in such a way that the ontological 
status of these connections could be definitively known or empirically located. Rather, I 
wanted to consider how and to what effects dialogue about these seemingly diffuse scales 
and the claims made about their stability-maintaining properties became an integral part 
of legitimating the euro.   
People frequently commented that my status as neither West nor East German, as 
someone with an outside perspective, was appropriate to this study. In this way I wasn’t 
bound to a point of view merely by belonging to one or another. Ironically, this was even 
confirmed by a close friend in Frankfurt who caught a ride with an East German pastor, 
who was also a statistician. My friend recounted some the things I had shared with her 
about my project. The pastor confirmed these observations and was quite surprised that 
my friend was knowledgeable about this issues and felt comfortable discussing them. 
(July 1. 2008) 
In my interviews with research participants in Leipzig and other former eastern 
cities I visited, I was interested to learn about the post-unification experiences with 
changing forms of monetary relations of credit, debt, savings and investments. How did 
these experiences contrast with the technical and pragmatic experiences with money in 
the GDR? Details about the more mundane and boring aspects of money in the GDR 
have received little ethnographic attention. Other than to describe the special status of the 
West German mark and its various uses, socialist money is dismissed with the statement 
that money was not important in the GDR. Barter networks, connections, and access to 
western money and commodities were more important. Thus it is hard to imagine the 
modalities of payment, banking, and cash management in the GDR. Filling this gap is the 
historian Jonathan Zatlin’s careful analysis of monetary policy and ideology in the GDR 
(Zatlin 2007b). Drawing on a wide range of materials, from state documents to citizen 
petitions, the beliefs, practices, and contradictions surrounding the proper role of money 
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in the GDR come into view. Understandings of wealth and resource allocation are 
analyzed. However, a limitation of Zatlin’s approach is the use of western classical 
economic theory as the measure by which both internal and external contradictions of 
GDR money can be unpacked. Thus, it is harder to see the way in which socialist 
currency was part of the everyday and occupied its own logics and meanings just as the 
social meanings of money have been analyzed in western market contexts.   
“We have lived both systems.” This expresses a notion that the East German 
subject can critically evaluate from within both systems, whereas as West Germans have 
not needed to question what they take for granted. While not all my respondents would 
claim their GDR past as a basis for the critical analysis of the present, there is nonetheless 
as sense that the west became what it is by virtue of this externalized ‘other’ system. 
Most of my close friends and respondents in Frankfurt and Leipzig with whom I 
spent significant time were extremely conscious of their spending. Many had very limited 
incomes, or had to be cost-conscious because of financial obligations to children, or to 
family members. I did observe how those respondents who spent a majority of their youth 
or adulthood in the GDR relished the opportunity to invite friends to a modest dinner or 
coffee. In some homes I noticed that personal care items such as shampoo bottles and 
shower gels were carefully arranged as if on display. Daphne Berdahl described this 
practice from GDR times, when the containers of western products would be displayed as 
status markers. I was surprised to see that this practice continued. No longer a sign of 
status but perhaps a sign of care for ones’ home, and by extension, for one’s guests.  
The majority of my respondents viewed the German form of market economy to 
be different from that espoused and lived in the US. Moreover, American practices of 
indebtedness and speculation were seen with skepticism and disbelief. The former were 
sharply contrasted with German monetary values and practices, in both structural and 
ideational terms. For instance, defaulting on and surrendering a home with an underwater 
mortgage to avoid payment would not be possible in Germany as one is liable for the debt 
regardless of residence in the home. Moreover, most Germans consider themselves to be 
fairly conservative investors, if one has money to invest at all. Statistics show a high rate 
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of savings and a relatively low ratio of investments in the stock market, relative to US 
consumers.  
It is often the goal to separate out and differentiate statements about different 
currencies, and to assess the reliability of memory about monetary values in the past. 
Memory of prices in the past is strongly influenced by present experiences and concerns. 
One may not remember precise amounts, but instead ratios of value in the past relative to 
the present. If wages barely rise and yet the costs of goods and services increase more 
quickly relative to earnings, temporal shifts in value may be felt and reflected upon. They 
can create a sense of anxiety about the future and suggest that one had it better in the 
past.   
Scrutinizing context: Unpacking the value transformations of 1990 destabilized 
any presumption of this being a narrow technical matter. Instead it was layered down and 
weighted with history. First, I was asking respondents’ to reflect upon an economic 
‘event’ that occurred twenty years ago. As one interlocutor put it, it is the history of a 
history. What she meant by this is that what people remembered about this event would 
be multi-layered and informed by present concerns. It is thus not a ‘correct’ or accurate 
recovery of what people thought or did at the time. That said I do not approach it in terms 
that assume a correct answer can be given. Much of the debate is itself framed as if in 
retrospect, the answers are clear and what people say must be corrected to fit the 
consensus. What I want to show is that there is only a muted and ambivalent agreement 
about the ontology of value, its forms of conversion at the time, and the politics of 
revisiting it in the present.   
In many respects one could think of the currency union as the medium though 
which a kind of internal refugee status was created, a displacement from which and 
through which a new normality needed to be constituted. I did not want to begin with the 
official narratives, but instead understand how it came to be, and what forms of 
subjectivity and knowing naturalize it yet also destabilize it.    
My focus is decidedly unbalanced. This has something to do with the unbalanced 
nature of the economic processes I set out to understand and describe. My research in 
Frankfurt focused on the visitors’ center of the Bundesbank as the site from which to 
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pursue my study. In Leipzig, it was focused around local events and concerns but with an 
eye on collecting personal histories and reflections of the economic changes since 1990.  
This means that my ethnography is neither balanced nor representative of either the full 
scope of communications’ work at the Bundesbank, or in capturing all of the class and 
subject positions in west, east or unified Germany. What it does attempt to do, despite 
these limitations, is to particularize the abstract logics and meanings of currency union 
projects within a historically and politically layered process of coming to terms with the 
German past and a European future. The euro story provides the frame and context for 
revisiting the monetary project of 1990.  
Evaluation: my approach to the interviews I conducted with respondents about 
knowledge and experience of money in the GDR, and the changes during and after 1990 
was to view respondents as research participants and co-producers of knowledge. This 
was important to me given the way in which memories of, and statements about how 
things ‘really were’ in the GDR are subjected to relentless scrutiny in post-unification 
memory politics. While it is a matter of course to contrast what people say with 
alternative explanations and experiences, or to reflect upon what is displaced or left out, 
this mode of evaluation has, in my view, become a form of exclusion and dismissal in its 
own right. This means that the gap between past realities and present representations 
made by easterners are subjected to greater skepticism and critique than are similar forms 
of remembering of westerners. To give a sense of this logic: whereas in the latter one 
might be dealing with faulty memory, in the former it can be taken as a purposive re-
figuring of a past that never was. If easterners talk about a past when everyone had work, 
and where the economy of shortage was at least colored by a sense of greater 
interpersonal cohesion and warmth, such characterizations are deeply contested by those 
who believe to know the true nature of things and emphasize negative and coercive 
aspects of life and work in the GDR. Those who contest and dismiss positive memories 
of the GDR as nostalgia or worse can be western academics, politicians, and educators. 
Just as often easterners who wish to emphasize the injustices of the GDR state will be 
most critical of such forms of remembering the past. The counter-argument given—that 
there is injustice and inequality in the western system, just differently distributed, has 
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efficacy even if it seems to do little to overcome the impasse of acceptable forms of 
comparison. Whereas affirming experiences of equality in the GDR is seen as 
whitewashing an illiberal past, in the post-unification context it is formally guaranteed, 
yet always on the horizon of indeterminacy for many. The form and content of critique 
about ‘what is’ and ‘what should be’ is subjected to different criteria of evaluation when 
describing life in the GDR, and life in post-unification Germany.  
As the analyst, one is left in a double-bind: what is perhaps a productive mode of 
analyzing the ways in which experience mediates structures of inequality or asymmetry 
as in, for example, the resort to myth-making is itself a material practice the produces and 
elides salient realities. In the context of post-unification one is more likely to be caught in 
the cold war binary. The decision about what counts as a myth, then, is decidedly on the 
side of western democracy. This is also true of the modes of evaluating economy: 
whereas now economy is understood to be performative, in that the model does not 
describe but ‘makes’ the market, assessments of the planned economy proceed in terms 
of the binary of the ideal and the real; fact/fiction; illusion and reason. 
It is clearly problematic to remain caught within binaries such as these. Many 
analysts work instead to show how it is used and made culturally and politically 
meaningful by different subjects. It is in this sense that I retain the distinction, to 
understand how and under what terms it is used to validate or dismiss knowledge claims. 
The authority to make claims and statements on the economic ‘realities’ of the GDR, 
post-unification development or EU integration is not equally distributed. That is, when 
easterners use it, or try to counter it, in order to show the politics of economy in the 
modalities of the currency union, valuation, or re-construction, their authority may 
always already be subject to skepticism. Easterners, by default, would be more likely to 
be selective about the past, whereas westerners might simply be ‘forgetful.’ Forgetfulness 
is political and intentional for eastern subjects; for everyone else, it is biological. It was 
often made to seem that one did not need talk to easterners to understand how things were 
since westerners ‘knew better.’ Showing interest in the technical side of money, even if 
most respondents did not ascribe it importance in the GDR, nonetheless opened up the 
  27 
space to talk of 1990 and beyond the usual parameters ascribed to eastern memory work 
generally. 
 
Lessons of 1990 
Even with its many problems, unification and reconstruction have been posed as 
one-time event and set of obligations not to be repeated. From the beginning it was 
presented as a privilege and limited to the case of East Germans alone. In this way, it 
would not set a future precedent for claims that might be made on Germany. At the same 
time, however, the story of East German privilege, relative to their lives in the GDR and 
to the struggles other formerly socialist subjects had to endure erases the important ways 
in which ‘reform’ uncannily repeated problems of the past, and depended upon an 
internalized other—the GDR as second totalitarian state.  
What does it mean, pragmatically, to address material differences more broadly? 
Are these measures left to the timing of the market, or might more radical measures—as 
in 1990—be taken? What are the implications of such actions, economically but also for 
subjectivity? How do the logics of accounting necessarily pervade any pragmatic attempt 
to address inequalities in the present and over time? And how will different subjects 
narrate, rework, and authorize such attempts? Is difference merely reinstated and marked 
at the same time that the ultimate goal is for its disappearance? What is the meaning of 
solidarity in such projects and how is it enacted? Keith Hart argues that money is a 
memory bank. But I would like to argue that money also depends on a forgetting of its 
‘politics.’  
A currency union is thus an especially privileged site for excavating in the ruins 
and remainders of what later may emerge as a final and settled measure of value. A 
currency union acquires this apparently stable vision of value only by marking off its 
temporal agency as residing in a singular past moment. A conversion takes place, 
multiple equivalencies are worked out, and a “price” is settled. But the effects of currency 
unions, despite prescient predictions, are understood fully only in hindsight, their impact 
ongoing and long lasting even as they are rendered something “past.” A currency union is 
a synchronic act of translation—it takes a snapshot of an image of some economic real, 
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yet its causal effects reach back to the past while delimiting the future of economic 
possibility.  
Public responses to and critiques of the euro in Germany highlight similar traces 
of currency unions and their undecideability. The shift to the euro was ostensibly a mere 
conversion of equivalent monetary values. Yet this conversion also exposed a gap to 
many Germans. The conflation of the euro with rising prices, in literal terms the refrain 
euro-teuro (a word-play on the German words for euro and expensive), signals how the 
gap between buying and selling is both exploited and fails to signify the proper 
temporality of the market.5 Sellers used the gap to change prices of goods and services. 
Price increases were folded into and disguised by imprecise acts of reckoning. The old 
currency is maintained as a constant and meaningful measure of value in the present, 
even as its temporal “life” ended at the moment of “replacement.” Deutsch Mark prices 
are supposed to be fixed in a past moment, while the euro moves and flows with the 
contemporaneity of economic shifts in the present. Yet the gap between life with the 
Deutschmark and the economic present of the euro and its uncertain obligations indexes 
new failures of appearance in which the illusion of correspondence between the value of 
money and its ability to settle future obligations is called into question.   
At the same time, the gaps exposed by public critiques of the euro cover over and 
efface the violent reordering of the East German economy during the 1990 currency 
union by locating this unruly trace within the political failures of socialism.6 This is why 
the project of European economic integration stakes its claim on this dividing line 
                                                 
5
 The refrain of euro-teuro, which began only months after the introduction of euro notes and bills 
in 2002 and continues into the present, comprises another significant site through which my 
research unpacks the meanings and effects of currency unions. Until the current euro debt crisis, 
the euro-teuro discourse was perceived by Bundesbank communications staff as the most 
intractable and frustrating misrecognition of the benefits of the euro and its claims to stability.   
6
 See also Benjamin Robinson (2009). The Skin of the System: On Germany’s Socialist 
Modernity. Stanford University Press, p. 31:  “Capitalism, in principle as susceptible as socialism 
to the question of whether it is ‘the thing itself or its simulacrum,’ seems to be free of demon 
doubles. Never a ghost for itself, never suspected of being only a simulacrum of capitalism, really 
existing capitalism is now no longer haunted by a rival either. Spectral nonidentity turns out to 
have been a terminal problem only for real socialism, which was always its own scariest ghost. 
While the stake through socialism’s undead heart sent it firmly to the grave, for capitalism it 
meant only that its gaze in the mirror revealed a fleshier and more robust self.”  
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between the political and the economic, displacing economic failure within the realm of 
the political. Currency unions, especially that of German unification, but also European 
monetary union, might therefore be thought of productively as signaling an arising of this 
split between the economic and the political upon which ideologies of monetary stability 
depend. For competing West and East German States, economy displaced nation in 
signifying the proper German identity after the Holocaust. In Germany, the economy has 
come to signify what politics no longer can. For Germans, economic stability is the 
salient utopia,7 one that depends upon a stark separation of economics and politics, upon 
independent central banks, upon stable currency. But the ideology of political 
independence depends upon what is unsaid, what can’t be said. Independence and 
transparency can’t banish the politics of economy. 
 
Plan of Chapters 
Chapter 2 is an ethnographic exploration of the communications work of the 
Bundesbank in Frankfurt and in Leipzig. The key field site is the visitor’s center, 
Geldmuseum. Seminars, public talks, interactive tours and open-door events in both cities 
offered other venues through which I could also consider how eastern and western 
histories and concerns inflected this work. My focus here is the euro, but I also re-visit 
the Bundesbank’s role in, and understandings of the 1990 currency union. 
Chapter 3 proceeds in two parts. First, I explore the ways in which the euro single 
currency is both integral to, but also interrupts the stability claims in which its EU 
guardians seek to ground it. I show how the link between the euro and rising prices, as 
well as daily practices of reckoning back in time between euro and D-Mark require new 
forms of legitimizing the meanings of money in the EU. Second, I unpack grass-roots 
practices of direct democracy that engage with market and technocratic forms of 
expertise. Specifically I show how referenda on the sale of the public works in Leipzig 
and the 2008 Lisbon Treaty referendum generate intense forms of making the politics of 
the EU tangible. I highlight the specific forms of reasoning and practices of making sense 
of the EU that intersect with the lives and concerns of respondents in Leipzig and Dublin.  
                                                 
7
 As Gustav Peebles notes, all monetary projects are inherently utopian. Ibid. Pp. 19-38.    
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In chapters 4, 5 and 6 I unpack key events and problem-spaces that inform how 
the end of the GDR, the 1990 currency union, and unification between West and East 
Germany has been remembered and represented. Specifically, I show the politics through 
which unification has been narrated as a particular monetary event. Chapter 4 contrasts 
the narrations of two experts directly involved in the technical practices surrounding the 
1990 currency union. Through the parallel and contrasting views of a western economist 
from the Treuhand (Privatization Trust Agency) and an East German banker ‘in two 
systems’ the politics of the 1990 currency union come into view as site of critique 
reworked in the present. In Chapters 5 and 6 I unpack interviews and ethnographic 
moments to render visceral the way in which differently situated subjects narrate their 
experience of the currency union and its social, political and economic entanglements in 
the present. I read with and against different sources through which the problems of 
monetary and economic value might re-appear as contingent—a site of struggle and 
redefinition. I argue that the inclusion of East Germans into the currency regime of the 
Deutsch Mark displaced the link between currency and ‘state’ identity to other forms of 
boundary making and inscription such as financial transfers and competing measures of 
monetary value (Berdahl 1999; Cattelino 2008; Peebles 2011). Financial transfers 
between west and eastern German regions become the contested measure of marking the 
moral logics of payments, and the assessment of “real” economic value these entail. 
These are also salient sites of negotiation in the recent euro crisis.  
In chapters 7 and 8 I connect the sites and problem-spaces of the dissertation, 
from reading across the binary of socialism and capitalism to the euro debt crisis that has 
drawn increasing attention since 2009, beginning with the sovereign bond debt problems 
of Greece. I show how debates in Germany about the meaning and obligations of 
financial measures to unify West and East German economies after 1990 share certain 
logics in common with current public uncertainties about European economic integration. 
To highlight these interconnections I draw parallels between German representations of 
Greece in the debt crisis and those of East German regions after 1990. Revisiting the 
German experience thus illuminates how a shared currency shifts the logics and symbolic 
media through which subjects make sense of complex monetary interconnections.
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Chapter 2: 
Re-membering stable money in the age of the euro 
 
Introduction: Financial Literacies, material monies 
 
I take the underground (U-Bahn) from Frankfurt Zoo, change at Hauptwache, and 
arrive at the stop Dornbusch. From here it is about a ten-minute walk to the Geldmuseum 
der Deutschen Bundesbank. This journey was brief in contrast to the three and a half hour 
train trip I also made at other times during my fieldwork from Leipzig to Frankfurt to 
reach the Geldmuseum in time for a special evening event or the opportunity to conduct 
an interview planned long in advance. Whether the journey was brief or long, I would 
anticipate each visit with a knot in my stomach, but also with a sense of curiosity about 
the potential new insights and encounters I grew ever more certain to have. (Holmes and 
Marcus 2005) 
The Visitor’s Center or Geldmuseum of the German Central Bank must be 
situated within the changing sovereignty of the Bundesbank, now part of the European 
System of Central Banks. Explaining the euro through the visitor’s center was part of a 
changing landscape of monetary authority and credibility. Though its creators sometimes 
asserted the center was created independently of the euro, other staff members hinted at 
the ways in which it would anticipate the advent of the euro, and the questions that might 
arise on the part of the public. The Geldmuseum is a site of production as much as it is 
also consumed. This site is at the heart of battles about the role of monetary policy and 
the democratic possibilities of the public. Just as the mother creates a pedagogical 
environment for the child,8 with life consequences, so, too, does this open space of the 
central bank create a different and necessary interface with its “publics.”   
The Geldmuseum materializes the tensions of money’s (im)material body. The 
freedom of money is both confined and let loose in this space. That is, as both museum 
                                                 
8
 Here I allude to the gendered reference of the central bank as female/Mother (Mutter 
Zenrtalbank), the State as male/Father (Vater Staat), in some German narrative colloquial 
traditions of personifying these institutions.  This metaphor was also referenced in one interactive 
program at the center.   
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that showcases money’s concrete presences, and interactive center that tries to capture 
money’s fast-paced virtual presence and temporalities, the site opens itself up to the 
constantly moving but also inert qualities of money. The traditional or “primitive” forms 
of money lend themselves better to narrative possibilities and concrete engagements than 
does the abstract and technical relationships explained in the monetary policy and theory 
part of the center. This construction shapes how both guides and visitors use and 
experience the site. Money’s objects capture the imagination, whether past or present.  
The museum side is not limited to the pastness of money but points to modern paper 
currency and coin as an important artifact of money’s modern form. Money’s hardness 
and concreteness is still fragile and is subject to conceptions of value that lie within and 
outside its’ body. For instance, the Hyperinflation is the most pronounced story of crisis 
presented in the Geldmuseum, with a leaning wall, emergency money (Notgeld), and 
documentary footage materializing in no uncertain terms the fragility of paper money’s 
efficacy as medium of exchange, unit of account, and store of value. Whether money has 
an inherent value, or maintains an accepted value through the institutions that guarantee 
its legitimacy, money speaks for itself, but its speech is always limited and contingent.   
This site is fraught with the politics of money even if it poses that politics outside 
its walls. Money is moving in the background, but often a silent actor.  How does one 
make it show itself? The German word for monetary policy is “Geldpolitik” (money 
politics). The name includes what it also attempts to exclude. It is a technical politics, but 
the “political” is decided elsewhere. This space has the mandate of making central bank 
practices more transparent; at the same time, however, there is little freedom for staff 
members to define what that transparency is or to shape the politics of representation in 
that space. The informal conversation of ethnography is thus not tangential but indeed 
enabling of transparency—and in so doing uncovers the central tension of managing 
financial space in the present.   
I came to view it as a public space that far exceeds its appearance as a ‘museum’ 
or more aptly, a visitor’s center, as it is termed by many inside the Bundesbank. With the 
advent of the European Central Bank, located not so far away at a far flashier location in 
the city center, observers and commentators often say that this once dominant institution 
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is diminished in importance and influence. Bundesbank specialists with whom I worked 
expressed a reflective anxiety about this changed status. In many respects, however, this 
sensibility spurred concerted attention to translating the core values and concerns of the 
institution to the new euro currency. Durable meanings of stable money and central bank 
independence re-signified the euro as ‘just as stable as the D-Mark.’ This was so even if 
many felt the euro-project to be a political endeavor in tension with the monetary 
epistemologies long cultivated at the Bank.  
This chapter details and unpacks the communications work of the Bundesbank in 
building legitimacy for the euro and awareness of monetary more broadly. I show how 
the mundane and the arcane aspects of what central banks do forms a site of tension and 
interconnection with a diverse ‘public.’ My analysis is grounded in the questions and 
concerns of my project, which in many respects was aligned with those of my ‘expert’ 
interlocutors, but in others, was informed by an ‘outside’ perspective of critical query 
about the impact of monetary ideas and policies that exceed narratives about it. It is based 
on research over a period of several years (2006-1009), which included interviews and 
participant observation of daily activities in the public space of the center as well as 
official presentations and events.  
In the analysis below, I will highlight key themes and concerns that formed a 
thread across the time and space of my work here. For reasons of space and clarity, I will 
focus on the perspectives of communications specialists in how they understand and 
delineate the aims of producing a culture of monetary stability. In the following chapter, I 
will include more detailed examples and ethnographic vignettes of visitor interactions 
and dialogues. What I wish to highlight here is how the introduction of the euro 
facilitated new forms of communication that sought to re-inscribe the authority and 
legitimacy of the national central bank as the guarantor and executor of the euro project. 
In that role, the German history of monetary crises and stability serves as a crucial frame 
for highlighting difference and uniformity with national political and European-level 
aims of the euro. The materiality of banknotes and the technical aspects of managing the 
money infrastructure are an integral part of these efforts. They are also a form of 
managing histories: some remembered strategically, and others forgotten.  
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By approaching this work at the intersection between ‘experts’ (institutional 
insiders) and the ‘public’ (broadly conceived), my subject-position as researcher was a 
liminal one. This is because I felt my own role to be further away from the ‘expert 
colleague’ position adopted by other anthropologists of financial institutions. I did not 
come to the project with prior training in the field of economics or monetary policy. But 
as someone with a theater and communications background, and as a social scientist, I 
felt my work to be para-ethnographic (Holmes 2014; Holmes 2006). At the same time, 
because of my distance to this expertise and because I was closer to the subject-position 
of the visitor (the public), my interlocutors at the bank often viewed me as such. 
 In my approach to understanding the role of expertise and professional practice I 
have been inspired and informed by the work of anthropologists ‘studying up’ and 
‘sideways.’ In her research with Wall Street investment bankers on insider professional 
understandings and practices of shareholder value, Karen Ho (Ho 2009) analyzed the 
contradictory forms through which these assumptions have been mapped on to the ‘real 
economy’ in expectations of corporate performance or the presumed profitability of 
down-sizing the work-force. By working within the institutional setting professionally 
and ethnographically, she was able to show the centrality of institutional financial 
cultural practices and habitus to producing what are presumed to be ‘abstract global 
forces’ outside culture. In parallel, the work of anthropologists Annelise Riles (Riles 
2006), Hiro Miyazaki (Miyazaki 2013), Caitlin Zaloom (Zaloom 2003), and Bill Maurer 
(Maurer 2005) have shown in different registers the ways in which numbers, financial 
techniques, and payment systems ‘do work’ beyond the calculative and technical claims 
made about them. Interpretive, affective and epistemological concerns are inseparable 
from these presumed ‘objective’ abstract forms that make up the material financial 
landscape of modern economies. Dominic Boyer (Boyer 2008) has insightfully written 
about the emotional stakes of transgressing disciplinary boundaries in the study of experts 
noting an uncanny doubling of one’s own analytical endeavor (2008: 41). There is 
familiarity and discomfort at imposing on another ‘disciplinary’ jurisdiction and feeling 
compelled to absorb it into one’s own. In my research this has been a constant and 
persistent worry and potential. Moreover, he suggests that one treat experts not simply as 
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rational, but as ‘human-subjects’ with fantasies, desires, and anxieties. Anthropologists, 
such as Hiro Miyazaki (also mentioned by Boyer) confront the limit or end point of one’s 
epistemic models (41) or the anxious recognition of the limits of technocratic knowledge 
(Riles 2006) and the interpretive emotion surrounding numbers and yield curves (Zaloom 
2009).  
I have struggled mightily with speaking to these dimensions of my own field 
research given the many limits placed on me by my respondents at the Bundesbank. The 
performance of rational neutrality is sacrosanct, even if communications work does leave 
room for humor and creative explanations. Ultimately, though, and underlying all of this 
was desire and doubt, conviction and uncertainty, about the very project I was aiming to 
understand—the euro—and the entangled histories of money, post-war recovery, 
unification, and the shifting landscape of European monetary integration. In this light, it 
is possible to highlight those fragile sites and moments upon which the performance of 
certainty and transparency depend. Money is such a site of exploration and an object that 
gathers together hopes, disappointments and necessary illusions. If I shift between the 
pragmatic and performative registers in which I came to know this work and became a 
subject of it—with all of its anxious and desiring undercurrents—it is one that I show to 
highlight how money is also a subject of self-splitting. That is, dwelling on money and 
monetary topics long enough, it is as if one becomes an object to oneself. Money mirrors 
those sites of tension and hope that keep the system suspended, and which can just as 
easily fall apart.  
I show some of the fault-lines produced and covered over by the political and 
economic strands of a European stability culture. From the point of view of the particular 
histories in Germany of the Bundesbank and the desire for stable money, it is possible to 
see how monetary stability is distinguished from but dissolves into the politics of 
unifying monetary projects. The technical work of separating currency from politics is 
both comforting and spectral. The ‘science’ of money is a form of keeping the past at 
bay. Monetary obligations inhere in projects that promise stable financial futures. 
Precisely because of money’s potential for unity and difference, the ideology of monetary 
stability depends upon the careful management of and accounting for the past.  
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Designing Monetary Pedagogies 
 
The stability culture of the Bundesbank has been praised and critiqued. It is 
legitimized in part on the German history of financial crises, most centrally the 1920’s 
Hyperinflation. Some have questioned whether or not the general public ascribes to this, 
with one author arguing that unemployment is perceived to be of more import. Given that 
the Bundesbank (and now the ECB) view their mandate as ensuring price stability rather 
than directing monetary policy at employment and other economic factors, this is an 
important point.  
Spectacular histories of monetary disorder and financial crises are inextricably 
tied to the horrors and traumas of German history. New identities took shape in the 
‘economic’ form left open to be filled with new meaning attached to post-war economic 
success symbolized by the D-Mark. It would be difficult to exaggerate the importance of 
the 1923 Hyperinflation as the dominant ideology of this institution. Indeed, in the 
opening words by then Bundesbank President Axel Weber to the 100 page visitors’ 
guide, it is noted that the nominal value of the highest domination bill in Germany was an 
astounding ‘one hundred billion’ (2005). This time of hyperinflation, it is underscored, 
was “felt on the body’ and testifies to the devastating effects of monetary devaluation.  
As one of the Geldmuseum designers, Dr. E. expressed this: 
 
E: The 1923 Hyperinflation wiped out the middle class such as lawyers. With the 
inflation they were completely impoverished. And then deflation and the world 
depression led to the Nazis, the destruction of society. Economic crises have 
imprinted themselves on us and we are shaped by these experiences of monetary 
devaluation. But this understanding does not fall from the heavens and will not 
last forever. We must continually work to maintain this understanding. How 
should I say it, for our clients—the public—we must win their interest. This is our 
task, and we will do our best—but they must participate. Politics must support 
this aim. You, Frau Dalinghaus, must also get involved. 
 
A central theme throughout the center-exhibits and accompanying narratives is 
that of the multiple functions of money—as unit of account, medium of exchange and 
payment, and store of value. The monetary disorders of German and indeed global 
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history conveyed in the center show the social impact of what occurs when money looses 
any of these critical features. These ‘functions’ might be thought to express something of 
the daily experience of money. Some features stand out while others are un-reflected. If 
individual experiences of financial crises are highly varied and lacking coherence it is 
often because moments of uncertainty highlight one aspect in particular. For others it may 
be felt as a complete unraveling of what only yesterday seemed certain and taken for 
granted. As one of my interlocutors expressed it: ‘people have money in their hands 
almost every day, but they don’t know what it is, what stands behind it, or how it 
connects to other economic processes.’ German history is felt to offer the concrete 
lessons of what may otherwise be taken for granted.  
A further distinguishing feature of the monetary philosophy that explains the 
importance of the central bank and in particular, the Bundesbank’s foundational approach 
to monetary policy is the motto: only scarce money is good money. This has traditionally 
been the task of modern money management through which central banks legitimize their 
existence. In an era of paper fiat money, scientific management of the money circulating 
in the economy relative to goods is crucial for preventing inflation or deflation, and 
protecting the value or money from political manipulation (such as governments 
financing unsustainable deficits). The latter practices are part of the histories already 
mentioned. Democracy is preserved, it is thought, in that money is made separate from 
political agendas with short-term goals and unrealistic promises. The work of the central 
bank, so it is seen by insiders, has a longer horizon and assumes the effectiveness of its 
policies will always be ‘delayed.’ Stable money and stable prices are a public good for 
which the Bundesbank claims credit through the success story of the D-Mark. Now it is 
the task to achieve the same with the euro.   
As much as the institution shares the commitment to the new European monetary 
order, it poses immense conceptual and pragmatic challenges for communicating the 
work of monetary policy given the ‘experimental’ and unprecedented scale of linking 17 
economies to one currency. As one colleague explained this: 
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“There are often great misgivings about the new member states who are joining. 
They are worlds apart. It is hard to explain that each of these countries will have 
one voice (one vote) at the European Central Bank governing council board as 
Germany. There is a lot of skepticism that the votes of states with small 
economies will bear the same weight as Germany, with its strong economy. It is 
hard to imagine that we will not be at a disadvantage even if Germany’s exports 
have profited since the introduction of the euro. ‘One vote’ is a hard concept for 
people to comprehend about the organization of the European system of national 
central banks. 
 
I would argue that the labor of explaining and grounding the continued legitimacy of the 
Bundesbank in these terms has been a crucial means of storing up credibility for moments 
of crisis such as those that now raise questions about the future of the euro.   
The euro, as a currency and monetary instrument, is viewed in economic theory as 
largely valueless or virtual  (that is, the euro is money just like the dollar is money). The 
efficacy of the euro must therefore also be concretized as a particular quality of belonging 
and interconnection within the euro-zone. Thus, the quality of euro coins and bills plays a 
prominent role in public relations work. Explaining the security features of bank notes 
and coins and illustrating the difference between legal and counterfeit exemplars is 
important in larger efforts to win legitimacy for the euro among the public. Where many 
analyses emphasize money’s efficacy as empty form, my fieldwork demonstrates how the 
particularity of money (of currency) is part of this efficacy. While particularity is not 
always and everywhere central, I argue that in Germany, money’s physical being as 
currency—as coins and bills—is inseparable from money’s efficacy as monetary 
instrument more generally. Though far distant in time, the hyperinflation of the 1930’s 
has left visceral traces, even if individuals did not experience this time personally. As 
institutional memory, money’s concrete form matters in spite of dominant understandings 
that monetary policy is primarily concerned with quantity and velocity, the relationship 
of money supply and price.    
I learned there was great public interest in understanding the monetary ideas 
behind the euro and the work of central banks. Interest was not limited to specialists or 
students; a broad spectrum of visitors, including local residents who returned regularly, 
comprised a very diverse audience. Interactive media, exhibits, guided tours, and the 
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publically accessible library formed a crucial venue for visitors to conceptualize some of 
the key theories and practices of monetary policy that have informed the German 
experience of money, and the euro specifically. Workshops and lectures provided student 
and professional groups a detailed introduction to the techniques and infrastructures of 
central banking. In particular, by following the work of communication specialists 
(Betreuer/in) working directly with these diverse audiences, I grasped the challenges and 
significance of creating an open public space within the central bank for encountering the 
euro. Through interviews and observations I was continually amazed at the ways in 
which visitors identified different points of departure for building understandings of the 
euro project and forming questions about it. 
I was also interested in the nature of the concerns people expressed about the 
euro, and how institutions like the Bundesbank addressed these. For instance, I observed 
how public critiques of the euro often took the form of the well-known complaint about 
rising prices associated with the introduction of the euro, or ‘euro teuro’ (a word-play 
combining euro with the German expression for ‘expensive’). As an anthropologist, I 
considered the cultural and economic factors that informed this experience of the euro in 
its early days as a circulating currency. The fact that the public had different ways of 
reading the euro could also be understood as part of a longer process of making and re-
making the currency as part of the everyday in Europe. But it also exemplified the kind of 
opening up of the knowledge practices that inform the monetary policy governing the 
euro. While a statistical answer invoking the harmonized price index did not satisfy 
everyone, it nonetheless suggested how the key mandate of the central bank, ensuring 
price stability, connected to consumption practices across member states. Over time, 
institutional responses showed flexibility by giving greater space to the ‘felt inflation’ of 
individual consumers, showing how experiences that fall outside an index also contribute 
to broader developments and are taken seriously. 
Importantly, however, the communications work with the public must also be 
placed within the context of institutional mandates and the special history of the 
Bundesbank, known for its independence and Sachlichkeit (empirical reporting). Public 
requests for commentary on the latest developments of the US-financial crisis 
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(dominating news at the time of my research) were sometimes in tension with the goal of 
providing an accessible and timely, yet analytically sound explanation of rapid changes in 
the markets. Thus, interactions with the public carefully bridged the gap between the real 
time of journalistic reporting and the institutional time of analysis. Moreover, this can be 
understood as an important source of authority through which trust is maintained, a point 
not lost on many visitors.  
 
Conceptualizations: Prof. L, a specialist of economics and history, was the 
driving force behind the idea, conceptualization and development of the visitors’ center 
project. His former doctoral advisee, Dr. E., worked collaboratively on conceptualization 
and design. Many other actors and entities, public and private, in and outside the bank, 
were involved in bringing the center into being. According to Prof. L., the project 
developed gradually. It was the collective work of many in the bank, but it could also be 
met with resistance and indifference within the bank. He recalls how then president of the 
Bundesbank, Hans Tietmeyer, grumbled and complained behind the scenes, often 
creating obstacles rather than providing support. But at the official opening Tietmeyer 
along with others professed unambiguous praise and took credit for making the center 
possible.  
The impetus for developing and expanding new forms of communication between 
central banks and the public is part of a larger institutional shift beginning in the early 
90’s that corresponded to new techniques of monetary policy (Holmes 2014; Holmes 
2006). In conjunction with, but also displacing measures that target money supply and the 
setting of interest rates, the practice of inflation targeting was adopted. As Douglas 
Holmes has described it, inflation targeting aims to enlist the public in the effort to shape 
expectations over the medium term with regard to inflation, price movements, and 
saving/investment planning. By evaluating and making transparent the measures that 
capture but also exceed what can be known about market developments occurring in real 
time, central banks employ what Holmes calls “an economy of words.” These are public 
statements that evaluate and perform as much as they interpret numbers and project how 
the effectivity of monetary policy can be understood to work with a temporal delay. Thus, 
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central banks respond to and co-constitute market actors’ expectations. Because such 
expectations shape how central banks design monetary policy, emphasis on transparency 
and a ground-level, ethnographic’ approach to how actors are reading and making the 
market is crucial, according to Holmes.     
But in the context of the European single currency, there is another critical 
dimension of this communication that seeks to re-work the past in terms of the present 
and future. In Germany, and in Europe broadly, monetary policy depends as much upon 
the durability and credibility of the single currency as it does on virtual economic 
indicators. New forms of thinking the relationship between money and the state depend 
upon the trust in a system of central banks that guarantees one currency and one 
monetary policy for multiple (and different) economies within the euro zone.  
 From the point of view of monetary experts, the ordinary ‘foot folk,’ the general 
public’ was traditionally seen as both uninterested and far-removed from the matters of 
monetary governance. Though the collective actions of market participants have never 
been irrelevant to policy makers, their conscious participation in and awareness of 
monetary policy has only recently become the focus of expert concerns and visions. The 
effectivity of monetary policy depends more and more, it is thought, on the public’s 
understanding and acceptance of central bank decisions.   
 In an unpublished speech given to central bankers in Riga, Prof. L. defines three 
main target groups that central bank communications work aims to address: policy-
making institutions, financial markets and – everyone else, i.e. the general public” 9 
Many avenues, including monthly reports, communiqués, and a web-site presence are 
available to the first two groups. The former groups require information necessary for 
setting wage policies or intervening in financial markets. In contrast, the visitors’ center 
is designed to reach the broad public as its primary audience. Though limited in scope 
due to its accessibility (who can visit), it can reach a part of the public that is less likely to 
make use of the other tools available, or to find them necessary for their private 
household planning. As Prof. L. also explains, the kind of information most important for 
a general audience concerns the conditions for stable prices in the near future.  
                                                 
9
 Prof. Dr. Dieter Lindenlaub, 2005, speech for the central bank in Riga 
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 The public should be convinced of the correctness and plausibility of policy 
decisions. This is especially important when price developments do not correspond to 
central bank projections and when interest rates must be set or measures taken that do not 
address and may even worsen other economic factors such as employment. The public 
must be persuaded to understand why particular sacrifices are necessary for policy 
measures to take hold. Moreover, and most importantly, the central bank is independent. 
Political institutions and other financial institutions and actors also make decisions that 
affect economic processes such as unemployment or external shocks due to rising oil 
prices. The Central bank must show direct intervention in broader economic imbalances 
that fall outside its mandate or ability to act. Monetary policy can work towards price 
stability, but it is not the only influence on price developments, exchange rates or 
inflationary pressures. With the introduction of the euro, therefore, and the public linkage 
of the new currency with rising prices precisely this kind of labor was required. While for 
the broad public the euro currency could easily become the lightening rod of critique, the 
communications work of the bank aimed at showing other interconnections to explain the 
relationship between prices and market forces.   
 Public expectations about rising prices or currency instability shape labor market 
negotiations for wage increases or resistance to other structural reforms seen as essential 
to maintaining competitiveness. In the German context, coordination between monetary 
policy, government and unions has traditionally worked toward building acceptance for 
painful reforms for broad economic goals. The independence of central banks requires a 
concomitant “duty of accountability to the public.  It is the price of independence, but is 
also its guarantor”. This is essential to authorizing its special status in relation to the state.   
 Monetary policy is something grasped in the long term. Its impact is rarely felt 
immediately. Retrospectively and at a distance, the cause-and-effect relationships may be 
discerned but are never certain. For this reason a pedagogy of monetary policy would 
provide a frame of imagination to view economic developments at a distance, and as part 
of an interconnected ‘whole’. To facilitate a mode of evaluation, therefore, that might 
patiently reserve judgment in the present for a future contingent is part of the work of 
producing different horizons of expectation. Success of a particular monetary policy can 
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only be viewed with a proper orientation. Communications work, especially the form 
available concretely and viscerally at the visitors’ center, can suggest such an orientation.  
 
“…monetary aggregates, credit volume, exchange rates, growth, international 
interest rate differentials, import prices or wages, it is simply not enough. These 
data do not allow an opinion to be formed if the observer cannot structure them. 
Numbers are not self-explanatory. The observer needs a theoretical spotlight or 
framework of reference to be able to interpret the data. The central bank must 
provide this framework of reference by announcing its monetary policy strategy. 
This strategy tells the observer to what extent the stated variables are indicators of 
future price developments and therefore suitable for the orientation of monetary 
policy measures, and whether the aspired goal can be expected to be reached on the 
basis of the measures taken (especially interest rate decisions)” (2005). 
 
 Fiscal, wage, tax policy all can influence and impinge upon the stated goals of 
monetary management. Prof. L. argues that one aspect neglected in the scholarly 
literature (at that time) which is central, and I would add, illuminates a particularly 
German stance toward money as a ‘public good’ is the importance of monetary/price 
stability measured over a longer period of time (medium term). Policies aimed at 
ensuring that prices remain stable may in the short term have problematic effects (or seen 
to be ineffective in a present moment of asymmetry). Thus, according to the philosophy 
of price stability as it has been grounded in Germany’s own experiences of monetary 
disorder, the work of monetary policy is social insofar as it secures long-term growth and 
prevents inflationary as well as deflationary pressures. 
 
“Deflation…leads to a wait-and-see attitude and thus curbs consumption, output 
and investment, while inflation obscures the signals which prices normally give 
market participants in their search for those employment and production 
possibilities offering the highest yield; it curtails investment and employment, 
destroys assets and the capital market and harms, above all, average citizens who 
are inexperienced in financial matters and cannot react to the inflation situation in 
good time” (2006) 
 
 Transparency and effective communication about Central Bank policies secure the 
basis for the continued existence and independence of the central bank. It has an 
  44 
“information advantage” that should be made accessible to the public. But this advantage 
is not one to be used in providing investment advice or financial consulting services. 
There is thus a clear distinction between the form of communication appropriate to a 
central bank, in contradistinction to that provided by commercial banks and other 
financial institutions. The work of the central bank is distinct and separate not only from 
the ‘state but also the financial market place. This distinction is carefully emphasized in 
presentations at the bank even if it is also clear that that the setting of interest rates and 
interbank lending and reserves facilitates and influences financial stability and the 
commercial activities of commercial banks (the latter notably for the good or the harm of 
public interests).  
 The public may wish for investment strategies or other financial advice. 
Hypothetical questions, such as about how to prepare for inflation and which assets such 
as gold or other investment vehicles are ‘safe bets’ should not be encouraged, and indeed 
are carefully resisted and deflected in interactions with visitors and the public. For staff-
members interacting most closely with individuals and visitor groups, responding to 
questions like these is an art form as much as a hedge against misunderstandings. Any 
statement staff members make might be wrongly perceived as an official opinion of the 
Bundesbank. The message most strongly communicated about inflation or deflation, for 
example, is that monetary policy should work to ensure that changes in monetary value 
are not distributed unfairly across society, or imposed upon future generations. Given that 
currency reforms to address such monetary disorder in the German experience did indeed 
produce ‘winners’ and ‘losers,’ ensuring that such phenomenon are prevented in the first 
place is presented as a form of ensuring social equity. If monetary policy is effective, in 
other words, people will not be in a position of anticipating catastrophe (and therefore 
benefitting from privileged inside information).  
 In moments of crisis, though, the central bank may very well make decisions 
without first notifying the public. Past history, as well as recent events in Cyprus in 2013, 
where a bank bail-in and capital controls effectively imposed losses across the social 
body and immobilized money and people, suggests how moments of exception, in which 
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information is kept from the public, challenges the sincere aims of central bank 
transparency.  
 The ECB has a two-tiered strategy (monetary indicators and inflation targeting.  
The appropriateness of monetary policy measures in addressing economic problems is 
subject to contestation. Given that central banks have a legal statute that guarantees its 
independence, but are not democratically legitimated, i.e. board members cannot be voted 
out of office, it is therefore crucial to win stability and trust. Credibility is based just as 
much on an explanation of alternative options as it is on persuading about the measures 
taken.   
 Presentation of fundamental issues, especially those such as the importance of 
stable money (and what happens when this is not the case) informs what the center 
privileges in its presentation. Historical examples serve an important empirical and 
historical purpose in showing how monetary policy has been used (and misused in the 
past), how social conflicts have produced and been shaped by monetary instability or 
particular policy decisions. Prof. L. explains that history should inform the thematic and 
theoretical presentation rather than as chronology. These “spotlights’ can inform and 
illuminate the monetary policy of the present. Current affairs should be presented in such 
a way that visitors can form their own opinions. How do factors like unit labor costs or 
GDP interact with monetary policy decisions such as the raising of interest rates, for 
example?  
  Different views and explanations should be allowed. It should not be perceived as 
an ideological endeavor to “deceive the public.” Numismatic collections are important 
and act as a draw on visitors’ interests and attentions. But coins and paper money do not 
speak for themselves. For Prof. L. it is important to convey a sense of what stands behind 
forms of money and monetary tokens. Conveying the monetary and economic decisions 
that shaped and informed their use, circulation and governance can show something 
essential about the historical and economic processes and events in which they were 
embedded and made possible. For instance, the silver or gold content of coins would be 
decreased to change or manipulate the value of the currency, just as the emergency 
money of the Hyperinflation illustrates how official money lost its essential functions and 
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therefore required a substitute. “The correlations, which make consideration of the 
monetary tokens relevant to monetary policy, are not self-revealing; rather, the links to 
monetary policy, which make the illustrative nature of the monetary tokens clear, always 
have to be established first” (2006).  
 Updating exhibits to address current and fast changing developments is a cost-
intensive and practical challenge. Moreover, visitors have a limited ability to absorb and 
process difficult and abstract content that characterizes monetary theory, history, and 
policy. Thus interactive media, compact and illustrative as well as entertaining forms of 
explanation serve an important role in making ideas accessible. National Central banks 
are charged with communicating with the public about the European system of central 
banks, its policies, and about the single currency. Specific national histories can make 
this new project tangible and generate support for the project.  
 Dr. E. once expressed the ideal theoretical concerns described above in 
professional, affect-rich terms to me as follows, crucially intersecting with the shift in 
stance described by Douglas Holmes in how central banks conceive new communicative 
forms. But in contrast to a uniformly communicable form suggested by Holmes, my 
interlocutors suggest how historical legacies shape and are transformed by broader 
developments that acquire a special visibility in the physical and conceptual space of 
visitors’ centers specifically:  
 
We were one of the most important banks in the world. We used to set the interest 
rates, hold people at a distance. There was a colossal change not just because of the 
founding of the ECB and the monetary union, but also because times have changed.  
Just to describe, I have been here in the bank (im Haus)—my father worked for 40 
years at the Bundesbank, I grew up here. I worked here already when I was a 
student (Schüler). In the 70’s when the Bundesbank gave an estimate, a press 
notice, the indebtedness of the public budgets will rise 1.5 points, the next day it 
was printed in the Wall Street Journal, the Bundesbank says…Then the 80’s came 
and there was a shift toward a more academic approach. These societal changes, 
from the academic approach to democratization have made society more 
democratic, as I see it, and less authoritative. Today you have to legitimize, explain, 
and give justification for your models. You have to show which model you applied 
in making projections. This includes the presentation of the material in the 
museum. We have to explain better what we do and toward what end. It must be 
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scientific, but we don’t have truths or wisdom. We have theories. Each concept has 
a theoretical basis. For example, the English economic theories have a harder time 
here. We are more inclined to German and French ideas. We imagine that is 
theories here are in competition and it is up to the visitor to decide which one 
sounds most plausible and well supported. We take a logical positivist approach. 
Theories can be falsified. But we believe there a many theories, each with their own 
intellectual merit. I can show you models and theories, and you can decide. I can’t 
claim that I know how to maintain the stability of money...we don’t make promises. 
This is what falls away completely from modern political discourse. Politicians 
make promises. We don’t. This informs our stance, our presentation. 
 
My research at the Geldmuseum, as well as interviews with staff and visitors, confirmed 
that people from all walks of life, of different ages, educational and social backgrounds 
visit the Geldmuseum and interact multiple levels and intensities with the material being 
presented. Throughout my research I observed and learned that this approach to 
presenting the concepts and histories of money management, as open-ended theoretical 
and cultural questions, did make an impact on visitors to the center.   
 
Para-ethnographic ‘critical’ encounters 
 
One hot summer afternoon, early on in my fieldwork, I was surprised to hear the 
security guard instructing visitors that the visitor’s center would be closing early that day. 
There were not many visitors that day anyway and I had been using the quiet time to 
work my way through several of the interactive media programs. There was a calm sense 
of urgency about the closing and I was puzzled as to why. I looked for M at the 
Betreuerin’s table in the corner of the gift shop above, where the consultants had their 
small workspace. From there one could look out across several tables and through a 
window into the center below. But on my way up I saw her descending the stairs from the 
library. On this upper level and above were the restricted floors and office spaces of 
communications staff and the offices of the press, library and research staff. Why is the 
center closing, I asked. University students have occupied a stretch of the nearby 
highway (Autobahn), she told me. They are protesting the introduction of student fees, 
she continued. For security reasons it is better to close. Why would that be a problem 
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here, I wondered out loud, intrigued. Well you know, it could turn into an anti-capitalism 
demonstration and students might have the idea to come here, she noted calmly but 
wryly. Oh, is that really a concern, I probed a little further. She shrugged, not very 
concerned. But the decision had come from above.  
I didn’t hold things up any longer and collected my things from the locker room 
below. As I did I couldn’t help feeling somewhat surprised that the Bundesbank would be 
a target of protest in this instance. Perhaps it had something to do with the history of 
student protests in the city, famously in 1968. Or perhaps it spoke to the prominence of 
the Bundesbank in this city and its critical intersection between private banks on the one 
hand, the ‘state’ on the other. It would prove for me to be an instructive metaphor for 
thinking about the nature of communication with the public in this space. It was 
characterized by the normality and centrality of the money landscape of daily life. Central 
Banks are a kind of necessary and yet impenetrable edifice that makes monetary stability 
a goal that is understood to serve society as a whole. At the same time, such an institution 
and its mandate is still fragile—dependent on public trust and aware that trust can be 
rescinded. It must therefore be earned. To be credible it must be open to critique, and yet 
it must be carefully managed through a careful, transparent communicative form. This is 
how I would come to understand the monetary pedagogy of which I would become a part 
and which I would push against with my own open-ended inquiries and analytical ends.   
Paradox, differing opinions, messy narratives are allowed here. But they must also 
be controlled. They must conform to the mandate of the institution, even as they 
continually escape those more narrow meanings. This space is open to the public, but 
fearful of the public at the same time. In a meeting about my research, key respondents 
were intent on underscoring the necessity of institutional unity. The pedagogical mission 
must be embedded in a uniform and consistent voice. I responded by making what 
amounted to be an incorrect analogy, stating that it was something like a good choir.  No, 
I was corrected. A choir is composed of many and different voices. Here we are talking 
about a singular and uniform voice. The same voice, thus no sopranos, tenors or basses as 
my analogy implied. Multiple voices reduced to one. 
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In many respects I was not very different from any other member of the public. I 
sometimes asked questions that could not be given an official or even an informal 
answer. I wanted to be convinced about soundness of the single currency project as a 
means to understand how it should work, what would bring, how it would animate and 
become naturalized in daily life. I was entangled in the communicative work of the bank, 
just as my interlocutors were in my research project. The labor of communicative 
potential was a shared concern and horizon of possibility, even if for somewhat different 
reasons. Specialists with whom I worked might better be understood as communicators 
and teachers rather than technocrats. Yet their pedagogy engaged and elucidated 
technocratic knowledge practices and models with which they, too, had limited and 
differentiated experiences of application. These are the institutional representatives on the 
front lines; they must carefully navigate and create an environment in which 
communicative work performs authority yet conveys essential knowledge about the 
central bank’s mission and tasks. Given that the central bank is not a democratically 
elected body, but which has specific obligations to maintaining the public good through 
prices stability, many of my interlocutors emphasized the importance of this form of 
building and maintaining legitimacy. 
Specialists were thus on the front lines of building credibility and alert to the 
possibilities and limits of what could or should be communicated about the work and 
mission of the Bundesbank—now part of a larger system of central banks responsible for 
one currency (and policy) for 17 different national economies. Communication should 
make evaluation possible. But it should also persuade and naturalize. I, on the other hand, 
was eager to hear about those openings where the euro had not quite settled in, where and 
how it might still be the subject of critical reflection. Much like the communications 
specialists who so generously supported and put up with my interventions, and 
interruptions, I navigated the possibilities of thinking with and against the naturalization 
of money.  
The Betreuerinnen, translated loosely, ‘caregivers,’ are in many respects the 
‘heart’ of the communications work in the physical space of the exhibition. I use the 
feminine form of the German word caregiver to indicate the gendered aspect of this work. 
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Though male employees could hold these positions, only women have served in the role 
(to date). As Frau K explained, when the center was conceptualized there were no plans 
for accompanying staff. ‘They assumed it would run by itself,’ she told me somewhat 
wryly. Of course, it did not take long to recognize the error of that assumption. Even still, 
and despite the significance of their intimate contact with the public, their work tends to 
be underappreciated. I understood this not only from their self-descriptions, but also from 
my observations during fieldwork. To give the most vivid example, at the museum 
evening presentation celebrating the ten-year anniversary of the center which detailed the 
history, work, and future plans, the consultants were not even mentioned! 
Betreuerinnen give guided tours, lead workshops and facilitate group activities, 
and stand at the ready to answer questions of visitors. When they are not otherwise 
occupied, they read the daily press packets to stay apprised of new and changing 
developments in the economy and financial markets. These packets are prepared in the 
press department of the bank. They include in particular articles that refer to policy 
decisions or assessments of Bundesbank and ECB policies and projections. The 
consultants have some form of professional or academic background in macro-economic 
and monetary topics. Several have worked in other divisions of the bank. Because the 
position is flexible and part-time, it allows consultants to combine professional and 
parenting responsibilities. Precisely because many of the consultants are mothers and 
have an interest in educational activities for children, the communications work expanded 
‘informally’ to include age-appropriate offerings. Young children were never included as 
a ‘target audience.’ One former Betreuerinnen, no longer at the bank at the time of my 
research, developed the tour and narrative for these presentations, which continues to be 
used, adapted, and expanded for special occasions. 
Of central importance is the distinction between the central bank and commercial 
banks. For instance, some visitors confuse the Deutsche Bundesbank with the largest 
German investment bank, Deutsche Bank. Though the central bank may not be 
democratically elected, it is a public institution. Independent from the government, it 
nonetheless has obligations to the state (its ‘profits’ flow into the state coffers) and most 
importantly to the people. As Frau V., one of the Betreuerinnen expressed this:  
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“We are not here in the interests of private banks. Critical questions can be asked 
here. We are not a corporate bank but a public institution charged with price 
stability. We also have to make clear that we are part of the euro system of central 
banks. We are not working in our own interest, but for the public good. With such 
a young currency union in a globalized world, it is necessary to emphasize this 
collective monetary and economic policy. It is not like the Federal Reserve, which 
has private banks behind it. It is difficult to make European monetary policy 
concrete for the broad public. It is not very tangible.” 
 
For me one of the most important insights, though perhaps not surprising, is the 
effort involved in engaging directly with the visitors and called upon constantly to 
respond to questions that quite often straddle the fine line between what can be stated 
‘officially’ and the openings for building rapport and facilitating a deeper dialogue with 
visitors. This form of labor falls outside what is formally privileged as communications 
work. Describing a particularly meaningful interchange with a visitor, who expressed 
great surprise and gratitude at the dedicated attention visitors received, Frau V. responded 
to my query about how the work at center is viewed by other bank staff, she noted that 
one-on-one conversations with visitors are generally not accorded the same importance as 
formal presentations. ‘There is a kind of ambivalence to the work we do here on the 
exhibit floor.” The subject matters that we touch upon and explain can only be 
comprehended slowly and they are difficult to actualize. It requires a high degree of 
effort and can sometimes be exhausting. But this form of work is also an identity 
question- we want to remain visible. That is very important.   
Only through my extended ethnography with the Betreuerinnen in the exhibit 
space and informal conversations did I learn to appreciate how, in this context 
specifically, such informal conversations represented a professional risk given the 
guarded and careful management of ‘institutional’ statements. One of my interlocutors 
explained how a journalist once published an article in which a comment about a former 
Bundesbank ‘scandal’ was attributed to her presentation for a guided tour. Though she 
had never made the comment, she was asked to account for it by her supervisors. I 
present this example here to underscore that what may seem like unremarkable 
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challenges elsewhere acquire a heightened sensitivity in this context. For it is a space 
where trust in fiat money is built and as easily undermined through the incitement of 
discursive statements about what ‘stands behind it.’ 
This tension would be heightened as the US financial crisis spiraled out to reach 
the financial sector and international industries and corporations in Germany. In 
Frankfurt, known as the city of banks, many local residents sought out the Bundesbank in 
hopes of acquiring a new angle on developments that affected investments and 
workplaces. The Bundesbank visitor’s center and events were in high demand. Herr S., 
one of the senior staff members in the communications section, felt that the 
communications work had also changed during the crisis. “We are at a disadvantage 
because we have to hold back in our responses to the public. We don’t want to paint 
further crisis scenarios.”  He explained how a journalist had recently visited and why 
there was no information or discussion of the financial crisis in the visitor’s center.  
Repeating what I had often heard from my other interlocutors in the bank, he 
argued that such a topic is extremely complex and it has to be carefully researched and 
processed. “We are still in the middle of things. The crisis began last year and it is still 
unfolding. All we can do is explain. But of course, we don’t reach the person on the 
street. (Then) Bundesbank President Weber gives interviews to the Bildzeitung (a 
German tabloid) to achieve a broader effect. Here one can clearly see the careful 
management of who can speak to the press, and on what terms.  
However, visitors brought their own stories and explanations of the crisis. One 
particularly eloquent respondent, an elderly gentleman who reflected on the financial 
crisis, told me the story of a tree in Africa that, once it becomes too tall begins to find a 
way to grow sideways. Trees do not grow to the sky, he said. They reach a limit and 
either collapse, or find a different way to keep going in the example of this rare tree. The 
moral of the story holds both a warning and a promise. The current system is not 
sustainable according to the idea that growth is unlimited and exponential. The promise 
(and hope) is that there are other (more sustainable) ways to take up longstanding 
concerns about human necessity. 
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Materiality of money 
 
The money museum uses space to show money’s material as well as virtual 
instantiations. Guided tours typically remain in the more traditional space of the museum, 
where the narrative is embedded in a particular history of money. The theoretical stance 
is what one might call evolutionary across vast temporal-spatial contexts, while 
highlighting national (and European) dimensions important for the contemporary 
moment. Moving from the contrast of the cow and the binary code, primitive forms of 
money are highlighted, from Africa, to the island of Yap, to Ancient Lydia and Rome. 
Hiding in plain sight, as it were, is an apparent contradiction about central bank 
pedagogy. Monetary policy in theory takes little note of currency’s material form.  
Important are quantity and velocity of book money, and the stability of prices. But here, 
monetary policy seems less concerned about economic measures (therapy), than it is 
about physical coins and bills. Indeed, an enormous effort, financial investment, and 
complex bureaucracy are expended by central banks in the management of hard cash.  
Counterfeiting is the iconic problem space of this management effort. The quality of bills 
and coins also matters. Thus the quality and concreteness still matter to modern 
(Western) money even if monetary policy makers and theorists alike prefer to emphasize 
money’s immateriality. Money’s inertness maintains an uneasy coincidence with the 
capital of circulation.   
Though it is certainly true that the story begins with the notion of money growing 
out of barter, it begins not with the narrative of the coincidence of wants, but rather with 
commodity money. The cow serves multiple narrative purposes that connect it to the past 
and the present. If a cow was a form of money in the past, so, it still serves as such in 
some parts of the world today. It is part of life worlds, even if it can also be understood as 
a store of value and medium of exchange. But the cow also juxtaposes a different insight, 
especially in explanations for children. This is the concept that money, in order for it to 
circulate widely and to be useful for multiple and more frequent exchanges, must be 
partible. It is difficult, it is said with some humor, to divide the same cow into smaller 
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parts more than once, thus something more permanent is needed. Another important 
concept is that money must be scarce to retain ‘value’. 
In the Tresor, a round vaulted structure (that is sealed and secured each night), 
some of the most precious and valuable exemplars of the Bundesbank’s numismatic 
collection are displayed. Here visitors sees gold bars, a very rare “Brutus coin,” as well as 
coins that illustrate a long numismatic history of German lands and the world beyond.  A 
copper plate from Sweden is used to tell the story of the beginning of credit money. An 
ancient Chinese note is the first paper money, and includes a warning to any would-be 
counterfeiters that such actions will be punished with death. Finally, a collection of small 
denomination bills from every country is displayed in pull out glass panes, so that both 
sides of each bill can be viewed in detail. A favorite story is told to children’s groups 
about the bill from the Cook Islands.   
The tour then moves toward the back wall of this side of the museum. A ‘buried 
treasure’ is displayed: coins that had been buried in a clay jar and discovered many years 
later. This find illustrates a common practice throughout the ages: ‘hoarding’ or burying 
one’s valuables for safekeeping or to hide from others. The find is also interesting 
because of the range of different coins found together and gives a sense of the vast 
geographic range in which these coins were circulating at that time. The tour then moves 
back in the direction of the cow, but shifts to the left to take in the displays that explain 
the security features of euro notes and coins.  
An entire wall is devoted to explaining how a 500-euro note is produced (though 
of course not in such detail that this would do counterfeiters any good. The display 
includes a metal printing plate, as well as an entire sheet of 500-euro notes. Across from 
this display are three separate stations where one can test the authenticity of one’s own 
euro notes (though the visitor is warned, only half in jest, that should the note prove to be 
a counterfeit, it must be surrendered on the spot). On the other side of these stations are 
exhibits that show examples of both authentic and counterfeit coins. In a space all to 
itself, in a corner right below the museum shop, is a large cabinet of drawers that visitors 
can pull out. These contain examples of bills and coins beginning with the early years of 
Germany’s history as a nation, include a collection of GDR currency as well, the different 
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series of the Deutsch Mark, and finally, examples of euro notes, and coins from all euro-
member states. Sondermünzen (commemorative coins) are also displayed.  
Visitors are then given a brief overview of the remaining, interactive part of the 
center. Highlights are the stability game, and the simulated monetary policy game, where 
one can choose the role of central Bank president, chancellor, or union Leader. Visitors 
are left to explore this part of the center on their own.  
So far I have given only the barest sketch of these tours, the interactive exhibits, 
and the ways in which visitors use and engage with the materiality of this space. I will 
expand the ethnographic description and significance of these daily activities and 
encounters in the following chapter. For now, however, I will suggest the important 
legitimizing registers of money’s material form in the ‘politics of building trust.’ 
In the pedagogical public relations of the Bundesbank, (and the European Central 
Bank), then, a central component of explaining or bringing monetary policy to the public 
is through a focus on paper money’s reliability, the recognition of its authenticity, and the 
delimiting of counterfeits. Yet according to central bankers, and even staff members 
involved in designing and communicating monetary policy through public relations 
activities, the security features of bills and coins have nothing (or little) to do with what 
counts as monetary policy, or with the actual practice of maintaining a currency’s value.  
Indeed, the complex of price and monetary value are important, even if it is recognized 
that bills and coins serve as glorified calling cards.  
Bills are especially subject to wear and tear and must be periodically replaced to 
ensure that the security features are testable and visible to shopkeepers, consumers, and 
bankers alike. Shredded euro banknotes are a favorite pedagogical artifact used at 
Bundesbank public relations events. These are old, torn, worn, or otherwise damaged 
bills taken out of circulation and destroyed (shredded). As Bundesbank staff often joke, 
shredded euros are literally their waste, Bundesbank trash. They get turned into raffle 
games where visitors can guess the exact amount of euros, sofas or chairs that visitors can 
use, and packed into small bags that can be taken home and kept, or used for confetti.  
Every third person, it seems, asks if it is possible to reconstruct a complete euro note 
from the shreds. However, at events in Leipzig and Dresden in the former East, a quite 
  56 
unusual question gets asked, one of those unruly traces. Half ironically, half in jest not a 
few visitors wonder aloud if these are the shredded documents of the Gauckbehörde, or 
to translate, the Federal agency in Germany charged with managing the STASI (East 
German Secret Police) files. Before surrendering to demonstrators, STASI agents 
attempted to shred as many files as possible. Even today, those shredded documents are 
painstakingly pieced back together. Jokes such as these can also be thought of re-
inscribing the political into monetary affairs, even as they mark different histories and 
problem spaces.    
Significantly, I found that these different histories shaped the way in which my 
respondents in Leipzig and Frankfurt expressed the so-called D-Mark nostalgia. In my 
experience, it was primarily West German respondents who spoke longingly and at some 
length about the loss of the D-Mark. In Leipzig I would often be told that others say or 
feel this loss second-hand. While West German respondents often assumed that people in 
the east would experience the far greater sense of regret over the replacement of the D-
Mark given the events of 1990, it was by far westerners who demonstrated this sense of 
loss most viscerally. At an event in Leipzig I attended during the memorial week of the 
peaceful revolution, I explained to a woman sitting beside me about my research on the 
euro. I assumed at first that she was from Leipzig but after hearing her wax poetically 
about the D-Mark I began to think that she must be from the west, which indeed turned 
out to be the case. I do not wish to make grand claims about this difference, as a survey 
or poll might aim to do. But I experienced it often enough that it highlighted the shared 
yet different histories in small, yet meaningful ways.  
At the visitors’ center in Frankfurt, however, doubts and skepticism about the 
euro were a staple topic of conversation in my interviews with visitors, just as insisting 
that the euro ‘is not responsible’ for this or that phenomenon was the persistent narrative 
of Bundesbank specialists and staff. Frau V told me in one of our formal interview 
sessions: 
“I think it will take a generation for the German public to adjust to the new 
system, to the euro. Money is multi-faceted. Money has always been beset with 
problems. That lies in the nature of humans, I think. What is money? Why does it 
make a difference? The most important aspect of money is that it must be scarce 
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to embody value. It is an abstract value of today, but also a claim on the euro 
system. Many visitors don’t realize that currency is no longer backed by gold, but 
by the monetary policy that makes it trustworthy. Monetary policy is very 
abstract. What does the inflation rate mean? It is difficult to understand. But it is 
‘behind’ the money people hold in their hands. People often do not stop to 
consider, what does the money I use look like? People have not really identified 
with the euro. In my presentations, I try to break down and overcome prejudices 
against the euro, to encourage people to become conscious of their currency and 
to win acceptance for the importance of monetary policy. In particular when I lead 
the guided tours for children and their parents, you can see that there is 
acceptance, that hearts are opened, and that there will be a foundation for the 
future.”  
 
Subjectivities of encountering economic knowledge 
 
What institution could be further removed from public influence than a central 
bank? A central concern of my research has been to think about the intersection between 
experts and the public, between what is perceived as highly technical and inaccessible 
knowledge and a layperson’s ability to speak about—and speak with—the agents of this 
expertise.  By agent I mean multiple kinds of actors—persons, documents, as well as the 
materiality of coins and bills and what these represent. In important ways, my field sites, 
especially the Geldmuseum in Frankfurt am Main, have lent themselves well to this line 
of investigation as the introduction of the single currency and the public relations work of 
the Bundesbank have played a role in producing new kinds of interactions with the 
public. At the same time, other aspects surrounding the politics of monetary policy are 
made less visible. The Bundesbank necessarily frames the presentation of monetary 
policy, the role of the Bundesbank and central banks in ensuring financial stability, and 
the logics of the single currency, the euro, in empirical, scientific terms. This is also the 
level at which the institution approaches the public—in factual rather than emotional or 
popular terms. However, this creates a tension from the perspective of the Bank between 
what different target audiences are able to understand and the form of institutional 
transparency to be conveyed. The Bundesbank has many avenues of communicating with 
the public with far-reaching effects. But it is the visitors’ center that solidifies most, even 
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if in an admittedly more circumscribed but essential form, the pedagogical visibility and 
authority of the institution in the new European context. 
It is important to note that this is not a setting in which priority can necessarily be 
placed on the best ways of representing monetary policy or the full range of pedagogical 
tools and models that could be useful. The visitor’s center is not a museum in this sense. 
At the same time, it is also not a propaganda instrument in a narrow sense (though some 
visitors see it this way). Because of the Bundesbank’s emphasis on its role as an 
independent institution with a strict mandate to remain ‘outside’ political decision-
making or the demands and influence of the government, yet making decisions that have 
political consequences, public relations staff must work within very narrow guidelines in 
reaching out to different sections of the public. From an inside perspective, the aim is to 
cultivate a sense of Bildung where people will, ultimately, make up their own minds 
about the ideas and practices underlying the work of the central bank.  
  Professionals in the banking and financial industry, students of economics, or 
interested citizens are able to negotiate the pedagogical strategies of the institution 
differently than families with children who also come to visit the center on a regular 
basis. Presentations and workshops are designed to be age-specific, and concretize 
knowledge about money as historical and theoretical, from the early forms of money to 
concepts such as the quantity theory of money (that, is, that money must be scarce in 
order to maintain its value), or the importance of trust, as modern money has no intrinsic 
value.  
Contrary to what many might think—that the simplified approach to monetary 
policy isn’t simple enough—the strategy of providing visitors with an abundance of 
material so that it is possible for visitors to weigh different kinds of evidence for 
themselves makes this site more accessible.  
A prevalent response by many to monetary and economic topics is ‘fear.’ In 
response to my initial queries, many visitors expressed hesitation or unease in describing 
their experience at the visitor’s center. Apologies or defensive statements such as ‘I don’t 
know anything about economics’ would preface many responses. Some felt they might be 
“tested” on memory and knowledge retention. A number of older female respondents 
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noted how they had been nervous about their visit. They expressed anxiety. Despite 
living locally, they had not come in the past because they feared they wouldn’t be able to 
understand anything. While these responses are perhaps hardly surprising, even 
uninteresting, they are crucial in understanding how many “non-experts” interact with the 
overwhelming complexity of monetary policy and theory encountered at the center.  
Staff members continually expressed a frustration not with numbers, but with 
language: with the limitations of expressing the theoretical and practical interconnections 
between, money, monetary policy, and economics as a whole. This inverts the 
intelligibility of numbers and language so incisively discussed by Maurer, in that 
numbers and charts may do more than narrative in explaining money. In Germany, 
economics is generally separated into two categories: Betriebswirtschaft (business/micro) 
and Volkswirtschaft (macro economics, of the people). The latter term carries the sense of 
people’s economy or national economy, but a particular macro perspective is also 
implied through the term, bird’s eye view (Vogelperspektive).   
Dr. E’s stance toward presenting the inaccessible content of monetary policy is 
closely linked with a strategy of undercutting his own claims to expertise. For him, 
communication should occur at ‘eye-level’ (auf Augenhöhe). A successful presentation 
depends upon the ability to conceptualize this expertise as exciting and interesting, but 
not inherently so because of his long-time professional engagement.  
 
E: “I mean, of course I am an expert, but I am an expert in all kinds of 
‘ridiculousness.’ A little modesty does us all good. To take this stance and say 
that...not elevate yourself over others, but tell a story that is relevant for this or 
that person. There is a dialogue. The audience, say school kids, should not feel 
that it is just performed (then it is anxiety-inducing). If they feel there is a 
dialogue then they sense they are taken seriously” 
 
 But for Frau B, one of the Betreuerinnen, the consumer mentality of many people 
blocks the capacity for engaging with monetary and financial expertise. She highlights 
the central tension underlying the notion of transparency: information is made available, 
but not necessarily in a form that is easily processed. Moreover, there is an expectation 
that complex topics be delivered in ‘sound-byte’ form, pre-packaged for immediate 
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consumption. Presenting the euro single currency or any monetary matter exceeds that 
possibility. Frau B. noted that many Germans only began to pay attention to the euro 
once it became clear that the change to coins and bills was only weeks and days away. 
Whether at the introduction of the euro or at moments of financial crisis, public critiques 
and expectations grow as experts are called upon to explain processes and projects felt to 
be long underway. In response to my queries about the interrelationship between the 
focus on material details of money and the policies and crises Frau B seamlessly folds the 
problem of information asymmetry into the manner in which the materiality of money is 
a starting point rather than an endpoint in taking responsibility for self-education:  
 
Frau B: “People also have to take responsibility to become informed. There was a 
lot of information and discussion leading up to the introduction of the euro. But 
there is a consumer attitude that it should be made intelligible for them. It requires 
thinking with, not just receiving information. We speak to many different levels 
of understanding and background. Explaining the security features of bank notes 
is a way of exciting interest. It is like an appetizer for the main course—to explore 
on one’s own, and in the depth that seems appropriate. It is possible to understand 
that the money you hold in your hand is also just a transitional form. It is a tiny 
part of a longer history with money. Parallels can be used to understand the logic 
to money forms. The cow, for instance, is a traditional form of activity and 
connection to exchange. It mirrors culture, history, and mentality—more than just 
a means of payment. It is a mirror.”  
 
The central focus of understanding money in this space, then, and through this 
site, are the specific ways in which currency is part of and makes larger economic 
interconnections possible. A central bank guards over, but also influences broader 
economic processes that impinge on a currency’s stability and value through the setting 
of interest rates. Unlike the US Federal System, the European Central Bank formally 
treats economic concerns beyond price stability as a secondary obligation, and has no 
legal mandate to craft policy that will influence unemployment or other economic 
fundamentals. Indeed, independence is emphasized precisely because the financial crises 
of the past are viewed to be the direct result of state manipulation of money and monetary 
institutions to fund wars and deficit spending. Money or currency is thus not only 
important as a functional object of exchange but as facilitating the stability of aggregate 
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economic processes and therefore, working in the interest of the greater public good. The 
euro is a project that references, reconfigures, but tries to remain outside the social.    
While current central bank practice emphasizes inflation targeting, the 
Bundesbank has traditionally favored careful management of the money supply. It is the 
later that is emphasized in the visitors’ center as the quantity theory of money—a 
foundational concept for explaining and reflecting the agency of money as both a 
quantity and a quality.  
There are many differing opinions about the quantity theory of money that 
centrally informs theories of monetary policy and German histories of monetary reforms. 
Jean Bodin (1530-1596 is credited with the theory, later to be expanded upon and 
modified by economists Irving Fisher and Milton Friedman. The theory holds that the 
supply and velocity of money can be measured and managed in the real economy. As 
Milton Friedman would argue, inflation is a monetary phenomenon. In Germany, the 
history of the 1923 Hyperinflation offers vivid evidence of this idea. But some question 
the applicability of this theory given the many forms of money that proliferate in the 
modern economy. For instance, central banks are not the only institutions that issue 
money in the economy. Credit and other monetary media or book money created by 
private banks, for example, may fall outside such measures and be difficult to track. But 
in light of the German experiences of financial crises in the 1920’s and 30’s, this theory 
(known as monetarism) has acquired a foundational validity. It is seen as an imperfect yet 
sound means of observing the relative quantity of money believed to be circulating in the 
economy.   
In ideal form, the theory argues that the money stock and the number of goods 
produced in the economy should be balanced (in equilibrium). Monetary policy may 
intervene, but there is a ‘temporal lag.’ Thus, it may seem that there is a discrepancy in 
this ‘balance’ (as illustrated by the price stability module in the Geldmuseum). If the 
quantity of money relative to goods rises rapidly, and exponentially then there is a risk of 
inflation. On the other hand, if there is too little money relative to goods then there arises 
what is known as deflation. Deflation is feared as much, if not more so, than inflation 
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because it is felt that central banks can do little to intervene when interest rates reach 
zero.  
In more recent thought about monetary policy, inflation is measured not on the 
basis of money but on price levels in the economy. A sharp increase in one set of goods is 
not seen as inflationary. Rather, it is when a general increase in all prices occurs that 
price increases are seen as indicators of inflation. Whether measuring the supply and 
velocity of money, or measuring price increases using the consumer price index, the 
understanding of central bankers is that policy instruments can be used to intervene in the 
market to ensure price stability and the measurement and storage capacity of money held 
in bank accounts and in one’s wallets. Preventing inflation or deflation is viewed as a 
public good. This is so because inflation or deflation is viewed as a form of unfairly 
redistributing wealth and risk across society. 
The relationship between the euro and the different, yet ‘converging’ economies 
that share it is precisely what is most at stake in unpacking and authorizing the relations  
‘behind’ the euro. The euro area in theory should comprise what is known as an ‘optimal 
currency area.’ This means that regions sharing a currency will be relatively equal in 
economic output and capacity so that a one-size fits all monetary policy will not produce 
asymmetric shocks in times of downturn. Other criteria of membership referring to GDP 
and State deficits are supposed to ensure the necessary discipline to maintain the system 
in which monetary sovereignty is ‘pooled’ whereas fiscal and economic policies of 
individual member nations remains separate. Anxiety about the disciplinary and 
economic cultural ‘traditions’ of the member states is given expression in the ‘no-bailout’ 
clause of the Maastricht treaty whereby nation-states remain liable for their national 
budgets and debts. At the time of my research, this rule was deemed to be unbreakable. 
Precisely how such different national economies will manage with a uniform monetary 
policy is what makes the euro a radical and unprecedented experiment. Nation-States no 
longer have the option to devalue an independent currency to deal with internal or 
externally induced ‘shocks. Everything depends, so it is thought, on member states 
complying with the rules. Thus, experts must be more attentive to facilitating public 
  63 
understanding of and acceptance for the crucial role that central banks now play in 
securing the stable value of prices (and therefore the strength of the currency).  
Differences lie at the intersection of expert and public understandings of the euro. 
How are these differences managed through the single currency, what disruptions occur, 
what pressures and responsibilities entailed? While money signifies belonging and 
stability in concrete ways, the euro-complex, the bundle of relationships, technologies 
and practices that bring together national contexts into a single (one size fits all) signified 
exceed the conceptual and linguistic repertoires individuals may have traditionally drawn 
upon in making monetary and macro-economic developments intelligible.  
Thus, it is not only monetary policy that should be made intelligible, but how it is 
concretized through its relationality with other economic measures and practices 
including, but not limited to the redistribution of wealth and debt through taxation, 
subsidies, EU funds, and so on. Monetary policy is the subject of macroeconomics, not an 
uncontested field in economics. Of the subjects included in that field, it is considered to 
be the most difficult and abstract. The debates between Hayek and Keynes, as well as 
monetarists and supply-side economics are well known. Heterodox economists argue that 
all economics is really ‘micro’ and question the epistemological claims that underpin 
macroeconomics and its econometric premises.   
As Dr. E. explained it to me, in the reigning monetary theory, “Money doesn’t 
even exist. The conceptual task is to proceed as if money is not even there.  But money 
binds everyone together, as Simmel has argued. It is an exhilarating phenomenon, but yet 
we still don’t understand it.” In many conversations and interviews, but less so in public 
presentations, institutional narratives about money and monetary policy were 
differentiated from political ambitions on the one hand and from the new forms and 
techniques that characterize the European Central Bank: 
 
E: The politicians have all had money in their hands, but the monetary union, I 
don’t believe they understood what they were voting for. I believe that many who 
said, yes, we are doing it. They didn’t even know what they were agreeing to. 
They explain that it creates freedom, but what does that mean? You want 
freedom, security, but promises are made without thinking through. In my 
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opinion, [and in experience of the Bundesbank], the quantity theory of money is 
unbeaten in addressing Inflation. But we hardly use money supply policy any 
more. Now we do inflation targeting. 
 
In both senses these are not departures from or critical demands to change the new 
architecture. Rather they underscore the subtle forms of preserving a distinct approach 
and set of priorities in communicating notions of monetary stability to the public. 
 
New currency, new legitimacy 
 
Frau Fritz worked on the enormously successful campaign launched by the 
Bundesbank before the introduction of the euro, with the goal of persuading the public to 
bring any D-Marks under pillows or in piggy banks to the bank ahead of the euro 
changeover. Known as the ‘sleepy coin campaign’ (Schlafmünze Kampagne), the aims 
were technical and legitimating at once. The Bundesbank wanted to ensure that banks and 
other relevant financial institutions would not find themselves overwhelmed in the first 
days and weeks of the euro changeover. By urging people to bring their money to the 
bank early, a potential bottleneck could thus be avoided. The Bank was also concerned 
with retrieving as many floating and hoarded D-Marks as possible for the purposes of 
carefully gauging the money supply and issuing the proper quantity of euro-notes and 
coins. Other campaigns designed to achieve similar results were inaugurated in Eastern 
Europe and paid for by the Bundesbank, illustrating the significance of the D-Mark 
beyond Germany’s borders and cash as the object of monetary management. The motto 
for the latter campaign was: ‘the euro is coming, the D-Mark is going, but the value 
remains’ (Bundesbank Magazin 4/2001: 5). Within Germany, it was proclaimed that the 
euro and the D-Mark would be ‘interchangeable,’ the former would be as stable as the 
latter. The sentiment was the same: the monetary form might change (a new currency), 
but its ‘value’ will remain. Frau Franz explained the challenge of these efforts given that 
people did not (at the time of the campaign) and still do not really have feelings for the 
euro. If Germans had been allowed to vote, they would have rejected the euro.  
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“We must explain our continued importance to the public. Before, the 
Bundesbank made monetary policy. Now, we have only one vote on the ECB 
board just like other member nations. It is hard for many people to accept that 
Germany with its large economy has the same influence as a small country like 
Greece or Luxembourg. It is therefore necessary that we continue to explain our 
role and assure the public that we are working toward the same goals. But we no 
longer can be perceived as deciding for Germany alone.” 
 
Beyond technical considerations, the campaign served another essential purpose: 
building public acceptance for the new euro currency. The German public had up unit 
then registered deep skepticism toward the euro, as evidenced in national and EU level 
polls. Bundesbank employees knew just as well from their own professional contacts, 
acquaintances, even family members how deeply reluctant Germans were to give up the 
D-Mark. It was thus a legitimate concern whether or not the public would be willing to 
bring their money to the bank. Would they hold on to their D-Marks as a form of 
resistance, for example? In this context, the design of a compelling campaign to raise 
public awareness and motivation to aid in facilitating the technical aspects of the 
changeover was crucial. It demonstrates, too, the cultural significance of cash in 
Germany. The physical/material body of money underwrites otherwise virtual (and 
technical) forms of money that dominate the financial imaginary.  
The campaign exceeded all expectations, with the Bundesbank winning a 
prominent advertising silver “Oscar” in 2002 known as the “Effie” awarded in 13 
European states and internationally (Bundesbankmagazin 5/2002: 14). Eleven billion 
‘Schlafmünzen’ made their way to the bank, a logistical master achievement and a sign of 
public acceptance at once. By enlisting the public in returning their D-Marks to the bank 
in exchange for virtual euros (and the starter packs given out before the formal 
introduction of cash in January 2002, a more intimate relationship with the new currency 
could be emplaced. It was a kind of rite of passage, leaving behind the old but awaiting 
the new and irreversible monetary relations the euro would instantiate.   
In 2006 and beyond, acceptance of the euro was and remained fragile while also 
being naturalized as a medium for marking shifting understandings of prosperity and loss. 
It is this sense that Frau Fritz encapsulated in 2006. She was not speaking an official 
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statement for the Bundesbank but instead allowing me to see the public sentiment as it 
arrived in her work on a project lying at the junction of old and new monetary regimes. 
Her reflections then were also prescient of the current issues that now inform the present 
euro crisis and the experiences of these shifts within Germany.  
 
Markets are not the same. There are different cultures, mentalities. This is why 
monetary policy in the Eurozone is so difficult. From building homes to taking 
out loans—in Italy more money is spent on food that in Germany, for example—
so there are differences. The ECB must make monetary policy for this space made 
up of very different economic cultures. Of course, the US states are also very 
different, but here in Europe there is no unified fiscal policy.   
 
Frau Franz put it in the terms of ‘cultural mentalities,’ but it was not meant in a 
pejorative sense. A central concern expressed by many was how monetary policy could 
be appropriate for what are thought of as vastly different economic spaces and financial 
cultures. Over the years that I would follow the communications work at the center, this 
became a frequent point of query, critique and confusion expressed in Q&A sessions of 
group presentations and museums evenings that featured current events. Indicators such 
as the consumer price index and the cultural and scientific interpretations it facilitated 
referenced these underlying anxieties. 
Indeed, as I learned over the course of my participation in group presentations, 
differences in consumer preferences, savings practices and market activity were built into 
explanations of the ‘harmonized basket of goods,’ the European-level equivalent of the 
consumer price index. One of the most important indicators for analyzing and expressing 
relative price movements suggesting an inflationary trend, the consumer basket of goods 
could generate complaint and diffuse it. Presenters illustrated ‘cultural differences’ in 
neutral terms that emphasized the European ethos of ‘unity in difference’ (though never 
expressed in those terms).  
How might European monetary policy for multiple nations that share the euro be 
concretized given that the center explains how monetary policy works at the national 
level? This leads Dr. E to describe in 2009 a kind of ‘pre-history’ of Bundesbank 
relations with the ECB. He explained that plans had been made to coordinate with the 
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ECB, not only in regard to the work of the center-- it was felt that this would be a 
museum of the Deutsche Bundesbank—but in terms of how communications work 
should be coordinated, and to what ends. As I have been suggesting throughout, there are 
small faultiness beneath the surface of an ostensible uniform mode of communication. 
Moreover, a desire for uniformity is expressed and continually undermined by the 
specific attachments to a ‘German’ mode of securing public support.  
As one colleague explained it to me,  
 
In the past we did not have to communicate as actively to the broad public. We 
were the ones who were ‘asked.’ Now we have to actively work to build 
understanding and acceptance. With the European Central Bank and the euro 
here, the question is raised more and more, ‘why do we still need the 
Bundesbank?’ Such a form of questioning in the past would have been breaking a 
taboo. Now we are not as important as we once were. We are no longer the one’s 
deciding monetary policy for Europe. The euro is not just for Germany. 
 
Many I talked with felt that the Bundesbank had given up power, but that this was also an 
opening up of the work of the central bank, even a form of democratization. I should 
repeat here that this narrative was not conveyed to the public in any explicit terms. But in 
my informal conversations and interactions, as well as interviews, the sentiment of 
changing legitimacy and purpose was directly linked to the convictions informing new 
forms of communication with the public. By emphasizing the contribution of the 
Bundesbank to a more broadly shared or ‘pooling’ of decision-making powers within the 
European system of central banks, building trust for the euro was at once a project of re-
inscribing a form of communicative legitimacy at once also separate from the euro.  
 In many instances, communications work was even distinguished from the 
‘economic education’ extended to schools and professional institutions. In the latter case, 
this work was understood in terms of Bildung, a deepening of a substantive understanding 
of the euro system, what central banks do, and the role of monetary policy in relation to 
other sectors such as finance and commercial banking. Communication, in contrast, was 
understood as a form of approaching the public.  Here, form is a mode of creating 
transparency. It may depend less on the ability of the broad public to understand the 
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content. Rather, it builds a form of trust that the relevant content is sound and 
disinterested from political agendas or market whims.  
 Politics has multiple aims, it was continually emphasized to me. This is why the 
independence of the central bank is argued to be enormously important to maintaining 
not only stability but also transparency of purpose that is separate from other economic 
factors upon which it has an impact—especially employment. The distinction between 
the Federal Reserve and the Bundesbank (and now European Central Bank) here is 
important because in contrast to the former which uses monetary policy to address 
unemployment, the European Central Bank’s mandate is price stability alone.  
But according to Dr. E. the Bundesbank made a dramatic mistake after the signing 
of the Maastricht treaty by relinquishing the sense that now, as he puts it, “we have 
nothing more to do, we no longer have a mission (Aufgabe).” Decisions were now being 
made by the ECB, but the actual work is being done at the Bundesbank (and other 
national central banks). But in saying this he refers to the long-held critique, and indeed 
the reason why it was believed in France and elsewhere that the hegemony of the 
Bundesbank needed to be tamed through monetary union: 
 
Yes, we did the same work before, but only with Germany in mind, so the critique 
is valid that we were navel gazing without concern for other European countries. 
The work has gotten more complicated, that is the situation. Now we do it in 
Europe. We are working as before only now it is more difficult, more complex 
and new tasks have been added. 
 
Dr. E. felt strongly that the mistake—what was neglected—was the task of coordinating 
the way in which the European Central Bank and the national central banks should define 
and approach a ‘European’ public. According to the Maastricht treaty each country 
explains relevant decisions and policies in their own national context. But who is the 
public? With whom is the European Central Bank speaking? Language differences are 
felt to be the most significant barrier, and in this sense language is understood in this 
context as culture. Dr. E underscores what I described above: the desire to ‘speak with 
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one voice.’ Rather than coordinating communications work between the European 
Central Bank and national central banks, for Dr. E there is instead a cacophony.  
If there is no European public (Öffentlichkeit), then why not build one, he asks 
rhetorically. But that is something that political leaders do not want, he argues. Though 
there is a continual profession about the need to push the European idea forward, there is 
instead is disconnect between national concerns and decisions being made in Brussels. 
Euro skepticism only grows, rather than being addressed. In terms of the European 
Central Bank, Dr. E sees the lack of coordination around core, foundational concepts that 
should be transported across the different cultural spaces in Europe lacking.     
More significantly, however, concerns about fiscal discipline get to the heart of 
the matter. How would this currency work, detached from a shared budgetary and fiscal 
policy that prevent any one member state from generating ‘imbalance’ in the system? 
What measures would be necessary in the ‘real economy’ to ensure stability?  
 
FF: We have a free market, what does that mean? Structural reforms are necessary 
to make this arrangement work. Germany is on a good path here. Corporations are 
making record profits because nominal wages have ceased to rise. Indeed, they 
are going down. So we are competitive. The economists are happy, but not the 
people. There is a leveling of wages downwards. People and businesses can now 
move, with some exceptions, in the euro zone. People are anxious here about low-
cost competition. But in the UK this is viewed positively. In Germany, the view 
of this is quite negative. People fear wage dumping. Many of these fears are then 
associated with Europe. It is clear, very clear that the developments will be 
downward. This can be clearly seen in Germany already. Unless, that is, record 
profits continue. But workers benefit little in that case. There will be a leveling 
downward.  
 
Such sentiments—expectations, anticipations—are precisely the targets of central bank 
communications work. New ways of thinking about currency ‘beyond’ the nation-state 
and its institutions were necessary. If in Germany laborers could be made to feel that 
wage sacrifices would eventually contribute to social stability within a national space, the 
new currency and altered role of the Bundesbank required a new form of assuaging 
inflationary fears and re-inscribing new forms of thought and discipline across national 
economic ‘cultural boundaries.’ How would the stability of monetary value and the 
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continued existence of the currency be guaranteed? In this sense, the antagonism between 
political and monetary goals that form a crucial aspect of the Bundesbank’s authority and 
accountability required new forms of communication, with which the ‘old’ content would 
nonetheless coincide. Frau Franz suggests how this new form finds expression in 
performing the familiar rituals and repertoires through which central bank independence 
is authorized and earned:  
 
People now have not really experienced a hyperinflation. They should know the 
importance of stable money. It is important to cultivate consciousness in the 
public. This is especially because our role has changed. We have lost some of our 
importance. It has to be said. We often have the impression that we must justify 
our existence—why we still exist. That is why it is so important to communicate 
our message and mandates, what we aim to achieve. The role of communication is 
growing here. We have to take a more active role, also in distinction from politics. 
The Bundesbank has a high reputation here. When the government wanted us to 
sell the gold reserves… there is pressure and we have to continue to legitimize our 
independence from political pressure. We no longer have a special role. We are 
the Central Bank for Germany. But the ECB must understandably increase its 
profile.  
 
Dr. E. in an interview in 2009 expressed this mandate and task in even more explicit 
terms: 
E: We work all day for the collective wellbeing (Gemeinwohl). But we are not 
visible. We work for the banks and are instrumental to the banking system. But 
then it becomes difficult to explain that we don’t save the banks, but try to prevent 
problems from reaching the real economy. Our primary concern is for the 
individual Bürger, for the individual citizen and the real economy. But people do 
not see or understand what we do. That is an information gap that we must 
overcome. In Germany we have a stability culture, and if we want that to 
continue, then we need the support of the public. An independent central bank can 
only survive—you have seen the conflicts presented in the museum—if we can 
depend upon the support of the public. People have to be willing to go to the 
streets on behalf of their central bank, for their currency.  I am putting it in 
dramatic terms. And this is something the lawmakers have recognized…the 
central bank is the only institution where the state is deprived of power.  
 
As Betreuerin Frau V. noted about responses to the euro and to global financial 
imbalances,  
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“This special presentation I prepared, ‘The way to the euro,’ it simply did not 
resonate with the visitors. They weren’t interested. It is really a colossally difficult 
subject.  The [2008] federal elections are coming up, but no one talks about the 
huge deficits that have arisen as a result of the financial crisis. There is a kind of 
collective silence in this country about the financial imbalances. In the center we 
are speaking consciously about monetary policy themes to try to reduce the fear, it 
is our task to help. But which theory does one trust? There is a lot of anxiety that 
yet another currency reform will be needed, a re-set because of the financial 
crisis. People fear they will have to begin again at zero.” 
 
However, there are always gaps in this ‘form of appearance.’ For the purposes of 
my study one such gap concerns the monetary transformation of the former GDR in 
1990. I will fill in some crucial details of the Bundsbank’s ambivalent role in this 
‘history’ below. For my purposes here, however, the important link made between 
German and European projects stands out in Frau Franz’s response to my question. If 
German unification joined two very different ‘economic spaces’ to a shared currency 
(and monetary policy), then to what extent did Germans see in European developments 
related challenges for ‘integration’?  
 
U: Do people connect German unification with the developments of European 
Union, or is it perceived as primarily a matter of national politics?  
F.F: With the fall of the wall there was already a sense of the difficulties to come. 
Before the move towards European integration was not felt to be so crass. The 
West was sealed off [from the economic divergence in the east]. After unification 
the East German, also the eastern markets collapsed. There was no longer a 
market for East German products. Everything there was crumbling and we saw 
how uncompetitive the industry was—the state was bankrupt. The difference in 
East German productivity relative to the west persists, even after 16 years. This is 
why it must still be propped up with massive amounts of money from the west. 
This is a special circumstance for Germany [compared to other EU member 
states]. In any case, it will continue, perhaps indefinitely [ewig]. How long will 
transfer payments, the solidarity tax be needed? Many ask if the situation will go 
on eternally with the eastern Länder ‘on the drip’ (am Tropf). Structurally weaker 
countries in the east are now also joining the EU. The fear in Germany is that we 
will only have something to lose. Poland’s economy is also struggling and then 
you have countries like France. Germany is the biggest net-payer to the EU. The 
enormity of what hangs on this endeavor. While the politicians negotiate and 
there are always difficulties. The Central Bank can only work toward 
guaranteeing price stability. Many members of the public would wish that we 
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could speak more directly to the political aspects of the euro. They expect us to 
represent German interests. But our mandate is price stability. It is not our role to 
alleviate fears—that is the role of politics. 
 
Ambivalent histories: the 1990 Currency Union 
 
Is the focus on money’s materiality a method of suspension, of reminding subjects 
how much they depend upon maintaining the architecture? The political and the 
economic are inverted such that political subjects are called upon to reanimate money’s 
inert body on a daily basis, even as politics is posed as inert and interruptive of money’s 
necessary circulation. Perhaps East Germans’ misrecognition of money’s (politics’) 
shreds makes this gap visible once again. It might remain an anecdote were it not for the 
marked absence of the economic story of German Unification in public relations work on 
the one hand, and its remarked, yet unremarkable status in representations at the 
Bundesbank Geldmuseum (visitor’s center).  
Before I reflect upon the ways in which the monetary and economic aspects of 
unification were commented upon in Frankfurt, I turn to my very first interview with 
Bundesbank specialists in Leipzig, in 2006.  
 
Perspectives from the East 
 
Leipzig, July 16, 2006: It is a warm summer day as I walk the short distance 
from the tram to the Bundesbank regional headquarters in Leipzig. In the distance the 
gigantic Monument of the Battle of the Nations (Völkerschlachtdenkmal) looms large on 
the horizon, commemorating the 1813 Battle of Leipzig in which Napoleon was defeated 
by Prussian and coalition armies. The monument was completed in 1913 and had been a 
notable site of controversy in the GDR because of its symbolic use in Nazi spectacles and 
as a barricade before the final surrender of the city to American forces in 1945. I walk 
past the National Library on the left and the former convention-ground complex further 
ahead on the right. This is where Leipzig, always an important trade city historically 
including the period of German division, held one of its many famous trade conventions. 
  73 
While the city center hosted the book convention, here the GDR’s agricultural and 
industrial developments were showcased and frequented by socialist trading partners as 
well as West German businesses. Though not as accessible as East Berlin, Leipzig also 
held the status of an ‘open city’ in the GDR, at least during convention times.  
When I was given directions, I was told that the large and newly built 
headquarters was just past a large supermarket chain. In contrast to West German cities 
with countless small and independently owned groceries bakeries, butchers, and 
convenience stores (many by Turkish or Italian immigrants), in the East large chains 
predominated. These are almost exclusively Western companies that moved in rapidly in 
1990, already before the currency union on July 1, 1990. A short box-like building was 
the only structure separating the supermarket from the impressive headquarters of the 
Bundesbank. The small building was no longer occupied, but it still bore a sign indicating 
its former use: ‘The Treuhand Informs.’ This had been a public information center of the 
large Holding that decided the fate of the vast majority of East German industry after 
October 1990. Officially, the Treuhand had completed its mission at break-neck speed, 
closing its doors in 1994. It lived on as a re-named federal authority with still-unsettled 
claims dispersed across other government divisions to this day. In 2006 I did not fully 
appreciate the irony of the juxtaposition of the Bundesbank headquarters and the old 
neglected ‘Treuhand’ information center. No one ever commented on why it was still 
there, though I sometimes wondered.  
Even as the renovated cityscapes of historic buildings, roads, walkways, and the 
main train station that also doubles as a two-level shopping mall suggested all was well in 
Leipzig, other structures reminded of different histories, of unresolved histories. 
“Appearances deceive” as it is so often said, which in a German wordplay can connote a 
double meaning of “Schein” as appearance or note (bank note). The indeterminacy of 
monetary value in the whole problem complex of German division and unification re-
stages in literal terms the unity and opposition of the commodity in Marx’s analysis of 
value form. The currency union of 1990 is a particular inheritance of Marx who somehow 
managed to tap in to a ‘German’ propensity to animate the body of money as an endless 
source of cultural and political commentary.  
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But in 2006 I had very different concerns in mind. This was my very first meeting 
with Bundesbank specialists in the East, and with East Germans who worked in the 
Bundesbank. The meeting was arranged by my main contact-person at the central office 
in Frankfurt am Main. It would be difficult to arrange such a meeting on my own, without 
the necessary inside networks. In 2006 I was conducting a period of pre-dissertation 
research. I had already spent one month working in the visitor’s center (Geldmuseum) in 
Frankfurt. In my work with the Bundesbank thus far I had already learned that many 
subjects were off limits. I had to navigate topics (and questions) carefully because they 
could always be perceived as eliciting personal opinions or information about internal 
procedures in the bank. As an institution, the Bundesbank had always been notorious for 
its carefully guarded appearance and statements to the public. Thus the institutional 
culture required a sensitive and careful negotiation of commitments to transparency on 
the one hand, and disinterested official mandates on the other. But for this meeting I was 
given permission to interview the two assistants to the president of the Regional 
headquarters. Both had first-hand experience of the events in 1989/90 and could offer the 
perspective of professionals now working in the central bank. Frau Müller coordinated 
public communications work for the regional bank president, while Herr Werner did 
research at the president’s request, also co-writing speeches and official reports. After the 
usual formalities of giving up my passport at the security portal, Frau Müller came down 
to meet me and we met Herr Werner in the conference room for the interview. Over 
coffee I explained my project and why I wanted to learn more about the 1990 currency 
union as a context for the euro. 
 At the time I was surprised and relieved that both colleagues felt at liberty to 
share their personal experiences and insights about that time in what would be an 
unusually informal interview. In my later fieldwork with these colleagues, such informal 
conversations were very limited. Both at the time, and in retrospect, the joint 
conversation, which I was also fortunate enough to record, turned out to be an 
exceptional ethnographic moment in my research with the Bundesbank.  
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Herr Werner often referred to the “Wende” as a break or caesura. The 
introduction of the D-Mark was a “deep and disruptive break.” In response to my 
question about the significance of the D-Mark in these protests, he replied: 
 
H. W: In the beginning it was about a better GDR, or more democracy, freedom 
of opinion, and yes, to overcome the supremacy of this one single Party. I was 
also against the Stasi-this oppressive apparatus …and the mendacity of the party 
line. That is how it began, actually. That changed within a few months in the 
direction of German unity and ‘we want the D-Mark.’ 
 
Frau Müller noted that the shift in motivation and direction only occurred with the 
opening of the border. She remembers that then the discussion turned relatively quickly 
to the D-Mark. Frau Müller and Herr Werner’s interchange recalls the emotion of the 
debate in the west, and the pressure it is widely felt that East Germans placed on the 
temporality of the process: 
 
FM: It is discussed to this day, should one have introduced the D-Mark so 
quickly, or not. But after the fact one can discuss endlessly, but at that time 
everything went very fast, and many say it was good so, that it went so fast, even 
if from an economic perspective it is viewed differently. But the pressure of the 
general public was there, then one acted relatively quickly.   
HW: And then there were bitter discussions about the correct rate of exchange 
between the GDR-Mark and the D-Mark, although it had already been decided. 
That was an eventful time…this is how I remember it. 
FM: Yes, because everything happened within a very short time. In November the 
opening of the border, and in less that half a year later there the introduction of 
the new currency. And then there was the merging (Zusammenlegung) of both 
states. First there was the uniform (einheitlich) currency, and then, was the 
[political union]. 
HW: Directly at that time of upheaval (Umbruchszeit) very few people took 
notice of all that with the Staatsbank, and the Bundesbank and how that all came 
together—It wasn’t important to the ordinary person (normalen Menschen) how 
all this happened. They wanted the D-Mark.  
 
At the time of this interview I was only beginning to learn about the tense disagreements 
between the Bundesbank and Kohl’s government. What interested me was the way in 
which the technical and policy dimensions of these decisions were acknowledged but not 
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centrally a part of the theoretical repertoire of explaining the logics of monetary unions. 
Moreover, unlike other episodes of currency reform and the project of European 
monetary union, public demands in the east for the D-Mark speak to an agency otherwise 
downplayed in these other histories. But the concerns of then Bundesbank president, Pöhl 
in 1990, also suggest that the link between the bank and its mandate to remain 
independent from political influence to protect the interests of the greater public good is 
reinforced and undermined in this story. Even though the empirical details of this case 
could underscore claims underlying the sound workings of a monetary union, the 1990 
case generated an ambivalent response. I first outline briefly the nature of this 
disagreement, and then I will re-visit narratives in Frankfurt about these decisions.  
 
Bundesbank histories  
 
The public disagreement between former Bundesbank president Pöhl and 
Chancellor Kohl over this most crucial policy decision is legendary. Kohl announced the 
offer of the D-Mark to the East German public without first informing Pöhl. As 
commentators have oft noted in their retrospective analyses, Pöhl was deeply humiliated 
by this breach of the Bank’s expertise and mandate. Jonathan Zatlin has even suggested 
that the move by Kohl was a violation of the Bundesbank law written into the German 
Grundgesetz (Basic Law). Pöhl nonetheless declared his loyalty to the government given 
the unprecedented historical task (Grosser), but he would later resign over this (though 
some cite other reasons). In the days following the announcement and the treaty 
negotiations between the FRG and GDR, there would be both further cooperation and 
disagreement over the rate of conversion and the technical details of the currency union.  
On the other hand, Hans Tietmeyer—a Bundesbank insider and board member—
would lead the monetary negotiations, stepping down from his official duties at the bank 
to mitigate the conflict of interest. Tietmeyer would follow Pöhl as Bundesbank President 
and participate extensively and critically in setting up the architecture for the European 
Monetary Union, signed into law in the 1992 Maastricht treaty. Though it is true that 
political elites had the final decision and the Bundesbank had different priorities, key 
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concessions were made to Germany and the Bank by adopting key tenets of the 
Bundesbank’s monetary techniques, independent status, and the location of the European 
Central Bank in Frankfurt.    
Differentiated analyses from within and outside the bank suggest further problems 
of the technical translations that directly impacted the monetary holdings of ordinary East 
German savers, as well as the industrial future of eastern regions which ended in a 
‘collapse’ not seen since the Great depression (as many authors emphasize). Pöhl would 
later make reference to this ‘disaster’ at crucial meeting of European leaders to discuss 
the European monetary union, for which the ‘missteps’ of German unification were felt to 
set a foreboding precedent. 
But as Frau Müller and Herr Werner explained, for many East Germans this was a 
time of euphoria: 
 
Frau Müller: I experienced it at the Sparkasse. I sat at the [bank] counter. On the 
first of July [the day of the currency union] I paid out fresh money, it was quite an 
experience. But back then I already said to myself, it is not an experience I want 
to live a second time. 
U: what about the introduction of the euro? 
Frau Müller: (nods) that was of a different kind and manner. It was no 
comparison. 
U: I see, so that was a very different experience? 
Frau Müller: Yes, the euphoria that dominated then in 1990 was not present at the 
euro introduction. The feeling was more (among the people) that of a necessary 
evil. Everyone did it [accepted it] because it was supposed to come, and it must 
come. But back then [in 1990] there was so much euphoria in the background. 
Because this currency [the D-Mark] stood for so much, for so much that one 
could not have gotten at the time [nicht bekommen hatte]. The concept, West-
money [Westgeld]— here in the east, it was holy. If you possessed West-geld you 
could pay for things in the Intershop. You could pay someone for a service that 
you desperately needed. There was emotion attached to the money. That was not 
the case for the euro. Emotionally, it was a very different story. 
Herr Werner: you could get things for West money not available in the GDR, 
such as auto parts. You could exchange money on the black market. It was 1:6 or 
5 at the time, at a high cost. It was not allowed. Not official. So it did have a 
certain value, people did have a market sensibility about things, for the value of 
this money. That is why the discussion about the conversion rate back then was so 
bitter. How will the wages be converted, savings? The Bundesbank had, I believe, 
a different perspective, their wished-for idea, than what came about. (Drifts off) 
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Frau Müller: There are many essays about that… 
U: About the rate of conversion?  
Frau Müller: About the topic of what all could have been done differently, what 
would have been more optimal, and so on, yes… 
U: Were people less willing to accept the euro given this experience? Have you 
encountered differences here? 
Frau Müller: This is of course a very personal view, but yes, I think so, that the 
acceptance was not as great, a: because one had recently gone through one 
currency change not long ago—then one had the beloved D-Mark, and now one 
was getting a new currency, where the advantages were not so apparent. I am 
speaking of older people especially, who don’t know as much. It was 
uninteresting to them that they would not need to change money in other 
countries, They could not take advantage of this. They only saw that they now had 
to adjust to a new currency, and get used to new coins and bills, that I have to 
convert again. The advantages were too far away, that’s how many older people 
thought. And still think that way today, logically. The benefit of having a 
common currency that allows you to move about across other countries is not 
something older people, who tend to move about in a small locality, would be less 
apparent to them. And they say they have already gone through the third and 
fourth currency change (Währungsumstellung). 
Herr Werner: People adjusted to the D-Mark very quickly. They wanted to. It was 
never questioned. No one wanted the GDR-mark back. That’s why the euro was 
viewed skeptically. One felt good with the D-Mark, trust was there, and one was 
viewed positively all over the world if one had D-Marks. It was the anchor 
currency in Europe. The euro-the European central bank it was new, people did 
not know much about it and were not interested. So there was skepticism, and in 
the worst case, rejection (Abneigung). There was even a [political] party against 
the euro. Then, there were economic professors against the euro. Now it is not so 
serious.  
 
However, the concerns of Pöhl and other experts about the 1990 currency union proved 
prescient. As Frau Müller and Herr Werner were careful to point out, East German 
regions suffered as a result of the monetary reordering that made the euphoria of 1990 a 
bitter pill to swallow: 
 
Frau Müller: In a very short time, the form of society (Gesellschaftsform), money, 
everything changed. And there are, one reads often enough that there are people 
who were not able to cope [sich nicht damit fertig wurden] 
U: Why is that the case, in your opinion? 
Frau Müller: Many reasons. Of course it depends on the person and their 
perspective [Einstellung], but an advantage of the GDR was…one was in a sense 
provided for [versorgt]. You did not know fear of unemployment. There wasn’t 
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any unemployment. You had a wage and food on the table [Lohn und Brot]. You 
worked, received money for your work, and you did not have to worry [kummern] 
about much. Switching jobs like we have today, it was not like that. People were 
tied to their place of employment for a long time, where they were trained 
[gelernt hat]. And with the Wende, so much changed. Many enterprises were 
given up, not taken over, shut down [sind aufgegeben worden, nicht übernommen, 
geschlossen].  And then these people no longer had an income. And then they 
learned the disadvantages of this new form of society. They did not fall into a hole 
because they were caught (auffängt) by the social safety system. But I think it is 
very different when one wants to work and can, but then cannot perform their 
work [ausüben] because they do not have work. One feels disadvantaged. There 
are many people then that have a problem. 
Herr Werner:: And the social system was different. In the GDR, anyone who had 
problems, the state automatically took care of them [gekümmert]. They were 
attended to [betreut]. It was a really comprehensive aid [eine richtige umfassende 
Fürsorge]. Whoever needs something today then has to go and apply for it [selber 
hingehen]. I need this… 
Frau Müller: people were not used to that here, to deciding for themselves and to 
go of their own accord and have to ask for things [selbst auch hinzugehen]. Many 
things were simply ordered. Automatism [Vieles war geregelet. Automatismus]. 
Now you have to take care of things yourself [selber drum kümmern]. And 
whoever was not used to that, who couldn’t learn it, could not cope [nicht zu recht 
gekommen] then would have a problem. 
U: then you notice even more… 
Frau Müller: that one has been pushed aside [abgeschoben] 
U: perhaps it was embarrassing for people 
Frau Müller: The employment bureau [Arbeitsamt] was also new 
Herr Werner: that’s why the banking was only a small part in a life, where 
everything changed. This was one part this whole aspect of money, meaning 
[Geldwesen, Bedeutung]. Not everyone managed [Nicht alle sind damit klar 
gekommen]. 
 
Back in Frankfurt 
 
I had many conversations with my interlocutors inside the bank about how they 
had experienced German Unification. I was interested in their assessment of the monetary 
and economic effects of decisions made in 1990. It was almost always framed as a 
political matter, outside the logics that might normally apply to sound monetary decision-
making.  
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As one Betreuerin put it: It was a political affair. There were many wrong 
assumptions about how much it would cost and what would be involved. I was in my 
early 20’s at the time. I would never have believed that an end to division would have 
come. I embrace what occurred despite all of the problems. The form of structuring the 
recovery—it is still discussed. It was politically motivated. Wages rose too quickly. It 
was clear to me then that there would be problems given the different levels of 
productivity. But at the time I felt that the path to re-unification was absolutely right. I 
still think it is fantastic. I especially think it is good that it came from the East. 
Frau V., told me about one visitor to the center who, upon seeing the display 
about 1990, argued that the wall should be put back. Others actually missed the old GDR 
currency, regretting the social envy that increased after unification, with its ‘winners and 
losers’.  For Frau V. what stands out centrally in East Germans’ arguments is that they, 
too, worked, and were working productively (produktiv tätig). There has thus been a lot 
of resentment because many West Germans don’t acknowledge this. They view that work 
negatively. What they don’t see, according to Frau V., is that East Germans have had to 
struggle more. And there are also language barriers, she noted. “There are some dialects, 
like the Sachsen dialect,’ that people here [in Frankfurt/the west] do not like to hear. The 
Sachsen dialect immediately stamps you as an Ossi.’  There has been twenty years of 
reporting about the rebuilding in the east, even that many projects have been successful. 
But it is hard not to ask, she says, “Will the solidarity tax be necessary forever?” She 
feels that one should continue to build tolerance for the support. “For instance, the tax 
money made it possible to preserve architectural cultural heritage there that otherwise 
would have been lost.  But there is still high unemployment in the east. In the GDR 
people always had work. With the massive unemployment due to the collapse of the 
industry, people felt that they no longer counted. They lost recognition. But for my 
children, there is only one Germany. So there is hope that perspectives will change.”  
 
Herr S, who directly experienced these events from the standpoint of someone 
working in the Bundesbank at the time, spoke to the politics of the exchange rate:    
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S: “With the fall of the wall, there was an enormous euphoria. In the East 
everyone wanted to have the D-Mark.  There was a refrain, ‘If the D-Mark does 
not come to us, then we will leave and come to you.’ But the economic 
connection [Anschluß] did not come the way people hoped. The economy in the 
east collapsed when the D-Mark was introduced because the economy there was 
uncompetitive. There was only an artificial exchange rate. The black market rate 
was 1:4. And this is why we have to transfer enormous sums to the east. Pöhl had 
warned because of the exchange rate. There is a significant qualitative difference 
between the Trabant and the Volkswagen Golf. If the exchange rate had been 1:4 
instead of 1:1, then the Trabant might have had a chance. Kohl promised 
blooming landscapes. And this is what has resulted. It is a long and arduous 
process. But in the Ruhr area, where the industry switched from coal to steel, that 
process also lasted 20/30 years.” 
U: Do you think there are lessons from the German experience for understanding 
the monetary integration process between member states in the EU? For example, 
what does it show about the importance of the convergence process? 
S: Yes, the German experience shows these difficulties. One could definitely 
learn from this how important it is to find the correct exchange rate. This is why 
countries have to participate in the exchange rate mechanism 2 for several years 
before adopting the euro. Back then [in 1990], everything happened over night, 
despite such differences. Now, if Greece becomes insolvent, then Germany will 
have to help. So you see how important the stability pact was. There has to be 
more pressure placed on countries to maintain fiscal and budgetary discipline. We 
will have to move closer together, but we are on a good way. Crisis makes it a 
necessity. The crisis has exposed many things and shown that the foundations 
have not been solid. More must be done. The central bank is fulfilling its 
mandate. It is up to Berlin to step in with financial and economic policies that can 
address these problems.  
 
In a 2009 interview with one of the Geldmuseum designers, Dr. E, I wondered if 
the currency union of 1990 might someday receive more prominent attention as a 
meaningful site through which monetary policy might be addressed. I used the example 
of convergence, so important to member nations joining the euro, but clearly absent 
between West and East Germany in 1990. In discussing this topic I could not help but 
notice Dr. E. unsettled demeanor. All of the other topics, even those points of difference 
with the political establishment or even the European Central Bank were addressed with a 
playful yet professional demeanor. On this matter alone, it was different.  
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U: I am also researching German Unity. Could such a topic be expanded? It 
seems there are lessons for the European integration. Do you see it that way?  
E: I would not design an exhibit about European integration or even German 
history. The GDR is not my topic. In the planned economy money played no role. 
It was not even money because there were no commodities. It was simply a 
demand claim. This whole topic is completely uninteresting to me. 
U: But there were many discussions about the exchange rate in 1990, and the 
Bundesbank was critical of the method chosen for integrating the two economies. 
It seems to offer some insights about the convergence criteria for countries 
adopting the euro, for example? 
E: The East German Mark was a false currency. Okay, yes there was an exchange 
rate in relation to hard currency (Devisen). But this is not an important topic. 
U: I was thinking more in terms of the last twenty years of unification, since it is 
important to how many East Germans experienced this process. 
E: That is not a reason—I admire Dr. L [See above]. That he did not include 
topics in the exhibit that have no long-term meaning. Of course there are many 
interesting stories, but that is not our way of presenting material. We focus on 
foundational concepts with a long-term meaning. We have not even addressed the 
topic of financial market stability. In conceptualizing new material we ask why, 
for whom—what is truly essential, what is indispensible. When I find an old 
screw, you know, I ask ‘do I really need to hold on to this,’ do I need it for a later 
time? It is better thrown away, to concentrate on more important matters. 
 
Dr. E. understandably wanted to express what I already understood quite well: 
that there are institutional limits and political considerations behind all of the concepts 
and ‘histories’ that explain money in the center. However, the post-war history and 
identity of the institution is decisively West Germany. The circumstances that shaped the 
Bundesbank’s crucial and ongoing role of unifying both Germany’s in monetary and 
economic terms is a source of technical pride and achievement in addressing an 
unprecedented pace of transformation and historic responsibility. But the introduction of 
the D-Mark was in many respects a profound source of instability whose implications 
(economic and symbolic) reach into the present. It unsettles and upsets the stable money 
story even as its ‘sublime’ material remains unscathed.  
Before I brought up the question of 1990, Dr. E had described in extraordinary, 
even transcendental terms,  
I always give this as an example to journalists. I find it fascinating that in the US 
civil war, or the First World War, people go to the front. They are in the trenches 
and know they have no chance of survival. And yet they do it. The state says, go 
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out to the front, you put yourself in harm’s way to be slaughtered, slaughtered by 
the thousands, and they do it. But when the same state says, here, accept an 
inflationary currency, no state can manage to convince people of this. No state 
can convince its population to willingly accept an inflationary currency. That is 
not possible. It manages to persuade on all imaginable things having to do with 
life and death, but not when it comes to a worthless currency. I find it fascinating. 
This is my observation. And the question is why. And is the one domain 
where the state has been willing to relinquish power, and makes the central bank 
independent. Really we have little power beyond setting interest rates, we can’t do 
much. What does it do? In the case of conflict the bank needs the public, and the 
public must be concerned with preserving monetary value. So what can we do to 
achieve this? As I said, we have a stability culture in Germany, and we have had 
disastrous historical experiences with the loss of monetary value. So the stability 
of monetary value is not up for question, it stabilizes society.  
 
The temporal relevance of the 1990 currency union must be locked away, erased, 
forgotten. Contemporary problems of economic stability are folded into synchronic 
notions of financial stability, in which moments of crisis maintain, but do not end 
economic suspension. Monetary policy takes effect within an economic landscape that is 
understood as a body (virtual money as the blood of circulation), and as architecture (an 
infrastructure of banks and credit flows that monetary policy targets). The illusion of 
suspension depends upon closing the gap between currency as inert body and currency as 
active life force. The irony is that at a moment of currency union, fiat money’s inert 
presence can call attention to the illusion, to money’s failure to fill the gap between the 
political and the economic. The violent yet arbitrary nature of suspension becomes 
visible. The material remainders left behind disappear within new justifications of 
economic stability.  This is why I often felt my role to be that of an ethnographic 
archaeologist, who tracks stubbornly and persistently what others say is unimportant, 
what lies beyond words, what can’t be recaptured.  
 
 
  84 
Chapter 3: 
‘Distant Europe, tangible euro?: making sense of interconnections in the EU’ 
 
Part I.  
The euro, ‘our money’ 
Why has a single or shared currency been so important to the project of European 
integration? In what respects has it been important that the euro is not simply tacitly 
accepted but enthusiastically embraced by Europe’s citizens? If in many member-states—
most notably Germany—the broad public was not asked to vote on this elite project, how 
has trust in this binding relationship been legitimized? And in what respects does the euro 
become a tangible site of contestation? And if Europe has seemed both distant and largely 
unintelligible to many, how has the euro enabled a closing of the gap, or possibly a 
perpetual reminder of that distance?  
What would it mean to have a voice about the euro in Germany? How are the 
categories of the political and the economic deployed and to what ends? What 
imaginative spaces exist for encountering and weighing expertise on the part of the broad 
public? At precisely the time when communicative practices of ‘transparency’ and 
materializing the euro project through language, how might the materiality of objects—
such as prices, physical currency, treaty texts and public infrastructure become unwieldy 
sites for pushing in, back and on the political and economic visions of elites? How do 
existing discourses on the market and financial obligation fold in and delimit such 
possibilities?  
This chapter aims to show the shifting rhetorical ground of the euro as a political, 
cultural and economic process. I argue that attending to the blurred boundaries in which 
the euro is ascribed political, economic and historical meanings can show the labor of 
making the euro inevitable, and the slippages through which this labor may or may not be 
effective. Surveys track relative approval and disapproval of the euro as coordinates for 
taking the pulse of feeling about the EU, with low approval ratings sounding off alarm. I 
am interested, however, in the specific forms this skepticism takes, how it is enacted, and 
the ways in which the rhetorical field is mediated by practices of conceptually 
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distinguishing what the euro ‘is’ at different moments, and in response to shifting 
economic contexts.  
The euro in its physical form, as cash and coins, as ‘transparent prices’ and as a 
medium of exchange that crosses and makes obsolete the national border controls of the 
past, is understood to be indispensible and crowing feature of the European project. The 
EU might appear to many citizens as distant and bureaucratic. The euro, in contrast, 
would be carried in one’s pocket and make Europe part of the daily. It was assumed that 
this tangible force would paradoxically work as something taken for granted: it is just 
money. These competing aims may seem to be compatible and self-evident for stable 
national currencies everywhere. But how would this work in an arrangement where 
national/territorial states share the same currency but not the same language or cultural 
dispositions toward money, or structurally the same fiscal or social policy mechanisms 
through which resources are typically redistributed across a ‘national’ state entity?  
National currencies have been legitimized by elites through appealing to national 
stories and essential qualities. The euro is made legible and narrated through the lens of 
technical management by the central bank. If national currencies come to be taken for 
granted precisely because they are a potent symbol of collective identity, the euro 
ironically shifts into the realm of skepticism because it must remain a ‘thing’ an empty 
form discourages identities in one instance and claims them in another.  
The irony is that money is sometimes understood as a form of voting. As we also 
know, multiple moneys and alternative currencies can supplement, contest or exert 
pressure on official monetary media. Moreover, private banks create money, but the form 
in which it is convertible and can be stored is subject to the monopoly of central banks.  
Yet as citizens we are not typically asked to vote on what shall be legal tender. 
But in Europe some were asked to vote on precisely this issue while others could not 
(Peebles 2011). More importantly, what should count as money in Europe is about what 
and who should back it, what forms of collateral will safeguard its value (Riles 2011), 
and how trans-border money will rework fiscal, social and political relations of financial 
obligation and monetary ‘memory.’   
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Euro-Teuro 
 
The “value” of the euro has been the object of ongoing debate and redefinition in 
Germany. For many West Germans, the ‘hard’ Deutschmark embodied post-war 
prosperity, stability, and national identity while for many East Germans it represented the 
abundance and promise of the “golden West.” Though from a technical standpoint, the 
changeover to the euro was remarkably smooth, to the particular credit of the public 
relations work of the Deutsche Bundesbank, early experiences with the euro produced a 
whole repertoire of practices and significations through which the “value” of the euro 
could be measured, debated, contested, and affirmed. While experts from politicians to 
economists and bankers promised that the euro would be as stable as the DM, many 
Germans have instead tended to link the euro to growing economic inequality and 
instability in Germany. More than a symbolic slippage of meaning, the “(t)euro” (a word 
play with the words, euro and expensive) critique highlights tensions surrounding the 
practical “repertoires” (Guyer 2004) through which Germans experienced the euro and 
the expert “re-stagings” of its economic, political, and cultural value(s) (Maurer 2006).  
Despite favorable exchange rates and positive economic indicators, many Germans 
nevertheless experienced the euro as a loss of monetary value.  
The lament of Germans’ reluctance to give up the D-Mark for the euro is 
repeatedly invoked within and outside Germany. By invoking this narrative, a number of 
rhetorical strategies are at work. What purposes does this serve? Sometimes, it calls 
attention to a real and symbolic sacrifice of economic power and the salient substitute for 
national identity. In tandem, the story of East German calls for the D-Mark in 1989 
underscores this affective sacrificial logic further. While it can be seen as a euro-induced 
melancholia, it also signals the unwilling, yet passively supportive acceptance of the 
substitute as part of the project of materializing a “European Germany.” It can therefore 
serve as a sign that Germany is not acting in its own interests, but for the greater good of 
Europe.  
In this light, public critiques that the German public did not have a vote or a say 
appear petty and nationalistic. In so far as experts and members of the public alike raised 
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concerns about the obligations and long-term constraints this might pose in terms of 
economic stability and solidarity, skepticism could be reframed as anti-European and at 
its most extreme, right-wing extremist.  This serves to neutralize or divert attention from 
the ‘anti-democratic’ forms through which the euro and many other elements of the EU 
have come into being (Peebles 2011).  For this reason, as we have seen in the previous 
chapter, the Bundesbank and its staff charged with building trust in the project are ever 
aware that had their been a national vote, the German populace would have in all 
likelihood voted no. Given the precedence of other member states who did hold 
referenda, or who have received opt-out clauses from adopting the euro, the all-
encompassing almost theological necessity of the euro can always be questioned (and 
alternative ‘fates’ made visible.10 Therefore, these reasons alone (and there are others) 
have required, I argue, an ongoing and adaptive labor to naturalize the inevitability of the 
euro.  
Frau Enke:: “The decision to introduce the euro was not made by the central 
banks, it was a political decision. We are just the executors. This is what we work 
towards in our economic education.   
U: I thought that the euro was not just a political, but also an economic project? 
Frau Enke:: Of course these can’t be so easily distinguished. The political can also 
be economic. 
U: Do you find that German history is reflected in the euro? Do you think that 
eventually Germans will think of the euro as they did the D-Mark? 
Frau Enke: I think that the history of the D-Mark is different from that of the euro. 
The allies introduced the D-Mark three years after the end of the war. That is also 
where German history divided. A currency reform was needed. This was the only 
way. It was necessary to have a stable currency. That it was so successful 
depended upon many favorable conditions. Perhaps because we started at the very 
bottom, that contributed to the experience of its success. The euro was a political 
decision, with an economic background. There are advantages, like overcoming 
regionalism in Europe, which simply didn’t fit into the global landscape. So the 
currency is one part. Now, the euro is as strong as the D-Mark. But when it was 
introduced, it arrived at a time of recession. There was a chain of unfortunate 
circumstances—it lost value at first against the dollar. But those circumstances 
had nothing to do with the euro…in 2002 the euro was made into a scapegoat. 
Now in 2006 blaming the euro has died down.  
                                                 
10
 In Sweden and Denmark the public voted against the introduction of the euro. Great Britain and 
Denmark have opt-out clauses and are not obligated to adopt the euro. Sweden does not have an 
opt-out clause, but it does not currently fulfill the formal criteria for adoption.  
  88 
U: Doesn’t the success of the euro depend on a new sense of collectivity? If the 
European Central Bank is responsible for multiple countries that share the euro, 
how do you build a new sense of collectivity beyond the nation? What if things 
suddenly go badly? 
Frau Enke: The national level was also difficult. The central bank can’t be voted 
out of office. So in many ways things have not changed that much. Brussels is just 
further away. But Germans are benefiting, especially as tourists. There is no 
longer a need to change currencies while traveling.  
 
 
In an interview I conducted with the assistant to the then vice president of the 
ECB in 2008, Herr Klein attributed the felt-distance to the EU as ironically the effects of 
its success. That is, insofar as the euro could be absorbed into the daily and taken-for-
granted practices of consumer activity people became forgetful of its political 
construction:  
 
U: “Why is it so difficult to communicate the European idea? How could one 
change that?  
Herr Klein (ECB): There are different aspects. There is the attachment to the D-
Mark, which for so many here was connected to their careers, the economic 
miracle. In the East it was a fetish—the currency one always wanted. Today one 
consumes Europe. People don’t remember anymore what it was like before, to 
exchange money at every border. With open borders, there is a consumer stance 
to Europe. It is nothing special anymore. The enthusiasm and vision has been lost. 
But money and the central bank—this is one of the most important symbols of 
collectivity, one that you carry in your wallet or pocket. From the point of view of 
the European Central Bank it is understood that each country has its own 
experience with money. We are very concerned about that. Here in Germany there 
is a stability consensus. It has sunk into the blood, you might say. A stable 
currency should hold value, and that value should not be put at risk. It is a public 
good, legitimated by the public. The Bundesbank offers a model. The Germans 
don’t want politicians to gamble with their money. They want solid money. This 
is a conviction that the European Central Bank is working to communicate across 
Europe. So that it sinks in. But it does not happen overnight.”   
 
Yet, the restriction on public referenda on EU measures like the euro has often 
intensified German frustrations not only with the euro, but also with the European project 
itself.  Early on during my research at the Bundesbank, one employee told me privately 
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that had the German public been allowed to hold a referendum on the euro, most would 
never have willingly given up the Deutschmark. Public critiques of the Euro invariably 
bring up the salient point that the German public “was never asked” whether they agreed 
to the Euro, in sharp contrast to other Member states, most notably Sweden and 
Denmark, where citizens were given the chance to vote.   
 
Herr Vogt, who in 2006 had been working in communications at the Bundesbank 
for ten years, emphasized a more local and grounded approach to direct engagement with 
the public in Frankfurt. He emphasized a highly reflexive “learning by doing” both before 
and after the introduction to the euro. There was a strong belief, too, that this work was 
reaching its intended audience, that visitors responded well, and that the evolving form 
and content grew out of the expectations and wishes of visitors. At this point in my 
research, he was concerned with representing the relative freedom of program creation. 
He explained:  
 
V: But all of this has developed out of the expectations and wishes of visitors. So 
there was not someone, such as the division director who said, so now we will 
offer this and that presentation, with these themes, and this is what we want to 
communicate, and the sequence of activities should be organized as follows. 
Instead, it is quite the contrary. We always had a feel for the thematic and we 
have often changed it. Now of course it is more European, euro system, European 
Union.  In the past it was the Bundesbank. It was a dominant central bank, and 
people simply wanted to know, what does this Bundesbank do, yes? And now it is 
much more wide ranging. These are some of our new themes: euro cash and 
coins; some people want to know about the D-Mark, but people are more 
interested in that now than in the past. People were not as interested in the cash, 
security features in the past.  
U: That all became more important with the euro 
V: yes. And there are topics such as central banks, private banks, and European 
union, but with the focus on monetary policy. But that has something to do with 
the new curricula, because now monetary policy is a focal point, something 
students are now required to learn about. Often monetary policy is directly 
referenced in the curriculum. That is advantageous for us, of course. We are in 
demand as a result.  
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The labors and travails of Euro-Teuro 
 
One important way in which this labor was made manifest was in what has come 
to be known as the euro-teuro phenomenon. The introduction of the euro has been widely 
linked to a rise in prices in Germany. Many experts and euro-proponents argued that this 
was a ‘felt’ or ‘perceived’ phenomenon and countered with statistics and official studies 
to disprove this reality claim. When the critique persisted, further studies searched for the 
‘causes’ contributing to this ‘perception among the public at large. These studies 
determined that service providers and retail businesses did take advantage of the 
changeover to manipulate and disguise price increases. Such tactics could serve the 
double purpose of making a profit while at the same time appearing to offer discounts 
and win over new customers at the time of the changeover. However, while these studies 
locate actual price rises attributable to the euro to its window of introduction, the German 
public persisted in highlighting the durability of such practices, even of proof was 
difficult.  
While it would be possible to analyze the euro-teuro argument in terms of the 
misrecognition of market processes, I extend my analysis to demonstrate how the 
political and economic meanings of the euro are mutually constitutive. Mainstream 
arguments about the euro take the form of a dichotomy between the real and myth, and 
between perception and fact. I want to think though the efficacy of this binary in shifting 
around or neutralizing possible critique on the on the one hand, and on the other, how the 
labor of naturalization might have efficacy, but not quite. In so doing I read against the 
grain of approaches that assert the euro’s inevitability or the tangential relevance of these 
repertoires to the governance of the euro. I argue that even where what seems to be at 
stake are exclusively consumer complaints mapped on to the euro, they require a 
response just as much because of the euro’s political claims. I highlight the discursive 
practices through which the euro is figured as a substantive force or in Marx’s terms, its 
fetishization as the agent of social change. At the same time, I adopt a pragmatic stance 
as has been advocated in recent work in the anthropology of money to consider how 
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shifting transactions of complaint, belief, and skepticism are expressed through the euro, 
and in relation to different forms of expertise.  
Much to the dismay of euro planners and supporters, the advent of Euro-Teuro 
appeared soon after the euro-notes and bills began to circulate. In an article in the 
Leipziger Volkszeitung, dated 02/26/2002, a cartoon illustrates an older man and woman 
who peer, dismayed, into their shopping basket.  The man says, “everything is more 
expensive, except for the basket,” to which the wife replies: “but the basket is the one 
thing we did not want to buy!” Another cartoon from the same newspaper (also 2002) 
shows a set of numbers with the symbol of the DM marked out and the Euro symbol 
etched in its place, even though the conversion should be (approximately) 2 to 1. This 
conviction of the 1 to 1 relationship between the euro and the Deutsch Mark has 
continued, and was still held by many Germans, over nine years later until it became 
subsumed by larger concerns in the euro crisis. Despite that fact that the relationship 
between the Deutschmark and prices for consumer goods and services would have 
undoubtedly also changed with inflationary pressures, a representative survey in March 
2008 showed that every third German would still choose to return to the Deutsch Mark.  
The euro, rather than the stable signifier it was intended to be by its planners, becomes 
instead a referent for multiple and contradictory significations as people perceive it and 
experience it in practice.  
There are, of course, many factors that have fed into public skepticism and 
complaint about the euro. Most important among these are the stagnant wages in 
Germany as well as increasing unemployment. Moreover, reforms to the social safety net, 
known as Hartz IV, have intensified the numbers of working poor and fed into low-wage 
jobs and work schemes that have increased productivity and profits for firms at the 
expense of workers’ ability to secure full sustainable employment and save for the future. 
In the former east, where unemployment has remained twice as high, the price increases 
ascribed to the euro have intensified feelings of material insecurity already created by the 
1990 currency and economic union.  
In 2008, I asked Herr Peters, a historian and project manager at an archive in 
Leipzig, about his experience of the introduction of the euro. He contrasted it with the 
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1990 introduction of the D-Mark in the east: “It was not as crass as the D-Mark 
conversion. I do not need much for me alone. But with a child, you do think more about 
it. In 1990, we did not have much of a comparison. But with the euro, we felt more like 
the rug had been pulled from under us [über den Tisch gezogen]. People got more upset. 
The higher prices had the effect that from then on I only went shopping in larger 
supermarkets. The baker or the butcher was too expensive. Which is not good for the 
baker or the butcher, of course.” 
Herr Kaiser, who worked in the department of cash management at the 
Bundesbank central office in Leipzig, described unemployment there in 2006. He felt that 
the structural employment in the region made it easier to win people over to the left and 
to the right. People could be convinced that foreigners were taking people’s jobs. I 
wondered what impact this might have on attitudes about the euro? “No, Leipzig is like 
anywhere else. There is the ‘Teuro,’ which the politicians deny. We (the Bundesbank) do 
too. But there are dislocations,” he admitted. “Just today I had my car in the repair shop. 
During D-Mark times it would have cost 100 DM. Today it cost me the equivalent of 170 
D-mark. On the other hand at TV used to cost 1,500 D-Mark and now you can buy one 
for 700 euros.” He argued that it is necessary to consider the basket of goods, where 
relative values of goods can be shown to balance out the increase and decrease of 
commodity prices overall. It is now more expensive to eat out, but other things are 
cheaper. Part of the problem is that people reflect upon and plan with the prices of 
essential goods on a daily basis. When the prices of these increase then it is more 
noticeable. People might use the formula to calculate the D-mark prices for the 
commodities they bought regularly. On the other hand, people internalized euro prices 
and so they could compare between stores. So the change to the euro has been good for 
competition, he felt. 
Many respondents differentiated the euro from the idea of Europe. Here is one 
example:  
“The euro is a Teuro. For me it is a Teuro. There should have been rules put in 
place to prevent merchants from raising their prices. A moratorium on price rises 
for a specified time could have been put in place by the government. Other 
countries did something similar, but Germany left it open, unregulated. Of course, 
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some people are not good at calculating the rate of exchange, so that contributed 
to the feeling that the euro made prices rise. But many things did become more 
expensive, especially groceries—things you buy on a daily basis. The euro is a 
stable currency, but it is still a Teuro. The European idea is well intended. But 
many things are decided better at the national level.” (Interview August 28, 2008 
Herr Klein) 
 
Statistics of trust 
 
Attributing rising prices to the euro has been a widespread experience in most 
member states that adopted the Euro, including newer member states, like Slovenia, 
which introduced the euro long after the original member states.  In no country has this 
been more contentious than in Germany. Notably, Germany has been the one country to 
coin a nationally specific term for the phenomena of (perceived or real) rise in prices 
after the introducing the euro, with other countries adopting the German term. At the time 
of my fieldwork, many respondents continued to engage in mental conversions between 
the euro and the Deutschmark to reflect upon and complain about the “true” cost of even 
the most mundane items such as butter and milk, cherries bought at a fruit stand and the 
cost of a cappuccino. For those who ceased comparing such smaller items, the temptation 
to convert reappears when contemplating the purchase of lager items such as automobiles 
and kitchen appliances. 
Experts (from statisticians to economists) measure this in quite different terms. 
One key measure for tracking price stability is the consumer price index. Also known as 
the consumer basket of goods, this economic measure provides a statistical picture of 
goods and services a typical household consumes and the relative costs, on a monthly 
basis. EU officials use the relative stability of this ‘index’ (more specifically, the 
‘harmonized basket of goods for the Euro area) over time as an important measure of the 
stability of the euro, and to argue that prices are stable. While the basket of goods does 
not claim to represent any one specific household, many Germans across class and 
income lines have often remained unconvinced by this measure, arguing that the basket 
inaccurately reflects what it really costs to make ends meet. In a parody of the often cited 
example of computers becoming more affordable as indicative of positive gains for 
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consumers, individuals in the media and on the street—even one visitor to the 
Bundesbank tent in 2006, would remark in ironic tones, “that while the price for 
electronics may have decreased, food and services have doubled, and “you can’t eat 
computers!” Perhaps somewhat paradoxically, in my interviews and conversations with 
some experts (though not all), this now “cultural practice” of converting and comparing 
between euro and Deutschmark is one upon which they also draw even if in the same 
breath they challenge this feeling with their professional knowledge. 
A new ratio of comparison therefore took hold between the euro and the D-Mark. 
It drew upon but blurred the precise rate of exchange in calculative and temporal terms. 
Euro-teuro could be understood as an evaluative ratio of broader social processes, for 
which the tangible euro could serve as medium of market and political critique. It could 
be called up as necessary, or come to consciousness unexpectedly when making 
particular kinds of purchases. For many Germans the rising cost of living and the nominal 
price increases in euros initiated this new ratio of comparison in which the cost of a good 
today would be compared (wrongly so, according to the specialists) with the cost of the 
item during D-Mark times. What people neglected to consider, it was argued, is that the 
D-Mark prices would have continued to rise and fluctuate. By comparing the euro price 
to the D-Mark price, one was essentially comparing a static price (fixed in a now frozen 
past) and the shifting price (fluctuating according to ‘supply and demand’ and related 
market phenomena).  
Over the first several years of my ethnographic research at the Bundesbank I 
found that public relations staff received critiques like the ‘Teuro’ with great anxiety, and 
to the surprise of this outsider, took them far more seriously that one might expect.  They, 
like many experts and commentators, worked to persuade and to educate people that 
official statistics demonstrated a very different picture of the euro’s contribution to price 
stability. Statistical analyses showed that prices had remained stable and that the euro had 
inaugurated a more stable price environment that had the D-Mark. However, many even 
well educated citizens were not convinced. Citing an oft-stated quip about the truth-value 
of statistics, many would say: ‘don’t trust any statistic that you haven’t falsified yourself.’  
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But for researchers and staff-members at the bank who had the purview of a 
constant stream of financial and market reports from major newspapers and institutes 
across Europe, as well as in-house research departments, public perception was a case for 
the psychologists. Perception and false expectations stand in the way of objective, 
numerical measures. No matter how much experts insisted that causal link between the 
euro and continually rising prices was all in “one’s head,” public critiques did not abate, 
though they ranged in intensity over time. However, the ‘felt-inflation’ would soon be 
folded into a new empirical study of this phenomenon. A study by Swiss statistician Hans 
Wolfgang Brachinger (Brachinger 2006) added empirical weight to the real economic 
effects of perceived inflation such that technical definitions of price stability had to be 
tempered with individuals’ economic experiences. Despite early dismissals of the 
perceived inflation as just that: perceived but not real, I observed that Bundesbank public 
relations work did incorporate an ongoing and shifting response to public skepticism 
which no amount of statistical evidence could overcome. Jumping ahead in time to show 
the durability of this critique, in a 2010 report, “Guter Euro-Böser Euro? (Good euro-bad 
euro?), which aired on German public television in the first year of the euro-crisis, 
beginning with the sovereign debt problems of Greece, Brachinger was featured 
prominently once again. Below is my transcription and translation of this segment, which 
conveys the stakes involved in providing credible explanations that can diffuse critiques 
of the euro. Such explanations also highlight the importance of externalizing agency to 
the market that is otherwise a reflection of class inequality and unequal production and 
consumption regimes. 
The narrator poses the question, ‘Why do we think that with the euro everything 
has gotten more expensive’ which official statistics do not confirm? Brachinger explains 
that the frustration begins already while shopping. If the prices of goods that are bought 
often change, then the customer notices immediately and feels that everything costs more. 
Brachinger is shown in a Zürich grocery store and holds up a pot of yoghurt,  
“The container of yogurt that I am holding is a well-defined quantity.  You can 
remember it, my mother for example buys the same yogurt she knows exactly 
which yogurt she always buys and she wants to buy exactly the same yogurt—she 
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lays value in buying the same one (legt wert darauf). And when it gets more 
expensive she doesn’t go somewhere else to find it, she sticks with her favorite 
store and is annoyed about the price. Price increases in things we buy often, for 
example groceries, we are very conscious of.  And this is why we have the feeling 
everything is getting more expensive. Things that we buy less often such as 
computers, televisions often get cheaper, but we are seldom conscious of that. 
‘These goods are exactly representative of that class of goods that strongly shape 
in our inflation-consciousness. Goods that are bought often play a significantly 
more important role than goods that are bought less often. So in clear text, if the 
price of butter changes or the cost of gas I’m intensely conscious of that. But if 
the price of the model 5 BMW changes, I’m not conscious of that. Because I 
might not buy Model 5 BMW for another 10 years” 
 
As in many other examples, small commodities bought every day are contrasted with big 
ticket-items bought once in a decade. The contrast of the BMW, as opposed to the 
computer or small electronics often used, highlights what I found to be the case 
throughout my research: that complaints about the euro crosscut class lines and incomes. 
It is just as likely that a wealthy member of the upper middle-class will complain about 
the euro as it is the case for a low-wage worker or unemployed person. Such reports, 
along with the communications work I observed at the Bundesbank, demonstrate and 
underscore the importance of legitimizing the euro on the basis of market phenomena 
while also externalizing effects such as fluctuating prices to the forces of supply and 
demand.  
 The research of Brachinger shows that perceived inflation influences consumer 
behavior, and thereby, the expectations that central banks believe contribute to 
inflationary pressures. The report explains that Brachinger has devised a mode of 
calculating this rate of ‘perceived inflation.’ He concludes that people’s perceived 
inflation is three times as high as the rate indicated by the official statistics. Brachinger 
concludes his explanation by playing on a highly popular trope I heard often in the field: 
‘never trust a statistic you haven’t falsified yourself,’ which is an ironic means of 
illuminating the constructed nature of such measures:  
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“The problem with a statistic and a lie is contained therein that I can never say 
exactly whether a statistic is a lie. Why? Because the truth is not available. I can 
only recognize a statement to be false if I can compare it with the truth.  I can do 
that with simple things, for instance how many people are here in the room. But 
with more complex things like inflation that is impossible. No person knows the 
true inflation.”  
 
Brachinger’s thesis of felt inflation speaks to the limits of measuring inflation, but also 
provides a market explanation that attends to consumer psychology and pragmatic 
repertories of calculating costs. It also diffuses the political nature of the euro and the 
monetary policy of the Central Bank 
One respondent noted that the benefits of the euro are enjoyed by those, who can 
take advantage of the difference between its ‘external’ and ‘internal” value. “Whenever 
you keep the exchange rate of a currency high, then those who take advantage of 
exchange rates feel they have more. But otherwise, the external value of the currency is 
not relevant to someone living on social welfare.” 
He echoed the complaints of many about the euro and price increases (euro-
teuro). “It is worst in restaurants and catering. So a bratwurst you buy on the street is 1:1, 
but in other sectors, prices haven’t changed much. Some prices are lower. But the costs of 
many services have nevertheless risen. Really prices there should have decreased. Why 
didn’t they go down?” Whereas some consumer advocates documented how merchants 
took advantage of the change, another explanation is that the currency was devalued 
before its introduction.  
Donncha Marron points to the paradoxes of numerical objectivity that provide 
some interesting parallels to the problematic discussed here in his study of the 
development of credit scoring in the US as a means of predicting and mitigating risk 
(Marron 2007). Marron notes that financial institutions are under some legal obligation to 
provide consumers with some explanation of how their credit score was calculated, in 
particular when credit is denied. He argues, “the production of objectivity through the 
elimination of the question of the subject and its re-situation across disparate, 
independent variables creates a counter-problem, and source of dissent, in terms of the 
loss of a coherent sense of cause … risk rests uneasily with how individuals experience 
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the world as subjects” (112) Drawing on Dawes (an economic psychologist), Marron 
writes, “there is always a need for a causal explanatory narrative to justify or explain 
relations between variables.  Without such a narrative, a statistical relation will tend to be 
rejected or ignored, especially if there are intuitive explanations or it clashes with 
prevailing cultural beliefs” (112). Marron highlights the ways in which technical 
expertise bumps up against its own limits in moments where individuals attempt to locate 
the meanings of this knowledge within their own explanatory frameworks (Dominguez 
1990; Neiburg 2006; Neiburg 2010).   
Public discontent with the Euro—whether it is the object of, or vehicle for, 
critique of other issues—highlights the difficulties in maintaining singular explanations 
of cause and effect. However, some explanations matter more than others—and carry 
more explanatory power. Technical explanations carry more weight than the ways in 
which individuals experience and make sense of them. Thus arguments about the agency 
and effect of the Euro often work at cross-purposes: efforts to build trust for the euro 
depend upon the very emotions that expertise excludes from its conditions of possibility.  
I point to the fissures and cracks of stable explanations to move beyond an analysis that 
merely critiques statistics and economic abstraction, or that privileges a narrative of 
resistance to the euro and the power of money alone. Instead I want to capture what I 
interpret as, at its best, an ongoing dialogue about the meanings and commitments of 
Europeanization and the meanings of monetary value. 
From the vantage point of the Bundesbank (or ECB) and other experts who are 
concerned with producing a coherent and “stable” vision of Europeanization, critiques of 
expert measures of economic stability tend to be perceived as undermining trust in the 
project of Europeanization and calling into question the necessity of taming the 
irrationalities of subjective economic experience with the logic of expertise (Holmes 
2014). However, I want to suggest that debates about the appropriate measures of 
Europeanization should not be dismissed as ‘mis-readings’ of expertise but instead 
understood as suggestive of the fragilities and uncertainties of modern global financial 
networks.  At the same time, these tensions and doubts are productive of different kinds 
of dialogue between experts and the public. These can and should extend beyond 
  99 
technical definitions of price stability to include the multiple contexts in which both 
experts and the public situate their experiences of money and economic stability.  
 
Putting a public face on the euro 
 
In July 2006 (coincidentally also the finale of the World Cup), I observed a three-
day public event at which the Geldmuseum of the Bundesbank was also represented: the 
annual Museumsuferfest (Museum festival) held on the banks of the Main river, during 
which all of the local museums hand out information about their collections, offer free 
admittance, and sponsor various activities. At the Bundesbank tent, drawings were held 
for a special ten-euro World Cup commemorative coin.  To be eligible for the drawing, 
visitors were asked to participate in the ‘Is the euro a teuro quiz?’  Participants studied a 
series of posters displaying various statistics and charts to illustrate facts such as how the 
euro measures up in different categories like interest rates and inflation in comparison to 
other economies, how prices have changed for particular goods over time, and the 
responsibilities of the European system of central banks.  While acknowledging that 
prices for services had increased, particularly due to the pecuniary nature of (some) 
service providers, the quiz was designed to assure visitors that the euro had not been 
responsible for higher prices and was indeed living up to its promised benefits.    
Though generally characterized by an atmosphere of humor and informality—
especially, one might add, because as many commentators had noted, all economic 
concerns disappeared during the euphoria of the World Cup—there were also moments of 
tension as visitors and passersby brought their own interpretations to the question posed 
by this quiz.  When one man heard about the drawing of the World Cup coin, he asked 
jokingly, ‘is it a Deutschmark commemorative coin?’ The staff member on duty shook 
her head to say no, sensing where this might be going.  The man laughed somewhat 
skeptically and moved on without stopping to participate in the quiz.  In another more 
charged incident, one woman who was asked if she wanted to take part in the quiz looked 
at the staff member with an angry glare, saying ‘the basket of goods!’ while making a 
gesture signifying ‘crazy,’ ‘I can’t eat a plane ticket or computer!!’ The staff member 
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thought a moment about how to respond and replied, ‘pesto sauce has gotten cheaper.’  
The woman looked at her in apparent disbelief, retorting: ‘well, I don’t buy pesto.  I don’t 
need that at all!’ The woman walked away as the staff member shook her head somewhat 
wearily.  Sometime after this, the same staff member overheard a participant who is 
reading the sign to himself, asking, ‘Yes, how is the rate of inflation in Germany…’ to 
which the staff member also speaking to herself (and at me) and looking out towards the 
river, replies with passion and pumping both arms to make her point: ‘Good—thanks to 
us!!’ 
Not all experiences of the euro were conveyed in negative or critical terms, 
however. In interviews I conducted in 2006 with visitors to the Geldmuseum, many youth 
were especially positive about the euro, repeating the narratives of the ease with which 
one can now travel through other member states without changing money and the 
possibility of comparing euro prices in different euro countries.  Many, however, noted 
that for their parents and grandparents, the euro often continued to be a source of 
frustration manifested in complaints such as the “Teuro” and rising prices, or the 
awkwardness in dealing with the various denominations of coins. In one focus group 
comprised of a teacher and eight students who were studying to work in a bank, four 
students expressed dissatisfaction with the euro while the other four students viewed this 
positively.  Debating among themselves about the pros and cons of the euro, one student 
argued that the reluctance of the British to give up the pound, which was stronger than 
the euro, was understandable—to which another student responded: “but we also gave up 
a strong currency!’ After more discussion, their teacher spontaneously asked her students 
to take a vote: who would like to return to the Deutschmark and who would like to keep 
the euro?   Though the vote remained divided down the middle, what was interesting to 
note is that two of the students who had been complaining about the euro raised their 
hands in favor of the euro during the vote.  Of course none of these students took this 
vote (or the return of the Deutschmark) as a serious possibility.  In my reading of this, the 
students recognized that ultimately an assessment of the euro couldn’t be reduced to 
simple pro and con arguments (or they felt there was nothing they could do about it either 
way).  However, when I recounted this event to one of the Bundesbank staff members, 
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she seemed alarmed saying, we can’t allow you to ask students to vote on something like 
this!  When I explained that the teacher had initiated this quite unexpectedly and that I of 
course would not pose the question in this manner, the concern dissipated—but only 
somewhat!  However, I was reminded again of how these debates are a site of continuing 
tension even when they take the form of more or less playful dialogue. 
In my conversations with youth from Eastern Europe whose families were living 
and working in Germany, concerns about the introduction of the euro in their home 
countries was often expressed because they feared that prices would rise as a result and 
be unmanageable for family members with such low incomes.  One young man from 
Poland noted wryly, that ‘if they have they euro they will all come here!’ (That is, to 
Germany), something he clearly did not want.  Though it is hard to say at the moment 
how representative these examples are of wider perceptions, they do illustrate the 
importance of understanding how different generational and national experiences inform 
understandings of the euro and how these understandings might be shaped in different 
ways in the context of one’s family.   
In August 2008, I participated in the festival once again.  Unlike two years before, 
the rate of inflation in the euro zone was much higher, having reached 3,75%--far beyond 
the Central Bank target of close to 2%, which is the official measure of price stability. 
This year’s quiz was entitled, The Euro Ten Years On: What has it brought us?  One 
visitor responded to the title by saying, “What has the euro brought? Only 
disappointment.” She began calculating what her salary had been in Deutsch Marks, and 
what it now was in euro. She said, my salary was cut in half, but the cost of living has 
doubled! Another visitor standing nearby approached a staff member and myself, 
demanding an explanation about article 115 in the as yet un-ratified Lisbon Treaty, which 
he understood as undermining the independence of the central bank.  The staff member 
explained to him that this was not the case, but that his question would be researched and 
he would receive a call from the relevant division at the Bundesbank.  As the staff 
member went to retrieve a form to make note of the question, the visitor explained to me 
that his son worked in the financial sector, as had he.  He had written to the German 
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parliament and received no answer to his questions.  He narrated with some passion a 
number of working theories and then expressed frustration with the euro, despite its 
current strength against the dollar. “The euro is a buttery-soft currency! It is not really 
stable. It is only strong because the dollar is so weak. Only Italy and Spain have really 
profited from the euro.” Soon after the visitor left, the staff member approached me 
sympathetically, saying, “You poor thing! This is a festival, not a place for discussion.  
We will call him back with an answer. It would be better to invite him in to my office for 
a discussion. This is simply not the place to argue!    
In another case, a visitor who also worked in the financial sector asked another 
staff member, “Aren’t you still public servants (Beamten)? Why do we still need the 
Bundesbank—isn’t the European Central Bank managing things now?”  The staff 
member spoke with me later saying, “I (we) get this question all the time.  The visitor 
was laughing when asking the question, not even taking himself seriously.”  Though the 
staff-member made light of the exchange, one could see a kind of “battle-weariness in his 
face.  The provocation was two-fold: one, that Bundesbank employees have existential 
security unlike many other Germans these days, and, two, the work of the Bundesbank is 
merely an excuse for justifying such positions to begin with.  Though encounters with the 
public are by no means always this intense, such questions reveal the ambiguities through 
which both experts and the public must navigate new definitions of economic 
responsibility within the EU.  
 
Good old D-Mark 
 
And yet, the D-Mark continues to provide many Germans with a baseline from 
which to reflect on their lives in the past and to calculate the temporalities of market 
transformations. As in the examples above, efforts to show how faulty memory can be 
when reckoning with the past underscore how the euro competes with the affective ties 
that have traditionally reinforced attachment to national currency. Below I want to 
highlight two different instances of these forms of reckoning.  
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In the first, a consumer report illuminates well the emotional qualities people 
attach to the D-Mark and how these are intimately connected with recalling time prior to 
the euro. The aim of the report also illustrates the use of official measurements as a 
method of detaching this affection from the D-Mark while also inscribing a new regime 
of legitimacy for the euro. Though these forms of argument and evidence continually 
‘fail’ to win over everyone, such efforts to set people right are about more than financial 
education. They are about deflecting the politics of the euro through its naturalization as a 
market medium. Whereas in the past the conflation of capital and currency could draw on 
national boundaries to enlist the public in support of the currency (Peebles 2004), the 
euro must redraw such boundaries through a logic of the market. Often taken for granted 
when using national currencies, the market reappears here as an open question as people 
scrutinize claims about the euro.  
In the second example, I draw on an interview with an entrepreneur in Leipzig to 
show the reasoning through which reckoning with the euro is narrated. This example also 
shows well the temporality of currency within histories of change and transformation. 
  
 Deceptive memories, strategic forgetting: A consumer and economic 
informational program ran a short-piece on D-Mark nostalgia and its relation to the 
accuracy of memory about price and the value of money. I was able to view and record 
the program on June 17, 2008.11  
The moderator, Jörg Becker, sets up the piece by invoking the mythic history of 
the D-Mark: “The D-Mark inaugurated the hour of the social market economy.  For 6 
years now the D-Mark has been enjoying its well-earned retirement. But more people 
than ever before people long for this bill and for the good life with which it appears to be 
connected. In German, this last part makes use of a play on the double meaning of 
banknote “Schein” and appearance (here, “scheinbar”). “It is now time to correct this 
appearance.” On this last note, Clara Schuman, who is featured on the last series of the 
100 D-Mark note can be seen winking.    
                                                 
11
 Transcription and translation mine 
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Reporters walk through the streets of an unspecified city, but clearly in the west 
based on the urban features and accented High German. They are gathering avid attention 
by handing out D-Marks as the entrée to their impromptu mobile survey. As they extend 
the various notes, people respond with laughter, tears, and sometimes even euphoric 
outcries. “Thank you, thank you,” one woman exclaims and places the bills inside her 
shirt, close to her heart.  Another women gestures strongly, bill in hand, saying “I would 
help with the printing if we could get these back!”  Upon receiving the D-mark note in 
their hands, many women place it close to their breast, eyes closed with longing, as if 
embracing a long-lost friend.   
The all-informative narrator asks, “Were the D-Mark times really so rosy? What 
is the truth, and what is simply a legend? In order to test this we are on the go with D-
Mark notes.” The question the surveyors want the street participants and the viewers at 
home to contemplate: ‘At what time did a D-Mark have this purchasing power? 
Concretely: when was it possible to buy 5 liters of milk, 1 kilo meat, sugar, flour, bread, a 
pound of coffee, cheese butter and chocolate, eggs, vegetables, and fruit? Everything in 
this basket here for 50 D-Marks? When was that possible?” “When was it possible to fill 
the grocery cart with items such as these for 50 marks?” Respondents can select from 
four dates: 2000, 1995, 1985, or 1965. Many respondents guess the 1990’s, and some the 
80’s.  
In further examples, people are asked about a specific denomination of note and 
its value. People can give examples of what they could purchase with a 5 D-Mark note, 
for instance. One man replies, for 5 Marks I could buy 6 beers in 1977. And with a 10 
Mark note? I could buy a crate of beer. The facts are checked, with the Federal Office of 
statistics, which shows that such prices for beer were last seen in 1957, and not 1977 as 
the respondent had guessed.  
Another man guesses it was possible to buy 4 loaves of bread, 30 rolls, and a crate 
of water for that amount. But we are told that was last possible in 1965. Yet another 
remembers that he could fill up the tank of his VW Bug with gas for a 20-mark note. But 
we learn that the last time this was possible was in 1966, before the oil crisis. And the 50-
Mark note, which is ascribed a quality, the “adequate” one? Another man replies nodding 
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to his wife, ‘you could go out for a nice evening for dinner. It was sufficient.” Or in the 
words of one, ‘that was the ‘obligatory’ note—you could buy pretty much anything 
essential you might need.” And a women leaving the store gestures, ‘before, with 50 
Marks, you could buy a whole cart of groceries!”  
The 100 D-Mark note, “the note that can do it all’? A young man stops to think, 
‘with 100 D-Mark, what could I afford with that? What could I do? Much more than fill 
the tank with gas, he laughs. And there was even enough to cover dinner.’ When asked 
this same question, a middle-aged man claims that he could buy two pairs of jeans, 
whereas now with 50 euros (for him approximately the equivalent of 100 Marks 
according the 2002 conversion rate, ‘I only get one pair.’ 
The narrator chimes in here abruptly with a firm, correcting tone: “Wrong, the 
jeans have decreased in price since the introduction of the euro. The last time a brand 
name pair of jeans could be purchased for 50 marks was in 1967.” 
 And the shopping cart full of groceries for 50 D-Marks? Some guess in the 
2000’s, before the introduction of the euro, while some estimate it being possible around 
1985. In both cases, respondents get it wrong. “It is hard to believe” the narrator prefaces 
the correction. “Everyone we asked was off by decades. In fact, the year that you could 
purchase this cart of groceries was 1965.” We learn that indeed almost all the prices 
remembered correspond to this date. One consumer reflects, as if still processing the 
revelation: “This is just a normal shopping phenomenon. Memory deceives. It turns out 
that you don’t always have a feel for the prices.” But not everyone is willing to revise his 
opinion, we learn. ‘I don’t believe it. Nevertheless, the D-Mark was much better!”  
 The report concludes, almost with a sigh of resignation. ‘The good old D-Mark. 
Her purchasing power is mercilessly overvalued. But with each price increase the Euro is 
ever more unpopular, and the love for the D-Mark greater.”  
As I noted above, the changeover to the euro provided an opening for merchants 
to take advantage of new ways of thinking about and converting prices and exchange 
rates in order to hide an increase in prices. Both experts and the public draw on this latter 
phenomenon to locate the agency behind rising prices away from membership in the euro 
and on to external market forces or instead in the corrupt behavior of particular market 
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actors and the public, or to connect the euro with specific economic effects in ways that 
question more directly the claims that can be made about the euro.   
As the director of the visitors’ center commented during one interview in 2006,  
 
‘The introduction of the euro occurred at the same time that Germany was 
undergoing a time of recession and new economic context.  This had the 
disadvantage of leading to a common conflation of the euro with the effects 
of other economic trends such as a rise in energy costs and other pressures of 
globalization…It is necessary to communicate that these pressures have 
nothing to do with the euro…’ 
 
And yet, such attempts to de-link the euro from the market remind that money is far from 
the neutral medium of exchange that many economists and specialists claim. 
 
Reckoning with the euro 
 
Herr Nord, an alternative energy entrepreneur in Leipzig, offers a vivid way to 
think about the cultural logics of calculating the efficacy of the euro. By reckoning the 
relative values of currencies, prices, and costs of living, it is possible to reflect upon the 
historicity of money.  Reckoning with the euro shows the repertoires of intelligibility that 
have accompanied the euro as political/economic project. They also show how the euro is 
tangible in a way that the EU often is not, but not in the ways that the architects of the 
project might wish. At the same time, however, we can see that the idea of Europe does 
not necessarily coincide with the euro, just as the euro can be seen as a good idea, but 
materializing new inequalities and uncertainties about its sustainability.  
 Herr Nord emphasized in the third-person plural that. ‘We can accept that we 
have a single currency, thereby emphasizing the changes that east Germans have 
experienced more recently in contrast with the difficult and limited conversions of 
currency in the GDR: 
 
So of course we understand these many changes that came with different 
currencies. So that today the expectation of Europe, the measuring out of 
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Europe’s profile in the world is a fantastic story. There is no alternative to it, I 
think.  If you imagine the US currency area, if every state had its own currency, 
then it would not function. So this single currency, I think it is more or less 
uncontested. Naturally, of course there are strong critiques about the introduction 
itself. One is not just practically self-employed, or economically informed. You 
are also a consumer. The predominant association with the euro, in my personal 
opinion, is that with the introduction of the euro political establishment was in a 
position to make the inflationary approach/projections less visible. The nominal 
value of the euro was approximately half that of the D-Mark. We know that the 
exchange rate was 1,95 something. But with the high prices and low wages, it 
seemed as if the value of our money was cut in half. If prices had not gone up, 
them the euro would have remained without critical comment if it had really been 
the case. But of course first in the services sector, in my perception, the change to 
the euro led them to push up the prices and not abide by the 1:2.Instead merchants 
used this rate to position themselves better. But the prices stayed high and so our 
purchasing power was cut in half. Of course when you calculate back with the 1:2 
rate it can be wrong, because you don’t include the price increase over the last six 
years. So of course there have been price increases in certain sectors that would 
have accepted if they had been moderate. But now it is the case that when you 
remember back to the prices in the past, in principle you are paying more in euros 
than we paid with the D-Mark. So then if you take six years and calculate, there 
has been a rate of increase around 15-20%. And that is not available. If you look 
at inflation, we are at somewhere between 1-3% I don’t know, so we have had 
different levels of inflation, where the rate has heated up such as energy, with the 
Iraq war, since then 2003, energy providers. You stand there and ask, how much 
did things cost and how much did I a pay in the past, 20 divided by 6, that is about 
3%. The rate of price increase, that is also what grows out of wages, that would 
have been okay, But politics did not control who raised what prices, didn’t have 
the possibility to do it, or they just didn’t think ahead. They assumed everyone 
would stick to the exchange rate. But then you see, whether it is Mr, Zum Winkel 
or whomever, the Germans are not honest. The small man can be as honest as he 
wants, but he doesn’t control the price when he enters the store, or the price he 
pays for rent, he has to pay it. So he can be honest, work as hard as possible for 
his employer, give up surplus value, but for the worker there are no possibilities. 
So that he might calculate his wages through this factor 1,95…. It’s not possible. 
So I think that this introduction of the euro, on the one hand it is a fantastic story, 
but on the other it has meant that in our daily lives, the ordinary citizen has been 
deceived.  But it is not visible because the sum, the amount that is stated is 
smaller and very few people can weigh how much of an increase there would be 
with inflation, but it should not have doubled in six years. 
 And another matter is this question of adjustment or alignment with other 
countries. For example in Poland and Germany or France there is the one and the 
same good, whether it is an hour of work or a loaf of bread, or a pair of shoes, no 
one gave a single thought to how that could lead to problems. I know of cases 
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where bread is transported from Poland to Germany and sold at dumping prices. 
People from Poland come to work here and they can work here or 4 euros, then 
people in Leipzig can’t afford to live.  
The euro is to a great extent the scapegoat. Of course it is not the only one. 
We have our executive, the political, the politicians –they don’t have a firm 
handle on things. I have a positive sentiment toward the euro, but then when you 
have these experiences in your personal life. For example, if I take the price of 
gas. At the moment the price for a liter of gas is euro 1,50, between 1,40 – 1,50. 
So if you calculate back to, if you extrapolate forward with your calculation, it 
costs us now, in East German money, calculating back, a liter of gas costs us 6 
euro. I mean, from the D-Mark, from the DDR Mark practically in the D-Mark 
1:2, and then into the euro yet again 1:2. That means that today what costs 1,50 
was 3 euro, if you calculate back then we are at 6 marks. So in just this short time, 
from 1989 20 years have passed by I pay for a liter of gas in GDR money, if I 
calculate that far back, 6 marks. That means that somewhere, in 20 years that is 
several times 100 percent added on. And it is exactly like this with many other 
commodities.  I could calculate this for services. During GDR times I could eat at 
a restaurant for 5 marks. That was enough for a Schnitzel and a beer, and maybe a 
dessert and there were--schnitzel is schnitzel I think, maybe a bit better today, the 
side dishes may be better. In the GDR you only had whatever vegetable was in 
season, now you can get any vegetable that can be transported cheaply. So, I paid 
5 GDR marks for that. But if I go out to eat anywhere today and order a schnitzel 
or beer, I am already at 10 euros. 10 euros are around 20 west marks, and then 
calculated further back, that is 40 east marks. The ration is in principle dramatic if 
you calculate back, so and I don’t allow that to hold me back, I ask what all has 
been going on during this time. And then people’s wages have not grown at that 
same rate. So when I think of our people, what did they earn, 1, 200 or 1,400 a 
worker’s salary in an office, and if I calculate, during GDR times they had 600 or 
700 marks. But now they have costs that are 4 times as much.  Of course other 
prices have risen moderately. And there have always been complaints about the 
price of food (groceries).  But it is about 10 percent of income. Of course it has 
gotten cheaper.  
Now with butter and milk, demand is so high, in the beginning, it was said 
that there was a high demand for milk in China and the production is insufficient. 
Of course, supply and demand rules the market. But if you know something more 
about this story, then it is the case that Chinese in general don’t tolerate milk well. 
That means it is just an argument to justify to people why the price is rising. And 
the same thing happens today with rising food prices. We are told that it is due to 
the rising costs of oil. And then there are so many milk production facilities that 
sit idle, because the EU pays a premium for non-production. So we pay the 
farmers not to produce. In principle it is not a question, we have quotas, if there 
really were bottlenecks then we could raise the quotas. You can just put a few 
more cows in the stall, and the milk will be bought. It is simply that, the legend, a 
myth was invented so that people can be told, listen, certain commodities are in 
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high demand in the market, and so to sell something at this [lower] price is no 
longer possible in Germany. For many, many years at the Leipzig trade fair, sat 
with Americans. We grew up very socially in the GDR. There is so much hunger 
in the world, and you throw so much away. Why can’t you put it in a ship and 
take it to Africa. They told me, we live in a market economy. If no one will pay 
for the ship to go from point a to b then the heap of grain will not be transported.  
The argument that people are starving to death there, that doesn’t count in this 
(American) society. So lets translate that. Just because somewhere in Africa or 
wherever there is undersupply and people are starving, we use the argument that 
prices in Germany are rising.  
 
Conclusion 
 
To return to my interview with Herr Klein at the ECB, whose career with the 
European Central Bank began with the birth of the euro (in 1999 as book money), as he 
narrated it, what I want to underscore here is the labor of legitimizing the euro and the 
fault-lines through which doubts find expression:  
Currency is a public good, but it is also market mechanism. I am a champion of 
the free market. The central bank is an independent advisor. As a public 
institution it is responsible for the common welfare (Gemeinwohl). When I asked 
about the still unfolding financial crisis, Herr Klein attributed the origin of the 
crisis to the US. “At some point the music stops playing. Small banks have gone 
under, those that are not ‘system relevant.’ The Fed and the ECB have different 
mandates. The ECB is first and foremost responsible for price stability in the 
medium term. The crisis has been a day of reckoning. Americans are still not 
saving. Balance has to be restored. After irrational exuberance comes a nasty 
awakening. The difference between Great Britain and continental Europe is that in 
GB people have never experienced a big bang. They don’t know what it is like for 
things to go downhill. There is a catching up process.   
How the proportions of scale are accounted for in the ECB: the new 
countries that joined 2004 all 10 together have the same economic weight as 
Holland. Iceland, so what? Malta, Cyprus—these countries are barely visible 
statistically. The four biggest countries account for 80% of the economic 
performance in the EU. Of course it is more complex. This is on the basis of 
aggregated data. Slowakia is nominally ripe. But countries have different 
developmental stages. We have managed that well. If there is a solid domestic 
policy, you can live successfully in the currency union. How would we have 
managed in the current financial crisis if we had not been in the currency union? 
There would have been dislocations. The euro has been a protective shield. We 
did not have that stability before when exchange rates floated up and down 
between different European countries. He did not understand why Denmark 
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continued to remain outside the Eurozone. They have to adjust at an instant to 
interest rates set in Frankfurt. They take on the policy but do not have a voice in 
the decision-making process in the ECB boardroom. And the British want to keep 
the queen on their banknotes. There are also political reasons. Sweden is obliged 
to adopt the euro, but have not done so because they do not qualify for purely 
technical formal reasons.  
These countries need to come to terms with themselves (mit sich selbst ins 
reine kommen). What do we want with Europe? A change of discourse is needed. 
This Eurosceptic discourse presents Europe as a zero sum game. When they 
decide what they want with Europe, then they can think about the euro. Is Britain 
in or out? Then we could have had a discussion. Europe is always a political 
construct, where countries are closely tied together. London is the greatest 
financial zone outside of the euro. It is absurd that the main activities happen 
outside the euro zone. It could be Frankfurt. More people work in finance in 
London than live in Frankfurt. The finance sector lives from knowledge and 
people. It is a conglomerate of knowledge and know-how. That is difficult to 
build up artificially. London is a financial center).  Language and infrastructure in 
Great Britain gives it an advantage. The regulator is at arm’s length and there is 
constant innovation.  
 
Central bankers’ primary responsibility is to ensure price stability—which is how 
they understand the value of currency to be created. They adopt a long-term vision 
arguing that sacrifices in the social domain must be made to ensure the stable value of the 
shared currency. While many members of the public may also prioritize the economic or 
exchange-rate value of the euro, many others look for results in the short-term: what 
implications does membership in the single currency have on public spending? Will they 
have to ‘pay for the poorer member states? Debates about price stability can contest 
and/or affirm how the value of a stable currency is defined.   
For example, experts are concerned with pointing out the difference between a 
currency union and a currency reform.  A currency union implies that the value of the 
new currency as well as the currency being replaced is in a stable and equivalent 
relationship of value to each other.  A currency reform, on the other hand, means that 
there is a real loss of value in converting from the old currency to a new currency.  Thus, 
by experiencing the euro as a loss of economic or monetary value, claims made about the 
switch to the euro as maintaining stable value are called into question.  On one level, a 
misreading or confusion about the differences between a currency reform and a currency 
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union may appear to be mere problems of definition, but I would argue that it also 
exposes the always incomplete project of taming the shifting nature of economic 
experience into the stable frameworks of monetary expertise. The category mistake 
speaks to the ways in which such transformations or conversions are experienced 
differently and in ways that belie the technical definitions used to categorize them.   
However, in interactions between experts and lay audiences on the subject of the 
effects and aims of the Euro, experts disconnect economic fact from experience or 
psychology—generally considered a subordinate explanatory framework to that of 
technical expertise.  Experience is written out of the technical definition.  While 
monetary expertise and explanation is far from uniform—a classic example is the 
Keynes/Monetarist debate— I have found that uniform and stable explanations are of 
central importance to monetary experts when communicating policies to the public, 
especially in the European context.  
Two related issues are at stake here: one is the more pedagogical problem of how 
to translate monetary expertise in ways that will make sense to non-experts; the other is 
the very political nature of this act in which technical definitions can themselves become 
unsettled in this process. Paradoxically, connecting technical definitions with other 
domains of experience and ways of knowing is what allows non-specialists to understand 
the meanings of these definitions, but it is also through making these connections that 
subjects may arrive at multiple and possibly alternative explanatory frameworks.  
Overshadowed somewhat by the financial crisis beginning in 2008, the Euro-
Teuro critique is always waiting in the wings, easily mobilized in moments of crisis.  
Most notably, the Greek debt crisis in the spring of 2010 resurrected renewed discussions 
of Euro-Teuro in the media.  Because they see the public as a powerful agent in 
influencing economic sentiment, Bundesbank staff acknowledges that market and 
political actors, cultural beliefs, and economic pressures work alongside monetary policy.  
However, the work of reframing the euro as being outside such influences is 
simultaneously an essential component of building trust in the Euro. Only by re-
inscribing the Euro as a neutral instrument that mediates fiscal responsibility but stands 
  112 
outside political and national interests can the (long-term) sustainability of diverse 
member-state economies be guaranteed. 
 
Part II. Bringing the EU closer 
 
“Politics is nothing but the attempt to reactivate that potential, or virtual, of the past so 
that a divergence or differentiation from the present is possible. Bergson is one of the few 
theorists to affirm the continual dynamism, not of the present, but of the past, its endless 
capacity for reviving and regenerating itself in an unknown and unpredictable future” 
(Grosz 2004) 
 
Introduction 
A refrain I often heard from my respondents is that during socialism you could 
not speak your mind for fear of being targeted by the state. Thus, speech could be a 
powerful act. Now, you can speak all you want. But it changes nothing.  
Many scholars have written about the EU as an elite project formed largely 
without substantial input from national citizenry. A technocratic project of immense 
bureaucracy and coordination decades in the making, it has been framed as a necessary 
means to ensuring democracy and peace in Europe. From the standpoint of ordinary 
citizens as well as in the critique of scholars, it has been imposed and implemented with 
limited opportunities for direct democratic decision-making. Referenda or popular votes 
have been distributed unevenly across member-states in accordance with specific 
constitutional mandates that require such a vote by law. For instance, in Ireland any 
change to the constitutional powers of the nation requires the people’s vote whereas in 
Germany national referenda are prohibited by law, due to the legacy of Hitler’s rise to 
power in part with a popular vote. Thus, across Europe, the experiences of democratizing 
the EU have been widely divergent, even sometimes contradictory. Again, to take the 
case of Ireland, if the desired answer is not achieved, people have been asked to hold a 
second referendum to yield the appropriate result. This occurred not once, but twice: the 
treaty of Nice was rejected and then later ratified, and the 2008 no-vote on the ratification 
of the Lisbon Treaty was replace by a yes-vote in 2009. Indeed, Ireland was the only 
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member nation to hold a referendum on the Lisbon treaty. Ireland was voting not only on 
its own behalf but also for the entire EU.   
 
What are the connections? 
 
In order to understand the global interconnections of money and financial 
expertise, it becomes necessary to attend to the ways in which local meanings help to 
produce what seem to be neutral and universal abstract processes. As Alan Klima argues, 
what is needed are “translations between various positions and understandings of a shared 
global situation that is, in turn, shared quite differently” (Klima 2004: 463). The question 
of how to locate agency and causality underlies competing explanatory frameworks used 
by both experts and the public to think through the meanings and effects of European 
economic integration.  The euro is mobilized in one instance as a response to 
globalization, and in the next as its agent.  
For example, the Economist special report on the celebration of the 50th 
anniversary of the EU (March 17, 2007: 13), “Europe’s mid-life crisis,” argued that the 
“biggest problem is economic” (13).  What is meant here is not the Euro per se but “slow 
growth and unemployment.”  The article goes on to note, “Indeed, economic ills make 
voters suspicious not only of globalization generally but also of such EU projects as 
enlargement and the single market” (13). Here globalization appears as a parallel process 
with economic integration. Yet, global economic pressures are often used to argue for the 
need for national economic cooperation at the supranational level, via the single currency, 
which necessitates economic sacrifices (such structural reform and austerity measures). 
But the promise of prosperity is also deeply tied to efforts to win trust for the euro, just as 
a rise in income inequality is bound to undermine that trust.  Is the euro (European 
monetary policy) merely a response to, or is it instead producing and intensifying 
globalization—if not within then certainly beyond the borders of Europe?  The article 
goes on to argue that the EU “works without the constitution” (13), but one could 
reasonably ask how and why the EU is imaginable without a constitution, but not without 
the single currency?    
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Herr Peters responded to my question about the idea of Europe—whether it is a 
shield from globalization, or merely a part of it—by connecting it first to the narrative of 
peace: “The EU is certainly a part [of globalization]. But I don’t imagine that European 
countries will fall upon each other. I think they have learned from history. Europe is 
about the internal market, represents [darstellen] a closed economic place of location. I 
don’t see a horror scenario there. I think it is more likely that power blocks could form. 
But these are only fantastic imaginations [nur fantasievorstellungen]. But what about 
differences within the EU, I wondered? Herr Peters:  
“It is nice that one can travel across Europe, pay with the same currency, it makes 
travel easy. But identity gets lost. I don’t think it is bad to have different 
currencies. It has something to do with being in a foreign place. For Germany it is 
a problem. There is still an invisible wall. I don’t like to say that West Germans 
are better Europeans than East Germans. But, the ease with which Europe is taken 
as a matter of course is more pronounced there. East Germany, it must first 
conduct itself [betreiben] as if it were part of Germany as a whole 
[Gesamtdeutsch]. There are still resentments between West and East Germans, 
such that others [in Europe]…they are much further away. European Unification 
did not come from the people but from decision makers [Entschiedungsträger]. A 
person must fit themselves in [reinfügen], find roles, and search…It will take 
some time still before one understands oneself as European. 
 
What has the EU done for you lately?  
 
Leipzig: One afternoon I sat down with Erika and her then boyfriend, Jan, for an 
extended three-way dialogue about the interconnections and possibilities they believed 
the EU to materialize in their lives as young citizens of Germany and Europe. Jan is 28 
and is self-employed as an insurance salesman. Erika, 22, is the young musician whose 
one-room apartment I had been subletting while she studied abroad in Finland. Her 
parents and sister had adopted me as part of the family during my stay. It was through 
their lives and stories that I learned not only about the GDR but acquired a grounded 
perspective about the joys and burdens of post-unification life in Leipzig. Erika’s parents 
were successful and creative in pulling together the different facets of their lives before 
and after ’89 into a stable framework in which their daughters learned to appreciate the 
value of thrift but also the importance of investing in education and artistic pursuits. Both 
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daughters were accomplished musicians and played expensive instruments. The 
instruments were financed by Erika’s parents, neither of which had a background in 
music or substantial assets, and who therefore financed their daughters’ musical pursuits 
through savings and credit. Erika had recently returned but had decided to live in her old 
room at home for a while to save money on rent, which I was paying by subletting. I was 
getting to know Erika better in person, even though I felt I already knew her a little, 
living in her place and among her books, furnishings, plates and dishes some 
manufactured in the now vanished GDR. During evenings when her parents invited me to 
dinner, or on cold fall day when I learned how to make stolen from Erika’s mom, who 
was preparing several for Erika’s care package to Finland, I got to know here even better 
through the lens of her parents’ stories and reports.  
Now that she was back, I experienced Erika to be a curious and reflective young 
woman. We talked about my research. Erika wondered what she could possibly 
contribute to a study about the euro and the EU but was interested in participating. At the 
time she had just begun to date Jan and she felt he might be better able to talk about the 
euro given his work in insurance. On a warm afternoon in June, we met at my (her) place. 
Erika brought a cake made by her mom for the occasion. We gathered around the table, 
well supplied with coffee and cake, to discuss the auspicious ‘EU.’ 
Quite spontaneously and fortuitously the trajectory of our conversation touched 
upon multiple and highly relevant layers of my project, spanning from the euro and the 
intelligibility of market indicators, to different perceptions of the EU within Europe, to 
the ways in which experiences of socialism and deindustrialization informed the first 
local referendum in Leipzig.   
 Jam emphasizes what he feels to be the advantages of Europe. You can cross 
borders freely and apply for work across the EU. “I like that, free borders, free markets. 
That helps with the growing together.” But he instantly notes a paradox, bringing up the 
example of Kosovo and the division of Serbs and Croats. “Why are they separating?: he 
laughed, shaking his head and gathering momentum for his main point: “They are 
separating and yet simultaneously they each want to join the EU. So they are separating, 
but then, they are coming back together in the EU.” For Jan it seems ironic to first insist 
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on being separate states and yet at the same time apply to join the EU where according to 
the latter logic, the point is eventually to dissolve political boundaries. 
 When I asked both about how they felt Europe and European issues were 
experienced in Germany, Jan felt the problem was one of “wrong communication.” The 
EU is not communicated well, and in parallel, ‘Germans are a people who are overly 
critical,” he felt. I heard this self-critique of Germany often, in part I believe, because 
Americans are believed to be more positive and this contrast often seemed to be salient 
for many respondents. However, it signals without stating so, the critique levied in 
particular against the complaining Ossi such that the critical stance can generate stigma 
as much it can also be shrugged off as being ‘typical German.’ 
 In my dialogue with Jan and Erika it was immediately apparent that Jan 
dominated the conversation, while Erika tended to take on a more thoughtful and 
reserved stance. I noticed this very often when it came to discussions of the euro and the 
EU, not only here but in many other encounters, that these were highly gendered topics. 
That is, female respondents often felt hesitant about articulating their impressions in 
informal terms. But I also had gotten to know Erica well through the stories of her 
parents in particular, and by subletting here one-room apartment. We were sitting in her 
apartment, surrounded by her belongings, and yet she was suddenly a guest and also 
contributing to my research project. Because Erika had just spent the better part of a year 
in Finland, I wanted to know about her impressions of the EU from a different corner of 
this construct, and as a young person enjoying the frequently touted benefits of European 
cosmopolitanism. When I asked if she thought people felt differently about the EU in 
Finland, Erica was both recalling and connecting impressions as if for the first time. 
 
ERIKA: Things are different there. Europe is communicated more openly, 
because they realize that they need the EU and that they have to be motivated 
because otherwise they will be irrelevant in the world, ‘no one will come to us.’ 
So in this way they are, of their own accord, a little more open.  
JAN: they are dependent 
ERIKA: I don’t know what you mean by dependent? 
JAN:  Young people want to leave the country 
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ERIKA: What struck me is that it is taken for granted that at some point every 
young person will spend time outside the country, to study, work, or in an 
internship. But it is clear to every young person that they will spend some time in 
a foreign country. Here in Germany that is not self-evident (a matter of course), 
except maybe for university students. But now I read in the paper that more 
should be done to encourage young people to spend time outside the country, 
more than the 1/3rd of students who currently do.  Now they want to reach a goal 
of at least 50 percent at the least. But these are the exceptions. We [here in 
Germany] still have the perception that people come here. 
Clinics in East Germany offer training, many people are now coming from 
Eastern Europe, trained here without cost, but then they leave to work in the west 
after having been trained here for free. They leave because they are paid better in 
the west. They all leave. This is the biggest problem we have right now. Because 
these positions are subsidized by the EU, these are free workplaces for the 
purposes of training, which is what the EU supports. But then people leave, 
because the conditions are worse here. So they travel on to work elsewhere. And 
at the same time, this is a loss for the clinics here.  
 
 
Erika is making an important link not only to the ways in which mobility imagined and 
undertaken from differently positioned ‘national’ starting points within the EU, but also 
to different histories of immigration and development. What is more, she makes a crucial 
link to the manner in which East German regions are crosscut by processes of uneven 
development. That is, as many commentators have noted, and certainly confirmed by 
many of my respondents, East German cities have been passed over for development as 
western companies took advantage of lower wages in Poland and the Czech Republic, 
and from the opposite end, Eastern European workers take advantage of the EU subsidies 
to build skills in cities like Leipzig, but then move further west—much as many eastern 
youth, where incomes and future prospects for promotion are much higher. Notably, 
Erika sees the loss of skilled eastern European workers not in terms of jobs lost to 
German workers, but as a loss to workplaces in the area not only in terms of invested 
time and money in training people who leave, but also for the possibility of new forms of 
community building in the EU. Jan, however, sees a country like Finland as more 
dependent upon the EU, whereas Germany appears here as self-sufficient. Even though 
many Germans, and easterners in particular, have left to work in other parts of the EU 
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and Europe, the norm continues to be a better life somewhere else in Germany. However, 
in response to Erika’s example at the clinics, Jan tacked on that such stories are not 
communicated to the public. An awareness of these issues is not possible because “the 
communication never reaches us.”  
 
JAN: but as far as the communication, that is never communicated here and never 
reaches us. I think it (the EU) is simply too far away. Sometimes you hear 
something about it in the news, that the EU has just decided something. You 
think, okay. People know that there are EU subsidies. That is closer to one’s life if 
you are employed, where do I receive my money? Stoiber [a CSU conservative 
politician] we know he is doing something in the EU, and we are all happy that he 
is doing it there and not here (laughs) But as far as the communication goes, we 
have the flag with the EU emblem, we have common subsidized projects, we have 
exchange programs, and we know that agriculture is subsidized by the EU—but in 
agriculture this leads to waste of money [Geld verschleudern]. For example, 
money is paid in order to leave fields unplanted. Or meaningless projects are 
sponsored. This is the case in general, in my perception.  
U: and Sachsen? 
JAN: I believe that Sachsen is a front-runner in agriculture, there we are very 
productive, but in much of Germany a lot of money is wasted (wird viel Geld 
versenkt). Butter Mountains—does that ring a bell? 
U: Butter Mountains? 
JAN: That is when the EU buys up butter, and it is stored. It is just stored, not 
sold, in order to stabilize the price of butter.  
U: But then why don’t they [the EU] address the milk situation? Recently the new 
EU policy states that subsidies for milk production should end and that the prices 
should be set by the market and not by some officials.   
JAN: Because that is not an EU story. That is a regional—no national—problem 
having to do with the wage policy (Lohnpolitik) in Germany. That’s why the EU 
does not intervene. And that is not their place to do so. Member states are 
autonomous if I remember this correctly. So the EU is not allowed to intervene 
(eingreiffen).  
 
 
For Jan the EU is most visible in statements in the media that inform of the EU’s latest 
decisions and in the dense and contradictory politics of subventions. The latter are 
understood as a tangible materialization of benefits but also waste exemplified though the 
analogy of the butter mountain. The EU promotes free markets and yet manipulates 
prices. Moreover, the EU political scene is the place for politicians who are otherwise no 
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longer needed or the source of embarrassment at home. When I brought up the example 
of recent protests at the time of my fieldwork about milk prices in the region being forced 
down by discount stores, and where producers had little choice but to sell their milk 
below their costs of production, the policies of the EU seemed contradictory. The 
relationship between EU, national and regional politics and policies is the subject of 
intense debate and a constant source of confusion. EU decisions thus seem arbitrary. The 
point at which EU and national agendas and powers overlap or are distinguished 
contributes to an effect of proximity and distance of the EU construct. I repeated what I 
had heard from my research with EU-educators at Europa Haus, that a majority of EU 
laws and policies are decided at the national level. Whereas people imagine that the EU is 
deciding things without the input of member states, as I understood it, the EU can’t 
decide, it is the national parliaments that make decisions. This sparked a discussion 
between Jan and Erika about whether the EU can decides things without the involvement 
of EU member states, the weighting of decisions, and if the founding nations have more 
weight in the decision-making process. This became a key point of debate with Poland’s 
accession to the EU given that weighted votes corresponded to the population—giving 
Poland potentially as much (or more) weight than Germany. Jan explained that in eastern 
Germany, antagonism towards Polish workers was prevalent:  
 
JAN: “Here in the east, Poles have been devalued. People feel they are taking 
away our jobs, or we go shopping across the border. But Poland has a more stable 
economy than here, a better partner for the EU.  But they are a developing 
country, less industry, more agriculture.  They have lower inflation than we do, 
greater growth. I can only welcome the fact that Poland is joining (kommt dazu). 
The bigger the better, I believe. But still, communication with people about the 
EU, it is too bureaucratic. Takes too long to understand the effects of decisions. 
And the states are tied together too loosely. The EU decides something, but then it 
may not go into effect for five years. Then the EU doesn’t interest people. I feel 
that the EU does not affect me (keine auswirkung)—the euro yes—but the EU, 
no. 
 
When Jan says that Poland has a more stable economy than “here,” he is referring to 
eastern Germany. As in Erika’s example about the clinics, the regions unfavorable 
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position in relation to West German and Poland are implied. I did not personally observe 
outright discrimination against foreigners in Leipzig and heard about such stereotyping 
via third parties (which parallels how respondents told me about cases of discrimination 
against East German workers). Jan’s description of eastern resentment toward Poles 
mirrors experiences of many easterners in relation to westerners. Notably Jan, like the 
vast majority of my respondents, emphasizes his openness to and acceptance of other 
Europeans and ethnic minorities. This does not mean of course that people were free of 
stereotyping and resentments, or that their daily practices corresponded to their stated 
openness and inclusion of others. Based on those individuals who I got to know well, I 
would be inclined to support their self-presentations. For my purposes here, though, I 
want to point out that eastern Germans tend to be stereotyped in mainstream discourse as 
more prone to racism and anti-immigrant sentiments. This is all the more reason why in 
addressing these issues, Jan, as many others, was careful and sincere in demonstrating 
acceptance of non-Germans, and the basic ideology of inclusion propagated by the EU. 
Thus, contrary to what is often stated by political and academic elites, the felt-distance to 
the EU does not necessarily correlate with nationalist sentiments. Distance or proximity 
is constituted in part through different forms of media. For this reason, and as many EU 
planners presupposed, the euro currency would be the medium that could make the EU 
tangible. For Jan, it is the euro specifically that exerts some felt agency over his life. But 
this does not mean that the euro must or will materialize the particular relations or 
meanings the architects intend (as we have already seen). But unlike other forms of 
connection with the EU, the monetary, financial and social relationships that membership 
in the euro or EU entails are more difficult to piece together. EU institutions emphasize 
the benefits and accomplishments, with less attention to the obligations or unequal power 
relations the EU creates within and outside its ‘borders.’ That young people reflect upon 
these new arrangements even while stating they are difficult to understand, is a point that 
Erica underscores below: 
 
ERIKA: From my perspective, it is too difficult to understand. To what extent EU 
decisions can be sensed in one’s personal life. That is the thing that should be 
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explained. The first time that it became clearer to me was when I was at the 
movies, watching this film, ‘We Feed the World’ It was about food around the 
world, how is it distributed. Where do tomatoes come from? 
U: from Holland (laughs)  
JAN: no, only water comes from there… 
ERIKA: we get the tomatoes from Africa and Spain because the EU subsidizes 
the cultivation there, but then in Africa, the farmers there can’t sell their products 
because Africans by the cheaper products subsidized by the EU. Well great. I 
don’t understand the logic of this. We could just produce for ourselves.  
JAN: That’s simple. The EU is a consortium (association; Zusammenschluss). 
Many are not aware that things work here because internal to the EU there are no 
borders. But outside the EU, and many are not aware of this, there are borders, 
with customs, of course, with subsidies, the EU is working for itself, and not for 
Africa. So, then, from the EU’s perspective, it is logical, if I can cultivate more 
cheaply internationally (im Ausland), if I pump money there than it is even 
cheaper (günstiger) if I can subsidize my own economy in that way. If the 
economy in Africa is destroyed (kaput geht) is from the point of view of the EU, 
from a purely technical standpoint, beside the point (egal) 
U: But it is often not presented in those terms, because connections with Africa 
are emphasized  
ERIKA: it doesn’t matter what sector, whether the fishing industry, foodstuffs, 
time and again when you go into detail, the bottom line that always comes out: 
Africa is exploited (ausgebeutet). But it is cheaper.  
JAN:  it is just like when medicines, a load of t-shirts, when I drive them down 
there to Africa, and I distribute them there, then I destroy their local industry.  
And as I said, from the EU’s perspective, that is uninteresting. From the point of 
view of the EU, that is good for us. I keep people down there small. They can 
never rise up and make stupid prices for me, or so. It is not humane and it is not 
moral but  
ERIKA: but then on the other hand, we complain that there are massive flows of 
migrants from Morocco that we (the EU) can’t absorb, who arrive in Spain 
because they have no work, …so in viewing this film some of the 
interrelationships became clear for me, but otherwise I never get a clear idea of 
what interrelationships there are, that are important.  So it is my opinion that the 
EU remains very far away.  
 
The film that Erika refers to is by the well-known and respected Austrian documentary 
filmmaker, Erwin Wagenhofer, who critically traces food production in the EU. His aim 
in the film is to raise consciousness about the unequal global interconnections of factory 
production of food commodities and how EU subvention practices exploit and destroy 
local production in Europe and Africa.  
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U: I think this question of the interrelationships is very important. That is also 
what would make it more understandable, but I am also not convinced that these 
are the interrelationships to be understood. For example, with monetary policy it 
can seem very abstract. In order to understand it, it seems to me that you need to 
think about what interrelationships it materializes, how it can become intelligible. 
With the financial crisis we are learning more about the role of the central bank, 
that it must ensure that banks continue to lend to each other. There are 
disagreements—did Greenspan contribute to the crisis with deregulation? So the 
Central Bank’s role is double-edged. It addresses but is also part of the problem. 
But in my research with the Bundesbank there is a concern with exposing the 
public to different positions. But other connections can always be made. 
Likewise, the EU is presented as the answer to, and not part of the problem of 
globalization…you are not necessarily encouraged to come to other conclusions. 
The EU should be made something near, something to be felt, but then other 
connections are discouraged. For instance the upcoming referendum in Ireland on 
the Lisbon Treaty [in German, the ‘reform treaty’]—In Germany officials, 
politicians and commentators all state that normal citizens can’t decide, that they 
are not capable to understand. So Europe’s citizens should be informed, but then 
they are not really viewed as capable of understanding and making a decision. It 
does seem like too much to ask people to evaluated the 270 pages of corrections 
to the treaty.  
ERIKA: I do think it is important to have an overview of the EU, to understanding 
the structuring effects, how much internationalization, how we should structure 
our companies, what qualities come from where? 
U: if you had the chance to vote, on the reform treaty, would you find that good? 
As Germans? 
JAN: yes, it would be good. What is it called, plebiscitary elements? It is done too 
little, especially in Germany. Our political system here is such that citizens here 
are allowed to participate far too little in decision-making processes. That is 
where this sullenness (passivity; Verdrossenheit) comes from. That’s why we are 
so uninterested in what is actually going on. We can’t change things anyway, so 
why bother? Bundestag elections, it doesn’t matter who I vote for. Either way it 
won’t change anything. It certainly wouldn’t be bad if we could decide as a 
people (als Volk), not through representatives, but where each person could vote. I 
would find that great.  
 
In my dialogue with Jan and Erika I was anticipating my upcoming trip to Dublin, 
Ireland, to follow the upcoming referendum there. Popular appeals and activist 
organization petitions for a national-level referendum on EU issues in Germany could 
serve as a cogent form of critique about the EU’s democratic deficit. In Leipzig and many 
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parts of Germany, local and regional level referenda were permissible and gaining in 
popularity. Yet not a few with whom I spoke viewed referenda with great distrust and 
skepticism given Germany’s past. Moreover, extremist groups such as the NPD had been 
able to win seats in federal parliaments because they appealed to popular resentments and 
frustration with long-term unemployment and growing inequality. For many critics, 
national or EU-level referenda would be used by various groups vying for more 
influence, instead of engaging with the substantial matters subject to the vote. In a 
parliamentary democracy, representative voting should be adequate to the democratic 
process. However, complaints about low-voter turnout, especially in the east, reflected 
the deep sense of disconnection between those who decide what is best for the people and 
the people who have to live with whatever is decided. Especially with regard to the EU 
popular and scholarly critiques alike lament the lack of input and consultation of ordinary 
citizens on matters that directly affect their lives. In Leipzig I heard many times from my 
respondents that in the GDR that dissidence through public critique might get you 
imprisoned but would garner a response, even change. In capitalism, you can speak all 
you want, but it doesn’t change anything.  I was curious to understand whether Jan and 
Erica felt that people might be more engaged in the electoral process if they felt they had 
the chance to participate more directly in the electoral process, through more direct 
democracy. Jan immediately supports the idea, but Erika has doubts, returning again to 
the theme of the intelligibility of the EU: 
 
JAN: it would be great if we could decide more directly. Then you would have to 
become informed, formulate an opinion (ein Kopf machen). What is it about? I 
wouldn’t even be able to tell you what the EU had decided for me lately. But if I 
had the chance to vote or be involved, it would interest me more.  
ERIKA: Before I went away, or even before we conversed now about this, I had 
never even thought, what does it mean for me to be in the EU?  
JAN: It means money. I don’t have to have money in order to 
ERIKA: (interrupting) I had no clue. But I still don’t know what it means for me.  
U: Perhaps you had a sense, but had not articulated it? 
ERIKA: I still don’t know how the EU, how I should connect with it. What does it 
mean when the finance people come to an agreement, for me it is always a great 
puzzle. Because… I would need to have it explained to me in very, very simple 
terms. Of course, what were just discussing about representatives for the people. 
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If we had to vote, there is so much you have to be informed about. That would be 
asking too much of people. That is what representatives for the people are 
supposed to be there for.  
U: Yes, that is an argument that is often made 
JAN: But I don’t think that we would be overburdened, people just think they are 
overburdened because so many decisions are taken away from us. They just 
decide for us and we don’t give any thought to what we might actually want. All 
of the sudden then we are informed there is no longer unemployment money  
(Arbeitslosengeld), now there is HartzIV. Done! There is nothing we can do. It 
was decided. So for example, there was just this opportunity for a local-level 
referendum about the sale of the Leipzig public utilities. Everyone was getting 
informed. We had a voter turnout of 80 or 90%. Everyone went—no one wanted 
the city utilities to be sold. So then it becomes suddenly routine, yes. You think. I 
have to sit down and read what it is about so that I can have a voice (überall 
mitreden kann). Then somehow this routine begins to stick. It is a process. So I 
don’t think this is problematic. People are forced to engage with the issues.  
 
In this brief interchange, Jan and Erika express some of the central tensions at work in 
my project. In post-unification EU Germany, as elsewhere in Europe, people are working 
to make sense of how their local and national frames and practices are inserted into the 
EU construct. It is perhaps not so different from efforts to think though global-local 
entanglements. But in many respects the EU makes explicit the form of such 
interconnections as they come to be expressed by tangible and barely perceptible chains 
of obligation and possibility. Within a trans-local and trans-national configuration like the 
EU, there seems to be a greater dependence on experts who can explain in simple terms. 
Yet the EU has built up its legitimacy through its distant behind-the-scenes rearranging of 
the social, political and economic order of things. It is not as if citizens necessarily feel 
compelled to reflect upon or connect the dots. Part of my methodology in unpacking the 
pragmatic openings for making sense of distant, technical matters was to generate 
dialogue through my line of questioning as opposed to tracking moments “when it is 
already there” or being purposely enacted. But Jan also made the crucial connection to 
the Hartz labor reforms, which many in Leipzig protested by reviving the Monday 
demonstrations from 1989. As I will show in the following chapters, the history of protest 
and change from the streets is a tradition that is reworked yet exceeds efforts to relegate it 
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to the undoing of the GDR. It is revealing that Jan’s characterization of it as a done deal 
shows the presence and absence of these protests.  
Therefore it was especially fortuitous when quite spontaneously, Jan made the 
case for the importance of referenda as a form of engagement with expertise by bringing 
up the example of the first referendum held in Leipzig. Precisely this referendum had 
animated the first months of my fieldwork in Leipzig and had spurred my thinking about 
the role of direct democracy in creating a different field of engagement with expertise.  
As we will see below, Jan reflects on this local referendum as both a case for and 
against the feasibility of allowing people to decide about technical, market matters. What 
is important for my purposes is the form of engagement he articulates—the notion that a 
burden might change to routine: by working through the issues at stake because one has a 
stake in the decision.   
 
Understanding the market 
 
 The referendum on the partial privatization of the city works had been the subject 
of citywide panel discussions, media coverage, and get out the vote campaigns. But many 
of the specific details were not debated publically until a week before the vote. The vote 
was to be held on Sunday, January 27th, 2008. The ballot was formulated in the following 
manner: ‘Yes,’ if you want the city works to remain in city hands, and ’NO’ if the sale 
should proceed. Thus it was important that voters pay attention to the specific form of the 
question. The rules of this first ever referendum stated first that at least 25% of those 
voting needed to vote ‘yes’ and second, that these yes votes were required to outnumber 
the no-votes. Below, I will reverse the no/yes formulation identifying those against the 
sale as ‘no-voters’ and those for the sale as ‘yes-voters.  
 To give a sense of the charged nature of the pending vote, the carnival procession 
in the city the week prior to the vote featured floats with explicit commentary on the sale. 
One float concretized the true intentions behind the mayor’s plan, depicting him in a 
pinstriped suit perched to dominate the globe, depicted as a yellow ball marked with 
Leipzig’s city districts (figure 1). The director of the city works is in black holding the 
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key to the gates. Another float is covered with an oversized picture of the mayor, a broom 
attached. Selling the public works, that easy? The broom referred to the claim that the 
sale would allow the city to clean house of its debt obligations (figure 2)  
 
 
Figure 1. Carnival parade in Leipzig: ironic commentary on the sale of the public works. 
Photo by author (2008) 
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Figure 2. Carnival parade in Leipzig: ‘the mayor will clean house with the sale’ 
Photo by author (2008) 
  
 The sale was publicized as a ‘share’ sale in the city works whereas the slogan of 
those against the sale framed it instead as a ‘sell-off the city of Leipzig.’ Leipzig’s mayor 
Burkhard Jung (SPD) was the chief proponent of the sale, or from his perspective, the 
strengthening of international investment partnerships though share holding in which the 
city would maintain a 50,1 % stake in ownership. In one panel discussion sponsored byt 
the LVZ (Leipzig’s local newspaper) Jung framed it not as a sell-out of the city. Things 
were changing and the market was liberalizing. Leipzig needed a strong partner in these 
times of change. Without a strong partner, he repeatedly claimed, we can’t grow in the 
future or increase business in Leipzig. He used the metaphor of a ‘ship Leipzig’ stating 
that were simply getting a strong off-board motor to dock with Leipzig and allow the city 
a faster trip forward. Otherwise, he warned, we will only be able to limp slowly along. 
Whereas the mayor proclaimed the sale as a blessing for the city, opponents anticipated it 
would be a curse.  
  128 
 Those against the sale appealed to importance of communal ownership of basis 
resources like water, energy and education, which should not be unduly influenced by 
economic interests or the pursuit of profit. Moreover, the city works were already in 
surplus, bringing in 50 million euros into the city. A portion of the profits subsidized 
local transportation. These were funds that were sorely needed and would be missing 
after the sale.   
 A finance professor reported on sale of city works in cities like Essen (in the 
west). The results were mixed. Some works were bought back. But assessing the success 
through the movement of prices could be difficult and so to argue that it was ultimately 
good or bad could be hard to pin down.  
 Another city representative differentiated the sale from the city’s budget deficit. 
According to him, the city was paying 45 million euros in interest alone on its debts. But 
this was a separate matter. Instead, the share sale was about securing Leipzig’s future and 
thinking across the boundaries of the city limits. City works were increasingly networked 
and in competition across regions and nation-states. The rules were changing and Leipzig 
needed to form new partnerships to secure the viability of the city works for the future.  
 The representative from the Linke was asked why the faction was against the sale 
when in Dresden, the sale of the collective living community to a US company had 
allowed the city of Dresden to pay off the majority of its debt. The moderator 
underscored that the Left was fundamentally against all privatizations, to which the 
representative agreed. The Left was working toward the preservation of communal 
ownership. The sale of the communal housing could only settle the debt once. Then new 
obligations would arise in the future and more public property would come under 
scrutiny for sale. This could not be a solution to the deficits.  
 Another opponent to the sale argued that the ‘outboard motor metaphor’ was 
problematic. It could make a boat turn quickly but it also made it instable. Had people 
forgotten that the city works had been sold twice before? Privatization was not always 
bad but in this case the city had already experienced two shipwrecks. The mayor 
emphasized though that the sale would bring in 320-520 million and that some of this 
money would be invested in order to pay for schools, streets and city renewal. Half a 
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million from the sale would be invested for 8 years so that the city could ‘create value’ to 
pay for these projects. In objection to this, one organizer argued that more sustainable 
measures were needed than one-time sales. The left representative underscored this point 
by making a different metaphor, this time arguing that the city works were like a milk 
cow. When it is slaughtered you can make a few wonderful gulasch meals out of it, but 
then the milk is gone. The mayor argued back that the cow would not be slaughtered. It 
would have two owners and would be fed twice.”  
 The finance professor cautioned that the projected proceeds from the sale were 
not that impressive. Stock shares in energy were on the rise so more could be earned. 
Moreover, as the Green party opponent reminding of previous sales of the works 
clarified, the works had been bought back by taking on more debt, and these were now 
part of the city debt and growing interest payments. Others pointed to the fact that debt 
was at the heart of the matter and this was not only Leipzig’s problem. It was connected 
to politics at the national and EU-level. Shares of the French partner, Gas de Franz might 
also be sold on complicating the transparence of ownership. The mayor insisted that this 
process was in accordance with European law and utterly transparent. The contract for 
the sale had been posted to the Internet for any interested citizen to view, even if it was 
not legally possible to reveal the identity of the other bidders for the contract.  
 On the evening before the vote, the LVZ published brief statements of prominent 
Leipzig residents on their position for the vote on the front page of the weekend paper 
Among those voting yes, the city works should be kept in 100% city ownership was the 
well-known former pastor of the Nicholas Church who had been instrumental in the 
Monday prayer evenings during the peaceful revolution. He argued that privatization 
usually resulted in the loss of more jobs and rising energy prices for consumers. Artists, 
writers, a local businesswoman and an economics professor were among the ‘yes’ 
supporters. Their arguments referenced the oft-cited metaphor of selling the family 
silverware, the conviction that the city works were a communal good, and that more 
sustainable methods of servicing the debt were needed. For the no-position, the works 
should be privatized were predominantly local entrepreneurs, city elites, and a political 
scientist. Their arguments emphasized the needed profits for debt servicing, that the 
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works would remain in partial ownership, and that the partnership would be better able to 
act. One businessman planned to vote yes, but that the process had not been transparent. 
The president of the chamber of craft production saw no alternative to the sale. An 
employee of a local museum questioned the communal logic of the yes proponents, 
saying that bread is also a necessity but we don’t nationalize bakeries. This last point was 
an implicit critique of the GDR-planned economy thinking that may have informed those 
opposing the privatization. (LVZ. 26/27. January 2008, p. 17) 
The day after the vote on the Leipzig public works I was eager to hear Anna’s 
perspective. She responded with energy and enthusiasm, saying, ‘I was very happy this 
Sunday. This was the first time in a long while that I had to stand in line for a long time. 
The polling station at the school was packed.” She told me that his had been the first time 
she was fully aware of how many other facilities were included in the vote. She explained 
the specific language on the ballot: the vote was about whether or not these could be 
privatized in the next three years. There was a list of all the facilities. For Anna this 
seemed to underscore the importance of the vote, and her conviction to vote no on the 
sale. On her way to the polling station she had reflected on the election poster of the FDP, 
with the slogan: ‘sell the public works—secure schools and child-care centers (Kitas) . 
[Sign: Stadtwerke verkaufen; Schulen sanieren].’ “That really bothered me,” Anna said in 
her reflective yet insistent tone.  “The city is responsible for these institutions regardless 
of how they have to be financed. The poster implied that if the public works were not 
sold, then schools would no longer be funded.” Some would eagerly connect her 
sentiment to the unreasonable expectation that the state should take care of things 
presumably lingering on from GDR time. Certainly the claim on the state to ensure basic 
rights and access to essential resources necessary to society has its socialist roots. 
However, similar sentiments were shared across Germany and so in the context of this 
vote, could be inscribed in a shared communal logic with the west. On the other hand, 
other kinds of reminders from the GDR erupted in her consciousness on that day.  
Anna remembered that a GDR-era tablecloth covered the table from which she 
picked up her ballot. She told me she recognized it from ‘long practice’ in the GDR. 
Anna said she was suddenly cognizant of how run-down the place suddenly looked, as if 
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she were transported back to GDR times, though of course now the place was tidy and 
maintained well.  
Her husband, now a retired engineer who used to be employed by the electricity 
plant, heard from current workers that they had voted against the sale. “And our vote had 
results!  
And then to find out yesterday evening after the polls closed that the mayor’s 
office had already planned the income from the sale into the budget. They thought to 
themselves, ‘these ordinary folk will not manage it. They are not politicians or 
experienced persons, just simple-minded citizens. They will not manage enough no-
votes. Well, they guess wrong. They probably were already planning the sale of other 
works, or were already in negotiation talks.’ 
On February 1st, the LVZ published letters from local residents airing the 
perspectives on and complaints about the sale. Those pleased with the outcome declared 
it a victory for democracy. The plans of city leaders behind closed doors, and without the 
consent of the people had been thwarted. One letter writer expressed respect for the 
citizens of Leipzig arguing that vote demonstrated people knew more about the economy 
than the city government gave people credit for. That reader drew on the metaphor of the 
slaughtered cow mentioned above. Those displeased with the vote nonetheless expressed 
support for the democratic initiative shown by residents. From missed chance to outrage 
over the inclusion of the projected sale in the state budget, the referendum was clearly a 
salient experience in a city where citizen protest had become synonymous with the 
Monday demonstrations of 89/90. But my neighbor, a self-employed alternative energy 
consultant living on state support for health reasons wrote in castigating those who had 
prevented the sale. He equated the decision with the socialist past. “Three steps back to 
socialism” he argued. Attributing the ineffective public communications work for the 
privatization to ‘Directors following the orders of the party’ he suggested that though 
people believed they were acting on behalf of the community, they were instead 
maintaining the power status quo. He made note of picture in the ZFL of Walter Ulbricht, 
with the caption, ‘that things work better without capitalists.” For him the vote 
exemplified how many in Leipzig believed the same ((LVZ, 1. February 2008, 18). .  
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Later, in February, I was having coffee with Herr and Frau Schmidt, an elderly 
couple in the café across from the Thomas Church. The referendum was still on their 
minds and we talked about it. They had voted for the sale of the public works because 
they believed the sale would have offered more options for the city. According to them, 
few youth had participated in the referendum. They only observed older people at the 
voting polls. Frau Schmidt complained, “The youth did not add their voice.” But they 
were nonetheless surprised to learn that the money had already been planned into the 
budget. Regardless of their desired outcome for the vote, the felt this was wrong. It was 
reminiscent of GDR times. You voted but you already knew the outcome. Their main 
target of criticism was not the mayor’s party, the SPD, but “die Linke,” the newly formed 
hybrid of western and eastern socialist parties. They felt that the Linke was not capable of 
governing. “They understand nothing about economics!” The couple’s remarks evoked 
what had been written up in the paper. The LVZ reported that while every second eligible 
voter was between 60 and 69 years old, only every 4th voter was a young person of 21-24 
(lvz. 1 Feb 2008: p. 18). Many of the yes votes did indeed correlated with Left voters. 
But the vote had been decisive, with 87,3% voting yes to continued public ownership and 
12,7 voting for the sale (p. 18).  
 
Switching positions? 
 
When I asked Jan whether he had voted for or against the sale, I was surprised to 
learn that he had voted yes and not no, and that his example referenced a vote that for 
him ended in disappointment.  
 
 JAN: Yes, I have to say that I was very disappointed, but I absolutely understood 
the outcome.  I was disappointed simply because I am a very economic thinking 
person. I believe when a business or facility is managed by public authorities, 
then nothing will come of it because government agencies have the problem, they 
don’t think, they don’t think economically (ökonomisch).  There is an 
arrangement to reallocate profits from the public utilities to other communal 
agencies, such as the LVB (Leipzig public transportation), which is cross-
subsidized, yes, but nevertheless if the public utilities were pressured to compete 
  133 
on the market, and not through subsidies, then they would work more efficiently. 
For example, the public utilities have a huge administration, they have far too 
many people working in administration, they don’t’ work economically. Of 
course it is good because it is an employer, yes, so workplaces (jobs) are created. 
But they could work more economically if they had the pressure of working 
against the competition. And that is reflected in the costs of the consumer. 
Everyone complains that they have no money, but it would have been 
advantageous. So, in the public hand, it can’t afford this. That is not why they are 
there. Public agencies have certain responsibilities, to take on debt for things like 
education, but there are not there to be competitive on the market. So, and then 
they even hinder competition. In Leipzig no other provider can get access. Other 
providers are here, but the question is whether they are more expensive since 
there is really no market competition. … That’s why I wanted to see the utilities 
sold.  There was information about what happens to the utilities if they are sold, 
what happens to the money and the profits, so the cross-subsidization would be 
eliminated, those were all things to be considered.  
 
Jan blends market ideals of competition and efficiency with a socialist ethic of what 
public agencies are responsible for. He ascribes to belief in the market while empathizing 
with the decision of the voters, as will become clear below, because of the experience of 
privatization and marketization in 1990. But to extend the thread of inquiry about voting 
on technical financial matters, I wanted to know his assessment of how the issues 
regarding the sale were explained. Did he feel they were properly explained?  
 
JAN: No. Ahead of the referendum I heard a few reports in the media, but those 
were from small broadcasters, those were small informational broadcasters like 
Mephisto, none of these broadcasters have a wide range, and then informational 
events  
ERIKA: but that is the university broadcaster 
JAN: but it still was not carried widely, and I believe that public opinion had 
already been decided in advance. So then the city tried, the mayor and so on, to 
advertise for the sale, but I think not widely enough. They did not thoroughly 
explain it to the public, but from the beginning the public had already been 
influenced or persuaded by small clubs that were against the sale 
U: like More Democracy? 
JAN: Yes…and others, I am not sure which. But these small associations are 
much better at doing public relations work, and they went out and told people, 
dear citizens, if you do this (vote for the sale) this is something very bad, then the 
utilities no longer belong to the people, then they won’t belong to you anymore. 
So then they believe it, and it sticks in people’s heads.  People don’t think far 
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enough, I have the impression, in the principle of investment-that you have to 
spend money in order to get a return on it. The private household does not think in 
this way because the private household only consumes and people expect a 
service in return. But there is always a trade-off. Spending in order to get a return. 
This is not how private households think. So, I believe this was what was in the 
heads of people, in relation to the city utilities, and they did not want to give them 
away. In the past during GDR times, we had VEB’s which were people’s owned 
enterprises, yes, and that was still in people’s heads, and that’s why it did not 
work. Something like 80% of voters voted against the sale of the utilities.   
ERIKA: But didn’t you explain to me, that through the profits made from the sale 
that would have just been a drop of water on a hot stone in the effort to balance 
the budget.  
U: Yes, for Leipzig, yes. It would have not covered the budget deficits like the 
sale of collective housing in Dresden. 
JAN: In Dresden I also see that things are not thought through. It was a good 
decision to sell, but then they just made new debts. They really did sell the family 
silver (Tafelsilber), yes, at some point they have nothing more to sell. But the idea 
was good. They just needed to have approached it more economically. Now we 
have this pile of money...they should have invested it. The difference between an 
investment and an expense, they don’t understand, because with an investment 
money flows back, they should have done that. But of course, public agencies 
should have money for education, to build kindergartens, and then that is also an 
investment. It can work. For example, do you know about Q-cells? I believe that 
is a village,  
U: isn’t that in Dessau 
JAN: Yes, and Q-Cells established itself there, and they draw in so many tax 
revenues that they have a balanced budget there. Money is coming in there. That 
is the kind of thing that must be done, something like that should be done in 
Dresden, Leipzig. But it is not.   
 
 
As I hope to make more explicit in the following chapters, Jan is skimming the surface of 
an embattled set of relations that connect the 1990 currency union, revaluation, and the 
forms of privatization and investment in the East. Later in the interview Jan and Erika 
will have more to say about this history from the vantage of young people adapting and 
absorbing these changes differently and less encumbered than their elders. And as I will 
argue in following chapters, efforts to fight for and retain alternative evaluations of this 
process of transformation are under erasure, but with messy remainders. What is 
interesting here, though, is Jan’s characterization of the peoples’ thinking as a 
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misunderstanding of the market rather than possibly a keen recognition of how it ‘really’ 
works. In fact, during my fieldwork at this time the socialist past informed the choices of 
yes and no voters, a point I will return to in later chapters. Investment in the region—the 
specific forms it has taken and its relative effectiveness—are bound to market ideologies 
as much as they are to the parameters created by the currency union specifically. But to 
stick with the argument I am building in this chapter, the ways in which localities and 
nations are inserted into monetary projects like those of the EU and German unification 
does become central to public debates about autonomy and development, and ultimately 
to the fiscal and financial flows that make or break places. I will show below how 
policies of taxation and investment are structurally and symbolically reworked, deployed, 
and subject to different interpretations in Ireland and Germany, but that eastern regions, 
too, have been unevenly remade in the project of economic integration. Taxation policies 
have been important in both eastern Germany and Ireland, but according to different 
logics and effects. Whereas Leipzig has become a ‘work-bench’ for western companies 
with investment in the region benefitting not the development of the productive industry 
but rather the profit margins of ‘external’ companies, Ireland attracted investment 
precisely because of outcompeting other member-states with generous tax breaks and a 
large banking sector. But in both cases, local autonomy is seen in opposition to the plans 
of political and economic elites.  
 
U: But as I understand it there is also a problem in terms of where businesses pay 
their taxes and that this is done in the locality of the company headquarters. 
JAN: yes, exactly 
U: And that’s why Leipzig doesn’t benefit from companies like BMW because 
the taxes are paid in Munich 
JAN: That is true, but there is also splitting so that taxes are paid here… 
There are different kinds of businesses taxes… Gesamtsteuer… 
But this is not communicated at all. This is why the vote was 80% against the 
sale. Because most people did not know why, most people heard that the utilities 
are making money and that money will be missing afterwards, and the money we 
will get for the sale is far from what is needed to pay down the debts. But that is 
no comparison. Of course, Leipzig is in debt, of course it only helps a little, if at 
all. But then just because the mountain of debt is so large, you can’t say if I sell 
something small then it doesn’t help anything, of course it would have helped 
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somehow, it could have reduced the interest or something like that. I believe that 
is the case. And in any case the purchasing company would have had to pay taxes 
here, yes, Vattenfalll  
U: Gas de France 
JAN: Yes, Gas de France. They would have paid taxes here. This is a question 
that could have been addressed. Contracts could be made that obliged the 
company to guarantee employment to the workers. In Dresden, with the sale of 
the residential building cooperative, they agreed that the rents would not be raised 
for 10 years. It is simple to make such arrangements. Oh well, that’s the way it 
goes.  
U: But here, at the time of the referendum examples were given of cities in the 
West where utilities were sold, and then localities tried to buy them back. They 
had bad experiences with the sale.  
JAN: I believe firmly that they likely did not think it through thoroughly enough. 
Yes? They probably got nervous in the middle of the sale—I don’t know exactly 
the details anymore—In between they became anxious and wanted to back out 
and then bought them back for a lot of money. And that was the problem. If they 
had just sold it to begin with, and planned it well, like a manager would do it! 
When Deutsche Telekom sells one of its divisions, a test division, then the 
telecom makes a profit and doesn’t draw back, saying uh oh, we made the wrong 
decision and try to buy it back. That is the problem. Nevertheless to come back 
again and again to the point about communication and participatory decision-
making of citizens, the issues weren’t explained correctly. There were 33,000 
opinions; some aspects were made public, there were articles in the newspaper, 
like columns for and against, and there were a few short articles. But that all the 
interrelationships were really explained, no, that is not the case. There wasn’t 
even much available online.  
U: There were a number of events in the city, but they were all very late, within a 
week or so of the vote. [To Erika] Your mother wanted to attend, and could not do 
so… 
JAN: That is the problem 
U: And then the mayor had already planned the sale into the budget, although the 
decision had not even been made 
JAN: and was there ever fallout for that! Yes. The money had already been 
practically spent  
U: Yes, it was already included in the budget 
 
Nothing summed up the politics of the referendum better than this last point—the city 
leaders were so certain that the local populace would not turn out to vote no that they had 
already planned the sale into their annual budget and some of these anticipated funds had 
already been spent. As another respondent told me after the vote, this act angered her the 
most and exemplified the low opinion of peoples’ capacity to make reasoned decisions, 
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weigh the evidence, and exert their democratic rights. But Jan’s characterization of 
‘33,000 opinions’ also expresses the unwieldy nature of putting the matter to a popular 
vote. While this referendum may not seem remarkable to a reader knowledgeable of 
many such examples globally, and one might also agree that people respond out of 
‘emotion,’ what was important here were peoples accumulated experiences of the market 
through a process of privatization that even the experts deemed ‘without example.’ In this 
light, the referendum exposed the kinds of subjectivities formed by unification and 
Europeanization while indeed showing the potential for ‘routinely’ reflecting upon the 
power-laden relations of market decisions. As noted above, no sooner had Jan made a 
case for referenda at the national level than did he seem to reverse his stance when 
describing the vote on the city works. My aim here is not to dismiss such indecision but 
rather to show the complex forms of reflecting upon the interrelationships produced 
through the specific media of Europeanization. Once again, and quite spontaneously, Jan 
connects his thinking to the most tangible instance of the EU—the euro. And as I will 
continue to make the case throughout this dissertation, the 1990 experience of monetary 
union is a messy remainder in the ‘euro’s march’ to win the hearts and minds of Germans 
and Europeans: 
  
JAN: Yes, I think that sometimes it is very good if one does not allow everyone to 
participate in a decision, yes, not because I now seem to have changed my mind 
because the sale did not go through, but I do think that sometimes public opinion 
is not backed up by the facts. Sometimes people have a feeling, that I don’t want 
this.  The euro is the best example, yes. In Denmark people voted against it, voted 
against the euro. The euro was not introduced there. The euro is the best thing to 
happen for the European economy. You have more transparency, there are no 
longer any exchange rates and it makes things more certain for businesses. They 
can calculate better, and there are fewer costs [transaction fees], and so on, and so 
forth. It stabilizes the inner freedom. The single currency is something communal 
(Gemeinschaftliches); it is clearer to calculate with. Whenever I used to travel in 
Italy on vacation and I had to change money, I always thought, they are screwing 
me over. I always thought they are pulling one over on me (über den Tisch 
ziehen). So, and now that is no longer the case. But if it had been up to Germany, 
if Germans had voted, then we would not have gotten the euro, and that would not 
have been good. Yes. Especially here in eastern Germany (Ostdeutschland); we 
had a bad experience with the changeover from the Ostmark to D-Mark. But what 
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does that mean, bad experience? The Deutsch Mark was stable. It worked (hat 
funktioniert). Okay, of course then afterwards I only have half –1:2 or 1:3 was the 
rate of exchange, right? 
U: up to certain amounts could be exchanged at 1:1 and 1:2 or 3…. 
JAN: Right, exactly. Everyone wanted that. But then all of the sudden everyone 
noticed that things got more expensive. But it was not more expensive because the 
D-Mark was bad. It was more expensive because the economy picked up with the 
changeover from the planned economy to capitalism 
ERIKA: to the social market economy 
JAN: or the social market economy, that’s how it was. (laughs) 
U: (laughing) which ideology would you like? 
JAN: yes, it is difficult. Anyway, that is why it got more expensive, not because 
the D-Mark was bad.  
 
Techno-skepticism 
 
JAN: And now with the euro we really do have this phenomenon of price 
increases (Verteuerung). The consumer basket of goods (warenkorb) says of 
course… there really was an increase, the basket says that it wasn’t the case but 
that is not correct. The basket always lags behind, and there are the wrong things, 
the wrong appliances in the basket. Inflation is always measured against this 
basket of goods, by the Federal statistics agency, [explains to Erika]. The basket is 
a collection of goods (commodities), of particular consumer items used by 
households, around 30 products. But then things are placed in the basket like 
video recorders and mp3 players, goods that an average household might buy and 
what is paid for them. They note the prices of these items, and then all the 
amounts are added together and a sum comes out. And then depending on how 
much one pays, if it gets more expensive or cheaper, then so inflation rises or 
falls. And based on this a measure is fixed. So then in Germany the price level is 
said to be higher or lower. But the basket is always behind, for example it takes an 
eternity, four, five—even 7 years for the basket to be updated. The combination of 
goods in the basket is updated every seven years, and the comparison is made 
every two years. Then the comparison is made. But seven years ago, there were 
no mp3 players, and that’s why it doesn’t fit. Yes, and I don’t know how current 
the prices are, that are gathered for the composition of the basket. 
U: I believe it is monthly 
JAN: but the composition of goods is not changed.  
U: I am not sure 
JAN: That is done every 7 years, as far as I know.  
U: But then there is the EU-level, harmonized price index…then it is more 
abstract 
JAN: I think it is more accurate. It is a statistical quantity 
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U: I have been tracking how statistics are explained in the Bundesbank’s 
communications work. Recently the concept of felt inflation, which has received 
an empirical basis. This felt inflation has effects on market behavior… it 
eventually was taken seriously, so people’s discussions and critiques did have an 
effect. They did bring about something, and say something. 
JAN:  I think the problem is that wages are not rising 
U: especially in Germany 
JAN: I think especially in Ostdeutschland, especially in Leipzig. In Leipzig we 
have an unemployment rate of 25%.  
U: Is it so high? 
JAN: Every fourth person in Leipzig is without a job. That is incredible/mind-
blowing. 
U: where did you read this? 
JAN: every month in February the unemployment report is published. I heard it 
on the radio…this was a while ago. We have one of the highest rates in Germany  
U: Even more than Berlin? 
JAN: Yes, we also have the biggest unemployment bureau. 
U: Really 
ERIKA: I also heard that. That’s why I have often wondered why one shopping 
center after another is opened here in Leipzig 
U: I have wondered that, too. 
ERIKA: I know that it is a trend, one center after the other 
U: you need money to shop there 
ERIKA: Yes, that’s what is strange 
JAN: But you have to look at who is shopping there 
U: Leipzig is dependent on tourism 
JAN: Leipzig is a beautiful city. Many people do come here from elsewhere, 
people with money. A number of months ago I spoke with someone, who said, for 
shopping we go to Leipzig. People come from Munich and from Hamburg. They 
come here for shopping. We built a Breuninger here [an upscale department 
store]…it is one of the nicer ones …located at great location near the market 
square.  
ERIKA: It is just standard 
JAN: I think that is good because, if there is something here that can be 
consumed, then there will be consumers who come for it—if not in Leipzig then 
elsewhere. That is, I put an effort into convincing BMW and DHL to come here, 
or researchers, then at least there is something here, and that carries far [trägt 
breit], because you need infrastructure for these works; we have an interstate 
(autobahn) built here and the news spreads that Leipzig did something to make 
that happen. The fact that Leipzig makes an effort to attract such companies—that 
is news that travels, I think that is good, independently of whether these 
establishments can immediately make a profit, that is, reach the quantity of sales 
(Absatz finden). Likely they are in minus, but sill the fact that they are here in 
Leipzig, I think it is good. 
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Just as Leipzig has depended upon attracting investment from the west, which as we will 
see in subsequent chapters, is a key dimension about the effects of the 1990 revaluation, 
so, too, Ireland has been caught up in the politics of ‘euro development.’ Euro-
membership resembles a running cost-benefit analysis that is folded into the register of 
solidarity and obligation. Perceived flouting of such generosity on the part of 
‘beneficiaries’ becomes an occasion for reminding and forgetting.  
 
In Dublin we can have a voice 
 
Dublin: Through my contacts at the EU-Direct center in Leipzig I was able to 
connect to a partner institute in Dublin, Ireland. I traveled to Dublin to spend a week 
observing activities surrounding the national referendum on the ‘Reform Treaty.’ 
Because voters in several countries had rejected the European Constitution, the treaty was 
designed to take its place as only a slightly less formal revision of existing treaties and 
arrangements. Ireland was the only country that would vote on the treaty. The vote was 
therefore important because essentially one country would decide on the fate of this new 
treaty. By Irish constitutional law, Irish citizens were required to vote on any measures 
that would revise matters of Irish sovereignty. Thus, to the chagrin of EU elites, the Irish 
would once more pose an obstacle to the European Project’s ever forward and deeper 
march forward. Once before Irish voters had rejected the Treaty of Nice in 2001, only to 
be asked to hold a second referendum in 2002, in which the voters this time gave the yes-
vote elites expected.  
 Upon arriving for the first time in central Dublin, at the famous General Post 
Office, which served as a headquarters of the Irish Independence movement during the 
Easter Uprising and still bears the visible pockmarks of flying bullets, I noticed 
immediately that opponents to the treaty had occupied this strategic street front. What I 
didn’t know at first, but soon discovered with astonishment, was that the occupying 
group was that of the German-based ATTAC. It is a citizens’ action group critical of 
globalization whose origins lie in the proposal by economist, James Tobin, to introduce a 
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citizens’ transaction tax on currency speculation. Member of the Frankfurt-based branch 
of the organization would garner media attention later in October of 2008 by occupying 
the Frankfurt stock exchange (DAX) to protest the decision of the German Bundestag to 
bail out banks during the financial crisis.   
Life-size posters of Angela Merkel, Nicholas Sarkozy, and Manuel Barosso in the 
poses of the three wise monkeys: ‘see no evil, hear no evil, speak no evil’ (figure 3) made 
an instant statement about the way in which the EU in all its forms is manifested not as 
the bulwark of peace and democracy, but of the blinkered visions of politicians who hold 
on tight with our without the populace’s input. In Germany, the EU is promulgated as a 
no-alternative vision of Germany and Europe’s progress forward.    
It was not long before I made acquaintance with several of the German organizers 
of this occupation. Egbert, a middle-aged engineer working with green energy, became 
my most important interlocutor from the group. I joined the group for a meal and coffee 
at a near-by cafeteria. An immediate common point of reference was the high prices in 
Dublin. In Germany it was possible to buy coffee and a roll with cold cuts for as little as 
4 euro, whereas in Dublin even the sparsest of meals required a minimum of 8-10 euros. 
When I asked Egbert how the group had come to the decision to support the no-campaign 
in Ireland, he explained that at least in Dublin, unlike in Germany, ‘we can have a voice.’ 
That is, where in Germany national referenda are prohibited by law—something ATTAC 
is working to change—in Ireland people are able to vote on EU matters. It is important to 
emphasize that the German polity has never once been given the opportunity to vote 
directly on any aspect of the EU. Another organizer brought up the example of the EU 
charter of rights, which the Commission published in miniature book-form. What seemed 
like a practical way to put this text in people’s pockets was read in another sense as a 
statement about its importance. In this case, miniature signified a lack of importance. We 
ended up meeting four times over the week, with Egbert giving me frequent updates on 
poll-results coming in on the day of the vote.  
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Figure 3. Dublin, Ireland: Lisbon Treaty Referendum. ‘No to the reform treaty’ 
Photo by author (2008) 
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Figure 4. “Congratulations Ireland” 
Photo by author (2008) 
 
 
Saturation  
Dublin was quite literally saturated with campaign posters on almost every street 
corner (figures 4 and 5). ‘Yes’ and ‘No’ posters quite often stood side by side on poles. 
On one street, yes and no alternated along fixtures. Buses were covered in campaign 
slogans, and buildings, doors, pavement slabs, store-front windows, even wooden crating 
bore official posters, slogans written in chalk, and neon graffiti sprayed on dark stone 
surfaces.  
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Figure 5. “The New EU won’t see you, hear you, speak for you” 
Photo by author (2008) 
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The poster designed by the official referendum commission showed the bottom 
halves of a woman with a skirt and flat shoes surrounded by a man with working boots 
and another wearing jeans on each side. The heads and torsos were erased from the 
picture with the slogan above: ‘Lisbon Treaty: Get the Complete Picture’ (figure 6). At 
the bottom corner of the sign people were given directions on how to access the 
referendum commission handbook and website.   
 
 
Figure 6. “Lisbon Treaty. Get the complete picture” 
Photo by author (2008) 
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Three posters one on top of the other: Fine Gael: ‘Europe, Let’s be at the Heart of It’ 
Vote Yes; “Yes to Lisbon. Let’s Make Europe Work Better’; Keep Ireland’s Clout in 
Europe. Vote No.” 
 To give a sense of the array of the arguments vying for space and attention 
throughout the city, the following list of signs I was able to track across the city, I begin 
with one of the most dramatic. Signs were taped to the inside of storefront window, and 
at a slight distance, several other posters all with ominous tones: ‘Don’t Throw it all 
Away (figure 7). Vote NO to Lisbon. Stop EU super-government! Vote No to Lisbon 
(Democratic Alliance) (figure 8). The EU Flag is crossed out with a stop sign. Above this 
sign a news article was taped with the tagline: ‘Journalists gagged over Lisbon? Even 
more dramatic, and invoking the revolutions for independence, “People Died for your 
Freedom. Don’t Throw it Away. Vote No.” Yet another flyer with a swastika declared: 
‘Dictatorship. Open Your Eyes!!! European Union. The constitution of Dictatorship. The 
Laws of a Police State. Take Your Country Back. Vote No.  
 
 
  147 
 
Figure 7. “People Died for your Freedom” 
Photo by author (2008) 
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Figure 8. “Stop EU Super-Government” 
Photo by author (2008) 
 
 
 
 
In contrast, and jarring in its simplicity, a white poster with edges tattered was 
taped to a metal parking meter. Hand-written with black permanent ink: Cowan. Bad 
Language. Bad Treaty. You Fuckers!’  Others recalled of past no-votes on referenda in 
Europe: People’s Movement: Follow the French and Dutch: Vote No.” Pacifist and anti-
war platforms were also highly visible on streets and buildings. White spray paint on 
granite pavement stone: ‘No to Lisbon’. Black spray paint, two circles enclosing a figure:  
‘No to Militarization. No to Lisbon.” A similar one showing a gun. Next is a list of 
further campaign agendas: 
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A United States of Europe? No Thanks! Vote No to Lisbon. [eirigi] Don’t Risk 
EU Taxation. Vote No.’ Socialist Party: ‘No Privatisation of Health and Education. No to 
Lisbon. ;‘Good for Ireland, Good for Europe. Vote Yes.; Workers Solidarity Movement: 
Vote No. Against a Capitalist Europe. Against a Bosses Ireland. Organize for Real Social 
Change.” IBEC: ‘Vote Yes for jobs, the economy and Ireland’s Future’ A Europe that 
Works better’ (figure 9).  “People before Profit. No to Lisbon” Euro sign. Three wise 
monkeys: ‘The New EU: Won’t See You, Won’t Hear You, Won’t Speak for You. Vote 
No.’; Attac: Non, Ne. No, Nein zum EU-Reformvertrag. Ein anderes Europa ist möglich. 
“Congratulations Ireland! You are having the referendum 486 million Europeans have 
been denied” ‘Die Welt ist keine Ware” (the world is not a commodity). See also figures 
9-12. 
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Figure 9. “Vote Yes for jobs, the economy, and Ireland’s future” 
Photo by author (2008) 
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Figure 10. “Europe. Let’s Be at the Heart of It” 
Photo by author (2008) 
 
Putting it all together 
 
 I met with Liam Brennan on the day of the vote. Liam had only recently begun to 
work at the center. He told me of a recent debate the center had hosted and organized on 
the treaty and referendum. It was one of the best-attended events in the history of the 
center. Unfortunately he had not been able to attend but was able to view the recorded 
event. Liam somewhat reluctantly admitted that he personally had not immersed himself 
in the details as much as he should, and was now ‘catching up’ ahead of the vote. But he 
offered an acute and vivid portrayal of the sentiments, dialogues, and visible 
infrastructures surrounding the vote. Posters urging yes or no plastered every street 
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corner, competing for space and attention. I had already observed signs on buses, in store 
windows, on walls and fences, and in the hands of street campaigners at the corners of 
pubs and retail establishments, laboring to get out the vote (for their respective positions). 
Newspapers and television media were transmitting a constant steam of competing 
perspectives, from politicians and politicians as well as the ordinary working person 
trying to make sense of it all. For many Irish citizens, a key worry was how much say 
small countries would continue to have in EU-decisions going forward. This concern was 
captured best with the recognition that Ireland would lose its right to have an Irish 
representative in every commission under the new provisions. In general, many felt 
confused about the more than 270 pages of legalese they were being asked to evaluate, 
Liam summed up. But many were indeed working hard to form an opinion even as yes 
and no campaigners worked to exploit the intelligibility gap to their own purposes.  
 Liam described the tenor of the yes and no sides of the debate with a measured 
clarity, with the no-vote offering more concrete details about the treaty amendments and 
the yes-side promising doom if the treaty was voted down. As Liam put it, “It would be 
bad, very, very bad, for Ireland, and for Europe, if we voted no.” 
 
Liam felt that the Yes-vote betrayed a lack of familiarity the treaty document. They were 
not as well versed as the No-side, which he said was much more specific:  
 
“You talk to people, and they say, ‘I don’t understand. I don’t know what it’s 
about.’ You have a document that is extremely difficult to read. It is very difficult 
to read. And you have people saying all sorts of things if you vote no, and they 
are very specific, much more specific.  No vote is much more specific. The yes 
vote is strongly worded and much less paralegal. You feel like, you should vote 
yes, OR…[else] threat, …I feel that’s the message people are getting, that is in 
talking to friends and family, acquaintances.” 
 
Liam lamented that as the only country voting on the treaty and indeed determining its 
ultimate fate, Ireland would be blamed by some for obstructing and other for rubber-
stamping the visions of EU planners.  ‘In 2001 we voted no but then they came back to 
use and we voted yes.’ I explained how in Germany many people felt they were denied a 
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vote or a say in anything regarding the EU. If other Europeans had the chance to vote, 
then Ireland wouldn’t be alone. That’s true, Liam replied, then it wouldn’t feel so bad. 
You feel as if you are the recipient of mixed messages.’ Liam voiced the concern of 
many skeptics of pubic referenda, that ‘Emotion can win the day. People have discontent 
with the government, so they use the vote on this EU matter to punish the government.  
 When I asked about how well the main issues to be decided in the referendum had 
been explained, Liam felt that the information had not been that clear. The No-vote has 
been very specific, he repeated. I can read the leaflet put out by the European 
Commission. But when I review the main text, it is hard even for me to put together. I 
wondered how this vote was similar or different to the referendum in 2001. Liam thought 
a moment, ‘I would say the fear factor. People feel they may be giving away more 
sovereignty. I am not as well versed on whether or not this is the case. People shouldn’t 
listen until they can make up their own mind. But it is intimidating—like reading legal 
documents.” 
 I drew an analogy to parsing through the terms of credit card statements to which 
Liam nodded.  
 
“Yes, yes… you will always have people who are very well versed, and have an 
opinion. People will have strong convictions about Europe, but vague 
understandings. They might say, we won our independence, and now we are 
giving so much away. But Ireland benefits a lot from being in the EU. But to test 
the extent of that claim you would have to be an accountant. These two views are 
very prevalent; some people share both. But in the end there is no way around it. 
So I would say that the word that sums it all up is ‘confusion.’ I have a friend—
she feels so undecided. There is probably some apathy. It will be interesting to see 
the turnout today. I do think a lot of people feel it is important. It is a national 
interest. I wouldn’t say sovereignty but it is about ones place in Europe.” 
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Liam: “Many people I have spoken with find it suspicious that most of the major 
political parties are all agreed on voting yes to the treaty. It is a shame that there is 
not more debate, and that the politicians all agree with each other. But the No-
vote has worked harder, and they have been quite persuasive. In my perception, 
they came through. Not that it makes it right. The No vote seems like the 
underdog.” 
U: The papers seemed to frame voting no as a rejection of the EU. I thought it was 
about the treaty, not about being in the EU? 
Liam: it should just be about the ratification of the treaty. The EU will continue 
on, but people always fear that we will lose neutrality. Most people do not see it 
in a simplistic way. For example the qualified majority vote issue. My friend 
knew about it. She had been reading it. People don’t want Ireland to be sidelined. 
They just don’t want Ireland to lose, to be diminished.  We don’t want some crazy 
rules to be imposed upon us from the outside. Ireland has benefitted from the EU 
there is no doubt. It is not a rejection of the EU.  
U: I was surprised that these two issues were being conflated 
Liam: Yes, that is a debate that could be played on both sides. 
U: it gets played elsewhere 
Liam: In radio and television, there has been a lot of intelligent discussion 
U: what about the economic developments. I have heard people in the press 
stating that if you vote no, investors will leave Ireland. I have also heard that 
Ireland is one of the most indebted countries. Would you say that is the case? 
Liam: yes, it is true. The economy has been doing well. Property prices went up, 
equity. But yes, there is a feeling that a lot of people are in debt. There is 
nervousness about that, and as to how Europe affects this, confusion. Confusion 
reigns. Lots of companies have come here…would rejecting be bad for our 
economy? Again, people are confused… 
U: I wondered how that might feed into the debates. From here Germany seems 
powerful, but their self-perception is that they are being sidelined.  
 
Liam: that is interesting. I think especially in relation to property, there is concern.  
 
 I was curious to know how people in Ireland talked about the euro, given the daily 
repertoires of critique in Germany. Liam thought a moment. “People do feel they lost 
something, lost value in their currency. Ireland always lost in relation to sterling. But the 
good thing is that you can compare prices. But we, there hasn’t been that much debate—
people always felt there is nothing you can do about it. People did feel prices went up, 
though.” 
 Liam gave an example by contrasting Greece and Ireland. In Greece there had 
been a protest, where everyone refused to shop for a day. ‘You would never have that in 
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Ireland.’ People just accept the prices. But without competition, how can you shop 
around if everything is the same price?  But there is apathy. Consumers in Ireland 
rallying—that would be the day pigs would be flying. I think it is the culture. People in 
Ireland are laid back. I would say people tend to put up and shut up. I think we are too 
laid back. In other countries, you often read about protests.  
 I explained how just recently the milk farmers in Sachsen were protesting about 
prices. They actually got the discounters to raise the price by 10 cents. People in 
Germany are very price conscious. “Interesting that you say that. One group that is very 
vocal is the Irish farmers.” Liam felt that with the introduction of the euro, the general 
consensus is that prices seem to go up a bit. “We can compare prices. We are always the 
loser. I don’t think people blame it on the euro. I don’t think the euro is to blame.  I think 
over here it is pushing up the prices. …. Then again I don’t know that Irish tourism has 
suffered.” I noted that in Germany, and especially in Leipzig where I had been living, the 
unemployment was high. People did not have income to travel. They don’t experience the 
benefits of the shared currency. “Yeah, yes. People are traveling much more…  more so 
than in the 80’s. At this stage I would say, the euro is here and people don’t think about 
it. It is great that you don’t have to exchange currency. You can compare prices.”  
 I explained how surprised I was that I could buy a 10-euro SIM card for my cell 
phone, and without the need to show proof of residence, as was required in Germany. 
Liam was not aware of the different rules in Germany. Where he felt that the difference 
in prices did stand out were concert tickets. In Ireland a ticket could cost as much as 100 
euros, whereas in other countries, people were not paying as much. Though incomes have 
risen, the cost of living also rose significantly and property prices were unimaginably 
high. ‘That is the Celtic Tiger,’ Liam brought it to a point. ‘We all benefitted a little bit, 
but a minority a lot.” 
My interest in the referendum, as I narrated the purpose of my visit to Dublin, was 
how Europeans were making sense of the interconnections that the euro facilitated, but 
whose specificity beyond consumer benefits and low-transaction costs were often fuzzy. 
The monetary policies and ideas behind the euro were akin to the abstractions of the 
referendum. I wondered how the desire for more direct democracy meshed with the need 
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to ultimately trust the experts in the technical matters now unusually being put to a 
popular vote. Liam chalked it up to the postmodern condition. People don’t trust as much, 
and they are questioning more. On the other hand, there is too much information. The 
Internet allows for unprecedented access to anything one might want to know. But what 
was one to do with it? He recalled the comments of one writer he had recently read who 
argued that people nowadays are mistaking information for knowledge. They are not the 
same thing. As with the vote on the 270 page legal text, people are now confused more 
than ever.   
But was there an expectation that people should understand the treaty? The lack 
of coverage on the treaty in Germany and the saturation of it in Ireland highlighted the 
gaps in and absence of a shared ‘European’ sphere of communication. So how could 
citizens of EU member states form a ‘cross-European consciousness about elite proposals 
and claims? Liam agreed that it was difficult. Of course it is all too much, that is a 
common response, I added my usual caveat. European institutions produce hundreds of 
documents, but it is up to people to see how it relates to their lives. And Irish voters 
would be deciding on behalf of all Europeans if the treaty would be ratified. Liam 
replied, ‘we are all in isolation. Even in the UK they have not been covering this… 
If we were aware of how this was going in down in France or Italy” he trailed off. It 
seemed to me, I elaborated, that there needs to be less fear of critique. ‘The worst thing is 
if the EU gives the impression that people should only agree. It would be great if there 
were referenda Talking to people in the pub, they feel that either way they are damned. 
They feared people will be angry at Ireland. That is why many people I have talked to 
feel that it is a historic vote, I explained. “One thing is for sure, we have been saturated,” 
Liam noted, coming full circle.  
 
A different Europe 
 
When the results of the successful no-vote in, I was invited to join the German 
and Irish organizers for a celebration gathering at the Teacher’s Club, a cultural arts 
center and meeting house not far from the popular temple bar district lined with pubs.  
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A number of the Irish organizers held speeches. The tenor of these speeches was 
one that re-inscribed the no vote as simply a different way of voting for Europe.  
 
Iris:  
“One of the most energizing things for me being part of this tremendous campaign, a 
victory for this small country which has sent a message to these bully boys that we don’t 
want this anymore because we do want a Europe which is about people, which is about 
peace, and which is not about all the kinds of things rained down on folks, all these 
incredible people who turned out to vote no, the working people who came out to vote, 
and they will come out again if we continue to work together to do that. The most 
extraordinary thing about this whole experience is that the more we reach out the more 
energy we got, and so many times people said, it is really difficult to work together. What 
we achieved today we achieved because somehow we stayed together and the other 
fraction didn’t, so let’s drink to that.”  
 
Sean:  
Close to 50/50, a fantastic achievement. Separate leadership from representatives, support 
of the workers…organizations across Europe, what we said made sense. We need to 
continue to present a clear voice. Yes, people got involved for different reasons in 
rejection of the treaty. It was honorable reasons, like the anti-war movement. There is a 
clear order between us and Libertas. What we did was a fantastic achievement. It was 
very brave to offer people an open mike to people in this room…we might have to be 
forcibly removed…(laughter). The political establishment, well we established that they 
are wrong! Lets get rid of them. Great victory, we build a movement to challenge the 
establishment.  
 
Irene: 
“Today is an amazing day. An amazing week. Things are blowing our way big time. The 
vote today is about the desire for a different kind of politics. A politics that is for people 
and not the political establishment. These events showed what is possible. The media was 
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full of misnomers, criminal damage. So decisive, beyond all our wildest beliefs, the kind 
of clarity from a working class area saying, we are not going to be treated like this by the 
political elite. And suddenly there is a momentum behind it that I think is really 
significant. We use these words like democratic deficit and so on. But its been very, very 
clear this week what exactly that means. And the clarity with which people expressed 
themselves shows there is a different way forward. There are two things coming together 
shows that yes, obviously voting is incredibly important because it can give us 
confidence to take on these bosses across the poll, the bosses putting forward these ideas. 
The way forward, that’s what we have to get organized about. The way we have been 
able to relate to people in working class areas is something we haven’t seen before.  
A new Europe, no war mongers in Europe….” 
 
 
 
Figure 11. “Don’t Be Bullied” 
Photo by author (2008) 
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How can they vote no, when they have received so much? 
 
Leipzig: Not long after my return from Dublin I met with Frau Dietz and Herr 
Schuhmacher at the EU direct center in Leipzig. Both were disappointed with the 
outcome in Dublin.  
Herr S. comments that politicians in Ireland received the receipt (die Quittung 
kriegen) for their decisions. I was not familiar with the meaning of this expression in that 
context so I asked for clarification. Herr S. gave the example of the labor reforms in 
Germany (Hartz IV). He credited the electoral success of the NPD in the regional 
parliamentary elections with the same phenomenon. This is when people ‘give the 
receipt’ to the political establishment for unpopular decisions by voting for the 
opposition. Frau D. added, ‘it is when people want to show that the country can’t go 
forward with these politics and that things have to change. Now in Ireland we see the 
result of such thinking. 
Herr S. explained that with the Harz IV measures being introduced, those 
unemployed for longer than one year now had to use up any existing money or assets, 
cash in insurance policies, in order to receive assistance. He noted that the NPD does not 
target academics but instead “rather simple people, who can’t see beyond their own 
political horizon.” These are the people who feel that foreigners are taking away their 
workplaces. They wish to express their disagreement and so the NPD faction won seats in 
the Landtag. Now they may even take on key positions. But in fact they were already 
under investigation by the Office of Public prosecution. “It is that simple to make 
politics,” he noted, adding with a sharp edge to his words and tone. “Why should I vote 
for a treaty? Most would not be able to explain it!”  
 Frau Dietz queried, “but such slogans or arguments were not present?” “In 
Ireland?” I asked. I summarized some of key narratives I had heard. Yes, some people did 
invoke national narratives like, ‘People spilled their blood for Ireland. Don’t give it up so 
quickly.” Of course, given the lived histories of revolution in Ireland, such statements 
made an impact. I also told them about the campaign slogan using the three wise 
monkeys. When I had spoken with people I heard responses such as ‘Europe is far away’ 
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and ‘we are only 4 million people. What voice do we have?’ Many illustrated this fear by 
referring to the loss of the Irish representative in the commission. These were the 
examples that were mentioned again and again. Experts tried to explain. They also 
reminded people that the commissioner should not be working on behalf of national 
interest and so the national identity of the commissioner was a mute point. In order to 
fully understand that there were other competencies where the ‘Irish voice’ could be 
heard required a deeper understanding of the parliamentary system in the EU. These were 
difficult to explain. But it was an important point. I noted that another fear people 
expressed was that accepting the treaty could lead to the loss of neutrality.  
 Frau Dietz was surprised,  “They are neutral?” I explained that even though 
Ireland had supported the war effort in WWII, they had remained neutral, and that this 
was an important point for people with whom I had spoken. Frau Dietz wondered why 
they were afraid of this, with Herr Schuhmacher interjecting annoyed, “What do they 
want? They have to participate in NATO.” I explained drawing on what I had learned in 
Ireland that Irish troops cannot be deployed in NATO operations. Many voters expressed 
concern that this would change ‘through the back door.’ There is the fundamental 
question about if the EU can create new competencies. Herr Schuhmacher then 
explicated for me how similar concerns had been raised about the German Basic Law, but 
that in many respects the EU had already intervened in national competencies. “If you 
had posters here making that explicit, you would have an outcry here, because many are 
not aware of it.” I finished my summary by noting that abortion also animated voter 
concerns about how far the EU might go in overturning its restriction in Ireland. These 
were the themes that were important in Ireland. Copies of the 270-page treaty had been 
widely distributed. Admittedly it was difficult to explain. I told them of a story relayed to 
me by a colleague conducting research in a museum at that time. On a smoke break, some 
facilities staff had brought up the issue of foreign workers. But I did not see any explicit 
slogans targeting foreigners in the campaigns and in my conversations with people 
skepticism about the treaty was not framed in terms of anti-immigrant rhetoric. It is true 
that Ireland had experienced a large influx of workers from countries such as Poland. But 
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I noted that in demonstrations in Austria the anti-immigrant arguments had been more 
pronounced than I had observed in Ireland.  
 For Herr Schuhmacher my observations illustrated how in the EU there are 
“different construction zones.” He felt that migrant workers had been effectively 
integrated into the Irish labor market precisely because Ireland had profited most in the 
EU. Capital flowed to Ireland from, and because of membership in the EU (and the euro). 
Firms were started there. But in Austria there were different issues. They had had quotas 
on immigration, which had been repealed because of EU requirements for an open 
market. And here in Sachsen, too, every third person can tell you a story about a stolen 
car at the Polish border. But studies showed that criminality had gone down. He argued, 
“Now the police work together in such cases. It is not simply about the borders being 
open, but now the police on both sides are forced to cooperate. And that is a good thing.” 
 I wondered if they had personally encountered people who had experienced these 
thefts at the border. Frau Dietz searched for a moment, “well, maybe more in the media, 
but not personally.” Herr Schuhmacher added that he had spoken with some workers 
about it and then I pursued it further by asking if perhaps students at the Euroschule 
might have told him about such incidents. Herr Schuhmacher explained, “Well, people 
have very different perceptions and capacities to remember (erinnerungsvermögen).” He 
switched to an analogy he knew would resonate with the research I was doing with the 
Bundesbank. “It would be an interesting question, go to the visitors at the Geldmuseum 
and ask them, take a 10 mark, 20 mark, and 50 mark bill, go out into the streets and ask 
people how much they could buy with this money in the past. People will tell you it is 
worth more than was actually possible.” I knew immediately that he was describing a 
recent report on consumer affairs. He jumped in affirmatively, “Yes, on Plus-Minus, a 
fantastic report. The last time people could by a case of beer for 10 D-Marks was in 
1965.” We all laughed. “But in any case” he continued, “it is like with the treaty, if you 
are dealing with people like this, they believe it, it is simply the case. You can come with 
arguments, but they will say three times that it is not true, they will still believe they are 
right. Trying to convince such people...You can explain, ‘listen, nothing will change with 
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the Lisbon treaty. What is in that document is already the case, now. It is only this and 
this and this that is being added, and this is already a tremendous success.’ 
Frau Dietz leaned forward, “Yes, this is what I was saying before. On the one 
hand people say the EU, it is so far away and that is when they realize that it is already 
reality, I don’t want to judge this, but then on the other hand, they nevertheless complain 
that with the Lisbon treaty the commissioner in five years, but no Irish commissioner. But 
you could also see it as a consequence, and be saddened, but really you have the feeling 
that people pull this thread out, and before that—I am sure that if it had not been for the 
vote on this treaty, they would not have complained that without this commissioner they 
don’t have a voice in Europe. Only because of the treaty, they suddenly trot out their 
arguments just to be against it. That’s how it sounds to me.”  
 
Herr S: but the argument might be true that at some point Ireland will not send a 
commissioner, but that affects the other 27 member states also. So no country has 
better rights 
U: Yes, that was explained 
Herr S: The commissioner is not the representative of Ireland in the commission. 
Commissioners are the mouthpieces for the commission.  
Frau D: Yes, that was said, but is it experienced that way. Of course, here Günter 
Verheugen, our European commissioner, we hear about how great his work is, but 
it is not tied back to Germany. 
Herr S: Why don’t they turn their attention to their own elected officials? They 
are the ones who ratified the treaty 
U: They did do so. It was a complaint against the Irish government. But on the 
other hand, other countries did not vote, so it seems wrong to place all the blame 
on Ireland.  
Herr S: (laughing) The Czech Republic is also holding things up. 
U: People were also suspicious that all the parties were in agreement. They told 
me this is not common in Ireland 
Herr S: Here, too, only the Linke voted against it. 
Frau Dietz: people here don’t even really know what the Lisbon treaty was.  
Herr S: Yes, like in the example of the D-mark prices 
Frau Dietz: It was only covered here for one day, there was not any public 
relations work about it in Germany, why should there be, but what is absurd is 
that people are now coming more frequently and want a copy of the Lisbon treaty. 
Then I can only say, we don’t have it in printed format. Then I am told, why print 
copies of it because it is not certain that it will be ratified. What kind of public 
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relations is that? You can’t just tell people, you don’t need to be interested in it, 
because it probably will only end up in the wastebasket. 
Herr S: that is correct  
U: They printed the whole thing in Ireland.  
Herr S: I don’t think that it is necessary. People only wanted a copy of the 
constitution after it had been rejected.  
Frau Dietz: Yes, because bad news is always good news. 
Herr S: exactly. People can get a pdf copy of the treaty from us.  
Frau Dietz: no 
Herr S: yes, as a data file, not printed 
U: But maybe older people want to read it and are not able to use a computer. 
Herr S: there are copies in bookstores 
Frau Dietz: now there are copies at the BPB since two weeks, so you can get it  
Herr S: but we are not printing out 270 pages here 
 
When I asked how they thought things should continue and how the EU might work 
differently to reach the public, Herr Schuhmacher’s response was one part weariness, one 
part acerbic wit: “The day would not be long enough for me to begin to answer that 
question. They need to conduct a praxis-oriented communications work.” Frau Dietz 
agreed, both passionate and yet somehow knowing things were unlikely to change: “They 
are always using the same old instruments, always bus campaigns and always event-
oriented programs. Europe is communicated in empty husks (in Hülsen verbreitet). You 
don’t win listeners and you don’t win followers that way. I have no solutions about what 
should be done with the treaty. I don’t think it is right to ask people to vote twice as with 
Maastricht.” Herr Schuhmacher had left briefly to return with a stack of T-shirts: “This is 
what we get. We have a whole truckload of t-shits ‘European States in Cultural 
Dialogues.’ Frau Dietz, “First things come late, and these rulers—you can even give them 
out in schools. Herr Schuhmacher, “What I wish, is that they would hire people full-time 
to work in practical education work—long-term and in a sustained fashion. When we 
plan events, we only get funding if 100 people attend. It is a requirement. Or you can plan 
over three days and have fewer attendees. But you just scare people away. If the numbers 
don’t add up, then the funding has to be returned. Someone needs to recognize reality.” 
Frau Dietz agreed: It is like when people approach you on the street.  You put ‘Europe’ at 
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this same level and it is a nuisance. Europe is a forced theme, something to be preached, 
like the wandering preacher. That is the practice they promote.  
 For Herr Schuhmacher it was not the ideas were bad, just badly implemented. 
You can’t reach people with campaigns. But how can you reach people in every-day life?  
Herr Schuhmacher explained it in terms of scale. “I identify regionally, of course I also 
identify nationally as German, but I feel more connected to my regional identity. Now I 
live in Sachsen. But I don’t necessarily identify as European. But everyday we see 
Europe in our wallets, and on our license plates, but this is the extent of it. Nothing else 
occurs to me because what is important is what happens in my backyard. 
  
U: I heard about an experiment, a scenario where people were asked what would 
disappear if Austria left the EU. Suddenly the list grew as people remembered 
customs, border controls, exchange rate losses.  
Herr S: Many things are taken for granted now about the EU. The EU’s 
achievements are not even seen as accomplishments (Errungenschaften). That is 
the bad thing.  
Frau Dietz: The problem is that Europe is always connected to politics, but the 
accomplishments, advantages have less to do with politics. But the concept is 
connected too much with politics.  
Herr S: Yes, because politicians have made these decisions at some point in time. 
Frau Dietz: Of course, but perhaps it would be good to detach the EU from this 
political meaning (entkoppeln), if you consider, how many people in Germany are 
really interested in EU politics. To be honest, when I take the local paper, I 
seldom read about German politics, but I read about Nepal, America, and then 
Europe as another political topic, but Europe is connected to so many other topics 
of daily life, rights, travel, consumer protection, but you don’t hear as much… 
Herr Schuhmacher: You hear about new rights, and protections. But you hear 
about them one time. Where it comes from… you don’t get the background. 
U: in Ireland what people were emphasizing was quite different from how the 
vote was framed in Germany or Britain. The German press emphasized the 
economy and responded with indignation, ‘how can they vote no when they have 
received so much’! Britain used the vote for its own euro-skepticism. Many in 
Ireland said, ‘be afraid when your are in agreement with the British.’ I think what 
is missing is a European public space. 
Frau Dietz: What do you mean, that we should hear about what the Danish think 
of the EU? 
U: I was thinking of something said a podium discussion here in Leipzig about the 
Treaty, that the EU is presented and explained by national leaders and not in a 
trans-European sense. 
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Frau Dietz: I am not sure that I care what people in Ireland think about EU 
changes to cellphone rates. That is at the national level, why should I be 
interested? 
Herr S: it is a process, a long, long process. What I wanted to say, the outrage in 
Germany about the no-vote. It is hard to understand that people in a country that 
has profited so much from the EU should have a different opinion. 
U: But they were not voting against the EU 
Herr S: They were voting about the change of the change 
Frau Dietz: 80 million people can’t be a basis democracy 
Herr Schuhmacher: the treaty was a process decided over many years. And then 
people come and say ‘no, we want a different treaty,’ It’s too late.  
 
Like much of the reporting I observed in the German media, Ireland’s no to the treaty 
generated the conviction that some countries were taking advantage of the sacrifices of 
others. Whereas in Germany people had suffered through stagnant wages for a decade, 
Ireland attracted foreign direct investment due to its low tax rates and deregulation. In 
Ireland people bought houses, enjoyed almost full-employment, and seemed to be reaping 
economic growth (the Celtic tiger) at the expense of other member-states. The rejection 
of the treaty, then, was taken quite personally.  
 
Frau Dietz: How was the mood at the EU-Direct Center? 
U: I met with Liam but it was before the vote. I think people were disappointed.  
Herr Schuhmacher: whenever there is a referendum, then people vote who have 
an interest in saying no. Like in the example of the NPD. The outcome in Ireland 
was very narrow. If people say they want to have a basis democracy, then there 
needs to be compulsory voting. Then there is an obligation to engage with the 
topics. But personally I could care less about how the Bundestag votes on 
fertilizer. I am decidedly against referenda, because you see the results, as in 
Ireland.  
U: Maybe it is not about yes or no but an attempt to reach people differently, to 
build trust, a different consciousness about politics and expertise. With the 
financial crisis people have begun to think differently about how things are 
decided, how to engage with complexity. How much regulation, credit, where and 
to what effect? How are taxes used? Details make a difference. Decisions are 
made but we can’t follow the details. What is democracy when in the end 
everything is relegated to the experts, and even they can’t explain things, such as 
with the banks.  
Herr Schuhmacher: We have a high-grade division of labor. The EU Member of 
Parliament—and then at the opposite end, the auto mechanic. These are all 
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specialized niches. I don’t expect my auto mechanic to understand the treaty, but 
he should also have training.  
U: I mean that one could build bridges 
Herr Schuhmacher: Right. This whole Europe story is a good thing, and there are 
many advantages. But it doesn’t mean we have to give up identity. We are a ‘heap 
of states’ held together in this configuration. But that is all. No one is taking 
anything away, or forcing something on to people they don’t want. These are 
things from the past, I mean 50 years ago when this began we had just gotten 
beyond a war where people said, ‘this can’t be permitted to happen again so we 
have to think of a solution. How we can bind people together so that they get 
along, and they found it works best if they are linked together. No one wants war 
ever again. And that goal was reached. There will not be a war between member 
states, never again in this life. 
U: I have often heard this story doesn’t work for young people as well.  
Herr Schuhmacher: For the youth Europe is reality. People are only conscious of 
the disadvantages. It takes time.  
U: I didn’t experience the war, but it still resonates with me. Very few young 
people know GDR history, and I think this history is also deeply connected to the 
European story.  
Herr Schuhmacher: Yes, right. The EU is only interesting when we work together, 
celebrate together, eat and drink together such as when we work with partners in 
France. This is how to bring people in the EU together. In Ireland things look 
different if you sit together, eat, and work together. 50 years ago we were 
shooting each other. And 20 years ago we had a border through Germany. And 
young people barely know or remember that.  
Frau Dietz: thanks for the interesting report 
Herr Schuhmacher: at least we know that the people in Ireland like Europe. They 
just disagreed with a few things. 
U: Hopefully there will be a positive outcome 
Herr Schuhmacher: Or they will keep voting until they say yes.  
 
Indeed, Ireland would be asked to vote again in 2009, and would, with concessions, 
deliver the wished-for answer.   
In conclusion, I would like to return to the question of what interconnections 
should be made about the euro. If the EU seemed distant, the euro made the presence of 
the EU tangible. But not necessarily to naturalize the euro as a market medium; it could 
also bring the question of politics to renewed scrutiny and debate. One of my key 
respondents in Leipzig, a dissident in Leipzig’s peaceful revolution, had this to say:  
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Herr Lange: In the euro-zone, Germany is the export leader. But at the same time, 
the wages are too high. No one seems to see the contradiction. That is the thing. 
The criteria set in the Maastricht treaty, the annual deficit to 3% debt limit- this 
measure is meaningless. There are no criteria for the labor market, which is more 
important to economic growth.  
U: so then what do you think of the euro? 
Herr Lange: Maastricht is dangerous. It hinders growth. It is an anti-capitalist 
treaty construct. When they try to limit the deficit, then there is no growth. This 
could be discussed. You need not let everyone in. Chancellor Schmidt, Horst 
Köhler—the construct was decided on German initiative. The conceptualization 
of the ECB is a German one. For French politicians it is puzzling. It is 
incomprehensible economically. They should have established wages as part of 
the convergence criteria. It is a matter of political will, so they could have decided 
upon a minimum wage. The minimum wage says more that the 3% criteria. It is a 
political decision. 
U: But economists at the Bundesbank see the criteria as economic 
Herr Lange: In order to announce that it is a political decision. They just act as if 
it is economic. They are not that dumb. The most political thing in a country is 
[what counts as] money. But the people are made to believe that it is un-political. 
And if the ECB complies with the treaty, it must ensure the stability of monetary 
value. Those working there [at the Bundesbank) must ensure price stability. 
Everyone knows, without a certain amount of inflation there can’t be full 
employment. If you want to avoid inflation, then it means you have to keep 
unemployment high. It is clear politically, either you want to work toward full 
employment or you don’t. It is not honest to act as if these criteria are economic. 
Well of course, in this way you can foreclose discussion. 
U: But how do you think about this difference, what is political and what is 
economic about the euro? 
Herr Lange: At the micro-level you could say that whoever has money has a 
certain degree of power. At the macro-level, it is the opposite. Whoever has 
power decides about the money. This is what I believe is the case with the euro. 
Germany has the most power in deciding about the Maastricht treaty. He who has 
power decides about the money. Even the French politicians on the right don’t 
understand why these criteria are necessary, but the left in Germany doesn’t 
understand why it shouldn’t be the case.  
 
Herr Lange laughed heartily on this last note. I couldn’t help but feel that his 
assessment of the euro was just as much a commentary on the dialectic of the political 
and the economic that had also overshadowed debates about the 1990 monetary union. It 
is to the politics and economics of currency revaluation as a site of critique on Germany 
and Europe to which I turn in the next chapter.  
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       Figure 12. “Let’s Make Europe Work Better” 
 Photo by author (2008) 
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Chapter 4 
 
Shared narratives of critique, different forms of accounting: the 1990 currency 
union in east/west perspective. 
 
A former Treuhänder on the problem of monetary value 
 
It is early morning on May 4th, 2008, and I have just taken the regional train from 
Leipzig to Halle, about a 30-40 minute trip depending on the number of stops scheduled. 
Through a friend and anthropologist at the Max Planck Institute for Social Anthropology 
in Halle (Saale) I am able to secure an interview with a former West German employee of 
the Treuhandanstalt, Joachim Lenz. He began work in the Berlin division in 1990, having 
just completed his university degree in economics. Lenz works as an independent scholar 
and consultant and has written numerous scholarly articles on the 1990 currency union 
and privatization of the East German economy. 
Lenz is one of few critical voices to emerge out the Treuhand, where official 
publications and statements tend to celebrate the achievements of the institution. Lenz 
has staked his critical analysis on the problems the currency union instantiated and made 
manifest. However, he has written equally critically of the policy on property return, 
Rückgabe vor Entschädigung, which stipulated that collectivized property seized after 
1949 (the soviet occupation period was excluded) should be returned to the original 
owner(s) before compensation. Lenz notes in his writings that no other Eastern European 
country adopted the policy of ‘natural return’ of property. Disentangling ownership rights 
proved to be an enormously complex and drawn out process, which many analysts have 
argued further impeded investment in the East. East Germans who owned homes (notable 
cases in Berlin have been written about, in particular by Daniella Dahn) lived for years 
with uncertainty about whether they would be able to remain in their homes.  
Lenz’s experiences span across the globe, from time spent in India, studies in 
Oregon, to consulting work in Eastern European countries such as Hungary and the 
Czech Republic. Though he may at times sound like a mainstream economist, his 
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‘systemic view’ aims to think past and propose other ways of thinking about development 
and inequality of North/South global arrangements and imbalances. His is a hybrid 
approach that tries to think balance within the existing system. Growth necessarily leads 
to systemic imbalances and ‘interest’ moves money to underdeveloped regions that 
become indebted, not enabled to develop stable conditions for self-generated production 
and investment.  
 On a beautiful day in May 2008, I meet Lenz and my friend from the Max Planck 
Institute at the Halloren Café in the old town of Halle. My friend joins us for the 
interview. As a West German conducting ethnographic research in two industrial towns 
near the border of Poland, she had told me of lively discussions with Lenz as 
ethnographers and economists typically have very different ways of ‘describing’ the 
world. The café is bustling. We find a table near the large glass window with a view of 
the historic market place. The café is part of this history of transformation and rupture, of 
arcane debates about currency union and exchange rates, which in this story, decided the 
fate of an entire economy—so it is understood. But that history would not be readily 
apparent now. One would have to go looking. One would have to have some patience to 
understand this ‘interconnection’ 
The Halloren Café is part of the Halloren chocolate company, established in the 
early 1800’s, and the oldest in Germany. It is also one of the notable success stories of 
privatization after 1990. But like many East German products, and despite its tradition-
rich status, it does not have a large presence in West German retail stores (though at the 
time of my research this was changing). Its signature product is the Halloren Kugeln 
(small, elongated chocolate spheres/globes covered in chocolate, with a praline filling). I 
would often buy these chocolates as a ‘local’ gift for my West German relatives in 
Northern Germany, who I visited periodically while in the field. They were not familiar 
with the chocolates.  
Indeed, not a few of my insights about the distant, perhaps non-existent awareness 
or familiarity of many West Germans for the East derive from my conversations with 
family members. As an American, not raised in Germany, I was predominantly 
experienced as a third-party to the East-West antagonisms. Whereas my East German 
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friends and respondents often emphasized to me that this was an enormous benefit, West 
German family members and respondents in Frankfurt seemed less inclined to hold back 
their ‘honest’ assessments of the East with this German-speaking American as captive 
audience. It was assumed that I would not have the same stakes in the matter, coming 
from ‘outside.’  
A West German ethnographer once told me how, in presenting her work on East-
West German gift exchange during division and its refiguring of affective ties after 1990 
to academic audiences in Germany, that she was always asked to disclose whether she 
was from West or East. She found it almost impossible to discuss the topic without 
becoming hopelessly entangled in the politics of it all. My own mediated tellings of life 
and research in Leipzig and other parts East to my large extended family in the West 
materialized politics in other ways. As my descriptions got filtered back to me in my 
interlocutor’s response, it would often seem to me as if I was describing a remote region 
of the world, far removed from Germany. One cousin referred to the East as “Dark 
Germany” (Dunkeldeutschland.). She immediately made fun of the Sachsen dialect of the 
region. Recalling it seemed to generate for her a feeling of repulsion, not the good-
natured humor generally associated with the many other dialects that exist across 
Germany.  
As anthropologist Daphne Berdahl noted in her analysis of the film, Good-Bye 
Lenin, the Sachsen dialect became a marker of East Germany writ large (even though 
there are many other dialects), which could be deployed by Easterners and Westerners 
alike for comedic or for negative stereotyping. It is also important to note that young 
people I got to know during my fieldwork worked hard to illuminate the accent and adopt 
a neutral form of High German. For those who could not quite loose the lilting and soft 
melting together of consonants (my lay-description!), one could immediately be ‘outed’ 
as someone from the East.  
Despite their proximity, Leipzig and Halle also seemed to be like different worlds. 
After the redrawing of East Germany into federal regions, Leipzig and Halle were once 
again in the old/new bordering regions of Sachsen and Sachsen-Anhalt respectively. The 
two cities share a regional airport, one of the joint development schemes in the area, 
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which has not been without critique and controversy even if it is an important source of 
jobs in the area. While Leipzig seemed to reclaim some of its traditional Trade-Town 
spirit, some have suggested that Halle struggled to carve out a new identity. It had once 
been the capital of its district in the GDR, a status it lost to the near-by city of Magdeburg 
after 1990, which became the capital city of the region. Halle was also the center of the 
chemical industry during GDR times. It became so heavily polluted that, in addition to 
losing the substantial part of this industry after unification, enormous funds for 
environmental cleanup were required. By the time of my research, Halle was starting to 
take on its old medieval charm, with much of the market place and old city restored. 
Another part of town, called New Town (Neustadt) is a sea of high-rise socialist 
Plattenbauten (high rise apartment complexes) that had housed many of the employees 
working in the chemical combines. Historically, Halle was an important intellectual 
center and among other notable claims to fame, was the birthplace of the composer, 
Händel. Halle is also famous for its role in the salt trade, for which Halle is named, and 
which dates as far back as the Bronze Age. Salt-bars once functioned as a valuable 
“commodity money.” Like many cities in the former East that had at various times in 
their history been centers of wealth, the changing fortunes of localities reminds one that 
German division and unification are but one small episode in a long chain of historical 
entanglements.  
Nonetheless, after 1990 and over the years, Halle acquired a bad reputation, not 
the least for its high rates of unemployment. Attacks on foreign refugees and incidents of 
criminality gave the impression that it was unsafe. As is so often the case, much of this 
reputation is unearned and is a construct of the media. However, Halle also became the 
focal point of the most spectacular criminal cases that occurred under the auspices of the 
Treuhand. Many involved West German small entrepreneurs who were granted bids for 
firms, often without any formal vetting process or proof of funds. Indeed a whole ring of 
individuals, including management in the regional Treuhand offices, comprised multiple 
schemes, some of which still occupy the criminal courts. The most controversial case was 
that of the nearby chemical works of Leuna, which involved deals between French and 
German corporate and political elites, and culminated in one of the worst political 
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scandals of the Federal Republic’s history, leading all the way to Chancellor Kohl 
himself, who received illegal contributions for his 2004 re-election campaign.  
At the time of my interview in 2008, however, I was not very knowledgeable of 
the complicated history of the Treuhand, or of these criminal cases. At many points in the 
interview, Lenz would lower his voice, aware that others could hear our conversation. 
Especially at moments where he articulated key points of antagonism—about East/West 
perceptions, he seemed uncomfortable. Otherwise, he was very much the rational and 
precise scholar-practitioner. It was clear that he had been cultivating this work of 
explanation for some time, and that it was carved out in the very terrain of unbridgeable 
divides in perception and experience. Fortunately, I was a willing and decidedly 
unseasoned listener to this now decade-long discussion. I wanted to understand the logics 
of it all, so my lack of accumulated knowledge opened up possibilities. It was not easy to 
see it that way at the time. It felt more like a deficit. I was trying to catch up with a past 
that by now had too many layers that were just settling in to silence. For many I was 
stirring up the tired terrain of the past and words had already done far too little to change 
the stratigraphy.  
 
Ursula: What is your analysis of the Wende, the decisions about the currency 
union, economy and consequences? 
Lenz: Yes, the situation of East Germany was a special one in comparison to 
other East Block states. Other countries were not divided by the iron curtain. 
Germany was the only country with this border divided it. That was in many ways 
a special circumstance [Besonderheit]. For example, when a Hungarian decided to 
escape, and say come to Germany, he loses his culture. You can live better 
materially in Germany, but you lose home [Heimat] and language. And that kept 
people from leaving, from taking this step. That’s why if there had not been a 
division in two of Germany, they would not have needed to build the wall. The 
walls, or rather fences, that were built between Hungary and Austria, or between 
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, also had the intention of ensuring that East Germans on 
vacation would not be able to leave for the west. This situation led to one culture 
being divided into two halves, half-worlds, so two systems in one culture. And 
naturally opened up a certain weakness for the GDR, because it constantly faced 
the danger of its people leaving, running away. … So the GDR could only exist 
with this wall, and without this wall the GDR could not have existed. 
Nevertheless, that these divisive tendencies [Abspaltungen] existed, because of 
the state leadership in the GDR, still the sense of belonging-to 
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[Zusammengehörigkeit] was greater in the GDR, and by the way much greater 
than in West Germany, which you could explain mainly in economic terms. Of 
course I would much rather belong to someone wealthier than I am, but the 
wealthy brother doesn’t really know if he wants to have the poor one. This was 
the post-war generation…   
 
Lenz describes his time in Oregon as a counterpoint to his relationship with East 
Germans. In 1989 he felt more in common with students in Oregon that he did with East 
Germans of his age. They shared the same interests in music, books and ideas. He 
remembers how the landscape in Oregon resembled certain regions in Germany. 
Americans there even wore Birkenstocks! In contrast, the other Germany with which he 
shared a language and culture seemed further removed than Oregon. The shared German 
culture, spilt into two systems, is not a point of affective reference that would 
immediately provide a basis for an unproblematic coming together. Rather, in the context 
of German division, it becomes an economic variable with different implications for both 
sides.  
The border occupies an uneasy status in many economic explanations of German 
division. The Wall was not built until 1961. Border controls and different monetary 
regimes formed the most salient manifestations of border control and maintenance. The 
experience of living in the divided city of Berlin heightened this sense given the close 
proximity of the ‘island of the West’ in the East. Elsewhere, like in Leipzig, the border 
was further removed and not an immediate part of daily life. It is most iconic as a 
materialization of human rights abuses and deaths, the division of families, and the 
restrictions of freedom of movement. In the East it could be construed as a shield against 
Fascism, or an admission of the GDR’s inferior status compared to the West. Why else 
would a wall be necessary? But it also became an important marker of economic 
difference. From the early years of the GDR’s existence, the continued loss of skilled 
workers indeed posed problems for the East German economy and it has been attributed 
on both sides as a ‘positive’ gain for the West. Some reject explanations of it as an 
economic measure altogether. But it clearly figured prominently in the explanations for 
and against the currency union of 1990. The same/other status of East Germans and their 
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relation to the West similarly straddled the logic of ‘brothers divided’ and an economic 
variable caught up histories of competing claims of citizenship and economy between the 
two German states. Lenz continues, “So the GDR absolutely wanted to belong, and the 
wall falls, and the East German citizen wants to belong to us. And that is an enormous 
economic problem therefore, because…” Lenz stops. He thinks and chooses his words 
carefully, continuing: “a relatively speaking poor, underdeveloped country has no real 
chance against a wealthy country except if one considers the cost of wages.” He places 
the problem in the terms of competing states that must work in terms of competitive 
advantage—where wages and production differences can be a sign of poverty and 
opportunity:   
 
Lenz: It is of course a disadvantage for the individual who lives in a country 
where one earns little, but macro-economically speaking, it is a chance to 
develop. For example, that is also a problem in America—the Japanese, the 
Chinese with their lower wages ensure that production takes place there, and no 
longer in the US. Many things, toys, automobiles, some autos are still produced in 
the US but many markets have been lost. That means, this chance, from which 
Hungary or the Czech Republic could profit [sighs] from which many eastern 
European countries have now profited, such as investments from Western 
Europe—Germans have invested in the Czech Republic—and Nokia is now 
moving from Germany to Romania, so there is a lost of jobs in Germany—the big 
topic now in the newspapers. That means that there, workplaces are created in 
Romania, production is undertaken there, and that slowly things will improve 
continually—the wage levels and standard of living will improve. East Germany 
was in a completely different situation. They wanted to have the D-Mark. And the 
introduction of the D-Mark meant an equalization of prices, which means a rise in 
prices since the prices in the GDR were subsidized. They were not market prices. 
For example a loaf of bread cost 20 pfennige (cents). But that was not price of 
what it cost to finance the production of the bread, because in the GDR the 
production costs were much higher and were set by the State. Especially staple 
foods were very cheap in the GDR. Other things necessary for life were very 
cheap. So then in a common currency regime the prices have to be equalized. So, 
then in order to pay West prices, they have to have West wages. And that 
is…..well even today West wages are not paid, but still after unification wages 
were quadrupled relative to international standards, so there was strong increase 
in the wages in East Germany, and naturally that made East Germany an 
unattractive place to produce. That was the reason why the economy there was 
more or less finished there. So what remained there, what newly emerged there 
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developed because the State, the West German, the wealthy state sponsored so 
heavily there, but voluntarily and privately there was almost nothing.  
 
Lenz describes a global dynamic that has received no shortage of attention in critical 
analyses of globalization, development and capitalism. The irony here is that the 
difference in price, wage and monetary regimes confounded the usual logics. East 
Germans could not be expected to accept a solution in which they would mimic the 
conditions of a developing state. The logic of justifying economic difference between the 
global North and South presents a low wage zone as attractive for investments and a 
source of jobs locally, even if wages are below what could be earned in the wealthier 
west However, difference and inequality posed as a positive competitive advantage 
breaks down here. East Germans had formal legal rights as citizens of the Federal 
Republic, and could continue to leave for the West where they could secure better wages 
and benefits. But the introduction of the D-Mark to the East would immediately pose 
problems if wages did not meet rising prices of goods, which would presumably flow 
from the West. Whereas in other parts of the world, workers would have far less recourse 
to claim rights or put pressure on wealthier states, East Germans—so the dominant 
narrative goes—placed pressure on Western decision-makers to intervene in the ‘market 
logic’ as it were. The response presents itself as a further paradox in the post-Unification 
problems of deindustrialization and regional difference. The interconnection of the 
currency union and the re-valuation of wages manifests as both a privilege and a measure 
of unearned wealth. It is a gesture of social justice and of economic destruction. 
Individual consumption is enabled while the economic ‘base’ collapses. The solutions 
work within and exceed the usual logics; what was understood as a just wage includes as 
it also excludes, equalizes to displace difference temporally and materially. The currency 
union—in its temporality and placement—restages a cruel fiction. Value is made 
contingent, confirming money’s unstable referent. But in its failure it is transcendent and 
sublime. It instills hope and terror at the messy remainders.  
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Lenz gives what seems to be a textbook example, a fanciful thought experiment 
about a scenario unlikely to occur. That it did explains why the currency union is an 
eternally returning figure of this event:  
Lenz: I can give you an example to make it more three-dimensional. I myself 
worked in the Treuhandanstalt for altogether 7 years. So to give you an example 
from praxis, I was, the Treuhand was called the largest holding in the world 
because we became the ‘state owner’ of the entire East German economy. So I 
worked in the administration and I would telephone with managers, for example a 
shoe factory. One time a manager said to me, we were speaking about numbers, 
balance of accounts, I can’t remember the exact number now but I can reconstruct 
it. We make 6 million in total revenue [Umsatz] and 12 million in losses. And I 
thought, he had mistakenly inverted the numbers, that he made 12 million in 
revenue and 6 million in losses. An example for that would be, he sells a shoe for 
120 D-Mark, but it costs 180 D-Mark to produce, so he takes a loss of 60 D-Mark. 
So he said to me, he will sell the shoe for 120 D-Mark in the store but it will still 
cost 180 to make. Those are numbers, orders of magnitude that were unreal in the 
western world. I had just done my university exams at that time. In such a 
situation, I would have failed my exam if I hade even thought in that way, if I had 
thought in terms of losses higher than profits. It was a totally absurd situation. 
Ok? And then there were dramatic losses, it was learning by doing, there were 
losses because the production costs were higher than what it could be sold for. 
This is all connected to the currency union.  
 
 Lenz’s examples are from his own work experiences. As such they are rooted in 
the kind of dilemmas that West German bureaucrats had to make legible. In many ways 
this characterization of the East German worker who seems oblivious to the logic of 
production for a profit registers to me as an extreme stereotype of the illogics of the 
planned economy generally. The de-linking of production from “hard budget” constraints 
is the iconic explanation for socialist failure. For the worker in this example, production 
is more important than what it costs to produce. It underscores the significance of work 
and the determination to continue on even in the place of immense losses. But for Lenz it 
stands out as a complete failure of logic. He can hardly fathom it, let alone find other 
modes of explanation for it. Thus, it is possible that the protests of East German workers 
fighting to keep enterprises open could be reframed as understandable but illogical 
responses to the hard realities of privatization. It is not my place or desire here to play the 
example against its accuracy or appropriateness. This would only engage in the mode of 
  178 
interpretation typically applied to East German narratives about the past. It is not about 
turning the tables. Rather, I want to read around the example to suggest how it reflects 
difficult experiences of encounter and unequal powers of decision-making about the fate 
and status of workers and workplaces, such as the example above. It is an extreme 
example of what has been described as an impossible process. I choose to read the 
example in that register. It is striking, though, that such examples become a kind of 
shorthand to explain a complex process. It makes the point, but it is also a point of 
antagonism that shows the horizon of difference to be a different one for Lenz than would 
have likely been the case for the worker. By emphasizing its connection to the currency 
union the pressure of decision can also be externalized to a system-logic of unification. 
The currency union acquires agency because it re-sets the field of decision. It was an 
emergent process in a history of old and new entanglements. They did not unfold in time; 
time made them impossible and necessary: 
 
Lenz: We can make it three-dimensional [plastisch] with another example. I 
calculated it back The currency of the GDR for a German or American tourist, 
one had to exchange 25 D-Mark at a rate of 1:1, so you got 25 Ostmark, and that 
was more or less ok because drinks or going to a restaurant cost only 8 (D-Mark), 
so the tourist felt that was somehow ok. Because those prices were subsidized. 
But in international exchange, the rate of 1 Ostmark was 1:5. Of course it was not 
officially traded by the East side. But interestingly, was accepted by the East side 
in international trade. There was an alignment rate of 1:4 or 1:5. So, an example. 
There was a piano manufacturer. Let me think. He sold pianos as far away as 
Canada  
U: During GDR times? 
B: Yes, he really did sell these. And sold one for 2,000 D-Mark back then and the 
production costs were around 5,000 Mark der DDR. So you can calculate as you 
wish, he sold for 2,000 D-Mark to Canada, earns 10,000 Mark der DDR, so then 
the difference is 5,000 Mark der DDR, and he earns 5,000 Mark der DDR—a 
good business deal [Bombengeschäft]. So, calculated otherwise. He sells the piano 
for 2,000 Marks in Canada, the production costs 1,000 DM, so 1:5, and so he 
makes a profit of 1,000 D-Mark. Also a good business deal. So, the the Wende 
comes, the currency union. Now the piano is sold for 2,000 D-Mark just like 
before, and the production still costs 5,000 Marks, but no longer, and this is a 
decisive point, no longer Mark der DDR, but D-Mark. Now he has a loss of 3,000 
D-Mark. This is the example, where the losses are higher than the sale price. So 
what should happen? What should happen now? So really, the Canadian should 
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now pay 10,000 D-Mark, but he has no desire to do so. He can buy a Japanese, or 
even a Canadian one. What else could be done? The wages could be reduced in 
the GDR, but that’s not what the people want, they want higher wages. So then 
the conversion was into D-Mark, but it was still low. A crane driver in the GDR 
earned 1,000 Mark, der DDR—that is 1,000 D-Mark. But that is still low, relative 
to the wage of a West German driver. So there was large increase in wages. First 
there was the conversion into D-Mark, but then they were raised to be closer to 
the West German rate. It was not only the background that people in the GDR 
wanted it. The background was also that West German firms and West German 
unions also had an interest. Of course the West German firm does not want to see 
competition established in the East, and then there is a coalition of West German 
unions, and they also don’t want to see wage competition, and see jobs destroyed 
in the West. That means that the only one who should have been against the 
wages rising should have been the people in East Germany. But they didn’t 
understand that. They were also for the increase in wages. So that was the 
situation.  
 
 Here, as throughout the interview, Lenz expresses a sense of frustration with East 
German misrecognition of the problems, and of their own best interests. While these 
come across in the tone of the so-called (the superior knowing Westerner) “Besser-
Wessi,” I believe they also register a struggle over who (or what) was responsible for 
what was experienced as a disastrous process of decision-making. The immediacy of 
decisions and the social conflict that ensued weighs heavily on what may seem on this 
page like the typical economistic reductions. If one begins to grasp the larger story, 
however, they might be understood as a management of meaning in the present in a 
context where the messy details of unity are not a concern of critical public memory 
work.  
 
Lenz: The example with the piano maker. He could no longer sell any more 
pianos. Or, then only at a loss.  
U: Is this a real case? 
B: Yes, it is not only a real example, but a typical example. And most 
importantly—important is that the people in the GDR also no longer wanted to 
buy this piano. Because now they should also suddenly not only pay 2,000 but 
10,000 Mark (DDR), so pay 5,000 D-Marks. So the people in the GDR also did 
not buy East German pianos any more. And also no East German cars—and also 
no GDR anything! 
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Here, the sense of frustration could not have been clearer as Lenz turned in his chair and 
leaned forcefully on the table. He then places it in the context of recent nostalgia for East 
German consumer goods like the Trabant (Trabi) automobiles—the much derided ‘card-
board cars’ of jokes and stereotypes. But he does not deploy it here. Instead he 
underscores the interconnection between East German products and the conditions under 
which a sustainable economic base was an impossible problem, but also a possible threat 
to Western interests: 
 
Lenz: So—and this Trabi nostalgia. It was all shut down because in the 
production it cost I believe 40,000 D-Mark, much more expensive than the Golf 
[Volkswagen] in West Germany. But it is more complicated than this because the 
productivity in West Germany was also much higher, a lot more automation, more 
machines, and an economy with a much greater capital stock, that had just 
reached a high level of automation, so that fewer employees worked relative to 
the value that was produced, which meant that higher wages could be paid. But 
only then, when the capital stock is high. But that means, when applied to the case 
of the GDR, that a revitalization of the economy there could only happen if the 
wages were lowered, or if the capital stock was brought up to the Western level. 
So if new machines and equipment were put into the industry in the east, they 
could have worked as competitively as those in the west. 
U: Would that have been possible? 
B: But there are three problems. Where should the money come from? Who 
should pay for that? I mean, this capital stock that existed in West Germany was 
the accumulated economic savings of 40 years of industrious economic activity. 
You can’t just magically pull that out of the hat. The second problem is where are 
the markets? Yes? Who should buy it? The world markets are fought over 
fiercely. So now here comes another batch of goods, services, and so on. Who 
should buy these? [Lowers voice] And the third problem is in fact, this sounds like 
a conspiracy theory, this is not an official piece of information, that naturally, in 
West Germany there was no interest that competition should develop in East 
Germany.  
 
 I would only fully appreciate much later that the discussion above encapsulates 
the central problem of the currency union and its ‘aftermath.’ Namely, what sort of 
‘regional’ economy could, or should, emerge from this process. By now it might be clear 
what the stakes might be in giving or internalizing a coherent answer to that question. 
Below, in my interview with Edgar Most, this explanation acquires a force even as it may 
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also further inscribe it in the realm conspiracy theory. Here, it is readily apparent that 
intentions are multiple and contradictory. East Germans wanted the D-Mark. They did 
not and could not buy East German products. Firms could no longer pay to produce them, 
and there was no longer a ‘market’ where they could be sold. Political decision-makers 
promised an optimistic outcome that solved and created social fractures. West Germans 
found themselves making ‘life and death’ decisions about people’s material existence. As 
much as the rational actor theory and ideal models of supply, demand and value-different 
could not be ‘disproven’ they were at best cold comfort at such a historical juncture. 
Doing right by East Germans had to be imagined within narratives of altruistic 
achievement, historical responsibility, pragmatic creativity, and narrow interest in making 
a profit.  
 
Lenz: And this Treuhandanstalt as owner tried in individual cases to make 
decisions to the effect that, in special cases this money is made available, in the 
form of cost-free money, to activate investments so that a firm could 
competitively produce, or to close down the production. But the picture people 
have here still today, they will probably tell you here—they came with a 
flyswatter and swatted everything down. The Treuhand did not do that—it was the 
currency union that did that.  
 
It is notable that within only sentences of broaching the topic of the Treuhand, the 
currency union constitutes the crucial link to explain the cause and effect relations that 
also exceed it. The Treuhand is a site of antagonism precisely because particular human 
agents are readily identifiable. Whereas for Lenz the currency union is the negative agent, 
for East Germans it was (is) a logical target of critique. For the latter, it constitutes 
multiple agents and interests that culminated in clearing away, not reviving the East 
German economy. Given that the board of directors and all but one member of the upper 
management were West Germans, it is not an unwarranted critique. The work of the 
Treuhand, as already noted, remains the most salient point of public contestation. The 
political establishment (which cross-cuts political parties) is viewed to be deliberately 
preventing its transparency. Indeed, as Dirk Laabs recently noted, if conspiracy theories 
circulate, it is because the lack of transparency suggests there is something to hide (Laabs 
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2012). At the time of my interview, I admittedly felt conflicted since I had already noted 
how difficult it was for East German critiques to intervene in dominant discourses that 
repeatedly viewed Easterners as passive subjects who could not understand economy. 
Lenz wanted to tell his side of the story. Moreover, the currency union was a vanishing 
object throughout my research such that it was a relief, analytically, when someone 
wished to discuss at length.  
Though not explicitly explained at the time, Lenz moved immediately to another 
effort on the part of East German reformers, that of shares or dividends to extend 
ownership rights in the “People’s own economy.” But below it is explained in terms of 
how it worked elsewhere in Eastern Europe, and why it would have failed in the East 
German case: 
Lenz: If one had, like in the Czech Republic, there it was the case that the State 
was not the owner, and there really were such shares distributed, so macro-
economically there was an enormous stock corporation, and the people received 
shares. But you can imagine, you are a shareholder, you have a stock from a 
company that is making profits, and then relative to your option you are paid 
dividends, but imagine, once a year there is the plenary meeting, everyone meets 
and decides what to do, imagine there is a situation where the management says, 
this year we have made so many losses, every shareholder should pay 189 euro 
per share. What would this plenary session decide, they would decide to shut 
down the place to prevent further losses. But in the Czech Republic it was not like 
that, that the capitalized value [Ertragswert] there is a distinction between 
capitalized value and net asset value [Substanzwert],what is a firm worth, it is 
clear that if a firm is forced to raise its wages x5, that the capitalized earnings will 
be negative. Then it is over. You can’t sell the firm, you can only sell it at a loss, 
that is to say, give it away, and give the potential investor a lot of money to make 
something out of it. And in the case of the GDR, it was not the board of an 
enterprise that made the decision, but the State on behalf of the enterprise, also in 
the interest of the people. To compensate for the loss of jobs, then there were 
transfer payments for unemployment with the result that an East German, 
although he no longer has a job, lives much, much better than his Polish neighbor, 
even though he now has no work. The situation in Poland—there was less 
unemployment, but you earned much less than an East German and could not fly 
to Mallorca for vacation. It is not just the case that the East German couldn’t 
travel to Mallorca because of the Wall, but because they could not have afforded 
to. You have to consider that, given all the critiques, and complaints. These are 
the interconnections, in my view. 
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Between the lines of this explanation the remainders of a failed attempt at 
equivalence are staged. The logic of equalization—of making socially tenable 
decisions—left messy remainders. Easterners were compensated for unemployment and 
loss of their jobs, while also excluded from ownership. These ‘payments’ increased the 
standard of living, but reconfigured the basis from which income would be attached to 
one’s own work and production. A medium of payment is substituted for a commensurate 
value that would fail to show either loss or gain in the act of the conversion.  
Privatization welded together a contradictory demand to make socially tenable 
deals to save jobs, while privatizing as quickly as possible before restructuring. A 
medium of payment is not the same as capital investment, such that Easterners could 
consume, but they could not become the owners. The fortuitous increase is a payment 
that returns as a failed equivalence- in which what is received is not earned. System 
difference is now a difference between poverty and wealth. It is a privilege of history that 
erases the space of critique. But the critiques disturb because they remind and they 
unsettle those who had to make pragmatic judgments.   
 
Lenz: That it wasn’t made clear, that is somewhat, that was done on purpose, that 
this picture, the Treuhand is to blame for everything, was a conscious, a 
conscious, it was a conscious decision, to focus people’s anger on this institution. 
It was done on purpose, I know because the finance minister came to us and gave 
speeches, and said, your pay, you will get paid if you don’t let the lazy eggs sit 
there. There was a saying, save Bonn, sacrifice the Treuhand. The thought should 
not emerge that there were wrong policies, wrong monetary policies, or Kohl’s 
personal private interests were the reason for the misery, so it is these 4,000 
employees are the evil ones, everyone else is super, if it weren’t for this evil 
Treuhand that has shut down the businesses, everything would be super. So it 
appears to the people that Kohl is super, the D-Mark is super, German citizenship 
is super, everything is super, it is only this stupid Treuhand. But they didn’t see, 
that things can’t stay the way they are, that even a State economy can’t afford for 
enterprises to “write red ink’ [rote Zahlen schreiben], that are three times as high 
as the revenues. I just can’t sell a shoe for 50 D-mark that costs 250 D-Mark to 
make. You can do that until the entire economy is bankrupt. That is no vision for 
the future. Then there is no dinner…that they [Easterners] continue to work, make 
a contribution to the economy. It was cheaper to let them go, to service their 
unemployment claims, to pay them without them having to do anything for it, 
than that they keep producing with such enormous losses.  
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U: Was it the case that you had to work very quickly in the Treuhand, had little 
time to make decisions or evaluate particular cases, did that make a difference? 
With the privatization? 
B: Yes [hestitates]….yes [pauses, choosing words carefully]…that is the answer 
is yes. However, I know this discussion, that it is the standard argument, that 
everything was decided so quickly, that one did not take more time to think about 
what might have been, perhaps there might have been a more sensible, better 
solution. That is also certainly true. If I have a lot of time to consider different 
options, then I have a higher chance to achieve a better result. But the pressure, it 
was not just for fun, that we work very fast, the pressure really came from these 
blood red numbers, these losses, every day it cost 80 million D-Mark, that was… 
what was difficult for people to understand, what was difficult to help people 
understand [schwer vermittelbar] was that these enterprises, some of these were 
sold though they were writing black numbers, but the typical Treuhand enterprise, 
was given away for nothing, with money added to that, but then the buyer was 
contractually obligated to, we constructed contracts that obligated, that the money 
is taken not to be put in a Swiss bank account but to save workplaces. The idea 
was that they get the enterprise, they get the money, buy new machinery, make a 
profit and then they can pay the wages. That was the idea…that was the idea… 
These are not easy interconnections to understand, that explains the many 
misunderstandings, they think, they say we had bad intentions for them, they put 
us down, they made deals, they didn’t sell the businesses to the people, gave away 
businesses for nothing. That is not completely wrong, but it is not the systemic 
answer to the systemic problem. The systemic problem is the currency union. So 
then we have the whole problem—the losses, the fact that the businesses have to 
be given away, that money has to be thrown at it, and then I have the problem that 
I can’t explain it to people, especially those people who have not learned how to 
think in this way, to think in an economic way, in the magnitude of wins and 
losses. They just went to work, they did something, in any case, not like in West 
Germany with strict criteria, where the question is, does it make economic sense. 
Many things happened in the GDR world, there were losses, but as long as the 
economy makes up the difference, everything worked by command, you are told 
what to do, then it doesn’t matter if there are losses. This response ‘why not, we 
are just going to make a shoe.’ What stands behind the numbers? That doesn’t 
play a role for them. [At this point, we take a break and Lenz leaves the table for 
the restroom. He stops and turns back, uncomfortable] These are my experiences, 
this is not so simple. 
 
Lenz returns and reiterates his concern: “I have to do the work of convincing. 
[Uberzeugungsarbeit]. Of course there is Herr Sinn.” Lenz refers to the prominent West 
German economist Hans Werner Sinn, from the IFO Institute in Munich. Sinn is has also 
written extensively on the economic problems of unification. He is widely respected but 
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still a polarizing figure in the German media scene. In blogs and public commentary he is 
sometimes referred to as Herr “Unsinn,” which by adding “un” to his last name, changes 
its meaning from “sense” to “nonsense.” Sinn and his wife, also an economist, are 
influential in policy circles, even if their arguments seem to fluctuate with present 
agendas, sometimes contradicting what they have argued in the past. However, there is a 
wide consensus among economists that the currency union—its placement and 
modalities—is the beginning of longer and complicated chain of events and measures that 
shaped the subsequent privatization process. Lenz underscores once more to me—I must 
also be convinced—that “it must be said again, about the currency union because it is not 
understood, it is not seen. But it can’t be denied that it was so. The currency union had 
consequences, but that I haven’t been able to get that meaning across, so I am thankful to 
him [Olaf Baale] actually.”    
A subtext of meeting that I will mention briefly here was a book that had just been 
published by an East German journalist, Olaf Baale, bearing the title “Abbau Ost” 
[tearing down the East] (Baale 2008). The German word can be translated in other ways 
that are relevant to the different registers that attach to this context: dismantling; 
downsizing; reduction; decomposition. It is a technical, construction term. It is about 
infrastructure, as if suggested by the inverse term used to refer to the reconstruction of the 
East. What this reconstruction entails is revealed and problematized in the term. 
Suggested is a building up from a cleared surface. But it implies a clearing away of 
difference—economic livelihoods that should not emerge out what was there, but from a 
cleared terrain, a ‘tabula rasa.’ I brought a copy of the book, which I was in the process of 
reading. The author had spoken with Lenz and included some statements in his book 
about the currency union. Lenz was not pleased with arguments surrounding the quotes 
because they stood for him as further examples of “un-economic reasoning.” My friend 
spent much of the interview leafing through the book. Lenz wanted to return to the 
arguments surrounding his statements on a number of occasions, which only seemed to 
highlight the unbridgeable terrain in which economic reasoning was a struggle over the 
meaning and place of the referent—is it economy, or something else?  He said at one 
juncture, in response to an argument in the book, “that is not an economic 
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argument…They are understandably dissatisfied, but it doesn’t work that those who do 
not produce as much still want to earn as much as those who do. When all is said and 
done, they are profiting. It is not meant as a judgment. Resentments come when you don’t 
when you don’t see why things have become the way they are. Everything is at fault, just 
not this technical decision [the currency union]. They are not interested. They just want to 
work. That no one sees this—that is a problem.” 
Lenz returns to another essential link in the chain of argument: the drama of 
citizenship, the border, and the “pressure” of the East German people. “So then you can 
ask, oh God, oh God, if it [the currency union] was so bad, then didn’t people foresee 
this. There weren’t any alternatives to the whole story.” This is the ubiquitous Gordian 
knot: the currency union would not make up the difference between the two economies—
it would make it worse; it would be expensive (for the West Germans). But the East 
German people demanded the D-Mark. They could not be prevented from crossing the 
border and taking up residence in the West. The currency union was the only alternative. 
In any case, these are the “pragmatic” and “macro-economic” terms of the argument. At 
the time of the interview, however, I did not fully comprehend why the citizenship issue 
appeared time and again in how many West Germans explained the currency union. I 
understood the logic of it, but not exactly what to do with it as a “monetary problem.” For 
Lenz, though, and as he proceeded to explain to me, there was in his view “one” 
alternative, “…a very concrete alternative could have been possible, namely the 
recognition of East German citizenship.” He then describes some (but not all) of the 
power struggles between the two states, including various trade agreements that existed 
only by virtue of the GDR as inside and outside West German claims to sovereignty. For, 
as has been described elsewhere (see especially (Bickford 2011; Borneman 1992; 
Borneman 1993; Glaeser 2000). The Federal Republic claimed that only it was the 
successor the German Reich and bore sole representation for all Germans, including 
those in the GDR. However, during the period of what is known as Détente, which began 
in the 70’s, diplomatic relations between West Germany and the Soviet Union were 
established. Lenz explains,  
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Lenz: “so, eventually the GDR was recognized as a State, but not the citizenship. 
So that is to say it was recognized as its own State, but it was somehow a Sate 
without citizens [he laughs with irony] since all East Germans were considered 
West Germans. So as a consequence that meant that every GDR citizen, as soon 
as someone came over the border, one received a West German passport. This 
could also be done at any German embassy, even in Buenos Aires. Without any 
problems. So that is a big difference in comparison with someone from the Czech 
Republic, because they could not easily receive a passport. That was the situation. 
And that was also the context for the Wall, so that East Germans would be 
prevented from going across the border and picking up their passport. So—and 
this had the consequence that after the opening of the Wall, the East German 
citizen could threaten with this saying, there was this line, “If the D-Mark does 
not come to me, I will go to it.” It rhymed. That means, if the D-Mark isn’t 
introduced, we will run over to you [run you over]. It would have been cheaper to 
allow the East Germans to go to the West and leave the GDR to return to 
nature…it is still that way. Every second euro earned in Germany is spent here. 
That is why some West Germans have said they would like the wall back. There 
was no alternative. East Germans exerted pressure. In West Germany people 
thought, are they all coming…one could see ahead. But what is the alternative: 
the only alternative would be to recognize East German citizenship. But that is a 
paradox [that was untenable]: We belong together, but West Germany now, in 
order to support East Germany, after we have recognized you as West German 
citizens for the past 40 years, now will make that null and void. Now you are not 
West Germans, you are your own State. You can do whatever you want. You can 
be a tourist for 3 months in the West, but you can’t come here, and work. But 
legally they would not have been able to come, so that this pressure, that the West 
German mark must be introduced immediately, this pressure would not have been 
there. That is a very difficult thing to imagine [pauses], to say, that in [economic 
terms] to accomplish the building up of the East [in a manner that, long term, 
would have been better]. But then, they would not have been able to say, ‘if the 
D-Mark doesn’t come to us, we will go to it.’ Then this pressure is no longer 
there. The cumulative private investments would have all flowed to East 
Germany. Language barriers are great. But through the currency union, East 
Germany was no longer attractive to investors. After the currency union, it was 
only attractive, because there were investment subsidies, and we said, here, you 
get the key to the place, and you get 500,000 DM in addition [to take it off our 
hands]. Without these accompany measures, East German businesses were not 
attractive for investors. These investments went to Poland, Hungary, the Czech 
Republic. That money could have gone to East Germany. Would this scenario 
have been better in the long run? There would have been more work, and East 
Germans understand that not just as a source of income, but also as the meaning 
of life. They would have had the feeling that their wealth was their own. They 
would have earned it themselves, and that gives you confidence. Then the whole 
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thing would have not cost West Germany so much tax money, debts taken on. 
After 19 years, things would have been better with this other scenario.  
 
 There are a number of ways to read the link made above between the currency 
union, citizenship, and economic development that are relevant. First, Lenz is referencing 
a long series of tactics and antagonisms deployed by both states. These were not only 
questions of state sovereignty, but also systemic claims about which was the better 
Germany. That included quite centrally economic claims of superiority, but also the post-
war legacy and one’s distance from it. Both are necessary for understanding the 
citizenship logics. It is also important to note that some East German respondents who 
were otherwise critical of the GDR still objected to the non-recognition of East German 
citizenship. Conversely, as Lenz has already indicated, East Germany was quite removed 
from many West Germans’ lives before 1989 (a pattern that continues as I came to 
experience it during my many crossings between field sites in Frankfurt and Leipzig). 
The rapid dissolution that began in the summer of 1989 and the opening of the borders in 
November 1989 took West Germany by surprise, and indeed the metaphor of “accident’ 
is relevant here. That is, the currency union figures ambiguously and saliently in 
explanations because it recalls, for me, how one tries to make sense of an accident 
(Siegel). Here it manifests as a rational discussion about irrational measures and double 
binds. But the human agency and responsibility is what has to be managed—the 
aftermath of what then manifest as bad decisions in which one is inextricably bound. It 
feels like, why me, as if one had no part in the event. One did, of course, and that is the 
problem. As a technical problem it has a systemic logic beyond the individuals caught up 
in it. But it is ultimately about people—their hopes, aspirations and disappointments. The 
processes described above may not seem surprising were it not for the compressed nature 
of events—that within a span of only a few months, a ‘wealthy’ state absorbed ‘a poor 
and distressed’ state. What categories applied in such an unexpected set of events and 
problems? As much as it masquerades as rhetoric of payments and unearned wealth, it is 
also about sustainable futures and ‘responsibility’ for these.  
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What was chosen was that things should very quickly improve for people, but in 
international comparison it would be more expensive. That is got better so 
drastically…this is why the stark difference between East and West remains, why 
40% of the money spent here is not earned but has to be transferred. At the latest 
by now the overall situation could have improved and taxpayer burdens would 
have been lessened. And psychically/socially it would be a better situation. These 
East/West animosities would not be endlessly perpetuated. This is all because one 
did not understand what the currency union meant, that one did not understand 
that through the currency union this enormous difference in productivity would 
stretch into today. You can’t reverse the de-industrialization. Now it is a self-
reinforcing process. The young and well trained leave? The question is would this 
other solution have been enforceable? It was discussed in the Treuhandanstalt.. 
But it was not legally possible [rechtlich] because it was in the Grundgesetz 
[Basic Law] that East Germans were included as West German citizens. It is my 
opinion that there was not a legal problem. The law was used as an excuse for 
economic interests, because of pressure from the street. Then the GDR citizens 
could not have demanded…it is a crazy situation. They [the GDR] wanted 40 
years long that East German citizenship would be recognized. And now, where 
the Communist government doesn’t want it recognized, because the GDR does 
not exist, West Germany says, now we will recognize it to protect you from the 
results of the currency union. A complicated thought. Questions of this 
complexity are not suitable for the politics that we perform.  
 
At this juncture it is important to point out that what might count as an ‘East 
German’ critical counter-discourse on the above economic asymmetries ends up 
mobilizing the same terms. And, as difficult as it may be to recognize, Lenz’s ‘West 
German’ framing of the problems is itself a ‘counter-discourse’—in contrast to the many 
dominant political narratives that present the deindustrialization of the East as ‘good 
politics but bad economics’ or alternately proclaim the GDR economy as one big trash 
heap that met its inevitable end. The citizenship ‘obstacle’ must be further problematized. 
For what would certainly seem to many as an unqualified gesture of inclusion is caught 
up in the exclusionary and paradoxical logics of monetary and fiscal ‘transfers’ between 
West and East German regions. Ulrich Busch, an East German economist, has mobilized 
economic transfer theory to offer a subaltern alternative explanation of the Western 
‘development project’ (Busch 2002). Typically used to describe inter-State financial 
flows, Busch is able to show in macro-economic, political economic and financial terms 
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that ‘East Germany’ figures both as internal region in Germany, but also like a ‘separate 
state’ at the same time. In other words, to be brief here, the currency union and the West 
German dominated policy decisions have materialized this undecideable category in the 
very fabric of economic policy and financial flows between the regions. That is, financial 
flows eastward enabled a transfer of wealth and ownership rights to the west, through 
revaluation of the currency union, privatization methods, and western dominated legal 
mandates. A new market for Western consumer goods immediately filled the gap left by 
the collapse of the economy in the East. This relationship has continued as a dependence 
on West German regions, but one in which the basis for “East German’ self-sustaining’ 
and local productive economies are disabled. Because the financial circuit conserves a 
structural benefit to Western industry and services, the goal of ‘self-sufficiency’ can 
never make progress. Thus, the story of generous transfers of wealth to the East is much 
more complicated. If viewed from the perspective of two states, unequally joined 
together, then what occurred was more than an ‘internal’ reform project. It was an 
elimination of the ‘other system’ as something that could become emergent to preserve a 
status quo that should be adopted wholesale. East Germans could be included as 
consumers, but not as empowered citizens able to assert other visions of economic 
inclusion. The politics of the Treuhand was intimately connected to this question of 
‘alternatives.’ Lenz repeats the well-known moniker of the Treuhand as the then largest 
‘Holding’ in the world. The abrupt monetary revaluation and the temporality and scale in 
which privatization of an entire economy was restructured in four years made 
‘emergence’ out of the ruins something that could occur only with great difficulty. I 
asked if it was true that managers received a premium if they could sell firms off  
[abwickeln] quickly. Lenz responded with a mixture of hesitance and rationalization: 
 
The question is, whether it was a bad thing. Yes and no. It was a compensation for 
the fact that this job will not exist soon. They wanted to prevent the possibility 
that it would be an administration into eternity. But the second reason was that 
there was nothing but red numbers (losses). You can’t sell things for ten times 
their value. The best example is the Trabi, It cost 40,000 Ost-Mark, but with the 
currency union that was now D-Mark. East Germans were not buying them. As 
long as the enterprise is not privatized, then it costs money. With the premiums, 
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the state saves money if the enterprises sell quickly. Many argued that it was too 
fast and that the state should restructure first, and then sell. This was the idea that 
once it was restructured, when it was really nice, then it would sell. But the 
conviction then was that the state could not do a better job than private industry. 
This was the counter argument to the East perspective. We didn’t want a state 
administered economy.  
 
The almost complete elimination of the East German ‘productive industry’ was 
not an outcome of the natural logics of the market, but the product of a very entangled 
asymmetry between competing states/systems. Eastern ‘subjects’ in this story are 
constituted as historic agents in the elimination of their own economy by ‘demanding the 
D-Mark’ and purchasing West German products instead of their own products—upon 
which their work places depended. No one can fully escape this part of the story—as 
many of my eastern respondents readily admitted. The more salient point is that since 
then, the space of counter-critique in so far as this is meaningful to ‘East’ Germans, is a 
terrain fully occupied by Western discourses, terms, logical arguments, and definitions of 
history itself. Moreover, and to bring Lenz’s exasperation in line with those of a minority 
of East German economists’ ‘alternative’ explanations, in these terms they are simply not 
something the layperson will find compelling or graspable. Since this is the question of 
my larger study on the pedagogy of the euro, then the problem in the events of the 1990 
currency union is crucial. 
To return to the question of citizenship and alternatives in 1990, then, the irony is 
that those arguing against the currency union sounded as if they were exclusionary and 
thinking only of economics: 
 
There was also one attempt by a politician Oskar Lafontaine [who was the SPD 
chancellor candidate running against Kohl in the 1990 elections after Unification; 
in 2007 he took on the position of chairmen in a ‘new’ party—Die Linke (The 
Left)—which merged west and east left parties, the latter being the PDS, formerly 
the East German SED] to make this suggestion, with exactly this context in mind. 
He warned against the currency union because he predicted that there would be 
50% unemployment. But he was spit upon, derided and accused of being 
unpatriotic. And then it was clear, that in the fall of 1990, one year later, The 
German elections, Kohl needed East German votes. But people say that is not 
realistic, that he would not have risked the country’s welfare just to win votes. 
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That is too complex for Kohl. But I have begun to think, the chancellor of unity 
ruined unity for the sake of his own political ambitions. We don’t have economic 
unity, just a black hole that can’t be fed without big brother, that the East can’t 
make it without this wealth not in relation to what they contribute economically. 
That is why there are right extremists. This situation… it is all because of this 
presumptive introduction of the D-Mark. Kohl is the Chancellor of division, of 
perpetual economic division. [Bitter feelings] have remained even 20 years after 
the Wende.  
 
In 1990, Kohl and his financial advisors could win support by speaking the language of 
unity, inclusion, and affective ties that should not be ‘monetized.’ Thus, a monetary 
instrument was ‘de-monetized’ as a figure materializing this inclusion. If Easterners 
wanted to ‘live like those in the West’ then for West Germans this could be read as desire 
and misrecognition at once. Moreover, the ‘national question’ had to be reconfigured. 
Germanness here would not be a source of anxiety. Instead, it would be a source of 
patriotic duty. West Germans would assume historic responsibility for East Germans in 
an internal project of becoming one, but according to a Western model. Externally, it 
would be a project of re-establishing order to chaos. Precisely at a moment in which the 
Nation-State was the subject of intense debate in the deliberations over European 
monetary union, those offering non-national perspectives were not welcome. In the rapid 
overturning of events, money would create new boundaries (Peebles) while ostensibly 
dissolving them. However, Lenz does not mention the alternative that many East German 
respondents have emphasized over the years—unification according to article 146, which 
would have required the creation of a new constitution. As apologists for the accession 
according to article 23 never tire of arguing, that way would have been messy, time 
consuming, and chaotic. There would have been ‘other remainders,’ for sure. Important 
over twenty years later, though, is to allow what ‘will have been’ to populate the ‘no-
alternative’ representations of the past. Insofar as inequality and discrimination has 
constituted other exclusions, such as violence against those perceived to be foreign or 
racial others in East German regions—especially rural areas hardest hit by 
deindustrialization and demographic decline—other ways of thinking are urgent and are 
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actively sought by many of my East German respondents. For Lenz, it is a ‘systemic’ 
problem:  
 
There is no perspective for the future, foreigners have to fear going to some parts 
of the East. A travel agent has even warned that Black Americans should avoid 
East Germany. … Many now say that the transfer payments will never equalize 
things, but they will continue on. How can we help East Germany? It is an 
interesting precedence for the end of work society. Nations that have grown in the 
past will not be able to do so in the future. Growth is an ecological problem. It is 
hopeless to think about what can be produced. But we are a productivity-oriented 
society. It would be better to think of a basic income. That is not the same as 
servicing claims. East Germans have rights to these claims, but wealth is still 
generated elsewhere.  
 
When I asked to hear about the few ‘success stories’ of privatization, of the firms that 
maintained a presence in the regional economy, we landed back at the problem of the 
source, identity and sustainability of wealth, ownership, and production in the East.  
 
There are success stories. Kathi is an East German bake ware company in Halle]. 
But they received countless millions of state money and they got new machines. 
That part of the story is never told. There is Rotkäppchen [champagne]. But, 
Rotkäppchen is under West-German ownership [this is also one of the few ‘East 
German’ brands that has a national market presence]. These were economies of 
scale. If only parts of a large combine can be saved, how do you figure out the 
rights to one part? How do you figure out how it could develop if had not been 
collectivized? If you sell, then how do prevent the part that is privatized from 
being shut down the next day? You can only prevent that by giving more money. 
Can it be re-structured? East Germans have suffered. They have lost self-
confidence. But the success stories—they all received massive subsidies. Spee 
Laundry detergent—they were bought by the West German firm, Henckel-
Düsseldorf. East Germans love it, they think it is East German. We are now 
someone. West German marketers targeted this by maintaining the name. They 
feel sorry and so they appeal to the East German market. But it is not something 
that should warrant East Germans’ pride. But of course, I don’t mean that they 
should have that taken away. They should believe it if they want to, for the sake 
of peace. An individual can’t do anything about the fact that one is in an economy 
and can’t produce. There was not a single business that can manage on its own 
strength. It is psychologically interesting. In one sense one took everything from 
them, and then they say [with pride]: Kathi, Rotkäppchen, Halloren! [He 
pronounces each name in a celebratory/ironic tone] 
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Lenz continued to work in the modified version of the Treuhand, which for public 
appearances was ‘dissolved’ in 2004, but whose tasks were simply reapportioned across 
different agencies. “I just went on, only the telephone number changed.” I asked Lenz 
whether during his time at the Treuhand the currency union was a topic of discussion? He 
responded, “People just weren’t interested. In the re-privatization department, many were 
lawyers. For those with an economics background, they understood, but it was 
unimportant. They took the situation as it was, did their work. Even if one understood 
why enterprises were in debt, it was not of interest to them. It was discussed—but not in a 
controversial way as if one were of a different opinion. I haven’t seen that many have 
discussed this. But that someone is of a different opinion [about the negative effects of 
the currency union] I haven’t seen. But that someone doesn’t see it at all—that is 
true…that is a problem.” 
 
Edgar Most’s Third Way: A Banker in two systems 
 
In late May of 2009 I attended one of the few forum discussions dedicated to the 
economic transformation of Eastern Europe at the History Forum in Berlin.12 Edgar Most 
was one of three expert presenters. Most was formerly the vice president of the GDR 
Staatsbank der DDR (the East German ‘central bank’) and one of the few East Germans 
to have a prominent career at Deutsche Bank (Germany’s largest investment bank) after 
German Unification. I had heard of him already in 2007 from Prof. Rainer Eckert, a 
former dissident and historian appointed as Director of the Zeitgeschictliches Forum, the 
East German counterpart to the House of History [Haus der Geschichte] in Bonn. The 
Leipzig Forum had hosted a podium discussion in 2006 on the planned economy, ‘The 
Red Directors,’ for which Most was a discussant. Eckert, who like many former 
                                                 
12
 (Geschichtsforum 1989/2009 Europa zwischen Teilung und Aufbruch) 
Humboldt University, Berlin. Von der maroden Plannwirtschaft zum forierenden Kapitalismus? 
Die wirtschaftliche Transformation Osteuropas und ihre Folgen. 
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dissidents, tended to view former elites in highly skeptical terms, characterized Most as a 
former insider with sound reasoning about the planned economy and its problems. In all 
the time that I spent in Leipzig, from 2007-2009, none of the literally hundreds of events, 
exhibits, or discussions were explicitly about economic aspects of socialism or post-
unification problems of economic transformation. Instead, political and historical themes 
predominated, often picking up some facet of oppression and resistance in the GDR, 
‘working through the past’ [Vergangenheitsbewältigung] initiatives broadly conceived. 
Given Eckert’s endorsement, Edgar Most was someone I had long hoped to interview. In 
April 2009, he published his biography. Only in 2009 did he begin to take on an active 
role in the media landscape of public memory work about German division and 
unification (notably after his official retirement from the board of directors of Germany’s 
largest and most powerful investment bank, Deutsche Bank. I saw his name on the 
program of the History Forum in Berlin in May 2009, which was one of many precursor 
events and programs that populated political, cultural and historical institutions across 
Germany ahead of the twenty-year anniversary of the Fall of the Wall in November 2009.   
The small audience in attendance on May 30, 2009 seemed dwarfed by the 
expansive hall and the sea of empty chairs. Revisiting the end of the dilapidated (marode) 
East German economy was hardly a draw on a Saturday morning. In the audience a tall 
woman in her 60’s, with long flowing white hair and an intensity to match her determined 
figure was eager to question Edgar Most. She held a paperback book in her hand, one I 
recognized. It was Siegfried Wenzel’s (formerly a member of the GDR planning 
commission), “How much has Re-Unification cost?” (Wieviel kostet die 
Wiedervereinigung?). She had questions about the first private bank in the GDR, which 
Most founded during the last days of the GDR’s existence. While I could not follow the 
specifics of what she was asking (the privatization of energy networks which had some 
connection to the bank), I was immediately impressed by the intelligent and passionate 
persistence of her inquiry. Her detailed questions seemed to provoke some uncomfortable 
evasions from Most. Since beginning my fieldwork in Leipzig in 2007, as I have already 
hinted above, I had rarely encountered any public activist attention to explicitly economic 
details of the German Unification. I found myself distracted in planning of how to gain 
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her attention after the event, while also introducing myself to Most and requesting an 
interview.  
Fieldwork that might capture ‘ethnographically’ some measure of the enormous 
economic shifts of 1989/1990 proved far more difficult than I had ever imagined. This 
was not due to its unimportance, but because it was a topic full of so many burdens and 
emotions that many respondents simply wanted to avoid it. There were revelatory 
moments to be sure. But it took some persistence to convince those who did agree to 
interviews that I just wanted to ‘listen’ and learn, and not make judgments. But the 
monetary aspect of it was not something that could be apprehended through the micro-
practices of money that ethnographers have traditionally described. I imagined that daily 
practices and logics that had occurred since 1989 might nonetheless be traceable through 
personal financial histories. However, that proved to be difficult because one’s person 
financial history and reflection upon it was already part and parcel of a discourse from 
‘outside,’ one that, I think, many simply felt they could not inhabit on their own terms.  
After cornering Edgar Most and asking if I might arrange an interview with him at 
a later time, I managed to catch up with Inge. I did not have my digital recorder. We sat 
on a bench in the lobby and we spoke for more than hour. My scribbling of notes could 
barely keep pace with her velocity and flurry of words. She had worked in the finance 
ministry of the GDR. She could not move up in her career because she had not joined the 
party. Her mother lived in the West and she refused to repudiate and break off contact 
with her relatives in the West. Though she continued to work in the finance ministry, 
work involving the energy sector, she was suspect and had few privileges. In 1989/90 she 
became active in the citizen action groups connected to the Round Table (New Forum). 
In the days leading up to and following unification, she worked to represent employees in 
a number of collective-owned factories, many who had little understanding of the new 
system or their rights in it. She personally documented many cases in which both West 
German managers and former East German functionaries exploited workers and engaged 
in questionable, even criminal behavior. There were, however, few legal venues through 
which to pursue such cases in the rapid pace of disintegration and privatization of firms. 
She along with other activists once met with the Treuhand President, Birgit Breuel, to 
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present a concept that would allow workers to become owners of company. She 
remembers that Breuel was uninterested and dismissive. It is well known that the Treuand 
practice rarely concerned bids from employee collectives (known as the Management 
Buyout Option). Inge’s documentation became part of her personal archive, not much 
more. I was eager to see the collection, but Inge shook her head and shrugged in 
frustration. No one is really interested, she said. After years of attempts to interest even 
scholars in the details, Inge had lost the energy. What could be gained from the tattered 
remains of her documentary effort on behalf of now defunct factories and employees 
spread to the far winds?   
I saw Inge again the following summer, in 2010, this time with recorder in hand. 
We sat outside in large bamboo chairs with cushions, well suited to the summer Berlin 
nightlife. It was morning, though, a water fountain gurgled in the background, while the 
café slowly filled with tourists and locals in search of coffee and a somewhat quite oasis 
from the bustling city. We talked about the recent events commemorating the twenty-year 
anniversary of the currency union. A good part of our conversation revolved around 
Edgar Most. Where was he before? Why was he only speaking out now about the 
injustices of privatization? What was his role in all of this? She had known of him when 
she worked at the Finance ministry. I had met and interviewed Most in December 2009 
(see below), but I didn’t have the answer to Inge’s questions. There are few voices of 
authority to change the terms of debate. Those that emerge—especially those of former 
GDR elites— are met with skepticism. Inge has read Most’s biography, about how Most 
privatized part of the Staatsbank to save jobs. But Inge queries, “whose jobs?” Party 
members? Other privileged persons who found a soft landing in the new system? Since 
Inge saw that former directors excluded ordinary workers, she remains skeptical. But 
there is no question that Most brings a much absent force to chipping away at an edifice 
of official erasures of ‘alternatives.’ By now, though, resignation, tinged with frustration, 
was Inge’s common companion on the subject of alternatives that ‘might have been.’ It 
was not that Inge was obsessed or consumed. She, like so many other East Germans, had 
gone on living her life, adjusting to the new circumstances. She raised a son who was 
now living abroad in Canada, and for whom she had great hopes. Like so many older 
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respondents, their children had left to find work and opportunities elsewhere. 
Nonetheless, as someone who understood, then and now, something about economy, the 
lack of attention and interest still troubled her. Though eager to have found an interested 
listener in me, someone not immediately dismissive of what she had to say, the lines in 
her face showed a deep weariness. It is hard to fight for lost causes that have decided to 
stay lost.  
 
Meeting Edgar Most in Berlin: 
 
On December 22, 2009, only days before Christmas and my own return back to 
the after two years in the field, I have an interview with Edgar Most in Berlin. We are 
meeting at his office in the Deutsche Bank main office on Unter den Linden, only a few 
blocks away from the Brandenburg Gate. Though Most has now retired, he still maintains 
an office at the Bank, which also reflects the high regard in which he stands in the 
company. Most joked in our meeting that he is as busy as ever, so it hardly seems that he 
has retired. But the difference now is that he can pursue activities that are of central 
importance to him. One of these is changing dominant views about East Germans in the 
broad public. In the commemorative fever of the twenty-year anniversary of the fall of 
the Wall Most has become a media sensation, appearing at public events and on 
television talk shows, and in interviews for broadly circulated newspapers such as Die 
Welt.  
One of the very few East Germans and former ‘elites’ to have secured such a 
status in unified Germany, Most is a novelty. His down-to-earth colloquial speech and 
sense of humor make him approachable. His success at the top level of West German 
investment banking give him an authority to claim a positive status for ‘life in both 
systems’ in ways most Easterners cannot. Prior to this, he kept a low profile, which 
shows that his success was contingent upon a careful balancing act. He seems less 
concerned with that now.  
For someone unfamiliar with the politics of pubic memory in Germany, Most’s 
characterization of socialism’s achievements would be met with the usual hysterics 
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proclaiming that his is whitewashing the dictatorship. Audiences outside this milieu may 
be equally skeptical of a former Deutsche Bank director who sounds like a page out of 
Marx’s or the critical scholarship on capitalism. His global discourse also mirrors the 
Wall Street performative of the global described by Karen Ho. Ironically, Most seems to 
agree with Ho’s assessment about the unsustainable practices and financial crises to 
which investment banks contribute. All this by way of appealing to the reader not to heed 
to the impulse to dismiss what Most has to say about the monetary and economic 
decisions of unification, or that there are indeed socialist achievements. But as I have 
been suggesting all along, the entangled histories can’t be undone with a critical edge. 
They are always already an ambivalent inheritance of Marx’s injunction (Derrida).  
 
Most: So, and we just had the 20 year anniversary of the fall of the Wall. There 
were many podium discussions, historical conferences, and so on. And then you 
notice, that tends to be the extent of it. And there I am mostly an outsider, so 
much that I slip over [überziehen] to the other direction, so that everyone becomes 
a little more normal. 
U: How do you mean? 
M: Yes, because it is now only about how the GDR was an un-right [‘lawless’; 
Unrechtsstaat] and Stasi-state, and everything is weighed and measured based on 
that.  
U: Yes 
M: And then the question always comes up again, ‘Mensch (come on), be happy, 
you have your freedom! Freedom is of course nice, but what can I do with my 
freedom when I no longer have a job. When I have no money to travel, when 
everything that was promised no longer can be fulfilled, when I was a person of 
distinction—a skilled tradesman [Facharbeiter] or engineer, or whatever else—
and I can only sit at home and my human capital, that is knowledge, is no longer 
needed or used. And GDR citizens were not at all used to that. The state saw to it 
[sorgte] that one could study, and when one studied, you also knew what you 
would become in the end professionally. Today we study everything, just not 
those subjects what we need. Some subjects in the natural sciences are not studied 
enough. For example there is a shortage of doctors in many agricultural regions. 
By us [the GDR], it would always be said, we need on average so many medical 
personnel or doctors, and then we trained them. And there were other 
possibilities, more of an attempt was made to be involved in education politics, 
from the skilled professional onwards until the highest level, to regulate 
somewhat what the state needs. Not everyone liked that [hat nicht jeden gepaßt] 
because they could not develop their individuality [individuum verwirklichen]. 
But the state saw that needs were covered. Today there is an oversupply in some 
  200 
areas, and in others we have absolutely no one. And that is a catastrophe for this 
society, because without the natural sciences nothing moves forward. Let’s just 
say, that ideologically, math and physics is the same everywhere, but political 
philosophical reflections [Betrachtungen] are different everywhere.  Depending 
on what one has experienced, if one was controlled, how one would see this or 
that—that determines how one reflects on things. We had a saying that we learned 
from Marx:  ‘the societal being determines consciousness.’ And this personal 
being [sein] is being erased from the West. That means that capitalism is really 
about who has a good pocketbook [Geldbeutel], who has a big pocketbook and 
where you are from, who are your parents? In what world are you born? It is like 
in India with the caste system 
U: I see.  
M: Yes it is unfortunately so, and under those conditions the question is, what is 
Being then.  And the most important thing, which is what we learned in the GDR 
that no one wants to admit is true, is that the highest need of the person and the 
greatest desire [Bedürfnis] of the person is work, that desire and contentment 
comes through work. We were taught that until the point of regurgitation. That 
made it a negative theory so that people complained, what is that all about [was 
soll das]? Some worked well, some worked poorly, and our civil laws in that 
regard were not the best. But when all is said and done [unterem Strich], after the 
Wende, where 50% of people did not have any work--now they all recognized 
what it means. And then the question is again, if being determines consciousness, 
after Marx, then actually the question is, if I no longer have a job, then I am no 
longer accepted in my environment, or at least one experiences it in that way, 
because one was raised differently [erzogen]. There was the bank director, like 
me, and then there was worker Y next to me, we were all on one level. The 
differences were not as great, also in terms of money. There were no grave 
[gravierende] differences. We did not live with excess [übermäßig], and therefore 
we lived closer together and we also helped each other more. The solidarity in 
poverty is greater than it is in wealth [Reichtum].  In wealth solidarity actions 
have to be organized, like now before Christmas. But I can hardly take it 
anymore, how many millions are being collected, if they really reach their 
intended purpose, or if along the way someone is serving himself, and then in 
principle everyone cleanses his conscience if he donates something. Personally, I 
find that to be the wrong approach [falschen Ansatz].  
 
Already at the outset of the interview Most characterizes aptly the predominant mode in 
which the GDR figures in public memory in Germany. This is by no means a 
phenomenon of the twenty-year anniversary. Rather, anniversaries bring to the surface 
what otherwise is cultivated, entrenched, and resisted across many sites, spaces of 
representation, scenes of interaction. While West German concerns have for almost two 
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decades defined the terms of debate through which antagonism erupts on the surface, East 
Germans are themselves internally divided. Because the pattern is one in which the GDR 
must be abandoned as a totality (see Glaeser), disentangling any single part of that 
experience as a resource for the present is met with intense disagreement and 
marginalization.  
The importance of work in socialism, the experience of relative egalitarianism, 
the creative ‘making-do’ with limited resources are genuine experiences that the vast 
majority of my respondents—including those most critical of the GDR and its inequality 
and hypocrisy—nonetheless emphasized. The difficulty is, as Dominic Boyer has 
insightfully noted, East Germans are expected to “coordinate their own knowledge of the 
past with the western utopia or “no-place” of the GDR” (Boyer 2006). Moreover, and to 
complete the circuit of “obligation,” when the past is claimed is meaningful, westerners 
can immediately re-cast easterners as “ostalgic” (378) or in this case, purposely 
refiguring the past that demonstrates a troubling complicity with the ‘second 
Dictatorship.’ Boyer suggests that “when these obligations are fulfilled, the 
gift, and with it the mediating agency of West Germans, cancels out of the equation” 
(378). This is the form of ‘Orientalism’ that Andreas Glaeser, Dominic Boyer and others 
have called allochronism, where ‘pastness’ becomes the means of marking Easterners as 
other, without a future in unified Germany (Boyer 2006: 378).   
What has so far not received analytical attention is how ‘other’ experiences of 
economy place the asymmetries of revaluation and privatization in a terrain of 
antagonism. For example, the presentation of material life in terms of the meaning of 
work and solidarity in poverty will immediately generate protest and corrections. One 
will be reminded that the GDR had become an unequal society where those adhering to 
the party line were privileged. Those with family members in the West had access to 
western currency and goods, and the State itself reinforced such differences through its 
many schemes to acquire hard currency. Moreover, nonconformists including those who 
professed membership in the church were not allowed to study. Indeed, Most himself was 
not allowed the traditional route of study for this reason. He was not a member of the 
party, but held higher offices in the state apparatus.  
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The larger point here is not about whether or not there was inequality in the 
GDR—which there clearly was. Rather, whereas in capitalism/liberal democracy the 
subjects are allowed to gesture to the gap between experience and ideology, those who 
lived in real-existing socialism are expected to totalize the inequality and injustice as 
immanent to the system. It is certainly true that the later understanding grows out of the 
socialist claim of unity between politics and economy. But that does not fully explain 
why, twenty years later, East Germans are expected to denounce as false consciousness 
all of their material experiences in the GDR, while their recognition of contradictions in 
capitalism is unwelcome. The concern here is about how these past experiences might be 
addressed now. What would pass as the usual fabric of critique at most US universities 
instigates hysteria and marginalization when written or articulated by East German 
authors, intellectuals, and scholars, and other ‘elites.’ In my view, and as I have been 
suggesting, I believe it is intimately bound to the economic inequalities that emerged 
through unification, and for which there is no public space in which to effectively work 
through those experiences. The erasure of the East German economy from the landscape 
and even the place of memory is thus a western gesture of self-closure that fails. East 
Germans interrupt it in speaking back to the problems of re-valuation, in which 
westerners are implicated in the traumas of post unification politics. Edgar Most 
materializes the ambivalence and confusion about how East German experiences might 
be understood as part of the future, and not an artifact of their past-ness. 
Most then goes into an extended discussion about the need for philanthropy, the 
gaps left open by the retreat of the state, and the necessity of a new social contract. It 
should be remarked here that in Germany the practice and understanding of philanthropy 
is a different one than in the US. Even in West Germany people have traditionally looked 
to the state rather than the private philanthropy for support of the arts, education and 
cultural heritage. With the increasing indebtedness of the state and reduction of public 
funding, the wealthy have not stepped in to fill the gap, as some commenters perceive to 
be the case for the US. Thus, US philanthropy becomes a kind of ideal to strive for, but 
also a means of critiquing and debating the proper role of the state. GDR socialism and 
its ‘excesses’ readily becomes a foil for arguments against state support, and a means of 
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dismissing critiques on the left. In this context, proclaiming that the socialist experience 
offers alternative insights is something that perhaps only someone such as Edgar Most 
might be able to pass off with a sliver of legitimacy. But he is not alone in recognizing 
that the GDR made the accessibility of the arts and literature a social right and not a sign 
of class difference. Thus, there was a broad exposure to theater and opera, for example, 
across the spectrum of society and educational background. It offers a grounds for 
critique that has some basis in the experience of the arts as de-linked from class and 
educational background. Most places it in terms of a humanistic ideal of Bildung—of 
developing the capacities already within the individual. It is a means of fulfillment 
different than that of the pursuit of wealth As Most puts it, “ If one only sees fulfillment 
in a large bank account, that is the wrong one.” Instead, the wealthy should give back to 
society through philanthropy, support poor people, elevate culture, cultural objects used 
for the benefit of people, for future generations.” If such claims seem disingenuous 
coming from an investment banker, in the political context I have been describing, their 
source in the socialist experience is all the more the subject of scrutiny. Because of his 
position as an elite in the GDR, the impulse is then to proceed as if the person is on 
trial—to measure his claims against reality. One can find endless referents then to 
disqualify so any force in the present is thus disabled. Most is, however, able to speak to 
the practices and habits of the wealthiest German elites, and the relative absence of East 
Germans in such circles: 
Most: I am trying to find money for the Goethe Schiller archive in Weimar. We 
are urgently looking for money. The archives are falling apart, because there is no 
money, unbelievable. It is world cultural heritage 
U: why have you not been able to convince anyone to support it? Is it because of 
the financial crisis? 
M: It was difficult before that already. Often people don’t know about it, they are 
not approached for support. And in the East it is a problem in any case because 
there are no wealthy people. The wealthy are all in the west. And the 90 
wealthiest Germans are in Switzerland.  
U: Really? 
M: Yes, and I know many of them because I have worked with them in various 
supervisory boards. When they are retired, they resettle in Switzerland. All 
respected people. And yet they are never approached in this direction, or haven’t 
been. But if society recognizes—we don’t want to abolish capitalism—but we 
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should employ the surplus toward the benefit of the community, and not just to 
become richer, then we should discuss this with such individuals.  
U: So how is it here with Deutsche Bank? Have you had the possibility to apply 
these ideas in the bank? 
M: Yes, of course, the bank does something. We have several foundations, like 
the Herrenhausen Stiftung. There are some foundations for self-help or social aid, 
and cultural foundations. The Philharmonic is supported with 5 million. But they 
are also the wealthy. The Berlin Philharmonic is the highest earning string 
orchestra, simply because they are too good. That is ok, they should be. I have 
nothing against it. But when they perform in Tokyo or Washington, or wherever 
else, then Deutsche Bank sponsors them. The Deutsche Banks says, rightly so, we 
can’t sponsor a second-rate orchestra, the orchestra must have a world reputation. 
And so one thing comes from the other. But the question is, where is the limit? 
When do you say, world reputation, ok, but society doesn’t exist only at that 
upper level. There are the masses and they also need to be pulled in. What is 
being done for children to have access to cultural heritage? It was different in 
socialism. Everything was cheap, and children were practically obligated to learn 
it. That was the other extreme because then many didn’t want to learn it. Today 
they recognize, thank god we were at least exposed to this, we at least saw 
Goethe’s Faust. Everything is made up of light and shadows. We [the GDR] 
overdid it with too much administration, but the State gave everything to elevate 
this cultural education [Bildung]. This state [unified Germany] only talks about it, 
and does nothing, and just leaves it to this or that development. There should be 
an obligation to create charitable endowments. If I exceed a certain amount, why 
is it necessary that I become a billionaire? If it is for the sake of material 
investments in industry and so on, then ok, why else do I need the money? The 
money could be deployed for the sake of the community. And not to make banks 
richer. 
U: Yes, of course 
M: Yes, but such thoughts are always countered with ‘well you want to bring 
back socialism and communism.’ That is not the point. The point is that we are 
living in a society that is drifting so far apart, and it is getting worse. The person 
should be placed at the center, no one else. 
 
At this point Most asked me about the state of things in the US. The lack of access to 
health care is for him unimaginable. Like many Germans, the US represents Capitalism-
pure.” Perhaps it is not surprising, then, to associate the winding down of the GDR 
economy as an outcome of that ideal of ‘the market will take care of it.’ The political 
establishment at the time of unification installed a radical form of the ideal which some 
have argued was applied to the East differently than in the West. Most’s life in unified 
Germany is unimaginable for many of my respondents, not even a position to which they 
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would aspire. However, many still consider themselves to be winners of unity and 
express empathy for those who became unemployed or struggled to arrive in the new 
Germany. Thus, it is not uncommon to hear from very differently positioned subjects 
about the inequalities that many Easterners perceive to have faced collectively since 
1990:  
 
M: [speaking of uninsured people in the US] That is the spawn of capitalism. That 
is what Marx denounced 170/180 years ago. And now we have it. And we 
experience the miserliness… so then I have to say that I am grateful that I have 
grown up in two systems, and can compare them. I did not do badly in either 
system, and now, I have not done badly at all. I am a winner of German Unity. 
When you sit in the executive suite of the Deutsche Bank, you are doing well. But 
in my surroundings [Umfeld] everyone became unemployed, all my siblings, 
friends, everyone. I am the only one who was a winner of this story. 
U: oh, all of your family and friends… 
M: and then they look at you and say, how did you manage to be so lucky—not in 
a negative way, but we have the discussion. In 1992 we had a school reunion, 
those of us who attended elementary school together, I began school in 1946, and 
we were in the same class for four/five years. And at the beginning of the 90’s, 
already 80% were unemployed. 
U: unbelievable [Wahnsinn] 
M: at 52 years of age. 
U: how have they managed since? 
M: well they came from different professions, for example where I am from the 
predominant industry was from the potash mines. And they just shut it down. 
Now they are mining again by going under the earth from Hessen to Thüringen, 
so now all of the sudden they are mining again. But in the 90’s it wasn’t good 
enough and they shut it down. Thousands of people flew out on the street.  
U: so they could have continued the mining then? 
M: Yes, of course! 
U: And how in that case— 
M: That is capitalism! Capitalism is not social. Capital thinks about nothing. 
U: Were there not economic arguments to be made at the time? 
M: but not in the form that the Treuhand worked. 
U: what is your assessment of the Treuhand? 
M: those in the industry, the western corporations, BASF and so on, they had their 
middlemen placed within the Treuhand, the board of directors and at the relevant 
levels. And if I say it in vulgar terms, in this way the potential/wealth of the GDR 
was advanced as prey to feed capital [den Kapital zum Frass vorgeschiesst]. And 
Capital took what was good for it, and the rest was liquidated [abgewickelt]. And 
when that didn’t work, then one conducted veiled po
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mines. They proclaimed that the potash there is not any good [Kali taugt nichts], 
even though we had sold it around the world. So they closed it, and the opening 
was shut down. But then later they determine that is in fact the best potash, and 
now they are selling it again. And now if they would hire those thousand people 
again…it was 20 km from the former border.  But tell such people who were 
affected by such decisions how wonderful unification was. 
U: you can’t 
M: you can’t do it. But when I sit on the podium in these discussions and am 
confronted…and let me give you a pressing example. In the GDR I was the 
responsible agent for the trade, industry, and construction, so I traveled all over 
the GDR and knew everything about it. After the Wende, then I was only in the 
upper levels of the financial industry. I founded a bank in the beginning with 
Deutsche Bank, Dresdner Bank, so then I was involved with 30,000 customers, 
and so then you develop a sense for what is good, and what is bad. And then I 
said.. It was not desired that anything of the GDR remain [Es war nicht gewollt 
das etwas von der DDR übrigbleibt.] 
U: Do you mean, from the very beginning? 
M: yes 
U: then why does everyone mostly act as if everything is rosy [Friede, Freude, 
Eierkuchen]? 
M: Because they simply plaster everything over with money. Kohl continued with 
the same politics as that of Honecker. There are standards, and Kohl wanted to 
say, we are good to you, even though you have so little money. 
 
The closing of the Potash mines in 1993 is one of the most controversial of the Treuhand 
privatizations. It was also the subject of an employee hunger strike that gained 
international attention. It has been described as a crucial moment in which across 
Germany expressions of empathy, support, and petitions were directed at political 
leaders, urging intervention. The potash mines on the Eastern side of the former border 
were profitable. Moreover, they produced a material that was used by a competitor 
company. There was a good deal of evidence that the Western firm would close the mines 
in the east and apply subsidies to the western branches of the company (violating anti-
trust laws). Thus, granting the bid was creating the means for closing down an eastern 
competitor. At the time one Treuhand manager, Klaus Schucht, noted in a 1993 
interview, "The hunger strike is irrational. People are fighting something that can no 
longer be changed."13 East German essayist, Jana Hensel, wrote about a visit to former 
                                                 
13
 http://www.csmonitor.com/1993/0728/28082.html 
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mine workers in the region in 2009 (Hensel 2009). Several miners had created a local 
archive to commemorate the protests. However, the archive is not advertised in tourist 
brochures, nor do road signs readily indicate where it can be found. The potash mine 
protest, like many others that occurred in the years after unification have not been 
brought into connection in a broader scholarly analysis, according to Hensel. She notes 
with irony that while every minute and every hour of the Peaceful revolution has been 
documented in detail, but the many strikes that occurred in the upheaval of unification are 
missing from official public memory (2009: 62). While Most’s claim that nothing should 
remain of the GDR easily sounds like a conspiracy theory (as Lenz already suggested in 
the interview above), the dispersed studies and analyses of the outcome of privatization 
lend some credibility to that experience. At many junctures where companies could have 
been saved, other modes of privatization chosen, or breaches of contract might have been 
addressed, a rather uniform response ensured that is quite visible in scholarship and 
analyses dispersed across many disciplinary fields. However, one has to search because 
no single study has brought many of these examples into conversation (much like 
Hensel’s observations about protests after 1990).  
However, the agency of protest in 19989 and subsequently is equally caught 
within the ambivalence that East Germans themselves express about their own role in the 
events. Thus, it would be problematic to suggest that there is a clear east/west difference:  
 
M…But then we had the second wage packet [zweiter Lohntüte]-that was 200 
marks per month per person in the GDR due to price subsidies. Children’s 
clothing, nutrition, you could ride in the Berlin street car all day long for 20 
pfennige. And everything that was necessary for life, even if it was at a low level, 
was paid for by the state. So with the second wage packet that was worth more 
than the DDR-Mark itself. You have to consider it from that standpoint. If you 
add everything together the purchasing power of the Mark der DDR was 0,8 
higher than that of the D-Mark. The DDR-Mark was not in that sense convertible. 
But with the ordinary person you can talk as much as you like, he wanted the D-
Mark.  
U: Because one did not understand- 
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M: Yes, because no one told them the truth. It was simply said, you will get the 
D-Mark, and everyone bellowed, hurrah, the D-Mark is coming. If the D-Mark 
doesn’t come to us, we will go to it. Such stupidity, such slogans! Any normal 
student who went to school as I did, should have recognized that on the one hand 
there is money, and on the other money and, in the rule, the political orientation. 
And for me that was…that the grey masses could be so stupid I would never have 
believed possible. U: Or one did understand, for example in my interviews and 
discussions many have said that they did have a sense that this would not go well, 
but they were afraid of losing their jobs.  
M: But they had work. Capital decides differently. Capital is just not social, and 
neither is money. And whoever says that capital is social is clueless.  
 
 One pattern emerged in all of my interviews and conversations with Eastern 
respondents about the currency union. This was the tendency to displace the agency of 
the currency union on to the ‘people,’ the masses, or East Germans as a collective. Some 
respondents (see above) were quite critical at the time and clung to the possibility of a 
different socialism. But for those who did not emphasize that aspiration as something 
they held at that time, the demands for the D-Mark were almost always placed in the third 
person. I rarely observed that someone expressed it in terms of “I was on the streets 
calling for the D-Mark.” Emotions about the D-Mark itself were more likely to be 
expressed in personal terms, and in the first person singular or plural. But rarely was this 
the case for the currency union itself. Where some respondents did express a sense of 
regret and responsibility was their reluctance to continue to buy East German products. 
Many recognized it in the present as a factor that contributed to the loss of their 
workplaces. But, at the scale in which privatization occurred, many agents, interests, and 
problems were in play. Thus, the way in which the burdens of economic failure and 
naiveté are sometimes exclusively placed upon eastern subjects should be placed in the 
context of hegemonic representations of unification that seek to downplay western 
interests. At the same time, in many accounts of west German journalists, policy makers, 
politicians, and elites part of these upheavals, gestures of regret mingle with explanatory 
frameworks that place agency in the scale, temporality, and uncertainty of the time. I read 
these different registers as evidence of trauma and rupture that are differently and 
unevenly shared, but that interrupt the notion of shared horizon of difference.  
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 Most proceeded to then frame the strength of West Germany in terms of the 
dialectic with the East. This is a prevalent premise for East German arguments about the 
significance of German division as an explanation of economic asymmetries and 
competitive practices: 
 
U: But in Germany you speak about the social market economy.  
M: Yes, that is also just a phrase. You have to consider where Germany came 
from after the war, how it developed. After that, and there was a GDR. And the 
GDR was the field of consideration [Betrachtungsfeld] for capital in West 
Germany, what one needed to do better.. And that is how they became so strong. 
West Germany would never have become as strong without the GDR. 
U: Without unity? 
M: no, without the existence of the GDR, the basic law, the banks, market 
economy. The productivity and wealth grew more quickly in the west than in the 
GDR. We had to pay reparations—80 billion, 4,000 enterprises were dismantled, 
railroad tracks, and in the West the Marshall plan was introduced. And capital 
reproduces there where it has the best chances. It was just that way. And already 
at the founding of the FRG/GDR the capital stock in the east was only 48% of that 
in the west. The GDR could not have survived, it only survived because it was 
incorporated into the RGW, and so our industry was organized around the 17 
country RGW and produced, and then we also had a particular currency system 
for that, we had introduced the transferable ruble. All of that could have been left 
[in 1990] to run for another 10 or even 5 years. Then the east would not have 
broken away from this relationship. We had textile machines—we didn’t have any 
cotton, we only built it for the Soviet Union; there were combines that had trade 
relations with Switzerland. These could have continued. Machine construction, 
electro-technic, heavy machine industry were part of trade networks. I could tell 
the whole litany of those enterprises and products developed for export, and for 
the 17 countries of the Soviet sector [RGW] where it was arranged what was 
produced for each country.  
 
 As Most indicates here, the industry in the GDR was organized not only around 
an internal market, where a large combine might be responsible for an entire sector of the 
economy. Some enterprises produced parts of products solely for use in other socialist 
countries. Thus, whatever the poor condition of factories and equipment in the GDR, the 
other crucial factor that made enterprises unsustainable was the abrupt severing of all 
these relations. Many explanations present these breaks as inevitable to downplay the 
problems caused by the currency union. Thus Most and Lenz (above) would be in 
  210 
agreement about the currency union and the problems it posed for trade relations. 
However, Lenz would likely emphasize the benefits of a low-wage region over the 
suggestion that other modes of production could have continued on as before.  
 
Most (continuing): And that was simply thrown overboard. Of course the 
enterprises in the west were happy about it, so they got the market, and they took 
specialists from us with them, in the form of workers and know-how, and in that 
way many became really big. And that’s what I meant with the vulgar saying: that 
the industry was fed to Capital. We had 9 million employed, and three years later 
after the work of the Treuhand we had only 5 million. The rest were sent into 
retirement, early retirement, or unemployed. Now many are still welfare 
recipients [HartzIV]. So in principle, the percentage of the population that was 
integrated into the economy—when I say that work filled a need, determined 
one’s being, I am participating and am accomplishing something for society— 
and then my children, relatives: they were suddenly gone to find work elsewhere. 
Many even continued to go to work though they no longer had a job. Some didn’t 
leave their apartment, because they were ashamed, you can imagine. And how 
many people took their own lives because they were marginalized.  
U: Are there statistics on that? 
M: Yes, perhaps—But of course no one talks about that! That is not wanted 
because then the victor would appear in the completely wrong light. And I just 
read Daniella Dahn’s [an East German journalist] book last weekend. She has 
time to pursue these questions as a journalist. I have to work. But though my work 
I have access to information she would never get. So we have a good relationship. 
But she analyzes this situation very cleverly. That now the West deserves to be 
the loser, not the East Germans. This is a generational topic. I saw her speak in 
different programs about this characterization of the GDR as an un-lawful state 
[Unrechtsstaat. All the trials that were conducted that would have documented 
that the GDR was a law-less state—almost all ended with acquittals. Not a single 
person was sentenced from the former GDR. But how many from the west were 
sentenced for criminal behavior, for corruption. But then it is said we were a law-
less state, in what sense? That all children whether poor or rich could live and 
study, that health-wise people were taken care of—not as well as today, ok it is 20 
years later, but the GDR is still measured— everything is viewed in a one-sided 
way, so there is simply a wrong picture. 
 
Most then speaks about prevalent practices through which past credentials, training, 
memberships, and status of the ‘other system’ were questioned: 
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Most: So then my book, is mostly interesting for financial people, but then I wrote 
about my life, tired to characterize the GDR… I was born on the Wartburg [in 
Eisenach]. I was in the church and so I was not allowed to study, and I did 
everything through the secondary education route, 12 years on the side. But after 
unification my diplomas were not recognized. Isn’t that schizophrenic? But I 
didn’t back down and they were recognized. But by then I was already a director 
of the Deutsche Bank. That helped. But many others could not fight back.  
 
Quite a few of my respondents did indeed have to re-qualify, and in some cases even 
repeat their education because credentials were not accepted. While quite obviously many 
new skills had to be learned; in some cases the training was almost identical. Thus non-
recognition of degrees was not a neutral affair. Andreas Glaeser’s (2000) ethnography on 
the merging of West and East Berlin police forces reveals related examples. But the 
inclusion of former party members and elites highlights how particular positions 
especially significant to the symbolic order of the Nation State could be the subject of 
marked discrimination (see Bickford). Below most describes the practice of penalty 
pensions. He also suggests how professional practices might also form points of 
connection: 
 
Most: My former boss, Kaminsky, the head of the former Staatsbank. It is clear he 
had to be in the party.  But he was a rational person [Vernunftiger]. He has a 
penalty pension  [Strafrente]. And with the penalty pension he could no longer 
afford to keep his house. Today he lives in a socialist high-rise 
[Plattenbauwohung] in Hellersdorf, together with his wife. And when I meet up 
with Helmut Schmidt [former SPD Chancellor] or Karl Otto Pöhl, the former 
Bundesbank president, they all knew Kaminsky.They negotiated with him back 
then [in 1990]. And they ask me, so what happened to Kaminsky, and they always 
held him in high estimation. So when I tell them what happened to him, they 
throw their hands over their heads [in disbelief]. That is German Unity. I myself 
am in this penalty category because I was a member of the Kollegium in the 
interest of the State for 34 years as director of the Staatsbank. So I was also 
placed in that category. Because I was, “near to the party” [regierungsnah]. Such 
ridiculousness. I mean, I can laugh about it, because I am a winner. But most 
people can’t. And that is why the mental German Unity has never been reached, 
until this day. Even after 20 years. And when you can’t manage to have a self-
sustaining [selbsttragender] society in East Germany. You can condemn the GDR 
as you wish, but it was a self-carrying society. It fed and developed itself, and so 
on. 
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 Most then proceeds to characterize different attitudes toward debts in the GDR. 
This is yet another difference then will be read as problematic by those who see the 
GDR’s immanent failure in its indebtedness to foreign creditors and the irrationalities of 
the planned economy. But given the opaqueness of ‘sovereign debts’ and their current 
politicization, it seems reasonable to consider the politics of debt between West and East 
Germany as a subject of intense dispute in unification politics.  
 
Most: But the west nurtured and developed itself based on debts. Re-unification 
was also financed through debts. And now Germany has even more debt. Pro 
person the debt is rising, much more than the GDR could ever have made. We 
could have also printed more money. But that was prohibited under the GDR 
constitution. The mayor of the community was not allowed to take out credit for 
the locality. Because those were considered debts. If they wanted to build a 
swimming hall or kindergarten, then he did not receive the money from the state. 
We as Staatsbank financed it, but a material thing stood behind it, not losses of 
the community. There was always something materially tangible. We took that, as 
I indicated in my book, in 1949, from the Soviet order, Stalin time. It was already 
stated there that credits were not intended to make debts. And that’s what I 
learned in my banking practice [Bankwesen]. And then I learned something 
altogether different at Deutsche Bank. So then ask me, which is better? Society 
had it better, but of course it could not develop as fast. But here the state takes out 
debts…financial crisis. Germany became on that basis the World’s best in Exports 
[Weltexportmeister]. If there had not been money in the world, then we couldn’t 
have sold our exports. If you consider it globally and not just from the point of 
view of business. Most people think so narrowly. And they are educated that way. 
I even learned cybernetics. Consider everything in terms of interconnection [im 
Zusammenhange betrachten]. Look beyond your own nose [über den Tellerrand]. 
I sat for the state exam in chemistry because I evaluated the chemical industry. I 
thought, I need to understand something about the industry I am spending money 
on. It was a very different upbringing that stood behind that. Of course not 
everyone did that. But whoever wanted develop their training in this world, did do 
it.  And that is, today, only capital decides what is valuable [was wert ist]. 
Terrible. I had hoped the crisis would be so bad that things would change. 
U: I was thinking something similar 
M: That was my great hope. But it wasn’t bad enough because through 
indebtedness, government threw so much money in and tried with money—once 
again everything is just covered over with money. This outcry was stuck in 
people’s throats. And now the same financial products continue to be sold. I just 
gave a talk to a small group... I compared the money system in capitalism to the 
money system in socialism. And I explained that if you don’t have control of the 
money system, then you don’t have control of the social system. Money rules the 
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world. Nothing else. But who rules money? That question must finally be 
answered. I don’t have to socialize the banks, but I could socialize the money 
system. That is how it was in Socialism. Everything that was money was 
distributed through the Staatsbank to be spent. And only things that were needed 
in society were financed. I don’t want to exaggerate, I would still allow for some 
monetary freedom, for human creativity, and the state can’t think of everything.  
But if money were socialized, these credit bubbles through debt couldn’t occur. In 
a few years we could reduce this excess money. There are 3,4 billionen currency 
speculations per day. Our house [Deutsche Bank] lives from them. A world 
currency could reduce speculation. It is not only the investment bankers. It is the 
greed of each and every person. That was different in socialism. There was of 
course a certain kind of greed there, but since the basic services were provided for 
everyone, everyone had the same education— let’s put it this way, people’s lives 
were secured through the state. That is what so many GDR citizens of my age find 
difficulty in coping with now. During GDR times you did not have to worry as 
much [kopf brechen], today you have to worry about everything. In the Czech 
republic, 60 % want the old times back. We should ask then, how is this the case. 
And what can we do about it.  
 
Most is critical of the way in which Germany presents its way of democracy as the model 
for everyone. 
Hitler once said that Germany should convalesce at the expense of the world [an 
der ganzen Welt sollte die Deutschen auch genesen]. Now the Germans say, on 
our understanding of democracy, the whole world should recover. Why ours? We 
should hold ourselves back, we who started two world wars. I have held talks 
around the world about German unity, at banks and other institutions. It was a 
surprise to me that I was regarded more highly as a citizen of the GDR than as a 
Deutsche Bank executive. I thought about that for a long time, why is that? As 
poor as the GDR was, we had trade-relations with all these countries, and they 
would have loaned us money if it had been necessary. And then we are constantly 
told that the GDR is bankrupt. There were enough countries that would have 
loaned us money. Our indebtedness per person was less than that of the BRD. It 
was just a question of perspective. We had inner problems and disproportions, 
there have been many talks about how we could have changed things 
proportionately [gradually], but bankrupt. We were creditworthy.  
U: in times of financial crisis 
M: But you can barely discuss this at our table here. Because here, everyone sees 
it differently: you [the GDR] were dilapidated [marode], your enterprises were 
worth nothing, the environmental problems. But the west had these too. If I 
consider the potash mines, the mining done under the earth in the west was not 
that different from the way it was done here. And now where they are starting it 
up again, there is a dispute. What has a say? Capital. If I sit here in the Deutsche 
Bank, then it is the Deutsche Bank that I must serve, no one else. I serve the 
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shareholders of the Deutsche Bank, because they want to see that we are doing 
our work well. And in the Staatsbank der DDR I served the state with the money. 
U: So do you feel that you were able to square your work in the Deutsche Bank 
with the socially conscious work that you described? 
M: of course, but, that is I did that on the side. I of course profited from the fact 
that I could think in an extensive way. You have Genossen around you who were 
practical, and those who were idiots because they only wanted to apply 
Honecker’s resolutions, and never used their heads. Then they had problems. In 
that sense that was something different—to make independent decisions, see ahea.  
I have an obligation to the Deutsche Bank, and that is to increase [vermehren]. If 
it is goes well or badly outside, that plays no role. It is only about what benefits 
the bank. What benefits capital. By us [the GDR] you always had to ask three 
questions— first, what benefits the state? Second, what benefits the enterprise? 
Third what benefits the bank? Here, [at Deutsche Bank] the first question is what 
benefits the bank, 2nd what benefits the business, and the state plays no role. This 
re-thinking I learned quickly. The economic thinking, whether in socialism or 
capitalism is fairly similar. Only the governing authority is a different one. Why 
do we have a state… otherwise you give it over to capital.. These 
interconnections. All I can say, it is good I have sampled both systems. So when I 
am confronted with this or that problem, I ask, why are we doing it that way? 
 
U: I wanted to ask you about the currency union back then. Is it also your opinion 
that the problems, the economic problems of East Germany began there? 
M: Yes, it was the wrong rate of conversion.  
U: Why was one so uninterested? 
M: Because the Ossis [Easterners] did not have the say, we didn’t exist any more, 
there was only SED, and therefore we were the cursed enemy. The human capital 
played no role. The new government of the GDR did not know anything [hatte 
keine Ahnung], and even those who were involved, Lothar de Maziere brought in 
Walter Sieghert, one of the best finance ministers in the GDR, he was also SED, 
and he had difficulties within his own party, but he said, what should I do. But all 
those people were not taken seriously in the west. They were taken seriously in 
America when they gave talks, but not in Germany. And, I was there at the 
negotiations with Karl Otto Pöhl in 1990, and we knew then that the D-Mark 
would be introduced, the people want it, but how would we go about it, what date, 
what rate of conversion, what does that mean in concrete terms? A new currency 
has its effect on the social milieu, and it was clear to me that when we decided the 
D-Mark comes, there would no longer be a GDR. At the time I went to Hans 
Modrow, minister president, and I said, Hans, that is the end of the GDR. There 
won’t be a GDR anymore. He objected, and I said, Hans, whoever has the money 
has the power, and in that moment when we agree to the date of the 1st of July to 
introduce the D-Mark, then politically we have no more chances because the 
people were so disgruntled [aufgemotzt war], then we have given up the GDR 
[vergeben]. The only question then is what are the parameters, so and because the 
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Volkskammer decreed the Accession instead of re-unification [with a new 
constitution], then everything was decided. If we had decided for unification, then 
everything would have been put on trial/to the test [auf den Prüfstand kommen]. 
Then we would have put the 10 pt. program from Kohl, it was set up at first to put 
a confederation in place, with special taxes, or whatever, many things were still 
open. Then it wouldn’t have been about throwing two systems together but 
allowing two systems to grow together step-by-step. But then, they all claimed, 
everyone would leave. Nonsense. And then afterwards three million people did 
leave, that is testimony enough [Aussage].  
U: they weren’t able to prevent that 
M: Yes, if you reduce the industry to 30%, then where should the people stay? 
The younger generation has to see that they find work.   
U: clearly 
M: And that is what was so bad…so we, I say…it was an election year, then 
unification, the Accession [Beitritt] the wrong currency conversion rate, and the 
wrong Treuhand at work, those 4 factors are the reason, led to the fact that after 
20 years we are not there where we could have been. And with the currency, the 
decision, we sat down with the Bundesbank, and said we want, laid out the details 
of the Staatsbank. And we explained, we have several different currency systems 
in the GDR, the one for the population [Bevölkerung] and the 2nd wage package, 
we had 660 million savings deposits and the second Lohntüte, that has to be 
included in the evaluation [bewerten]. And then we had the intra-German 
settlement system, East/West. Every year that was decided on the basis of a 
basket of goods [warenkorb/cpi], 3rd we had the entire east bloc with the 
transferable ruble. The conversion was 4,44. And we had the western part, how 
the D-mark stands in relation to the dollar multiplied by a rico. That means the 
real rate of conversion with currencies like the dollar, yen, franc, was 1:8, 1:9. On 
the black market it was traded 1:10. All of these should have been figured 
[bewerten] separately. Which enterprises will be deactivated, how is the wealth 
mediated [Vermögen vermittelt], how is the accounting and production settled, 
what trade relations have not been settled. With all that in consideration the 
exchange rate should have been worked out. I would say that even the rate for the 
population of 1:2 one could live with that more or less. For me that would not 
have been the deciding factor. But the economy, that was the bad thing, and with 
that the debts of the economy, that they were highly indebted, not the state but the 
economy. So these should have been devalued at the rate of 1:8. Then with the 
opening of the D-Mark balance the enterprises would have had a different starting 
basis.  
U: why wasn’t it done that way? 
M: because, in the past I told myself that they were simply too dumb to do it that 
way, but now I would say that it was 100% what they wanted [100% gewollt]. 
U: because- 
M: You see Kohl wanted to do everything so fast and thought that in that way 
things would be cheap 
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U: why cheap? 
M: Because he didn’t have a clue [keine Ahnung gehabt hat]. It is so. He said, 
let’s do it fast. In three years we won’t have a Treuhand anymore, don’t leave 
anything over from the old GDR, because some of it could have been resurrected 
and made better than he wanted, and that is where things clicked for me. In the 
beginning I thought too that they had good intentions. ‘We will be good to you.’ 
But then relatively soon I understood 
U: beginning when? 
M: that was when, after it was decided that the Treuhand would not exist after 
three years. When Rohwedder was assassinated and Breuel took over the power, 
and then it was said, in three years … then it was clear to me that it was an 
absurdity [Unding] that two different economic systems would be brought 
together in three years. And so then it was only Capital that was governing.  
 
Most feels that the foreign scholars are more objective. In Germany, the political agenda 
influences how the GDR is represented empirically, what count as the facts. “Germans 
are not honest,” he says. Outsiders are more willing to consider the cause and effect 
relations.  
 
If I say that we began with 50% less capital stock then West Germany, then it is a 
wonder that we survived for 40 years. Everything we managed to do. But to be 
evaluated based only on everything that went wrong. I don’t want to glorify the 
GDR. I only wish for the image of East German person [menschenbild] would be 
perceived differently in unified Germany, that they have an appropriate 
mouthpiece. That all this is considered [berücksichtigt]. The social conditions 
[bedingungen]. That the person is at the center [im mittelpunkt steht] and not 
capital. You can talk about the social market economy, but in the end… In the 
past, before there was a wall [before 1961], the East Germans were the Turks of 
West Berlin. Then when the wall was built, the Turks came to West Berlin. And 
they still have their problems with integration. They do the work Germans won’t 
do, but in the end they are still not fully accepted by German society. Everyone is 
arguing about this.  
U: What do you think of Thilo Sarrazin’s recent comments? 
M: He is a pure economist, without any social background. He has a point [Rein 
zugespitzt hat er recht]. But you can’t, as someone from the Bundesbank, finance 
minister of Berlin you can’t appear in public saying things like that. So 
provoking. So that his mouth really should be taped shut. Or he should step down 
from the position. 
U: And he was involved in the currency union 
M: yes, he came up with the conversion rate, he was the one who did that. 
U: But it was not his decision, was it? 
  217 
M: It was Kohl’s, but he prepared it for Kohl. 
U: So did he understand? 
M: He used only the one factor. He considered only the savings accounts of the 
GDR population, the quantity of money. He didn’t know anything about it, that 
we also had these accounting currencies, the ruble, the internal conversion rate for 
the non-socialist economic trade partners. Either he didn’t know, or he didn’t 
want to know. They only considered the conversion 1:2 in relation to monetary 
policy, not economic policy. I have been a podium discussant with him a few 
times. Once I said to him, you didn’t have a clue then, and he just said, you are 
right, Herr Most.  
U: and he was being honest? 
M: In such things he is honest. I have had back and forth discussions with him a 
number of times [einige Runden gedreht]. And also with Tietmeyer who was the 
successor to Pöhl, and when I negotiated with Kohl for 4 hours on the 20th of 
April 1990, and then when he said it was a political decision, it appeared to me to 
be just like the GDR. The party has decided. Just come up with something. 
Nothing different. The systems are always the same. Those in power are always 
the same.  
U: But what I think is interesting, what I wanted to ask you is that exactly at this 
same time the criteria for the euro were being worked out.  Why did they say in 
that case we have to observe criteria, and in the case of east Germany. 
M: well, we have that topic today, the Poles and the Czechs, who had to re-
fashion things through their own strength, they have a different self-consciousness 
than the East Germans. The East German wanted the D-Mark. And with the D-
Mark he surrendered himself. That means, those who didn’t want to give up the 
human capital, the intellectuals, they were thrown out. It is like in the war, I wrote 
that the when the west loses the war then the victims are dead, when you lose the 
cold war, you have to kick two generations. The victor can’t deal with the 
conquered. In war everyone was killed. After the cold war, everyone is still living 
so they still have to be killed. No one puts it like that.  
U: that is an interesting way to put it 
M: Why doesn’t Germany have an academy of sciences as industrial nation? 
Because it was in East Germany—this Prussian academy, where Einstein and so 
many others did research, it was continued on in the GDR and had a high 
international ranking during the time of the Cold War. And this academy was 
dismantled [abgewickelt] and the people, many are in the US, the Soviet Union, 
or elsewhere, Leibniz Gesellschaft where some people still meet together. But in 
principle they wanted to erase it. Professor Dr. Klinkmann gave a talk. He was the 
last president of the Academy. And he was supposed to assist in dismantling it, 
and he refused. He was accused of being involved with the Stasi, but it wasn’t 
true, and so then they apologized to him for years after that. That’s the reality. 
And since I know all these people, and still interact with them and helped them 
after the Wende, I know what I am talking about. I know something about their 
inner sentiments and so. Since the SPD and the CDU did not open themselves to 
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former SED, and I spoke with mayor Diepke of Berlin at the time and the SPD … 
they would have liked to include the elites in Berlin, and raised the question, they 
would have liked to have the elites from the academy, the research centers. I said, 
then you have to open your party, you can’t just assume that 2,2 million SED 
members were Stalinists. Maybe there were 200 or so. But, 80 to 90 were just 
normal citizens who because there was a party were compelled to belong, were 
schooled and drilled, but they kept their own heads. The grounding concerns of 
the party were not that wrong: no wars, peace, social justice. You can’t just vilify 
it (verteufeln). It was humanly reasonable. That we couldn’t do it all was because 
we weren’t wealthy enough.  The argument that we preached water and drank 
wine, so then I consider, after the borders were opened, and I was invited by big 
corporations. Compared to that, elites in the GDR lived practically communally. 
If one speaks about democracy and freedom, then you have to live it. You preach 
democracy and freedom, and you do the same thing. I do live it. I try to save 
businesses and to help local entrepreneurs. I try to use the capital of the Deutsche 
Bank so that another society can develop. What do we [Deutsche Bank] do? We 
are only striving after profit, creating Alternative [financial] products. These are 
different considerations [Betrachtungen]. From a purely human stance, I was 
raised differently, grew up differently, I am thankful for that. I also wrote a 
different history in the Deutsche Bank—not against the Deutsche Bank but for the 
Deutsche Bank, since I represented the Deutsche Bank in the public context. We 
founded 650 new enterprises. I can go from the Erzgebirge to the North Sea and I 
am still greeted. “You helped us, you were the ones.” But most customers from 
then are no longer customers of Deutsche Bank 
U: Why not?  
M: Because the bank made demands, because new people were brought in that 
represented the Deutsche Bank as it is. And because it was no longer the way that 
former GDR citizens who worked for the Deutsche Bank had represented it. 
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Chapter 5: 
 
An (un)timely affair: on money, power and belonging 
 
Prelude 
“Back then: The unification of Germany is as certain as tomorrow follows today. 
And on the day of the wedding between East and West Germany, we—the 
German Democratic Republic (GDR), as groom, will come bearing beautiful 
gifts.  We will come with many people-owned enterprises that will make the lives 
of our people better.  We will come as the debt-free part of Germany. I ask you 
now: and you as the bride, what will you bring?  Your back weighed down by 
debts! But we will marry you nevertheless, because we love you.”14 
 
Otto Buchwitz’s vision, presented at the 1954 SED party congress (Sozialistische 
Einheitspartei Deutschlands/ Socialist Unity Party), of Germany’s eventual unification is 
as striking for its apparently prescient, albeit inverted, futurity—it really happened the 
other way around— as it is jarring in generating a melancholic sense of “what if…?”  
Fast forward to 1990.  Well-known West German caricaturist Dieter Hanitzsch takes up 
the wedding metaphor anew, this time as commentary on the actual unification of the two 
German states (Hanitzsch 1990) Only this time, the gender roles are reversed.  West 
Germany is now the groom: the figure of West German chancellor Helmut Kohl stands 
before the civil registry office, decked out in tuxedo and top hat.  He virtually towers over 
his bride, East Germany.  She wears a threadbare dress, with DDR (abbreviation for East 
Germany) stamped all over in red letters, dark red patches holding one sleeve and a lower 
                                                 
14Damals war’s: Die Einheit Deutschlands kommt so gewiss, wie auf den heutigen Tag der 
morgige folgt. Und wenn die Hochzeit zwischen Ost- und Westdeutschland sein wird, werden 
wir, die DDR, als Bräutigam mit schönen Gaben kommen.  Wir werden mit vielen volkseigenen 
Betrieben kommen, die uns die Mittel geben, das Leben unserer Menschen zu verbessern. Wir 
werden als ein schuldenfreier Teil Deutschlands kommen. Ich werfe die Frage auf: Und Ihr als 
Braut, was bringt Ihr? Den Buckel voller Schulden! Aber wir heiraten Euch trotzdem, weil wir 
Euch lieben.”  Written on a fragment of paper and later found by a Dr. Hartwig Bernitt. Posted on 
the bulletin board in the Achiv der Bürgerbewegung in Leipzig.   
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section of the dress together, and old-fashioned ankle-length boots on her feet.  She 
brings gifts to be sure: four children!  The bride looks up to her groom saying, “You 
know my children, right Helmut?”    
The oldest son grips the corner of his mother’s dress, holding on to it as if it were a 
handkerchief.  His crumpled jacket bears the sign, “Unemployed.” Behind him another 
son stands on crutches, one arm in a bandage.  His caption reads, “Bankrupt factories.” A 
younger daughter in pigtails wears an apron with the label, “Social System.” The fourth 
son stands nearby, decked in his young pioneer outfit and carrying a book with the title, 
“plan-thinking bureaucracy.”  The wedding party is headed up by yet an even smaller 
figure than the bride—Lothar de Maziére, the last East German minister president—
carrying a book-length marriage contract. Size appears to be a further ironic marking of 
the caricatured person’s political importance. Onlookers to the wedding party stand at the 
front of the frame.  East German Social Democratic party leader Wolfgang Thierse 
gestures back at the bride and groom, proclaiming to his (presumably) East German 
audience, “After the wedding, we can say these are his children!” The circle of what 
might have been and what did occur seems to close around these competing visions: two 
unequal parts nevertheless becoming a measure of the whole (Borneman 1993).15 
One part of the story of German Unification is hard to undermine: the 
unquestioned difference in economic value between East and West. Nothing crystalizes 
this better than East German calls for the Deutsch Mark and the apparent euphoria on the 
day of the currency union on July 1, 1990.  While for many East Germans, demands for a 
1:1 exchange rate reflected concerns about their status as equals in unified Germany, 
from a (generalized) West-German perspective, the granting of this exchange rate 
(overvaluing the Ost-Mark) constituted a “gift” (whether out of a sense of solidarity or 
                                                 
15
 In his 1993 article John Borneman was highly critical of this metaphor: “Nothing could be 
more misleading than uncritically replicating this cultural metaphor at the analytical level. East 
and West Germans are not kin reuniting, but two separate peoples, each with its own set of 
dispositions, who are suddenly, in one of those accidental moments in history, thrown together in 
a national whole” (52-53). 
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urgency) (Maier 1997).16 The Bundesbank had been opposed to this rate on economic 
grounds,17 but was forced to comply with Bundeskanzler Kohl’s political agenda.    
In this chapter I re-visit the 1990 currency union between West and East Germany 
through the lens of the present, but with a critical analysis of the multiple and paradoxical 
sites of struggle in which, I argue, it is entangled. What I wish to show, here, is that 
contrary to the teleological narratives through which it is rendered an artifact of 
celebratory ending and yet simultaneously made unavailable for new reflections, there are 
indeed crucial insights to be excavated for the meanings of monetary projects in the 
present.  
In many respects, the 1990 currency union represents a concerted and 
unprecedented attempt to address inequalities and obligations arising out of the history of 
German division and the burdens of the national socialist past. While it is predominantly 
assumed that by virtue of a shared history, language and culture this act of solidarity was 
both necessary and inevitable, and that its enactment, though fraught with challenges, 
was unambiguously embraced, I wish to show the labor and ambivalences that exceed 
and disrupt this story. This is important in order to interrogate the assumptions that 
                                                 
16
 This rate of conversion was politically and symbolically loaded, even as politicians, 
economists, and citizens of West and East Germany argued and debated what was realistic 
economically, and what was necessary, politically. Many East Germans felt that this rate of 
conversion would ensure their status as equals. In hindsight, it can be argued that this rate of 
conversion achieved the opposite, and in fact, sealed a long-standing structural inequality 
between the old and new German states.  
 
Black market rate of East/West before November 1989, 8:1 
After November 89, 20:1 
Valuta Mark: 4.4 East German Marks 
 Conversion rates: 
 1:1 
 Money had to be in bank accounts (no cash) 
 4,000 Marks  - savers between the ages of 14 and 59 
 2,000 Marks – Children under the age of 14 
 6,000 Marks – Seniors over the age of 59 
 
 All savings over this amount were converted at a rate of 2:1 
 Wages and pensions 1:1; Debts 2-1 
 
17
 Bundesbank President Pöhl later resigned his post over this issue. 
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underlie the basis of distributive solidarity broadly, especially as it relates to the 
European project. If it is un-problematically assumed that solidarity with ‘one’s own’ is 
natural, whereas between non-national others it must be reframed in terms of contractual 
obligations or anxieties about moral hazards then this leaves unexplored the ways in 
which such framings significantly shaped the logics of East Germans’ integration into a 
unified Germany. Moreover, it would be to miss the opportunities to learn from this 
‘intra-German project nested within and also transforming Germany’s role in the 
European project. I argue that German unification can be understood as a project of 
monetary integration analogous to the one imagined at a much greater scale through the 
European project.  
Most scholars who have analyzed the ‘economics’ of the 1990 currency union 
would agree that this is an extremely messy affair (Caldwell 2011). While some would 
wish to change the terms of its evaluation and end with a positive note, others have 
worked hard to inscribe the messiness within new narratives of historical and national 
legitimacy. In my view, these struggles and re-inscriptions may simultaneously work at 
cross-purposes. Though they may serve the implicit aim of justifying the enormous costs 
on behalf of East Germans, for the sake of affirming East Germans’ inclusion, at the 
same time they erase or neutralize the very politics of this act on multiple counts.  For 
one, they leave little space for interrogating the forms of devaluation and subjection that 
many easterners experienced in this process, or the alternative forms of coming to terms 
with one’s own past(s). In another sense, they also miss the critical reflections of 
westerners directly involved in this process in so far as the modality of unification did 
bear an uncanny resemblance to the very past West Germans were trying to leave behind 
through the embrace of the European project.  
It is with these aims in mind that I unpack what I consider afterlives of the 1990 
currency union as it emerged in my ethnographic encounters and interviews with 
respondents in Leipzig (McKay 2012).18 Importantly, my questions were framed 
                                                 
18
 I have found inspiration from Ramah McKay’s use of this concept. Though speaking to very 
different circumstances here, it conveys something analogous about the upheavals of  massive 
societal change and their long-term effects.  
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explicitly around both German and European currency projects, but were otherwise 
unstructured, allowing respondents to surround their reflections with those contexts they 
deemed meaningful, and which our mutual dialogues generated. It is also crucial to note 
that for many, this topic was not necessarily one that respondents would have chosen to 
inhabit in telling me, an outsider, their story. Contrary to what I found that many of my 
western respondents assumed about East Germans’ propensity to complain or cling to an 
illusory and idealist refiguring of the past, many of my respondents had to be persuaded 
to offer their reflections. Ironically, it was I, the interviewer, who adopted the stance of 
what is typically mapped onto easterners. Only much later, in the process of re-analyzing 
my interviews, did I fully understand the implications of what for me at the time was a 
somewhat unconscious gesture of gaining trust. That is, by reiterating critical stances I 
had heard and read about I signaled that I took such critiques seriously and did not 
dismiss them. Moreover, by imbibing some of that revolutionary spirit that seeped out of 
the intense engagement of many research participants with the mass-demonstrations in 
1989, most significantly that of October 9, 1989 in Leipzig, it was I who seemed to fully 
embrace these experiences as opening up other possible worlds for thinking about the 
present realities facing East German regions. My respondents, then, had the opportunity 
to accept, revise, or reject these explanations such that in this very move the politics of 
money in unification could emerge in some unexpected and illuminating forms.  
 
Chasing Marx 
 
While many photographs of the Marx-Engels statue in former East Berlin 
circulate, both before and after the demolition of the Palast der Republik (Palace of the 
Republic) in the background, one image captures the stone likenesses with a provocative 
footnote painted in graffiti at the base of their pedestal:  “Wir sind unschuldig,” (We are 
not guilty). Part accusation, part explanation, the claim is double and the speaking subject 
ambiguous. Are Marx and Engels the subjects, saying, “We are not responsible for the 
particular instantiation of our theories”? Are contemporary residents of Berlin accusing 
Marx and Engels for the Cold War mess held by some to be immanent in the Marxist 
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vision of social transformation? Alternately, the graffiti is a strategic defense of Marx and 
Engels: they died long before the GDR emerged as a product of World War II division.  
Or perhaps East German subjects are voicing an otherwise unsayable ambivalence about 
who (or what) is responsible for political coercion, economic decline, and 40 years of 
division?    
Few outside Germany appreciate the visceral tension in the post-unification 
German context that surrounds the figure of Marx and his prescient diagnosis of 
capitalism’s inner contradictions (Derrida 1994). Whether changing the name of Karl 
Marx Stadt back to Chemnitz, or the highly charged debates in Leipzig about what should 
be done with the Marx relief once guarding over the university entrance—some arguing 
that it should find a new home elsewhere in the city and others protesting that it should be 
buried in the landfill like the exploded remnants of the university church destroyed in 
1968 on the orders of Walter Ulbricht—the figure of Marx, or perhaps one could say the 
“socialist economic” is no mere matter of scholarly debate. Residents in Leipzig and 
other East German regions must still live in the ruins of failed plans and solutions of both 
socialism and capitalism.   
In Germany, economic alternatives are continually rolled over and subsumed 
within the failures of Marxist-Leninist theories and the “irrational” market practices of 
socialism they presumably generated.  Thus, in Germany (and especially the new 
Länder), economic alternatives—of whatever variety—are met by many East Germans 
with a sense of resignation and ambivalence, to say the least. Whatever reflections East 
Germans might wish to bring to bear on their economic experiences, during and after 
socialism, most have learned that these are unwelcome in the public space of political 
debate or cultural expression, even in cities once part of the GDR. As an ethnographer 
trying to understand and take seriously precisely such experiences, I was continually 
confronted with a sense, to put this in figural terms, of mouths opening with no sound 
emerging, or a general reluctance to talk at all about one’s economic life at the time of the 
early years of unification (see also (Boyer 2005).19 Only after several years of fieldwork 
                                                 
19
 Understandably, some respondents wish to paint as positive picture of unification as possible so 
as to avoid the stereotype of “complaining Easties (jammer Ossi).  
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and establishing relationships over time was I able to scratch the surface of what has been 
at stake for ordinary individuals who must live out, for better or worse, larger geo-
political ruptures.20   
The reluctance to speak about economic affairs is quite central to my larger 
argument about who can speak about economics, and on what terms. Here, the 
indeterminacy surrounding East German’s possibilities for narrating their reflections on 
the shift from one currency to the other is caught up in the power dynamics of West 
German dominance in defining what constitutes economic value. So, for example, when 
some East German respondents say they lost money twice, first in the transition from the 
East German Mark to the Deutsch Mark (DM), and then to the Euro, that first loss is not 
intelligible from a West German perspective.21 The privatization of the East German 
economy by the Treuhand22 was clearly wrought with fundamental problems of 
translation—cases of selling factories for 1DM comprise only one salient example among 
many—yet precisely such value indeterminacies disappear in narratives of East German 
bankruptcy and irrational socialist economic practices. However, settlements of value like 
the one mentioned above (Altschulden or “old debts” is another),23 capture neither any 
economic measure of the socialist past, nor do they convey any adequate sense of market 
value in the present (Maurer 2005).24 Put another way, the western market value assigned 
to the GDR did not account for its economic value even in “western economic terms.” 
Karl Marx becomes a casualty of post-Cold War battles of defining economic 
efficacy, heralded as timeless theorist and cursed as pragmatic incompetent in the same 
breath.  Benjamin Robinson provides a cogent and necessary discussion of how Western 
                                                 
20
 Rupture might on the one hand be understood as trauma, and on the other seen as a source of 
reflection on “system questions” see Boyer, ibid.   
21
 This applies to some East German respondents also, who reported monetary gains as a result of 
the conversion.   
22
 Treuhandanstalt: the institution that was given the legal mandate for privatizing the East 
German economy after Unification (1990-1994).   
23
 This refers to the conversion of debts owed by people owned factories to the East German state 
into capitalist market debts through the currency union.  The term old debt disguises how these 
became in fact a new form of monetary obligation in the new system.  I will discuss this at length 
in subsequent chapters, as this was perhaps the single most destructive (violent) conversion of 
German Unification. 
24
 This is why, contra Maurer, I maintain a concern about the adequacy value measures.   
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Marxists have largely kept real existing socialism (its experiences and implications) at a 
great distance from their scholarly projects of social critique (Robinson 2009). In 
anthropology, too, Marx occupies an unquestioned place in the cannon of anthropological 
theory (as he should). Yet here, too, even with the emergence of a small subfield within 
cultural anthropology devoted to socialist and post-socialist studies, the implications of 
real-existing socialism’s ontological potential in the present is largely absent. Despite 
considerable critique of the post Cold-war moment, few seem to have questioned 
socialism’s end, or sought “socialisms” in ways other than pronouncing its death and 
highlighting its ghostly traces in the wake of neo-liberal economic transformation 
eastwards. At the same time, Marxist approaches to critiques of economy and dominant 
discourses feel relatively unproblematic in the US academic context, whereas in (East) 
Germany this can be an entirely different matter. 
During my fieldwork in Leipzig, the city of the largest Monday demonstration 
against the regime in October 1989, I encountered Marx as a truly ambivalent figure, in 
contrast to the theorist so effortlessly invoked in the halls of US academia. Former East 
German dissidents recounted to me with some bewilderment their encounters with West 
German social activists in the early days of the peaceful revolution. Ordinary citizen 
activists calling for change within their socialist society sometimes found their efforts co-
opted in sometimes un-welcome ways by vigilant leftist critics from the West who saw 
the abrupt break as an opportunity to continue the fight in contesting capitalist dominance 
on new grounds. On the other hand, after Unification countless East German academics 
lost their university positions (especially in the social sciences). In the present academic 
context in Germany, East German social theorists writing explicitly on East German 
issues of political and economic transformation since 1989 rarely hold tenured faculty 
positions and hence there is little opportunity for much needed subaltern re-framings of 
what these transformation might mean for collective experiences in post-unification 
Germany (Berdahl 1999; Boyer 2005).25     
                                                 
25
 For example, economic historian Andre Steiner, Zentrum für Zeithistorische Forschung, 
Potsdam; historian Matthias Middell,Universität Leipzig. Dominc Boyer’s study comes closest to 
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Many of my respondents critical of the economic measures taken to “translate” or 
restructure the East German economy do not, at the same time, wish to inhabit the same 
communicative space as the political Left in Germany. Yet the political Left, and to some 
extent, former party elites (real or perceived) make up the otherwise limited publications 
devoted to documenting and analyzing from an “inside” perspective the nature of these 
economic transformations (Dahn 2009; Most 2009; Wenzel 2006 (2000)).26 While some 
texts remain in the realm of the polemic, others are serious (and empirically researched) 
analyses of the economic structures and contradictions that continue to shape East 
German economic possibilities (especially in the new Länder). However, such 
investigations on the ‘real value’ of the East German economy or the costs of unification 
(Wenzel 2006 (2000)) were absorbed with a great deal of ambivalence among my East 
German respondents, if read at all. In sum, for many of my East German respondents, 
Marx provides at best anecdotal commentary on current events (Marx was right about 
some things), and at worst, an unwanted and embarrassing reminder of the utopian 
socialist visions that ended instead in nonsensical aphorisms,27 crumbling infrastructure, 
and political coercion.   
It is not my intention to question the continued validity of Marx’s oeuvre (far 
from it). Far more difficult to imagine is his absence from critical theoretical concerns 
about economic materiality and, indeed, the ongoing dilemma (for me at least) about how 
to understand the question of what is “real” about economic structures and experience 
(Balibar 1995; Derrida 1994; Karatani 2005). Rather, I want to highlight the lingering 
difficulties of grounding one’s theoretical claims in Marx or other socialist theory in 
unpacking the German post-socialist present.  In particular, pragmatic and creative 
alternatives find little oxygen in the toxic air of post-unification debates about the 
substance of economic value. In many respects, part of the labor of unification is about 
                                                                                                                                                 
a sub-altern perspective, but he too is a US academic and his book is not yet translated into 
German.  Daphne Berdahl’s ethnography is similarly important, but also not translated. 
26
 For example, journalist and author Daniella Dahn’s publications are well researched and 
empirically documented while also inhabiting a much-need critical perspective. Yet she is 
perceived by many (West and East) to be on the Left and polemical. See (2009) 
27
 These are brought up time and again by respondents, often in a tone of internal critique of 
economic conditions in the GDR.  
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ensuring that the GDR quite literally becomes a “footnote of history.” Yet as I will show 
below, while many of my respondents wished to place the past behind them, it is clear 
that this past is just as laden with the uneven histories of unification and the abrupt 
disappearance of a state that, for better or worse, people had called home.  
 
Timely and Untimely 
 
 The opening of the border and the opportunity it afforded for the re-unification of 
West and East Germany have been understood as timely and untimely at once. The 
temporality of events and the force and impetus they are understood to have created for 
the 1990 currency union are crucial for situating the politics of money in unified 
Germany. Beginning with the opening of the Hungarian border in August 1989, the large 
numbers of East Germans leaving for the west, and the dissolution of power structures in 
the GDR, speeding up with the opening of the Berlin Wall on November 9, 1989: each 
plays a prominent role in explaining the placement and timing of the introduction of the 
D-Mark to the East.  
Time is a central organizing trope for the experience of, and problems arising out 
of the temporal trajectory of the 1990 currency union. The velocity of decision-making 
and change is absolutely central to the power-relations through which the inclusion of 
East Germans in the West German monetary regime materialized inclusion and solidarity, 
and yet dispossession and new forms of hegemony (Borneman 1993; Ten Dyke 2001). 
Precisely in the guise of a generous act, the offer of the West German D-Mark 
exemplifies the mutual constitution of subjectivity and capital immanent to 
capitalism(Read 2003). There was not enough time—it was frequently commented—for 
the magnitude of the decisions being made. However, the pace of time made other 
impossible things possible. But timing is also significant. It was time that had to be used 
for fear that such opportunities might not appear twice (Grosser 1998). The timing of the 
end of German Division and the Cold War propelled the European project forward. This 
timing could be propitious, but possibly also ‘untimely’ in the sense that the many ‘what 
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might have beens’ are accorded a permanent opening for interrogating the teleology of 
the present (Song 2013).  
 ‘Politically,’ unification is widely viewed as a timely event. Some have argued 
that there was a small window of time in which to secure permission and acceptance from 
the four occupying powers in restoring German sovereignty. Gorbachev is a key figure in 
narrating German unification as timely, just as the ‘political’ decision to offer the D-Mark 
to the East became the signature achievement of crisis management in addressing the 
uncertain relationship between east and west, as well as the concerns of European 
partners about the ‘German Question.’ In the latter case, the agreement to deepen the 
German commitment to the European project through the support of introducing the 
single currency is the ‘price’ Germany would pay in exchange for rapid unification. Other 
scholars have emphasized that given the time and timing of the unprecedented challenges 
to be faced, the 1990 currency union between west and east was the essential stabilizing 
mechanism and signal that the West was up to the task of meeting its historic 
responsibility to East Germans on the one hand, and to Europe on the other. Only much 
later, and in the context of the more recent euro crisis, have the events of 1990 been seen 
as possibly foreshadowing and enabling the problematic construct of the monetary union 
which German elites played a crucial role in shaping, and as I wish to suggest, informed 
by the intra-German project of economic integration.  
 ‘Economically,’ the 1990 currency union and its revaluation of the East German 
economy are argued to have been untimely. It did not allow the necessary time to 
determine a more accurate measure of value of the East German currency, relative to the 
West. In this view, adjustment and calibration over time would have enabled a proper 
scale of comparison and more importantly, enabled the East German industry to adapt 
more slowly to the competitive pressures of the market. Due to the abrupt introduction of 
the D-Mark and the arbitrary determination of values, the granting of the west German 
currency to the east would come to be understood as a sign of belonging and 
empowerment, and yet also a form of shock therapy associated with structural adjustment 
programs for the developing world. Paradoxically, overvaluation of the East German 
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currency was a form of devaluation: of East German industry and economy, and by 
association, the work biographies and material identities of East German subjects.  
 However, much more is at stake than what happened to the economy. For some 
the timing of the GDR’s dissolution meant other missed opportunities. When I asked Herr 
Lange, a former dissident, about his experience of the Wende, he emphasized the missed 
chance on holding party leaders accountable: 
 
U: how did you experience the Wende? 
Herr Lange: My expectations were exceeded. I never imagined it would occur 
with this velocity. I thought it would take much longer, the downfall of the GDR. 
That it could succeed—before 1989 I never would have believed this to be 
possible. There were others who thought in 1988 or 88 that it could happen 
quickly. But I have to admit that I never thought it would happen with this speed. 
U: what did one hope for out of this process? 
Herr Lange: I know that at the time I had hoped it would not go so quickly, but 
for other reasons. Because it was foreseeable that if it goes so quickly then there 
would be few convictions [of SED leaders]. That took away my sense of 
excitement at the speed. The faster the process, the less likely anyone will be held 
accountable. Wolfgang Schäuble, then minister of the interior, already spoke in 
February 1990 on behalf of the GDR functionaries. It was clear that there would 
be no trials and convictions. Otherwise, I had no problems. I did not aspire that 
the GDR could be reformed.  
 
Herr Lange’s response to my question about the politics of money attached to the policies 
and outcomes of the 1990 currency union, and its impact on present circumstances 
conveys the complicated agendas in which critiques of the politico-economic decisions 
must be situated:   
 
Herr Lange: It is always difficult to compare. The transformative capacity of 
money into power and back is emphasized in a democracy. In the GDR a gain in 
power could not be expressed in money. It was the pleasure of power, in the 
politburo, to dictate to over 16 million people. This is the difficulty in socialism 
when you speak about money. The astonishing fact about this ‘Great Experiment’ 
[unification/currency union] is that it had no destructive effects on the FRG. It did 
not hurt the western economy at all. That is what is interesting about this currency 
union. There were many warning voices at the time, but there is no evidence that 
it damaged the FRG.  
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U: But perhaps it did have detrimental effects on the east—the eastern regions. 
This is what the discussions about the state of the economy in the east argue 
Herr Lange: oh well 
U: or the solidarity pact—many in the west don’t know that easterners also pay 
the tax 
Herr Lange: That is true. I think the problem lies in the fact that we are dealing 
with two fields of law. I don’t think you can generalize about eastern cities. 
Sachsen is now doing well. In a few years we might be arguing about what to do 
with the surplus. But it is true that more workplaces have been eliminated in the 
east than in the old (western) federal regions. 
 
Remembering a time of confusion: “it is too close” 
 
Katharina, a professor of history and oriental studies who taught at the university 
of Leipzig, became a close interlocutor and mentor during my research in Leipzig. In her 
70’s, she had been an academic in both systems and had managed unlike many others, to 
find her footing in the new structures. Though she did not have a full professorship, she 
was able to make a comfortable existence by teaching, writing, conducting research, and 
advising students. She was involved in many activities and organizations in the city and 
exuded creativity and curiosity in all that she did. All three of her children had left the 
area to work in the west or overseas. She was happy to see them find their way in the 
world, even if she would have gladly seen them established and in work in the region.  
Katharina was a wise soul and had a keen sense about the complicated politics of 
what I was attempting to do in my research.  On one afternoon quite late in my fieldwork, 
in 2009, we met at my apartment in Leipzig-Connewitz for coffee. We talked again about 
my project and my efforts to interview people about their experiences of the currency 
union and post-unification experiences with new monetary, financial and economic 
institutions and practices. She reminded me, “It’s not the original time. 20 years have 
gone by. So you ask people about the original event, and they narrate from their 
remembrances, but remembering is always selective. Influenced by what at present might 
be moving people. And then there is the personal memory of that time and the official 
one. You have the original event you have to explain, but then you have to account for 
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the fact that it is the history of the history. You should write that, account for why what 
people say is the way that it is.”28 
 I told her that I had found it difficult to persuade people to talk about these shifts 
and the experiences with money after 1990. And in Leipzig, where local institutions take 
up all manner of GDR history and contemporary problems arising from it, the one 
exception is this economic and financial dimension. Katharina, nodding throughout, 
offered some encouragement. “Yes, that already says a lot.”  
 I had recently returned from the history forum in Berlin, which aimed to provide 
a public forum for scholarship and commemoration on the events of 1989, ahead of the 
20-year anniversary of the fall of the wall. I recounted how there had only been one 
single panel devoted to the economics of unification and the problems of privatization 
and reconstruction on the east. This was the first time I had been part of a public 
presentation that included a member of the GDR Banking and financial world. Edgar 
Most, former vice president of the Staatsbank and now-retired Deutsche Bank director in 
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 Elizabeth Grosz’s discussion of memory via Bergson is helpful here: “Memory, our mode of 
access to the past, is thus, paradoxically, not in us, just as perception is not in us. Perception takes 
us outside ourselves, to where objects are (in space); memory takes us to where the past is (in 
duration). And incidentally, language, too, takes us to where concepts are. In each case, this 
movement—in space, in time, in concepts—is possible only because of our capacity to 
(temporarily, or with some effort) disconnect from our immersion in a tensile and expanding 
present to undertake the leap that these movements outside ourselves, and outside our habitual 
behavioral schemas, require. The past is not accessible to us as if it were stored or recorded in a 
file or document; we do not simply seek for the place in which a memory resides and find the past 
in all its detail there. This is both to spatialize duration and treat memory as if it were the 
perception of a thing. Bergson often talks of the act of disconnection that must occur for us to 
access the virtual, the past, or other languages: ‘Whenever we are trying to recover a recollection, 
to call up some period of our history, we become conscious of an act sui generis by which we 
detach ourselves from the present in order to replace ourselves first, in the past in general, then in 
a certain region of the past—a work of adjustment, something like focusing a camera. But our 
recollection still remains virtual; we simply prepare ourselves to receive it by adopting the 
appropriate attitude. Little by little it comes into view like a condensing cloud; from the virtual 
state it passes to the actual; and as its outlines become more distinct and its surfaces take on color, 
it tends to imitate perception’ (MM 133-134) “ (179)…The only access we have to the past is 
through a leap into virtuality, through a disconnection from the present and a move into the past 
itself, seeing the past is outside us and we are in it rather than it being located in us. The past 
exists, but it is in a state of latency or virtuality, as the potential of other ongoing presents…two 
movements or phases…” (2004: 178-179)  
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Berlin, was part of a panel otherwise populated by western experts. I explained to Maria 
how the audience was told we would not be able to ask questions, and how a 
documentary filmmaker and another former activist had attempted to pursue questions on 
the privatization of the energy industry in the GDR. I was frustrated with the lack of 
opportunities to think through and discuss what had occurred in this period of transition 
that included the currency union. Maria was not surprised. Her assessment below 
expresses how beneath the surface of peaceful or forced silence, a churning state of 
uncertainty, disappointment and competing agendas has yet to be worked through: 
 
A number of things come together here. I experienced this with the Academy 
(Akademie der Wissenschaften). First, you have the western arrogance that they 
take up these themes, but don’t know much about it.  And then it leads to things 
like what happened to the academy, you take on the alibi that academics from the 
outside are presumed to be objective in their evaluations. So that creates the first 
false picture. The inside knowledge is not asked about in a sensitive manner. The 
second is that exactly this topic of finances, and Treuhand, and Party assets and 
‘who’ is a highly sensitive topic because so much happened below the threshold 
of legality.  The CDU took over the CDU publishing houses, property and all. 
One argument that is always made is that these properties and businesses were so 
run down (marode), that they had no value. The second argument is that—many 
small producers such as the LPG’s, communal property, they would have liked to 
take these over and run it as a small business. Then the standard argument was 
always, ‘you don’t have enough capital resources. You need 50,000 D-Marks in 
capital otherwise you don’t get the company. From the western perspective, it was 
economically nonsensical. An owner without enough capital, it was felt, could not 
run the business profitably. So a lot was destroyed that could have continued to 
live (weiterleben können). Then after the fact it is said that it could have worked. 
There were some cases where people were able to succeed because the owner 
with capital agreed to transfer the property to eastern entrepreneurs who did 
manage to make it successful. The problem was that these issues were approached 
with western calculations of what would be profitable, and which did not 
recognize the specifics of the situation. The third issues is that so many business 
deals were made between western and eastern functionaries on the one hand, and 
on the other with business interests connected to the government and that 
information is not supposed to come out. It is indicative that Schalk Golodkowski 
was never put on trial. He was really a criminal and now he sits at his villa in 
Tegernsee. He knew too much, and he knows too much, and he can deliver too 
many people under the knife. And that is also a barrier. The cloak of silence 
covers all of this.  
 
  234 
Katharina tells me of an acquaintance who saw the sign of the times. He took the money 
collected from solidarity stamps for development projects from one of the local churches. 
He used it to establish a trust that is now used to fund 5,000-euro projects that are 
sustainable and long-term. But there were very few who had the knowledge or the 
courage, or the overview of things to do something, to say, we will take that now. And he 
used the confusion of the Wende—this was, after all a time without clear laws (a state of 
exception). If you understood that you could undertake all kinds of things, but who knew 
that then? I can only imagine what happened to the PDS assets, what kinds of real estate 
deals were made. So much happened during that time, that there is a cloak of silence over 
all the economic and financial aspects because otherwise, too much would come out. 
What really happened during the Wende—there is still a lot that is still not known. So 
you have the misfortune or the luck that when you meet people, you have difficulty 
determining who is telling you something and what they are telling you. And to find that 
out, who is telling you what, when, and how. That is difficult because you are from the 
outside. You have to write carefully. You can explain that these issues are still very 
sensitive; that it is still too close, too soon.   
I explain that with the recent financial crisis, how prices or debts are defined 
seems up in the air. But yet with the east/west story, the dominant narrative suggests that 
the case was clear. Katharina felt that of course such questions might be discussed among 
experts. It is also the case that the concepts of economics were very different, and that 
even within the BRD, this was the time of the new economy, where neoliberal—whatever 
it is called, it was assumed that different stages existed. But now with this present money 
economy, there is nothing behind it. In the GDR, value was based on what you produced. 
Now the money economy is drawn to absurdity. Things have been going on since the 
90’s. It is difficult to evaluate the old relationships. You have to see that this phase of the 
new economy was full in gear when unification happened. The FRG did with the GDR 
precisely what it just did with Hypo-Real Estate. It poured lots of money into it hoping it 
would recover, and then it doesn’t.  Something similar happened with the GDR. They 
wanted to build up small businesses, but then here, too, there was a real-estate bubble that 
ended badly. Now our economy is living only from finance speculation to make high 
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profits. It is an economy of appearances. I am interested in the theoretical foundations 
and so I consult different experts. Even they agree that it is like a casino. There is nothing 
behind it, no real foundation based on what a country produces and consumes. So 
Unification has occurred exactly in this time. Or that is when these processes intensified. 
So what you have is really a task with no solution. But you just have to say that, 
formulate it that way. This and that tendency was there in the East and in the west. 
Values and value definitions were different. The foundations of value were different. The 
west also had the problem of over-production. They were happy in the beginning to be 
able to empty their warehouses to the market in the east. So the crisis was delayed by 
winning a new market. It was a consumer market for everything whether needed or not, 
and then the market was saturated. And then the crying and gnashing of teeth started.  
I filled Katharina in on my most recent fieldwork experiences in Frankfurt and the 
interviews I had recently conducted with my contacts at the Bundesbank on unification. 
The Bundesbank had been against the quick currency union, but now represented it 
differently. The problems seem to be swept under the rug. They just say this is not their 
topic. Katharina wondered if perhaps it came from a feeling that one is not up to the 
analysis or does not have the skills. “Very few people can look beyond to the economic 
foundations of ‘homo economicus’ I read Peter Drucker’s books. He wrote about the 
social market after the II World War. He described how the market was organized. It 
interested me. Why have all these things that have been invented never come to fruition? 
A normal economist does not understand that they need history, in order to evaluate. You 
need a historical background and context. They can’t and don’t want that. They are not 
conscious of that.”  
Memories of economic transformation sit uneasily in the memory cultures 
devoted to the GDR or in unified Germany. The planned economy is something few 
would claim to miss, and in unified Germany reconstruction is both critiqued and 
celebrated, but is definitely not seen as a subject to be included in efforts to work through 
Germany’s difficult pasts, those shared or displaced.   
Arguments and critiques emerging out of expectations on the part of many 
easterners loose their force if the processes of transformation are seen primarily in terms 
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of the extension of capitalisms’ ills and displacements to the east. Likewise, if one only 
considers the space of hope and fantasy opened up from within socialism, the 
disappointed illusions imply a structure of feeling with those of us ‘outside’ are familiar, 
and yet which seems all the more unreasonable as a valid demand given that we know 
how things really are. In this latter view, peoples’ expectations are understandable but 
also unreasonable.  
For instance, some eastern scholars and critics argued early on that the GDR’ 
social system was superior to that of the west. Thus, adopting the western system whole 
sale (ready-made state) was experienced not as improvement but as limiting and 
devaluing of women in particular. In the GDR 80% of women had been employed 
outside the home, in contrast to 50% in the west. Despite the double burden women bore 
in working in and outside the home, many essential services were met within the 
workplace and thus were not the kind of material and existential burden they became 
after 1990.  
How respondents felt about the GDR system was characterized by a high degree 
of ambivalence at the same time that select practices and institutions were highlighted as 
practical and workable features of daily life that could have continued. Likewise, the 
assessment of the successes and failures, of winners and losers in the unification process 
could be informed by one’s position to the former state—whether one was a bystander, 
dissident, or passive/critical observer, and how well one had managed after 1990 to 
accommodate oneself in the new Germany. But in my experience, empathy for or 
dismissal of the former state, or ones attitude toward fellow easterners never mapped 
smoothly onto one’s present material circumstances or the level of critical distance one 
might cultivate to the past. If eastern society was internally fractured, where the fault 
lines and jagged edges surfaced or not was highly dependent on specific persons or 
topics. Thus, as Andreas Glaeser has noted about the dissident activists in his recent 
research on political epistemics, how one became involved in such groups was highly 
contingent and relational, calling into question the easy resort to demographic categories 
so often applied to tracing the subjects and intent of grassroots activism (Glaeser 2011).  
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A predominate undertone in explanations and normative arguments about the 
outcome of German unification, and the expectations which accompanied this process is 
told from the side of those within capitalism who have already been disabused of their 
illusions about the market. From this vantage point, East German expectations are framed 
as unreasonable, unrealistic, and illusory. Moreover, the ideals and fictions of the free 
market are taken as ideals that can be enacted in the world. Promises of self-actualization 
in the market are taken at their word. In contrast, the western scholar knows these are 
fictions. The world does not work this way. This is a lesson easterners were learning. 
Disappointment is inevitable and regrettable.  
If one considers both currency unions in parallel, the distinction between popular 
agency and technocratic planning stands out. Whereas the euro project is imposed from 
above by elites on the people below, the 1990 currency union is framed as the outcome of 
the demands of a collective East German body that made it necessary and inevitable. 
Even though the 1990 project was just as much driven by elite concerns, the weight of the 
project is placed on the agency of ordinary East Germans. They wanted, demanded, and 
desired it, is one refrain of both contemporary and scholarly retrospective reflections. 
It is important to note how and why dominant narratives about the meanings and 
effects of the currency union have been internalized and adopted by many easterners. 
However, in my interviews and conversations I found that dominant narratives might be 
confirmed and yet simultaneously destabilized in the same instance. This was not so 
much through what was said, but how and in what tense.  
I should also add that I did not have a full register of stances toward the currency 
union until after leaving the field. Only by reading together and against the grain of 
multiple and seemingly shared framings could I recognize how deeply emotional and 
moral framings haunted and were displaced in such accounts. I argue that the intentions, 
modalities, and outcomes trouble even as they are celebrated and normatively inscribed 
in such a way as to exclude other readings.  
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Euphoria and confusion 
 
The Leipziger author, Herr Kaestner, described the brief window of excitement, 
and shared euphoria in the west with this moving example. After the big demonstration in 
Leipzig he was in the west, in Münster, for a book reading. In a local pub he was told by 
the proprietor, ‘everyone of you in the east should have two of us westerners to support 
you, also financially.’   
Frau Bergmann did not participate in the demonstrations at first, out of fear. But 
after October 9th, she began to attend. Almost every day new slogans were coined and 
people sang them as they walked around the Leipzig ring road. She described the turn of 
sentiment toward unification. “Suddenly people began to chant, Germany, united 
fatherland (Deustchland einig Vaterland). I said to my friend, I said, oh my dear Lord, 
they [the west] don’t even want us. Because we were such a poor lot. The GDR was run 
down economically to the ground. Artists, those not in the industry, they did not 
understand that.  They didn’t know. The western artists didn’t have a clue. They thought 
we lived in paradise. Those westerners invited by the FDJ or the party elites, they thought 
this was a paradise. I thought, after the borders were open, they can’t possibly want us. 
But then Kohl spoke, and there were negotiations. My family had always voted for the 
SPD. My grandfather, my grandmother voted for the SPD. So I thought that I would vote 
for the SPD and not for Kohl’s party. But then I learned that Ibrahim Böhme, that he was 
a STASI informer, so then I didn’t touch it. During all my time in the GDR I had never 
belonged to the party, and neither did my husband. He had it very difficult because of 
this.”  
Frau Jung, director of the stocks and securities division of a Sparkasse bank in 
Leipzig, describes the short window of time in which mutual curiosity and euphoria 
coincided immediately after the opening of the border. She also captures how the D-Mark 
was at once a tangible sign of belonging and asymmetry  (Interview conducted in 
February 2008).   
U: how did people find their way, in your experience, in the changed 
circumstances surrounding money? With credit 
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J: good, good 
U: it wasn’t difficult? 
J: No, but what was right during the Wende time, there was the currency 
conversion, and then a half year later, and in the summer was when the Bürger 
held the money in their hands. That was the real currency union, then. 
U: but the conversion was a half-year earlier? 
J: yes, the conversion was a half-year before, so the fall 1989 and then in summer 
90 was when we first got the money. So, I can remember that shortly after the 
wall fell I went to the west to do an internship at the West German Landesbank in 
Münster and I did not have a single pfennig in west money in my bag. So then in 
Münster I received—back then it was something special, that someone was 
coming from the GDR, (laughs) we were three colleagues, they arrived and 
pressed an envelope in our hands—we were going to be training there for two 
months—and so when we arrived we received this envelope in the hand, which 
was a kind of symbolic pay (Gehalt). Actually they were training us, but they 
knew we didn’t have a single pfennig. So then we received a kind of symbolic 
pay, and it was substantially more than I earned in east marks. It was exciting 
[spannend] (laughs warmly). It was exciting. 
U: That is a great memory 
J: yes, it is a great memory.  
J: that was a super time. We were the exotics at the West LB.  
U: How was that? 
J: And it was nice…(laughs). Now one can hardly imagine that. The three of us 
arrived there and they looked at us as if we had just fallen from Mars. But then 
they were very nice and so that we were really ok.  While we were there we 
would go out to eat with a colleague who was responsible for us. And so the 
whole thing took its course. They were so nice and friendly, and they saw to it 
that we were invited to a new place each night.  Colleagues came to us and asked 
if they could invite us over. And we went to garden parties, and went out to eat. 
Colleagues in the west were less interested in the banking practices of the GDR 
than they were curious about the experience of revolution in Leipzig. ‘Did you 
walk around the ring,’ they asked. ‘What was it like?’  
We were dead tired after that time but it was a really wonderful time. And 
fantastic contacts grew out of this experience.  
U: that you have been able to keep? 
J: yes, that I have kept.  It was brilliant (klasse). They had never been in the GDR, 
and they thought about us, what kind of people are these? And then they noticed 
that everything was fine. Later this was unfortunately no longer possible. The 
euphoria had passed. Later I did another training at a Sparkasse in Frankfurt. Then 
the euphoria was already over, it was not anything like the time in Münster 
U: when was that? 
J: 91 or 92. Still relatively fresh, but no longer that they might say with 
excitement, they are from the east.  Then it was, oh, some people are coming from 
Leipzig. There were some nice colleagues. But it was no longer something 
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special. But Münster, that was really at the time of the fall of the wall, and the 
first were coming from the Sparkasse, and they thought it was as if we were 
coming from Siberia. That was a really wonderful time I have to say, because 
everything was exciting. 
U: I can imagine 
 
Knowing the economy 
 
Contrary to dominant assumptions that East German desires for the Deutsch Mark 
disguised the economic challenges that would come with unification, many examples 
(both in my research and in documents from the time) show that this narrative at least 
needs to be problematized. Not all East Germans shared such optimism, even in those 
early days.  Whether from visiting relatives in the West or reflecting on the nature of the 
relationship between an economic base and a money-price complex, it was already 
doubtful whether the East German industry could withstand such a conversion.  
A television documentary made in Erfurt at the time of the currency union 
captures two men debating in the street.29  One man speaks with a thick Thüringer30 
accent while the other man speaks in neutral tones and bears the presence of someone 
with more education than his counterpart (though the documentary makers tell us nothing 
more about who these men are, or about their relationship).  The man with the accent 
insists that the Deutsch Mark is a gift (ein Geschenk) and shakes his head insistently in 
wonder at the good fortune of being helped by the West.  His sparring partner shakes his 
head vehemently, arguing, “Kapital macht keine Geschenke” (Capital makes no gifts). 
“First there must be a “wirtschaftliche Basis!”  (First, there must be an economic 
basis/base).  
In an interview project about former citizen activists in Leipzig conducted by the 
Archiv der Bürgerbewegung (citizens’ archive), a prominent Leipzig activist from that 
time reflects on his thoughts about the then pending economic union with West Germany:   
                                                 
29
 Miterlebt-Wechselstunde Erfurt nach der Währungsreform. Broadcast as part of series 20 Jahre 
Mauerfall on 10. 31. 2009. 
30
 Thüringen is one of the federal regions once part of the GDR. It borders the West German 
province of Hessen.   
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“I understood my priorities differently then. I did not get very involved in 
the elections, but instead worked towards direct democracy taking root. We 
undertook a signature campaign.  I worked toward this as part of an initiative, 
Democracy and Initiative 90. We collected 40,000 signatures in support of 
anchoring public referenda31 in a new Constitution. I helped with the drafting of 
these direct democratic elements in the constitutional draft of the Round Table, 
and I was of the opinion that perhaps, that we could still bring about the 
possibility of a referendum on German Unification, about the way of and nature 
of unification, if this had to take place.  I was fearful of the tempo. I said we must 
first secure our position and when we had perhaps three or five years, then we 
could have come together at eye-level, but so, that is I saw during sleepless nights 
what was coming.  I am not an economic expert, no economist, but with my own 
analytic capabilities I could count that much with my five fingers what the 
economic and currency union would mean for the East German economy.   
And then I wrote in an article in the DAZ (Der Anderen Zeitung/ The 
Other Newspaper), which still existed then, I said early on.  I wrote this: the 
economic and currency union and the rapid unification will mean the immediate 
and unprotected exposure of the East German economy to the global market 
conditions and the simultaneous breaking away of eastern markets.  And in 
principle, that means the asset stripping of the Industry culture that we had, and 
this means massive unemployment.  And this is exactly what happened.  And left 
over will remain, I wrote back then, perhaps there will be politically wanted 
islands of modernization and as a whole we will have the problem that there is no 
longer work here and there will be depopulation, and left over will be the elderly.  
                                                 
31
 Volksentscheidung and Volksabstimmung both refer to public referenda, however the two 
words index distinctive legal options in Germany. A Volksentscheidung is possible at local and 
regional levels, whereas at the National level this is not possible. Volksabstimming refers to the 
national level-plebiscite, which is not legally possible in Germany.   
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It is unpleasant to have been right about this, but in the main features I already 
had recognized some of what was to come”32  
 
Frau Bergmann, who along with here husband worked in the industrial sector, also 
suggested that for those more familiar with the real circumstances, there was an 
increasing doubt about the ability of the GDR to continue without western assistance. I 
might add that other interviews, sources from the early 90’s, and other scholarly accounts 
suggest that the experience of rapid deindustrialization and collapse intensified these 
feelings. There was not a shared, birds-eye view of the situation as a whole. More 
importantly, awareness of the material decay changed as a result of unification, thus 
adding to and mingling with one’s awareness at the time: 
 
“This state— it was inevitable that it would go bankrupt. Investments were not 
being made in the factories. The technology was old. Even the bathrooms were 
old and ugly and we had to clean them ourselves once we finished work to save 
money on cleaning staff. There was no money coming or going. In the winter 
there was not even enough coal to heat the factory halls. So we went home. The 
streetcars stopped running because there was no electricity, so then we had to 
walk. Things were not working. The subsidies, everyone thought, this can’t be 
possible. You could buy bread for almost no money at all. How was that possible? 
The farmers were buying bread as feed for the pigs. The promise of flourishing 
landscapes—we said right away that is hardly possible. The economy, nothing 
was working. I knew it was not going to work.”   
 
 
 
Currency conversion   
 
When I asked respondents specifically about the currency conversion, I observed 
that memories of the technical conversions were strongly interwoven with the themes of 
devaluation of East German consumer goods and the wide-spread experience of being 
taken advantage of or ‘duped’ by western salespersons and practices both during the time 
                                                 
32Interview with J. Tallig (2009). Used with permission from Archiv der Bürgerbewegung. 
Translation mine.   
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between November 1989 and formal unification, as well as in the early years of 
reorienting selves and lives to the new system. However, these themes were expressed 
indirectly and often by contrasting ones’ own acuity and ability to avoid these pitfalls 
with the collective experiences of all easterners. For instance, statements about the 
exploitative treatment of easterners were predominantly put in the third person, about 
others who had experienced these problems. I rarely encountered anyone who told me 
about these experiences in the first-person point of view, as one’s own personal 
experience. When it was put in these terms, then almost always these stories referenced 
one’s own sophistication about what was going on. Either one observed misfortunes 
happening to others, or one recounted his or her ability to refuse such offers, or see 
through them.  
 For instance, this association is apparent in an interview I conducted with Herr 
Holtz. in July 2006. Herr Holtz had worked for the GDR Staatsbank and was one of the 
fortunate ones to be picked up by the Bundesbank. He became the director of cash 
logistics in the Leipzig regional central bank. Describing the technical procedures and 
armored transport of West German money to banks in the GDR, Herr Holtz. explained 
that credit institutions had to sign that they were responsible for the money, and for the 
security, that before the first of July 1990 no money would be given out. Banks were 
debited with this amount. He added in clarification, ‘It was similar to the euro.’ Before 
the 1 January 2002 banks were not allowed to release euros into circulation, except for 
the starter kits. I asked (naively) whether there had been starter kits of West German 
marks in 1990. He was extremely amused, laughing but also correcting me, saying “No, 
Let’s put it this way. People in the GDR were familiar with the D-Mark. They knew what 
the D-Mark looked like. With the euro it was different. There was a new currency, and 
that’s why there were starter kits.” My analogy to the euro had generated a different set 
of intentions than I had intended. Herr Holtz. must have immediately thought about the 
dominant stereotypes about East Germans’ lack of knowledge and gullibility at the time 
of the changeover. Herr Holtz. thus folded the ‘magical’ introduction of the D-Mark into 
a register of familiarity and every-day-ness of money that at once demonstrated sound 
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reasoning. This stands out because so many accounts portray the heightened emotion and 
irrational exuberance of the D-Mark conversion.  
Herr Holtz explained, though, that in 1990 there was not enough small change for 
retail, so there was a period of time, around 6 months, when East Germans continued to 
use East German change. But money could no longer be changed after the 1st of July. But 
there were special rules about the GDR accounts. Those living abroad had additional 
time.  ‘We get calls all the time where DDR marks have been found and they ask if it can 
be changed? They can wallpaper the bathroom with it, keep it as a souvenir or burn it.”  I 
remembered the scene in Good-bye Lenin where the children discover their mother’s 
hiding place too late and can no longer change the money. I asked him if he was familiar 
with that. He nodded, replying, “That is sad, of course, but there had to be a deadline. 
The D-Mark can still be changed to euros, but not the Ostmark. People didn’t know how 
much in East German Marks the STASI (secret police) might have hidden away.” He 
explained the deadline as a political decision, to prevent former party elites and security 
personnel from attempting to convert money illegally. What is interesting about his last 
remarks is the justification for the conversion deadline as having to do with corruption 
rather than other technical reasons for restricting the time of convertibility.   
When I asked what it was like for people who were not familiar with the western 
banking system, Herr Holtz: “we also had credit in the GDR. Savings accounts also 
earned interest. You could receive what was called a marriage credit. It was an interest-
free credit of 5,000 Mark der DDR. For each child 1,500 would be waived. If you had 
three kids then you didn’t need to pay back the credit. You were also restricted in terms 
of what you could spend that money for. You couldn’t use the money to purchase luxury 
goods. It was intended for setting up an apartment, for furniture and household effects. 
There were also some consumer credits, but they were not secured. You had to show your 
pay statement, but it wasn’t a problem. We didn’t have unemployed, and everyone had 
work and a regular income. People were paid better or worse. So they received credit. 
But, after the Wende, that’s when things really got going. There were different 
conditions, different for every bank. We had to get used to this. The problem was that 
anyone could receive a credit for 10 or 15,000 D-mark. People might have earned 1,500 a 
  245 
month at first so they thought it would be okay. But then in no time they were 
unemployed and many people found themselves in debt. Catalogues were sent to the East 
by the ton. That was the time when people lost their jobs. With the currency union many 
saw their savings cut in half for those amounts above the 1:1 allowed rates. Then the 
robber barons showed up who wanted to make a fast Mark. People were taken advantage 
of. If I think of all the western cars that were sold in the east in 1990, no one would have 
bought these in the west, and certainly not for the prices being charged. Then in a few 
months there were already problems with many of these cars. But the ex-GDR citizen is a 
fast learner [lernfähig geworden].  It took some time to adjust. People became more 
careful. But that went pretty fast. Anyone who is interested or doesn’t throw his money 
out the window learned. Such things happened in the old Länder, too. But those times are 
gone where you can pull the wool over easterners. By now everyone will have learned a 
little something.” 
Herr Lange’s reflections on adjusting to the new system make this more explicit:  
L: I think many people felt that they had the wool pulled over them. But 
that is understandable. I think there was too much pressure. 
U: Did that happen to you? 
Herr Lange: No, I was not taken advantage of. I didn’t have that much 
money that I would have even been tempted to take on large debts or to 
sign up for insurance policies. And there were a lot of pyramid schemes at 
the time. I was asked to join one. But you only profit if you are the one 
who starts it. There were companies like Amway, insurance salesmen. 
Every charlatan could try his luck here. There were even large tents that 
set up in Leipzig, from Christian sects, for example. The most ridiculous 
was a community of cowboys. For two years numerous groups came to 
Leipzig and tried all kinds of things. It was funny. I laughed then. Movie 
theaters were rented. I went and ate at the free buffets and then left again. 
There were some bizarre events. And the flying traders came to sell 
carpets, pure gold jewelry for 100 marks. Some did buy it. I saw it for 
myself. Merchants distributed bags on the streets with pornographic 
magazines.  
 
Frau Bergman engaged in some reflective accounting when I asked her 
specifically about what she remembered about the conversion. “We did not have very 
much. At the time of the Wende we had our car, a bungalow, and 30,000 Mark der DDR 
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in our savings. I remember well, now. The Wartburg we had ordered, that we waited 13 
years for, we had only three or four years to go. At the time I remember being upset that 
because there was a VW motor in it was going to cost 30,000 marks. I thought, they are 
crazy, that is our entire savings. If it would cost so much then they would have to see to it 
in the future that people could also afford it. And then I was also worried about my 
retirement.”  
Only when I asked her about her experience with the euro did she recall that the 
cap on the amounts that could be exchanged at the 1:1 ratio represented her savings being 
cut in half. “With the euro, our money was cut in half, and we already had the experience 
of our savings reduced by half at the time of D-Mark conversion. We were happy to have 
the west money. But still, our 30,000 Mark der DDR, people were only allowed to 
change up to 5,000. Our mother had no money, so she put 5,000 in her account to change 
for us, and then we moved it back to our account. In the end we had 15,000 Mark west. 
And then came the euro, and we had just gotten the west mark, and now we have to go 
through the whole thing again. Personally, I was not happy at all with this, because my 
impression was that our money was halved once again. But we couldn’t change anything. 
Personally we were lucky because we had work.” 
In my interviews I was eager to understand how respondents thought about the 
different notions of value that were highlighted in the critiques of the 1990 currency 
union. On both sides, experts had argued that suddenly a value had to be found, ‘as if’ it 
were a market economy. For instance, what had been state credits to enterprises and 
combines were treated in the conversion as market debts held independently by firms. 
This was one of the most problematic ‘conversions’ that was made and contributed 
further to the devaluation of the East German industry. I had been struck by how diverse 
experts had confronted the question of what is a so-called ‘real market value, then? In my 
analysis, this had seemed to open up the conditions of measuring value in both directions, 
even if the western standards won the day. In response, Herr Lange immediately 
associated this phenomenon with the devaluation of eastern goods leading up to the 
currency union, which is closely tied with the argument that easterners had undermined 
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their own workplaces by discontinuing their purchases of goods made in the GDR. Herr 
Lange shrugged, and in an ironic tone, noted:  
 
“Leading up to the currency union, all of the GDR products dropped in value. It 
was irrational. Suddenly all of the products lost value and people only wanted the 
western products. It was a phenomenon of this conversion. People even bought 
rice from the west, even though the rice in the east was also imported. I bought 
suitcases of rice. If you were a calm thinker, you could take advantage of the 
situation. I had rice for five years. I ate the last batch in 1999. It lasts! It doesn’t 
go bad. But, suddenly people felt like eastern products were worth nothing. They 
believed that the GDR products had no value. It was a puzzling phenomenon. 
Even household candles were not worth buying. It is curious. It can’t be explained 
that people believe a product they have used for years is suddenly worth nothing. 
They connected these goods with the system, and felt now it is over, and so this 
was an expression of this. Economically it makes no sense. It was ideological, this 
notion of falling value. I can’t think of an explanation.  
U: But many eastern products had been sold in the west. 
Herr Lange: Yes that was the idea behind the joint ventures. Maybe if wages had 
been kept low, these could have been built up. There were already many 
connections to the west because of the Leipzig Trade Convention. These 
connections could have been expanded.   
 
When I asked Herr Holtz. (Bundesbank) about savings and investments, he 
returned to the 2:1 exchange rate of savings in 1990. He explained that in the GDR 
people saved a lot. After the Wende, and after the loss in the 2:1 exchange, people tried to 
save. But it is difficult given the unequal treatment of West and East Germans. East 
German workers still [in 2006] earned only 85% of what West Germans receive for the 
same work. But life is just as expensive here as it is in the west. Even here at the 
Bundesbank our wage here in Leipzig is 95% of the wage earned in Frankfurt. But the 
time worked is the same. Everyone tries to save. But now with this new Hartz IV policy, 
it will be even more unequal. … Right from the beginning there was a distinction made 
between east and west wages, pensions, unemployment support. And that is the problem. 
The idea that we are equal [Angleichung] will not reach our heads until these 
fundamental differences are leveled out. Sometimes these distinctions take on different 
forms. It is not possible to guess when the same wages will be paid in east and west. 
There are regional differences. Some occupations are paid the same. But wages are 
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generally always lower in the east. These are the differences. Now with the new social 
welfare regulations, everything is scrutinized. Old people are expected to keep working 
while young people are on the street. But we all pay the solidarity tax, not just West 
Germans.” 
As R. Eckert iterated, with the end of the GDR people felt they were suddenly the 
losers. It is not simply a financial question—whether one was or is picked up by the 
western safety net. How one understands and maintains self-confidence through that 
process is perhaps even more important. What distinguishes east and west most, he felt, 
was the vast differences in wealth and capital accumulation. There is hardly a middle-
class in the east. Moreover, many here have been unable to save for old age, in contrast to 
the west. In the west, immense wealth has and can be inherited, whereas here this has 
rarely been the case. Eckert described the currency union using the term, ‘conditions of 
hysteria.’ For him, people had an uncanny greed for west money. Of course, you can’t 
hold that against them, he added somewhat apologetically. They had been denied access 
for decades. Inequality arose as a result of differential access to West German Marks. 
Ordinary East Germans saw how party functionaries lived, and they observed how those 
with western family or contacts could get access to western money and goods, all of 
which highlighted inequality in a system that staked its claim to superiority on socialist 
egalitarianism and a class-less society. Eckert remembers how, after the currency union, 
eastern products were cleared away and replaced by western goods. “People stood in 
front of the shop windows and applauded. How much greater, then, was the 
disappointment, when people recognized that access to western money was not enough.”  
 
Changing understandings of money (east/west) 
 
Frau Jung described her first experiences of working with western colleagues at 
the rapidly transforming Sparkasse in Leipzig. In the GDR working at a bank had been 
neither desirable nor privileged. But after the Wende many found their bank training was 
extremely fortuitous in the post-unification job market. Even if daily tasks and services 
were far more limited in the GDR relative to the FRG, bank employees still had a basic 
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and solid foundation to build upon in the vastly more complicated context of western 
banking. “In the GDR we had no fax machines, we had no copiers—all of that was 
unfamiliar here. We still wrote with carbon paper below. I remember someone saying, I 
will fax something to the central office in Frankfurt. I asked my colleague, what is she 
going to do? No clue, my colleague replied.” Frau Jung laughed. “It was highly exciting. 
It is hard to imagine now. A copy machine, I remember thinking, how...colleagues knew 
we did not have those. It was a time where we suddenly had new things and we had to 
learn quickly. It was not taken for granted. During the GDR times we barely had a 
telephone. Though it is barely 20 years ago, it is like a different world.”   
Herr Holtz described his experience of coming to work for the Bundesbank. “I 
was responsible for everything having to do with money logistics. My training was in 
banking and I was an assistant division manager [stellvertrendeder Abteilungsleiter]. In 
1977 I worked as the director of cash logistics in the Staatsbank, and I was responsible 
for 75 people.  In 1990, exactly on the day of the currency union I took over my new job 
in the Bundesbank. I was one of the first to get a job here.” Did many people from 
Staatsbank get picked up, I wondered? Herr Holtz: “as far as I know, everyone who 
applied was taken. But you had to reveal if you belonged to the STASI or the Party. I 
don’t know of people who were found to be members of the STASI. I went to Stuttgart 
for training.” What Herr Holtz does not make quite explicit is how the elites of the GDR 
Staatsbank were generally not eligible to work at the Bundesbank. Those with the most 
intimate knowledge of the politics surrounding the 1990 currency union went into private 
banking or other financial services. Lower-level employees unencumbered by party ties 
could make a new professional life in the Bundesbank. 
 I asked Herr Holtz to describe the new work atmosphere. He characterized it in 
overwhelmingly positive terms, but also indicated some of the ways in which gender and 
system differences shaped the creation of new work lives. For instance, he told me that in 
the GDR mostly women had worked in this division of the bank. To create a balance, 
some men from the People’s police and army were hired. The feeling of community was 
very high. “We had a good experience, and there were no problems. Not even if we 
worked long hours. The community feeling was very strong among us employees. It was 
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not as stressful as in the west—no elbows here. It was fun to work with people here.” He 
suggested how those who worked for the police and the army contributed to the good 
working atmosphere and teamwork.  “They were used to receiving orders. There was 
strong collective ethos in these professions. Of course, now people argue that it was 
“forced” due to the system. But there was a strong feeling of belonging.” 
 But over time, these mutual ties weakened. He said that people do still get 
together after work, but they do so much less now. “It is not the same as before. Everyone 
had work. Now there are different work start and finish times. In the GDR work began 
and ended for everyone at the same time, for the most part. Now everyone works 
different hours. And the social differences are greater now. Before everyone had the same 
status. Now the themes of daily conversations are so different. You don’t have the shared 
experiences that characterized conversations in the past. These differences affect life 
together.” Herr Holtz felt that many friendships had suffered. “A lot was thrown into 
disarray.” 
Herr Peters described the ways in which the greater importance of money changed 
interpersonal relationships and values. When I asked what kinds of changes in thinking 
he had observed, he agreed that yes, there had been many changes in how people spoke 
about money.  “In any case, now miserliness [Geiz] is greater. Not really Geiz. But in the 
GDR one was much more generous with their money.” He gave the quintessential 
example of buying rounds of beer:  “A barrel of beer-it was normal that I pay for 
everyone, and then the next one is up to pay. So one was more generous. With the D-
Mark you paid more attention. Everything was more expensive. People did not have as 
much money. So they had to pay more attention, develop a higher awareness. In the GDR 
we thought very little about money. You could exist without concern about money. 
Money was a topic that Herr Peters did not enjoy discussing. It had taken me 
some time to convince him to give an interview, which I felt that he did simply because 
his own work as a historian and documentarian depended upon people’s willingness to 
share difficult histories. He became very quiet as he described the stress and discomfort 
of negotiating the new money regimes of the west. “At first, I did not pay much attention 
to it. I applied for a student loan [Bafög]. I did not have much money that I would need to 
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worry about securing investments. It was extremely difficult for me to confront such 
matters. It was difficult. It was a torture for me to have to deal with such things. It was 
very unpleasant. I remember that I had to fill out forms for my health insurance. I was at 
the AOK, and I didn’t understand a thing. I didn’t want to understand. I resisted it tooth 
and nail. Why it was such a torture…” he trailed off. Choosing his words carefully: “I 
arrived relatively late in the new Germany… It took a long time until I could accept.” 
When did things change? “It was in the mid 90’s, it took that long. But then I began to 
think, ok. We have a nice life here, too. I no longer hung as much on the old.” 
 In response to my questions about debt and paying back loans, he spoke both to 
the ways in which people were picked up by the West German safety net, but also the 
changing circumstances facing low wage-earners and long-term unemployed. “If my 
income is under a certain level, then I am not required to pay it back. Germany is very 
nice social state. But by the end of the 90’s we started to have more American-like 
conditions. I don’t think it will become a 1:1 situation. The aid is ratcheted down ever 
more tightly, but I don’t believe that Germany would abandon people.  People will 
continue to receive money (financial assistance). But it is always more difficult to say” 
 
U: Were there similarities, then, between the social state of the GDR and the 
BRD?  
P: I never thought about that. In the BRD there is a stronger union movement. But 
to take care of the public welfare is very German, there is a lot of social 
legislation. I think that the GDR did give the impulse. The BRD had to be more 
attractive than the GDR. They had to be insusceptible against the GDR. I 
remember a friend told me about his visits to the West. His West German brother 
owned a gas station. He would always say, ‘In the west they are always thinking 
up new taxes to fund the welfare state because of you!’ So West Germany could 
not be an un-social state. Once the GDR was gone, they loosened the social 
screw, the pressure was not there as much. So there was a strong reciprocal action 
[Wechselwirkung]. It could be that it is a German tradition. 
U: I hear from many westerners how in the East, ‘they expect this or that’ 
P: I think it has a lot to do with how one arrived in the BRD. Those who have 
found their role can be more relaxed. What is really unspeakable about the 
Germans—the East Germans at the border were upset and complained in 90 how 
the West Germans were buying everything up. But the easterners did the same 
thing in the Czech Republic once they had the D-Mark. Now I am someone. I 
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forgot what bothered me…the [West German] State could do more now to 
animate people.  
After 1990, things became much more expensive. Many people left the area.  
 
Herr Nord’s account of the politics of money set in motion by the 1990 currency union 
offers insights into the changing temporalities of money, self-identity, and the wounds 
created by sweeping away what was rather than building upon existing resources and 
strengths. Most importantly, his account exemplifies the mixture of self-recrimination 
and critique of asymmetrical relations of power between west and east.  
 
U: How did you experience the conversions? 
Herr Nord: It was very clear to use that we could not continue on with the GDR 
money. At least it was clear that the GDR would no longer have a separate 
political existence. In the beginning there was the idea that, so with the beginning 
of the Round Table talks, one thought that there would perhaps continue to be two 
German states, with a border, and where piece by piece we would find our way to 
each other harmoniously, that sometime in the future that out of the good things 
from each state one Germany would emerge. I think, too, that the economy steam-
rolled over the politicians, and that the Western politicians had a great compulsion 
[Zwang], because the FRG was at that time also struggling economically 
[wirtschaftlich KO]. I would even say that they were just as bankrupt as the GDR, 
that is my opinion.” I reacted surprised, ‘really’? Yes, this Wende, the consumer 
wave that set in with one stroke from the east, this helped to reanimate the West 
German economy. It also allowed Kohl and his government to be perceived for so 
long as the chancellor of unity. Things let loose already when the East German 
placed his trabi on the scrap-metal heap and bought a new car. The factories were 
still running at the time, though difficulties were present. The massive lay-offs 
had not yet started and people were unable to assess whether their money 
holdings would continue to grow. Many took their savings, thinking as long as 
you have work, then it will not be a problem, so they bought televisions and so 
on. And then came the currency conversion. So then everyone wanted to have the 
West Mark so that they could consume and then on the other hand, a certain 
amount was changed at 2:1 [and not 1:1].  I recall that at the beginning of this 
story, what the GDR represented for us economically, for us citizens it was 
people’s property. We learned that we were co-owners, and in this phase there 
was…in all these things we were co-owners. And so some were deliberating how 
things would work in the future in terms of privatization and sales of this 
property. So there was a proposal for a people’s stock [Volksaktie] or wealth 
certificate that could be distributed to the people, but how should it be organized? 
So in the midst of these discussions there was the conversion of 2:1 which one 
could also see as an increase of value. You lose value now, but that is connected 
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to the fact that we had a very different price structure [in the GDR]. A normal 
working person had at that time, if he worked as a skilled tradesman, in an office 
or in production, earned around 600-700 Mark der DDR. Maintaining one’s living 
arrangements was relatively simple. 100 Marks for rent, 30/40 marks for 
electricity, water was free. Then here and there were other costs. Local 
transportation was also cheap. The only expense that could be aggravating was 
the cost of gas, which was 1,50 Marks, which for us was a lot. A car was 
expensive. A Trabi cost 12,000 or 15,000. The Wartburg was more expensive, 
20,000 and more. Televisions were what one liked to consider a luxury, around 
4,000 Marks. That was a lot of money. But I think, people had work. They knew 
that every month they would receive their paychecks and prices were—well—
calculable. Yes, the price system, there were only a few things were price moved, 
where you had to look at the price. Services were almost always calculable. 
People knew what was coming in and what they would need to spend, and what 
remainder there would be. Each family had a margin, something that could be 
saved up towards a car or a vacation, or whatever it was that they could afford. 
Everything was calculable within certain parameters. The children were taken 
care of, lunch was 75 pfennigs— for 75 pfennigs you could have lunch. Naturally 
a human always wants more, that striving for something more is always there. 
Often people discussed back and forth for a long time to get a raise of 10 or 15 
pfennigs because merit was linked to higher output. It was a difficult field. But it 
was relatively calculable life. People knew what they could afford and what they 
could not. They could plan ahead from the first to the last year of life. They knew 
how things worked in terms of childcare and education. Apprenticeships were 
more difficult. Anyone who wanted to study could get a place at university though 
perhaps not in a desired field. There were pension entitlements.  We had 
supplementary pensions where you paid in 1000 Marks. And with 62 you could 
retire. People made this philosophy their own over several decades and it was this 
that was destroyed because people treated the GDR money as [valueless].  
 
Herr Nord was one of the few respondents to so eloquently reassert and remind of the 
agency of money over persons and the recognition that money is the product of human 
agency in this story:  
 
And I don’t know why during GDR times people treated the aluminum Marks as 
if they had no value. We left them behind with derision. It was not all junk 
(Schrott). It may have been the case that many factories were not technically 
modern… but the way our life achievements are evaluated now, as if they don’t 
count. And that we contributed physically and mentally to what was available to 
us. Like a West German who buys a car, and there is scratch, so the price is 
lowered, it is worthless. We do that differently. Production lines are all worthless, 
and we believed it. We thought they are practically on the moon, over there. They 
talked everything down, devalued, and closed things down. It was all about 
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economic interests, the fight for the market. Of course it was relatively simple. 
We were washed with water. In my own experience we received a list. I never had 
to negotiate with the bakeries over the price. Now they would no longer take our 
bread. Interested buyers distributed calendars and calculators from over there. 
Suddenly we had to sell our goods. That was difficult for most GDR citizens. The 
growing-together of Germany—back then it went far to fast. One was only 
thinking of one’s own profit, on one’s own wellbeing. So it is likely that one 
battered to death [erschlagen] more than was necessary. You can see it now if you 
consider Russian lands. The Markets for the east broke away with the Wende. But 
in Russia there is still a market today –we could have negotiated some kind of 
trade agreement. In the GDR we used to produce many kinds of laundry 
detergent. Persil was produced during GDR times. Now it is the only one of these 
firms left over. The Eastern countries were our market. They came and harvested 
asparagus. Agriculture was important and was the biggest employer in the region. 
We had nearly full employment of women. There were many mistakes [made 
after 1990]. Of course there were sectors that were rightly closed down.  
 
What could have been done differently? 
 
Frau Bergmann also emphasized how the shift from being producers to consumers 
was connected to experiences of collective loss that exceeded individual circumstances. 
The deindustrialization of the region and the failed promises of the West to support its 
revival made manifest how neither the socialist past or the capitalist present offered 
meaningful collective anchors for self-realization: “The west didn’t know how things 
were with our economy. The west thought we were, well—but first, I must say that they 
(the west) could easily take us, 16 million people, by the hand. It was not any problem at 
all. They had food and everything else, Industrial goods and machinery, I know the 
western company my husband worked with, they immediately built new halls and even 
more operating tables. They were building things up, because they had advantages here. 
What Frau Bergmann pinpoints here is the way in which the costs of the currency union 
were simply a cover for extending western markets to the east.    
 Reflecting on my question of what she felt could have been done differently in 
1990, she struggled to find the coordinates that would make the losses of the past open up 
into a different future: “I don’t know…I am glad that socialism is over and gone. How 
things could have been done better [in unification], I don’t know. But the way things are 
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now, I really don’t like how things are—for me personally, yes, but for the country, 
Germany, how things are displeases me greatly. These big corporations, that is not 
acceptable. That they only think of themselves, that these corporations and banks are only 
interested in making profits. I do not find that acceptable. In my view, we should have 
smaller businesses, like in the 20’s. They oriented themselves around the needs of 
citizens and thought about their people. Here in Leipzig, we had companies that built 
housing and provided affordable daycare. They were much more social in their outlook. 
They thought socially. The large corporations don’t think socially at all. The top 
managers that step down, when you hear what they earn. That is immoral. That is not 
acceptable. Corporations are getting bigger and bigger, merging with others, and they 
leave Germany for the countries where low wages can be paid. What will happen to us? 
We are becoming a services society. But how will we be able to pay for services if we 
don’t produce anything, if there are no longer any productive industries? I just don’t 
understand.” 
 Frau Bergman might be accused of nostalgia but I would argue for a different 
reading. She is speaking to the empty promises of capitalist development and searching 
for a different past that can bypass the baggage of socialism, yet transport some of the 
values and priorities that she had nonetheless experienced in the GDR. In speaking to the 
problems of post-unification transformation, what people regretted at multiple levels was 
the disappearance of production as the salient site for creating economic and moral values 
also shared with, but denied by the west in its trajectory of monetary ordering and 
reconstruction.   
 For Herr Lange, the crux of the matter lies in the legal mechanisms of unification. 
In trying to address the pragmatic problems of unifying the two states, new formal legal 
differences were created that have hindered the growing together of regions, despite 
improved living standards: 
 
U: what could have been done differently in unification? 
Herr Lange: that is difficult to answer, so much was discussed then—on which 
topic? The majority voted for the market economy.  
U: But did people want the FRG? 
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Herr Lange: The direct accession would have been the simplest, simpler than the 
unification treaty. There were several mechanisms in the unification treaty that 
would have been better solved through a direct accession. 
U: Can you give me an example? 
Herr Lange: the question is whether they would have worked quickly enough. It 
would have probably been necessary to establish a transition mechanism and then 
set it up by treaty, but under constitutional law it would have been simpler. The 
unification treaty took the place of provisions set up under the Basic Law and 
direct accession. There were different mechanisms, whether regarding pension 
rights or the conversion of the health care system, the entire Trust Agency—these 
were all mechanisms regulated in the treaty that could have been obviated through 
a direct accession. Well good, it is always easier to say after the fact than it was at 
the time. But I believe it would have been much smarter. 
 
Herr Holtz linked the antagonisms and disappointments of post ’89 relations with 
the west to differing notions of personhood and to the experiences of devaluation after 
1990: “But it is not right to characterize the GDR citizen as stupid, as someone who can’t 
do anything or who is lazy. The problems in the GDR did not lie in the person, but in the 
system. Then in the west they would claim, ‘you don’t know how to work.’ But they 
don’t take the different technical conditions available to us into account. If I am repairing 
a roof and have only hammer and nails, then it will take me longer than a West German 
who has an electric drill.” 
 When I asked Herr Holtz if he thought these differences could be discussed more 
productively, he replied, ‘it started already after the war. In the GDR the Russians took 
our last working machines, rails. And there was no financial support like the Marshall 
Plan in the west. The GDR had to pay all the reparations to the Soviet Union. We had to 
deliver everything to the Soviet Union, so we could not develop like in the Federal 
Republic, or build up wealth. We were locked up here and couldn’t leave. Many highly 
trained professionals went to the FRG in the 60’s, and so we had to start all over again. 
West Germans could travel. They were more confident. That’s why there are differences, 
and these do not disappear quickly. When things are built in the east, made new and 
modern then there is the complaint from westerners, ‘now you put everything into the 
east’. It will take another 50 years, then the generations who lived this will not exist 
anymore.” 
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 So you think that it is best that the GDR is forgotten?  I asked? Herr Holtz 
responded quickly saying, “Germany has two histories. It is not so easy to say that 
everything is forgotten.”  
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Chapter 6: 
From divided state to ‘new’ regions: on value, place, and ‘catching up’ 
 
Anyone who has spent a significant time in Germany will have observed that 
regional identity occupies perhaps even a more central meaning in peoples’ lives than 
does national identity. As has often been explained to me, and as I have also experienced 
it, dialect, local dishes, even relative warmth or distance in one’s interaction with 
others—such as whether one greets a stranger who is passing by—all become salient 
signs of familiarity and belonging. Thus, it is makes sense that the transformation of the 
former GDR into five ‘new’ regions, based on prior historical regional identities, would 
offer a significant form of identification for many easterners becoming part of unified 
Germany.   
In this chapter I will show, through the lens of some unexpected circumstances, 
how explanations of structural economic constraints are naturalized, contested, but also 
carry with them the specters—the unfinished work—of the past.  It begins with what will 
seem like an unlikely and at first, tangential encounter with a local debate in Leipzig 
involving the reconstruction of a university aula, once the University Church of Leipzig. 
While this seemingly local controversy certainly reflects the dominant influence of West 
German elites in shaping the meaning and trajectory of urban development in many 
eastern cities and thus signals asymmetries of wealth and the differential access of east 
Germans to upper-level positions in many institutions, and could be analyzed fully in its 
own right, my concern here is to show how it intersected with my particular interest in 
the after-effects of the currency union. I will show how the traces of the 1990 currency 
union informs the shifting frames of ‘state’ and regional identities that are invoked to 
evaluate the ‘progress’ of post-unification development.  
 
Equalization and accounting for value 
 
The 1990 currency union materialized a new set of imaginaries regarding the 
inclusion of East Germans in the western system. These were pragmatic concerns 
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regarding what were in the beginning extreme differences in wages, pensions, and diverse 
social claims on the state. Given the speeding up of decisions leading to the currency 
union modalities and the elimination of the possibility of a gradual process in which the 
GDR would remain a separate state and thus catch up through ‘market mechanisms,’ 
other forms of justification had to be found. These rested on the promise and expectation 
that within a temporal horizon of several years—a figure that has been continually 
revised over the years, often at further 20-year time-spans in the future—conditions in the 
east would be harmonized with the west. Early statements of this promise concerned the 
establishment of equal living standards, to later be redefined as the same ‘chances’ in the 
east relative to the west. Though there are varying debates and understandings of what 
equalization would mean, harmonization of east and west federal regions is premised 
upon one day ending the different wage and pension systems. Eliminating this formal 
legal difference is viewed widely to be the conclusive sign that the project of unification 
will have been brought to a definite conclusion. Then why not end it now? The rates 
linger on because these different ‘fields of law’ presuppose that catching up is linked to 
market developments in the region. Relative value difference between the two ‘former’ 
states is thus preserved, yet folded into the politics of regional financial equalization 
schemes and the structural inequalities of uneven development. 
It is important to emphasize, and perhaps hard to comprehend, that processes of 
deindustrialization, urban transformation, and an entire social, political and economic 
reordering were experienced in the space of months and in aggregate, within three to four 
years. Leipzig alone lost an estimated 75% of its industry, and diverse studies put the 
numbers of unemployed across the east in the early 1990’s at 70% of the workforce. As 
numerous authors have emphasized, such numbers had not been seen since the Great 
Depression.   
In attending to the forms of argument through which accounting for ‘catching up’ 
takes place, my reading is informed by scholarship on the history of credit scoring, for 
example, such as in recent studies on US consumer credit and mortgage securitization 
(Hyman 2011). While in these studies questions of income, gender and class become 
highly significant for understanding how attempts to target new consumers and markets, 
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as well as efforts to democratize access to credit, materialized in contingent and 
unexpected ways, it is also clear how these are shaped by multiple agents, institutions and 
historical conjunctures. In the case at hand, however, it is histories of division, system 
difference, and the new pragmatic problems produced via the currency union and its 
forms of revaluation that are relevant for my purposes here.  
Converting the social and pension systems of the GDR to the western system 
necessitated not only different accounting mechanisms through which values could be 
established relative to those in the west. Understandings of temporal difference and 
historical obligations have also informed both the goal of equalization and its 
justification. Diverse arguments about the mechanisms and procedures are likewise 
shaped by post-unification debates about social justice, inequality and who should pay for 
the project of equalization.  
 Notions of ‘equivalent’ work being deserving of ‘equivalent pay are one key 
theme in these discussions. Another is the possibility of establishing a guaranteed 
minimum pension regardless of income, which is met with critique by those who believe 
that rates should reflect one’s specific productivity and earnings, or in other words, that 
rates should be linked to merit.  
 
Displacing and time 
 
A key difference from accounts of other currency crises is that the East German 
currency was overvalued, not devalued. Yet this overvaluation effectively devalued the 
entire economy in one act because of the ‘exposure’ to the market, without preparations 
or protections. It led to the loss of the industrial base, which as time has shown, could not 
be built back up. As Elyachar showed in her book on empowerment debt, the market does 
not just appear, but only insofar as ‘markets’ are manifestations of already existing 
connections (Elyacher 2005)  
If the progress of ‘catching up’ is deemed slow and incomplete and western 
policies made responsible for this, the causes can nonetheless be displaced to the failures 
and irrationalities of the planned economy. If a middle-class has not materialized in the 
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east or large-scale productive industries were few and far between, then it is a result of 
the transformations in the GDR that take time to restore and built back up. These are of 
course plausible factors. However, the attribution of cause and intent to practices after 
1990, and to the plans of western policy makers, is thereby diffused and critique 
neutralized.  
 The extension of the D-Mark to the east was a powerful symbol of inclusion and 
yet also a form of shock but for the industry ‘a death sentence.’ This is the paradoxical 
formula through which the costs and benefits of the currency union are explained. Often 
it is framed in terms of individual benefit distinguished from macro-economic 
circumstances. While it is true that access to the hard currency dissolved monetary 
regime opened many doors for individuals but closed them for others. It is for this reason 
that evaluations are mixed and remain trapped in the logic of winners and losers. While it 
is true that a monetary reordering such as this will have uneven effects and meanings 
across the social body, this framing presupposes that individuals are prior to and can be 
easily detached from the social. Instead, regardless of one’s individual fortune, 
revaluation cut across the social imaginary that it also rearranged.  
The granting of the D-Mark was a measure to keep people at home when it quite 
obviously afforded the power to leave.  
 The relative and ‘unequal’ value of western and eastern currencies and economies 
is a crucial element in this story of re-making the economy that can stabilize yet also 
defer the starting point of critique.  From one angle, this story seems to repeat the usual 
tales of market transformation and decline. From another, it is possible to perhaps ‘think 
other’ about the end and ends of capitalism. The Cold War was above all an economic 
contest. From the vantage point of the losing side, it felt like occupation after the war.  
What respondents expressed to me in interviews and conversations, in brief outbursts or 
quiet reflections, ‘read as information,’ fits into pre-existing frames through which the 
GDR can be seen as deficient and its end inevitable. But if read within the context of 
post-unification marketization and transformation, it is possible to consider how these are 
critiques with force, and hence must be neutralized by displacing the difficulties solely 
onto the failures of the planned economy. In the context of individual interviews I 
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conducted histories of division, unification and Europeanization overlap and are 
entangled in peoples’ understandings of changes since 1990.   
The imagined solutions and improvements, in particular the desire for a 
restoration of productive industry or the ability to attract corporate profits and investment 
are ones that anthropologists might view skeptically given their outcomes elsewhere. For 
instance, the aspiration of attracting the headquarters of large firms to the East as method 
of revitalization may still be caught within the same zero-sum logic of one regions’ gain 
over another’s loss. But these hopes also speak at once to power relations: to the erasure 
of boundaries and different form of power exhibited by the west. Even the logic of 
calculating pension points for years worked in the GDR formulated ‘as if’ those years 
were worked in the Federal Republic, these measures do not sufficiently tackle the 
transfer of wealth from east to west and the demographic challenges of long-term 
unemployment that affect growing income inequality in the future.  
There are certainly many factors that shape employment, investment and 
development in the region. For my purposes here, though, I am interested in the 
explanations that trace back to the 1990 currency union and its cultural logics of value. 
The salient link is that of revaluation and the destruction of eastern industry. This link has 
served as a persistent site of debate and critique in making visible the politics of 
economic reformatting in the east. For eastern observers, the eastern economy was made 
to serve western market interests and not rebuilding with the long-term of goal of 
preserving a productive economy in the region. The important point made by many 
observers is that it is immensely difficult to rebuild such infrastructures and networks 
organically once existing structures were dismantled wholesale. Ironically, the 1990 
dismantling (framed as deindustrialization) mimicked the actions of the Soviet 
Occupation forces after WWII. The dismantling of industrial plants, railroad tracks and 
other materials and their transportation to the Soviet Union served, along with other 
financial measures, as a means of extracting reparations for the war (for all of Germany).  
Since the institution of more drastic labor reforms known under the term Hartz IV 
in 2004, which merged the categories of unemployment and social welfare, low-wage or 
unpaid work has become evermore entrenched in the east (and now in the west). Those 
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falling out of the primary labor market have struggled to reenter it, with most finding 
themselves in the position of moving from one workfare measure to another. At the 
beginning of my first pre-fieldwork trip, this new set of reforms was in the process of 
implementation. The reforms met with fervent resistance in East German cities in 
particular, where many citizens revived their experiences of the Monday demonstrations 
to protest what were recognized as changes that would deepen and not alleviate decades 
of unemployment and underemployment in the east. The reforms would also serve to 
substantially drain savings and assets of individuals or families unemployed beyond one 
year given that eligibility for social welfare assistance was largely contingent upon 
means-testing. 
As I came to understand the practical realities of these reforms from people in the 
field, for instance, a husband or wife would not be eligible if the partner continued to 
make a living or collective assets were still available. The rules extended as far as where 
individuals lived, based on the square meters of a person’s residence. This meant that 
welfare applicants might need to sell their home, or move from an existing apartment to 
qualify for the assistance. In other words, these reforms meant in practice that anyone 
who now faced long-term unemployment would need to use up any or all assets that had 
been accumulated in the past. Clearly, with long-term structural unemployment making it 
difficult for many to ever return to full-time, well-paid employment, a future of poverty 
and severely limited means of saving towards retirement and old age waited on the 
horizon.  
I now turn to a potent example of the ways in which reconstruction and financial 
transfers to the east are politicized within histories of division and unification. The 1990 
currency union is a primary object of critique and justification for the extraordinary 
measures of ‘making up the difference.’ 
 
Endings and Beginnings 
 
“In order to apologize for the currency union which had the equivalent outcome 
of a neutron bomb on the East German economy, and to justify the financial costs 
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to the West that came in the wake of this disaster, the whole thing is credited with 
the aura of a good deed and gesture of solidarity. But none of this is true” (Busch 
2006) 33 
 
November 9, 2009 marked the 20-year anniversary of the fall of the Berlin Wall. 
Not surprisingly, the focal point of celebration was at the Brandenburg Gate in Berlin. 
During German division, the iconic structure was quite literally trapped in the death strip 
of concrete walls, fencing and barbed wire that separated West and East Berlin (from 
1961). At this gate, I, like many, stood in the packed crowd on that cold, rainy night 20 
years later. Umbrellas blocked any meaningful view and were a true hazard with sharp 
points prodding as one person pushed against the next, desperate to see and hear 
anything. I sent text messages to family and friends to mark the occasion. It seemed like 
the thing to do. 
A host of politicians and prominent persons, including former dissidents who 
played an active role in opposition to the socialist state were the honored guests of the 
festivities. The celebrations occurred on this now dismantled line of demarcation, its 
traces now marked by giant domino blocks (each one painted and designed by different 
groups, institutions, or prominent individuals for the occasion). Predictably, the finale of 
the evening was the symbolic toppling of this wall of decorated dominos to symbolize the 
opening of the Wall in 1989. Few will deny this unexpected opening its status as a joyous 
event that, at that time, exceeded any one person’s imagination. Since then, no other 
moment has been more salient in signifying the end of the Cold War and socialist 
dictatorship. The end of German division seemed to confirm the triumph of freedom. But 
what was, and is, the nature of that freedom? Political freedom? Market freedom? 
Personal freedom?   
                                                 
33
 “Um die einer Neutronenbombe vergleichbare Wirkung der Währungsunion für die 
Ostdeutsche Wirtschaft zu entschuldigen und die im Gefolge dieses Desasters für den Westen 
entstandenen finanziellen Kosten zu rechtfertigen, wird dem Ganzen nachträglich der Nimbus 
einer guten Tat und solidarischen Geste angedichtet. Aber nichts davon ist wahr” (Busch, 2006: 
17) 
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The carefully orchestrated political spectacle did not pass by without at least one 
embarrassment. A poorly timed report by the minister of transportation appeared in a 
newspaper earlier in the day, bearing the headline, “Ramsauer will Aufbau West,” 
(Ramsauer calls for development for the West). It is already telling that the evaluation of 
economic progress in East German regions has (until recently) been under the auspices of 
the ministry of transportation. The term Aufbau connotes the ongoing transfer of federal 
funds to support (develop) large infrastructure projects in the still structurally weak new 
Länder.34 As a term used in the context of describing (re) construction projects, Aufbau 
reminds the German public of the apparently never-ending task of completing the 
formula of equivalence begun twenty years before. Now, a growing number of West 
Germans link the 1,3 Trillion Euro transfers to East German regions as the agent of 
economic decline in West German regions. 
At a day-to day level, German unification brought few changes to the lives of 
most West Germans.  For East Germans, every aspect of society changed literally 
overnight.  New laws, bureaucracies, financial and work relationships had to be 
negotiated.  It was a steep learning curve. Many of my East German respondents 
expressed a sense of pride in all that they have overcome in this process of 
transformation. Yet, in the dominant discourses of unified Germany, these 
accomplishments have little social capital. Worse, the high price of German unification 
has left many West Germans with the feeling that their taxes finance new streets and 
modern infrastructure in the East, while at home things are falling apart. Images of 
dilapidated town homes and crumbling factories in West German cities are now part of a 
medial strategy in reports about declining infrastructure there. 
In a register filled with some regret, an elderly West German respondent I 
interviewed at the visitor’s center of the Bundesbank recalled the joy and gratitude he felt 
at the end of German division, yet the missed chance to explain to the West German 
public the nature of the challenges that lay ahead.  “At the time,” he said, “We were all 
prepared to make sacrifices, to do what was necessary.  But then Kohl and the political 
                                                 
34
 ARD Tagesschau, 9. November 2009 
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establishment told us that unification would not cost us anything. By the time it was clear 
that this would not be the case, the moment to win broad acceptance for this had passed.” 
The “stage” for the festivities stretched westwards from the west side of the 
Brandenburg Gate toward the Tiergarten and Siegesäule (former West Berlin).  
Symbolically, facing west had the (un)-intended consequence of reinforcing a frame that 
is prevalent in unified Germany today: that everything of value—all that East Germans 
sought for in that historical moment—lay decidedly in the West. In contrast, the 
motivating force for change in 1989 came from the other side, from within East 
Germany.  November 9th, 1989 was a night in which East Germans acted and West 
Germans were the onlookers. This is the way one key respondent, a former East German 
citizen dissident, put it: “West Germans have never quite gotten over the fact that the 
events of 89 took them by surprise, and that they could only claim the role of observer to 
this historical event.” He was referring to the grass-roots activities beginning months 
before, with the crucial peaceful demonstration of over 70,000 citizens in Leipzig on 
October 9,1989. In this ‘un’ free State, to borrow a dominant term now used to highlight 
East Germany’s absolute otherness, somehow, something fundamentally “democratic” 
occurred (Riley 2008).  
Another respondent told me about her sense of civil empowerment leading up to 
the evening of November 9th. She described the days and months before, when ordinary 
people overcame their fear and acceptance of state claims and went to the streets, as “the 
best days of my life.” Her tenor changed abruptly as she bookended her story with the 
declarative statement: “then it was all about money” (“Und dann kam das Geld”). The 
fall of the Berlin wall changed the dynamics of what had been, up until that moment, 
largely a call for economic, political and cultural reforms from within. 
By insisting upon only one measure of monetary value in the dominant space of 
remembrance and policy-decision making, the impossibility—or limits—of economic 
equivalence in 89/90 is left unexamined. Germans, East and West, continue to calculate 
and debate, contest and reinvent seemingly endless and irresolvable balance sheets in 
which the numbers, the pluses and minuses of economic integration, are embedded in 
both shared and divergent negotiations of economic change. The presumed fictions of 
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money divert and disguise the real claims on both sides of the equation. The conversions 
of monetary and economic value that were part of German unification also solidified an 
inflexible and problematic measuring rod through which the economic present is 
evaluated and contested.  
Many outside Germany are surprised to learn that German unification started with 
a currency union. Whether or not economic integration should occur before or after 
political integration has been a concern often voiced in conjunction with the European 
Monetary Union.  Here it is also important to note that technically German Unification 
proceeded through a “Beitritt” or “accession” to the Federal Republic of Germany, 
according to article 23 of the German Basic Law (Grundgesetz). However, the post-war 
creators of this provisional constitution envisioned a future German unification through 
article 146, which would have allowed for a new collective constitution—agreed upon 
and worked through by both German States. In fact, East Germany did not unify with the 
Federal Republic. Rather, East Germany was first reorganized into the five new Länder 
(states), each of which subsequently acceded to the Federal Republic of Germany.  This 
is crucial for the discussion surrounding both economic integration and the status of all 
things East German, as the decision of both West and East German political leaders for a 
Beitritt (accession) rather than unification left little room for new policies that might have 
brought change in both directions, rather than the form of bureaucratic colonization of the 
East which ended up occurring (Stoler 2002).35   
The Beitritt option essentially established two separate Rechtsgebiete (fields of 
law) that exist to this day, and which allow for different (lower) wage, pension, and 
income standards for East German regions. A number of experts, authors, former 
dissidents, and citizens both East and West, argue that this was a missed chance to unify 
along more equitable terms in shaping new and collective political arrangements for a 
unified Germany. Instead, post-89 transformation processes meant an almost complete 
transfer of West German bureaucratic, political and economic structures and institutions, 
                                                 
35
 I use the term colonization while also acknowledging that the term remains problematic in the 
German context.  However, if one considers the methodological insights found in post-colonial 
literature on questions of cultural encounters, identity and modernity, such as the work of Ann 
Stoler. I believe the term has productive value.  
  268 
including elites to the former East. Arguments about the bankrupt and disintegrating East 
German economy, and the “impatience” of East Germans required a quick answer, and 
thus pressured both West and East German political actors to find a speedy solution. This 
meant the end of a third way, and many West Germans believed that the Social Market 
Economy already represented a third way, in contrast to American-style capitalism. 
Importantly, this path toward German unification was framed entirely in terms of 
“Angleichung,” or becoming the same (assimilation). Not only did this end up reinforcing 
the sense that East Germans brought nothing of real economic value to the new 
arrangement, they were also expected to discard and efface 40 years of differences. At the 
same time, because East Germans who fled to the West were automatically accorded the 
rights of German citizens during German division, East Germans had a kind of double 
identity as citizens, but also immigrants in their own country who needed to catch up.36 
Because of the enduring structural problems in East German Länder and the 
ongoing necessity of financial transfers from West to East, what remains ever visible is 
the monetary debt of obligation: wealthier West German regions transfer money, East 
German regions have little chance of rebuilding what was stripped away in 1990. All 
German employees pay the solidarity tax (5.5% on earned income). However, many in 
the old Länder have no idea that this tax is also paid by East German employees.  Even 
when many West Germans know this, the sentiment about who has paid and sacrificed 
the most is altered little. It is still real money (Deutsch Marks), which pays for East 
Germans’ pension benefits, for example, which East Germans did not pay into (or paid 
into with money that had no value).37  Ironically, both West and East Germans share the 
conviction about the “realness” of the Deutsch Mark, even if many East Germans still 
                                                 
36
 However East Germans were accepted as citizens and had rights that were not easily available 
to “non-German” immigrants living in Germany. 
37
 I conducted interviews in Frankfurt and Leipzig, with West and East German respondents of 
different generations and backgrounds, during two years of fieldwork Oct. 2007-December 2009, 
and in June and July 2010.  Especially interesting were short interviews with visitors to the 
Geldmuseum der deutschen Bundesdank (visitor’s center of the German Central Bank), which 
was my key fieldsite in Frankfurt.  Because I am an American and neither West nor East German, 
respondents were quite frank about the views about both German and European currency unions.   
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wish to emphasize that their pensions are nevertheless the product of hard-earned money 
from a life’s work in the GDR. 
As numerous authors have noted, the conversion of wages at the 1:1 rate in 
particular created an impossible gap between wages and productivity, and is viewed as 
one critical factor leading to the massive de-industrialization and unemployment in the 
East (Maier 1997). Far from remaining a matter of the past, however, wage differences 
between East and West Germany linger on in uneven and contradictory ways.  Some 
argue these wage differences are necessary and reflect regional differences in cost of 
living.38  Others warn that lingering wage differences will only inhibit any efforts to 
“catch up with the West” (Angleichung), that cost of living differences are not so 
divergent, and more importantly, will continue to reproduce elder poverty and the need 
for government assistance.  For this and many other reasons, East Germans have been 
forced to move to, or shuttle between jobs in the West Länder and beyond.  I learned 
from some of my close respondents that the East/West pay scale does not necessarily 
correspond to where one is working in Germany.  In one case, a respondent’s son was 
earning an “east salary” despite working in South Africa! 
The point I want to make here is that much of what made these economic systems 
different—the details through which the convertibility of economic value was decided 
and enacted—is largely missing from dominant narratives about economic failure in East 
Germany. Phillip Goodchild, in his book, The Theology of Money, offers a different 
sense of how the formation of a price (money’s ability to carry value) might be revisited 
in both socialist and post-socialist temporal locations (Goodchild 2009). Accounting 
practices, Goodchild argues, are unable to capture the labor of evaluation—precisely 
those details about the kinds of value decisions made as part of converting the socialist 
economy that, I argue, would allow us critical engagement with questions of difference 
and equivalence between the two systems:  
 
                                                 
38
 Both West and East Germans hold this view (and the one following just as often) as opinions 
diverge on this same issue in West and East. 
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“The temporal work of evaluation, of finding and fixing a price, is not recorded.  
The price, once agreed, cannot be changed without renegotiation. The world that 
is counted, then, expresses the utopian ideal of a market where all prices have 
already been fixed and where the books have been balanced by enacting all trades. 
Not only does this differ from the real world of continual negotiation where prices 
never come to rest, but it also imposes the utopian ideal of determinate prices as 
an ideal frame of reference” (Goodchild 2009) 
 
In this view, it is possible to consider the value translations of German Unification 
as still under negotiation and the question of the economic value far from settled.  So far, 
I have only been able to hint at the complexities of what I call the acts of translation 
between the West and East German economies that had to be negotiated as part of 
German unification.  The sense that East Germany was bankrupt (Steiner 2010; Zatlin 
2007b)39 and the East German Mark without value (officially not even a convertible 
currency) largely overshadows critical attempts to take East German economic losses 
seriously.  Critical analytical work that might relay an alternative perspective on these 
conversions is often dismissed on economic, political, and empirical grounds.  The 
subtext underlying such dismissals often remains one of justifying what had to be done 
given the rapid nature of political change and the poor state of the East German economy.  
Crucially, East Germans find little possibility for inhabiting possibilities for economic 
evaluation. 
As East German author Jana Hensel (only 11 years old at the time of Unification) 
put this in one television panel discussion when confronted with the dominant refrain 
about economically weak cities, like Gelsenkirchen, in Western provinces:  
“The important difference in the East is that it [economic decline] stretches 
comprehensively across the entire region (flächendeckend im Osten eine andere 
                                                 
39
 Both Jonathan Zatlin and Andre Steiner make note in their respective books that the statistics 
on the GDR foreign debt were inflated on purpose by Günter Mittag, who wanted to exert 
pressure on other party members; these figures were, however, taken at face value by SED party 
elites and ultimately, western experts, in assessing the GDR’s solvency. 
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Situation).  I would like to be permitted to describe this process (möchte ich 
diesen Prozess beschreiben dürfen).” 40 
 
Regional identities 
 
During my fieldwork an important frame of reference for thinking about the 
afterlives of the 1990 currency union was that of the shifting reference to and 
displacement of the eastern regions’ former status as a separate state. Important legal and 
regulatory distinctions continue to mark this part of Germany as an accession-area 
(Beitrittsgebiet).41 At the same time, differences in costs of living or structural problems 
of unemployment or demographic decline can be narrated and analyzed under the 
auspices of ‘regional differences’ rather than as after-effects of policy decisions made in 
1990. I argue that the valuation of money, what counts as debt, and the temporality of 
economic transformation are central problem-spaces in making intelligible the shifting 
frames through which many respondents explained the work of ‘catching up,’ or put 
differently, materializing a structure of belonging in unified Germany. But as I will also 
show, the intra-German project is highly relevant to making sense of the tensions, hopes, 
and expectations of the European project.  
As I noted above, one of the central links between the 1990 currency union and 
the long-term trajectory of post-unification development is the massive de-
industrialization in the east and the fate of the East German productive economy. Many 
have viewed the re-valuation, or to be more precise, ‘overvaluation’ of the East German 
Mark as a primary agent in this demise even while many other factors can be called upon 
to displace this policy decision. One central reason why it continues to animate these 
debates has to do with the temporality of the revaluation. Thus, even if, as many argue, it 
may have been inevitable that soviet comecon markets would break away, or many east 
German products were not viable (competitive) in the western market, the currency re-
                                                 
40
 Presseclub, Im Osten was Neues, Nov 9, 2009.   
41
 “Accession” remains a highly charged term in designating and erasing the politics of 
unification.  
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valuation is understood to have shortened the time and limited the parameters under 
which more firms might have potentially survived the privatization process. My interest 
in these debates is not to settle the argument about which factor played the decisive role, 
or to suggest that the challenges of the eastern regions would have been easily solved 
with the survival of industry. On the other hand, it is important not to dismiss the critical 
voices of unification as unrealistic when targeting the destruction or loss of industry. 
Given the larger global transformations already underway, it is tempting to enfold it in 
the categories of neo-liberalism or post-Fordism. Understanding the symbolic and 
material importance of production to the politics of settling accounts with the GDR is my 
angle of interest here given that this is a primary register thought by many to refer back to 
the 1990 currency union and its politics of revaluation.   
It is important to remember that the GDR had (arguably) been a self-sustaining 
state which did attend to the building and maintenance of infrastructure (however 
unevenly), provided diverse services, and which saw to a certain level of local production 
of basic consumer goods. Thus, its fate as a deindustrialized branch economy in post-
unification Germany understandably signals a form of colonization or expropriation 
(though these categories are highly contested by scholars and politicians alike. Far easier 
is to view deindustrialization as a sign of the times in which global market pressures may 
radically alter the fates of once thriving industrial centers.42   
 
Accounting and place: what survived? 
 
 I discuss several materializations of difference that stem in part from the relative 
value of currencies and economies and the conditions for catching up. Because these 
connect differential value with a formerly separate ‘space’ or territory, further inscribed 
with its own temporal logic (history and the market), I highlight it as particular form of 
                                                 
42
 Examples in Germany and the US abound. Detroit is an iconic and painful example in the US. 
When economic factors serve as ‘background’ for a city’s decline it is possible to miss the 
politics and personal loss inscribed into the very experience of economy in such cases. In my 
project I am arguing that it is important to reflect upon the way in which de-industrialization 
could ‘feel like’ a moral reckoning with the ‘other system.’ 
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emplacement. Thus, what seems to be an obscure accounting system of pension points 
distinguished as east/west is a form of enacting the contradictory logics of German 
division, unification, and its materialization through monetary difference. It could be 
understood as analogous to cultural histories of credit scoring. But in the case of 
integrating east and western former states, it could be productively unpacked as an 
allegory for thinking about the promises and claims of European economic integration. In 
another vein, I want to show how the 1990 currency union highlighted the fictions of 
capitalism at its supposed moment of victory.   
The loss of productive industry in the east has been intricately connected to the 
currency union’s revaluation. That reordering opened up a permanent space of 
contestation even as it is easily absorbed into other dominant logics of market 
competition. I want to show how the shared emphasis on productive identities and 
exports informs debates about financial transfers and capital flows from west to east, and 
between the regions. Other frames exist to downplay the prior history of division and 
coming together. I want to unpack what work these shifting references do in arguing for 
new forms of tackling unemployment, demographic decline, and market development in 
the region. How do positions shift and get occupied by different subjects to highlight, 
blur, or dismiss particular claims and problem spaces? 
 
Herr Lange:  what could have been done differently? This is (pauses) the 
question. There were many different considerations and other concepts, such as 
shares distributed to the people by the Treuhand, really a fictitious accounting that 
would have been just as complicated, even more so because the share certificates 
would have fallen in value 
U: so every GDR citizen would have received a share of 
Herr Lange: at the time it was considered, but it would not have amounted to 
anything (laughs). These would have been very susceptible to a loss in value…so 
in really a nonsensical variant. So another idea was, so then it was suggested to 
privatize the state owned properties into small units that could compete against 
each other until they either hold their own or not. They could have been animated 
through competition in a short time. That is the story, or at least one variant of it. 
That is the history.. 
U: so was the problem less one of time than with the unification treaty? Maybe if 
these other options had been taken, there might have been fewer negative 
consequences for the East German population? 
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Herr Lange: oh well, there were not so many negative consequences for people, 
and in any case people are doing better now than before, generally speaking. No 
one can say he is worse off than during GDR times.  
U: yes 
Herr Lange: Even those on social welfare are better provided for than they would 
have been in GDR times. Wages were around 600 Mark der DDR per month. A 
student earned 200 DDR Mark. That is a standard of living far below what we 
have now. And pensions were very small. The standard of living, including for the 
unemployed, has generally risen. Now with Hartz IV it may be different. Now 
with Hartz IV the living standard is declining. But until 2004 it can be said that no 
one is worse off, except for former functionaries. 
U: Perhaps some people are not doing better, but experts and also others I have 
spoken with here argue that the eastern regions do have a ‘self-carrying’ 
economy. Many families have become fragmented because there is no work here 
and so they commute long distances or leave the region altogether.  
Herr Lange: Well that is the world. That is nothing special. It has always been the 
case that people go where they can earn more. There is a certain mobility of the 
work force, of those who can go where they can earn more. That is nothing 
special. In America that is important 
U: Clearly, but if everyone has to leave the eastern regions 
Herr Lange: Before the first world war 7 million people left Germany because 
they could earn more elsewhere. They left the German Reich 
U: But I am thinking about the towns and villages with demographic decline—in 
many cities there are only elderly people left. These are concerns that affect all 
the eastern regions, whereas in the west these problems appear in pockets. 
Herr Lange: well, as I said before, that has everything to do with the unification 
treaty, and that two different fields of law [Rechtsgebiete] were created. The 
consequences exist into the present. One created two fields of law, with different 
wage tariffs. It is actually a constitutional peculiarity that otherwise doesn’t exist. 
In a state entity the same law usually applies equally. But since the unification 
treaty a special legal status was created for the Eastern regions. The consequence 
of this is that people leave for those regions [in the west] where they are in a 
better position. That is a very natural story. You can only wish people well, 
whoever can leave should go. 
U: of course, that is clearly so 
Herr Lange: This is the only way that we will eventually equalize the situation 
U: but what happens…when will equal rights be harmonized? 
Herr Lange: Well, in the meantime you might say there have been tendencies 
toward equalization. Through Hartz IV there will be equalization (laughs) but 
even there there are two different rates, and once again two fields of law. That is 
what I mean by the long-term consequences of the unification treaty that would 
not have been necessary if there had been a direct accession. Then it would have 
been clear that everyone has the same rights within the same state territory. 
Young people go to the west because they have better rights and income potential 
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there. I can only wish them well, they should do so, it does not have to be viewed 
negatively.  
U: No, of course not for the individual person. 
Herr Lange: the depopulation of cities, there is nothing to be done about that. 
U: I mean that there is a lot of discussion about how one could improve this 
situation in the east.  
Herr Lange: well, then the best procedure would be to equalize the fields of law. 
U: but it is also argued that different wages are necessary to reflect cost of living, 
and that this is why the wages can’t be equalized. 
Herr Lange: Politically it is not wanted. 
U: But economic arguments are often made, that jobs would be lost here if wages 
were increased. 
Herr Lange: But if this logic were true, then lower wages in the east should mean 
more jobs here, but that is not the case. Politically, equalizing the wages is not 
wanted. The left party (PDS) lives off of this. This only gives the left a chance to 
survive with their anti-capitalist talk. They profit only because of the failure of 
others [political establishment] 
 
Embattled aula 
 
Over the almost two years of my research in Leipzig, a prominent construction 
site in the city center, at Augustus Platz, was the site of frequent demonstrations and 
public attention, as much as its various stages of completion marked time itself. During 
my first December in Leipzig, a visiting anthropologist at the Max Planck Institute in the 
nearby town of Halle joined me for a visit to the Christmas market in Leipzig. Upon 
seeing the construction site of the aula and the obligatory sign detailing the diverse 
sources of funding for the construction, she wondered aloud at the level of investment in 
buildings and infrastructure even while unemployment remained high, and with many 
polished but empty office spaces dotting the second and third floors of shops lining the 
cobbled streets of Leipzig’s shopping alleys. Perhaps even more intriguing, why was a 
university aula designed in the shape of a church steeple?  
The construction of the university aula was intended to invoke one past in place of 
another and was complexly tied to Leipzig’s socialist past. The aula was replacing the 
socialist architecture, which up until as recently as 2004 had been the public face of the 
university of Leipzig. But that structure replaced what had been the centuries old 
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University Church, arguably always a part of the university and thus long blurring the 
demarcation between the secular and theological traditions of the university. The 
university church had miraculously survived the allied bombings of WWII in tact, and 
was used during the socialist era as site for religious services and university functions 
alike. However, this did not last long as SED Party leader Walter Ulbricht made it his 
primary goal, with the help of local officials, to remove the church from what should 
become a properly socialist cityscape. Thus, the church was slated for implosion and the 
rubble cleared for the socialist structure (now in the present itself being replaced with a 
re-creation that should not so much copy what was destroyed but remind of what was 
‘lost’ at the hands of socialist ideology).  
More important for my purposes here, what sparked local debate as well as 
renewed attention were the acts of resistance and dissent at that time and the present 
concern with recovering the stories and details of those brave few who tried to stop the 
destruction of the church. These forms of resistance, however, were caught up in 
competing claims of victimhood and visions of how and what this new aula would 
represent. I became a part of this local drama in part through the oral history project and 
exhibit on this event underway at the citizens’ archive, my ‘second home’ in Leipzig. I 
was asked to be part of a public podium discussion about the history of protest 
surrounding the destruction of the church, which was just as much a local political 
intervention on the polarizing agendas surrounding the present re-construction. My 
friends and research participants at the archive felt that I, as an American academic 
interested in the socialist and post-socialist politics of place making, might have a 
perspective to offer. More importantly, as someone who was neither East nor West 
German, it was felt that I might offer a more balanced approach to facilitating a space in 
which multiple perspectives could be heard. 
What struck me most about the issues from the standpoint of my own project was 
the way in which they reflected the politics of elite asymmetries, even while having as 
their primary target the local antagonisms about the proper ways of engaging with the 
socialist past. In my presentation as a podium discussant, I spoke to the ways in which 
my own project on German and European integration was concerned with understanding 
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these differing visions, and allowing space for new forms of dialogue about the socialist 
experience. One of the Zeitzeugen  (‘witness’) and dissenters’ part of the unfolding events 
leading to the destruction of the church who was interviewed for the archival project 
approached me after the podium discussion ended. All around us, heated debates 
continued as many in the audience argued or exchanged assessments of the discussion 
with each other, while others were lined up to talk with some of the prominent panel 
participants, most notably a local politician who was critiqued by some for his 
positioning on the issues at stake. The elderly soft-spoken gentleman, who approached 
me after the event, as I would learn, had been a supervisor for business organization in a 
peoples’ owned enterprise in Leipzig. Impressed with my interest in the economic aspects 
of unification, he wanted to put me in contact with his son, an economist and assistant to 
the then vice president of the European Central Bank (Herr Klein, see Ch. 3). I learned 
that his daughter had helped to found a successful language institute in Leipzig. In no 
time I had their contact information and was encouraged to set up interviews with them. 
He would let them know I would be calling.  
The point of my foray into this episode of local politics then, which I should add, 
is part of the uneven access to wealth and influence in defining the politics of memory in 
the city, is the opportunity my presence at the podium discussion afforded me in making 
an unanticipated by fortuitous link between Leipzig and Frankfurt, and to the European 
Central Bank in particular. It also allows me to showcase one family’s post-unification 
story that I found to be quite exceptional relative to the many others I encountered in the 
field. Most importantly, it shows the cracks and fissures in otherwise seamless and 
readily available rubrics through which complexly layered histories of economic 
development, ideologies, and transformation can be put in order.  
 
One family’s post-unification story:  
 
Leipzig:  
I met with Frau Klein at her institute in Leipzig. Upon the recommendation of her 
father she agreed to meet with me, but as I had experienced with many respondents, she 
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felt unsure about what she could contribute to my queries about the days in 1989/1990. 
However, she had no hesitation about telling me of her admiration for her father and the 
example he set for her post-unification life.   
Her father had worked in a technical facility in Leipzig. After 1990 he was one of 
the first to be let go, even though he had never been a member of the party. 2000 people 
had been employed in the facility, which survived privatization, but as in so many 
enterprises there was a ‘surplus’ of workers according to western market standards, so 
“place had to be made,” or as they called it back then, an unwinding was necessary 
(abwickeln). Her father had never been ‘political,’ but still he had to go. When I asked 
why, she added that the position her father held did not exist in the western system, so 
there was no comparable position to which he could transition. But, his boss, as it turned 
out, managed to stay on and is still working in the facility today. There was a twinge of 
bitterness in her voice, not unlike I had heard from other respondents who resented seeing 
old directors who had been party conform manage to stay in work after 1990 even while 
many others found themselves on the street. At this point, Frau Klein quickly switched 
register to reflect on the attitude of her father in a positive vein. ‘I admire my father. He 
never once complained that he lost his job. He said, ok, for me it is over, I am 
unemployed and entering early retirement. But, you children, you can profit. This was the 
greatest gift he could give us children. We were very lucky.’  
I asked her how she had experienced the Wende. I prefaced this by explaining 
why I was interested, that I was concerned with understanding the economic 
transformations that had taken place in the east, in part via the currency union and as a 
result of privatization. Through my research in Frankfurt and in conversations with my 
German relatives living in the west, I encountered the perception that easterners are 
always complaining. So far, I noted, I have not met any complaining persons. I wanted to 
let her know that I was not intent upon filtering her responses through the dominant slot 
of complaint and false memory. Yes, she responded, people often have the wrong idea. 
But oh well, it is after all almost 20 yeas ago.  
After a brief pause, she added, that her boss from the west earned more than she 
did, but ‘I am not jealous.’ I could care less about that, she said. ‘What really annoys me, 
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especially when I am in Frankfurt, trapped in a traffic jam for example, I think about the 
incredible quality of life here in Leipzig relative to Frankfurt, and yet this is unknown or 
goes unacknowledged. I live in the Waldstrassenviertel  (a coveted neighborhood in 
Leipzig) and I think to myself how beautiful it is here. But still, large firms or global 
companies will not re-locate here. There are very few headquarters here. The large 
companies don’t come, and there is hardly a firm that is prepared to make this city their 
center of operation. This is our main problem. We have so few leadership and upper-
management positions here.’  
She went on to explain why she experienced this not simply as a loss for the city, 
but also for the kinds of connections she could maintain in her neighborhood and circle of 
acquaintances. She had made many close friends with westerners who had moved here 
for work, wanted to move up into middle-management positions or develop further 
professionally, but found that they had to return to western regions for such opportunities. 
There are simply very few top-positions here. After 2 years, people often move away 
again. They don’t want to leave. We have everything here and perhaps more so than in 
the west: schools and child-care facilities. The quality of life is actually better here than, 
say, in Frankfurt.  
When I asked her what she thought could be done to change things, she added 
that, yes, there were development initiatives for the area, such as creating clusters or 
branding the region, otherwise known as ‘Middle Germany’ (Mitteldeutschland). This 
includes the nearby town of Halle, and companies like BMW, DHL and Q-Cells 
established branches to strengthen the region. But as to the large companies, she quipped, 
“why should they move to East Germany?’ There is no business incentive for them to do 
so if they are well established where they have been for decades. But we do need to find 
ways to strengthen what is already here. Perhaps small businesses could grow and attract 
more interest in the region. But I am sad when I think of one family in my neighborhood 
who will leave for the west soon because Leipzig cannot offer them the position that they 
need. And of course, my brother will never return here. ‘ She added that her other brother 
is a musician in Dresden and so was able to stay in the region. But many leave, and even 
though Leipzig is considered a success story, the unemployment levels here have 
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remained persistently and consistently high because there are not enough jobs to support 
people in the region. For her, Halle still embodies the character of the GDR. Though it is 
less than a half-hour away by train, it belongs to a different federal region than does 
Leipzig.  Relative to Sachsen, to which Leipzig belongs, Sachsen-Anhalt does not have 
much weight. She laughs, admitting that she has never set foot in Halle. I know, Sachsen 
is known for its arrogance. It is not nice, but true.  
Historically, Leipzig was a leading city in the book publishing industry and book 
print technology. Many famous publishing houses had once been located here, many of 
which were re-founded in the west as a result of German division. But even during GDR 
times, book publishing continued and was a important part of the local economy. Frau 
Klein struggles to think of what has survived not only division, but also privatization 
after unification. The publishing house, Klett, is one such firm. But in almost every 
economic sector, firms in Leipzig are merely subsidiaries of ‘mother houses’ or 
companies in western cities. Leipzig has managed to cultivate its heritage as a city of 
music. Museums, theater, the arts, and especially the classical music scene—including 
the world-renowned Thomanenchor—are meaningful anchors for local residents and as 
national and international tourist attractions.  There is a lot of financial support for up and 
coming artists, for example. All of these should be supported and preserved by future 
generations. What is missing, what ‘broke away’ is the industry. In reflecting on the 
shifting terrain of the local economy and local efforts to create and build up firms, events 
and technology in the region, Frau Klein referenced yet another setback and source of 
disappointment for the city announced only days before—the loss of the fabulously 
successful games convention to the western city of Cologne. This development was 
especially visceral because the games convention was a local inception, nurtured over 
several years, and finally building up to be a significant draw on visitors to the city and a 
significant financial boon to local shops, services, and businesses in the area. Frau Klein 
expressed exasperation and disbelief as she said, ‘the games convention got its start here, 
we built it up, and now it is gone!   
We spoke at length about the other factors that significantly shaped local and 
regional realities such as the prevalence of low wage jobs, shift work, and the differential 
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rates that applied along east/west lines in terms of pensions, wages paid for the same 
work and in many cases at the same level of productivity in the west.  I recounted how 
two Bundesbank employees with whom I had recently spent time had lamented the fact 
that due to the Bank’s restructuring, many who had been able to continue to work in the 
east now had to re-locate to Frankfurt in order to retain their positions. In many respects 
this constituted immense challenges in meeting familial obligations such as caring for 
elderly parents unable to move away. The doctoral advisor of a close friend also turned 
down university positions outside Germany because of an ailing parent whom she could 
not leave. In a majority of cases such as these, there are insufficient resources to pay for 
care facilities or in-home service providers. In the GDR one could of course not plan 
ahead financially for the changed circumstances of unification, and even with the 
conversion of pensions to the West German system and inclusion in the welfare safety 
net, few families or individuals were able in the 20 years following unification to build up 
sufficient resources for the future or to assist children in their educational endeavors or to 
shore up basic necessities in times of unemployment or underpaid workfare programs. 
Frau Klein recalled her astonishment in observing how western friends, adults married 
with kids, still received allowances from their parents. It was not unusual for some to 
receive several hundred euros a month to treat themselves to shopping or dinners, or to 
buy gifts for the children. ‘My parents did not have any money to help us.’ We were only 
able to study because of scholarships earmarked for talented youth. My brothers and I 
were very fortunate in this regard. My parents simply could not help me like the parents 
of fellow students. And in any case, I did not want help. I wanted to be independent and 
able to take care of myself. But even my kids see that the children of parents who moved 
here from the west, they see that their friends receive bigger, more extravagant gifts, 
because there is simply more wealth in the family. Addressing these differences, and in 
many respects, injustices, will likely take another twenty years.”  
I explained that it was precisely this difference that seemed to be reproduced in 
the practice of maintaining lower wages in the east, and in assigning different points 
toward ones’ retirement on this east/west basis. That is, even young people who had 
never lived in the GDR were assigned a different status and this could only contribute to, 
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rather than bridge the gap between, the ‘structural’ differences between east and western 
regions. Frau Klein nodded, saying, ‘you are right, but I have no good answer for it.’ 
 
U: I have been interested in the logics of the 1990 currency union and its 
relationship to the euro, especially ideas underlying the convergence criteria, for 
example. In researching the details I have been astounded by the magnitude of 
decisions made ‘over night’ as it is often stated.  
Frau Klein: The East Germans wanted the D-Mark.  
U: of course 
FK: Everyone wanted the West mark. The logic was that politically and 
emotionally, we are now one people, so of course we must also have one 
currency. But as far as the financial technical aspects, you my brother can be of 
better service.  
U: how old were you at the time?  
FK: At that time, I was 19 at the time of the Wende. But to be honest, I was not so 
interested in the details. At the end of June 1990, though, I was on my way to 
England to study. But I have a story. It was always my dream to see the musical, 
Cats, in London. I remember very distinctly that it cost seven pounds, which was 
21 West Marks. That was simply an unimaginable amount to me, that one could 
spend 21 West marks when here in Leipzig it had only cost 2 Marks (east) to 
attend the opera. But then in no time I was buying tickets for Mama Mia, so you 
adjust quickly. But I just wanted to say that it was unbelievable then, to hold west 
marks in your hand, and between yesterday and today everything you bought 
changed—not the same yoghurt, not the same butter. For our generation it was no 
problem, but for the older generation…everything changed from one day to the 
next. Everything was new. One suddenly had to learn everything. You had to look 
at everything. It was most difficult for my grandparents.  
U: How is it when you look back and think of everything that people 
accomplished and learned, and yet it does not seem to be a source of pride or 
recognition in the dominant perception? 
FK: In Leipzig we have definitely profited, the infrastructure, everything that has 
been rebuilt, it is more beautiful here than in many places in the west. But in 
Germany, we don’t think of the positive. Everything is immediately criticized. 
This is a German mentality.  
U: It seems to me that given the difficulties of privatization and the way many 
feel that the west took over through the decisions of the Treuhand, that western 
companies did not want competitors. Perhaps there is something to work through 
on both sides? I am thinking of this because there is so much emphasis here in 
Leipzig that people here work through the past. Isn’t it important to also learn 
from this history of unification?  
FK: Yes, there is a lot to work through. So many businesses were bought up. And 
even now, as soon as something is successful, it moves away. There are entire 
regions that are dying out. No children, dying cities. The other day my daughter’s 
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teacher told me that she rediscovered the alphabet writing books from the GDR. 
These are really good so why not use them? But still I would warn against 
nostalgia—no one wants to have the GDR back.  
 
I would soon be meeting with her brother in Frankfurt. She said of him, ‘my brother does 
not show off.’ I had explained my research at the Bundesbank and public encounters with 
expertise. ‘Of course that is too much to expect of people here. But isn’t it important, if 
one is always hearing that such decisions should be democratically legitimated, to think 
about what this might mean for understanding economic decisions? Well, she replied 
somewhat wryly, the Ossis haven’t learned to think democratically. I countered, ‘or 
perhaps more than one might think. She replied, ‘but they don’t put it into practice. 
 
Market pasts and futures  
 
Frankfurt: During my fieldwork I was surprised to learn the extent to which the 
Bundesbank and the ECB led separate lives. That is, many of my respondents rarely had 
contact with or had never been to the ECB. While certainly some divisions in both 
institutions engaged in daily contact, this was not true for the majority of the 
communications work in which I could participate. Indeed, there was an underlying 
rivalry or competition that I often sensed with regard to the ECB. And in my fieldwork I 
had very little to contact with top officials or staff in either institution. Thus it was with 
great anticipation that I arrived for my interview with Herr Klein. After clearing security 
procedures and heading up in the elevator to Herr Klein’s office on the second to last 
floor, I could even feel the altitude change given the height of the building.  The view of 
Frankfurt from that height was equally stunning, and it was our first point of conversation 
as I made it quite obvious I was not used to conducting interviews in such settings. I must 
admit that securing an interview with Herr Klein felt like an enormous achievement, not 
only because of its juxtaposition with my work at the Bundesbank, but because it 
connected my field-sites and concerns as a result of my unlikely ethnographic encounters. 
Given the eclectic way in which I proceeded with my ‘excavations’ of the 1990 currency 
union, it afforded yet another productive link to thinking about its afterlives.  
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Herr Klein: The decisions made in 1990—everyone was flying blind. Before the 
opening of the wall the GDR was listed as the 10th biggest economy in the world. 
What an idea. This was certainly not visible in the numbers. The mechanisms 
used to read the information about the economy was regimented, so there were no 
incentives or resources to aid in this process. There was simply zero experience 
with such a transition. No proper numbers or data and there was political pressure. 
No one really knew what sort of object they were analyzing. Bundesbank 
President Pöhl said that the 1:1 exchange rate was suicide [for the economy]. The 
price signals had been disabled, so the rate was a 350% overvaluation. Absurd! It 
was a choice between pest and cholera. The East Germans simply didn’t have the 
patience. The unions fought for West German wages, but people did not 
understand that it became a choice between a wages and having a job at all. They 
could not use the cost-advantage that might have saved some of the industry and 
workplaces. They priced themselves out of work. But in all fairness, the 
employers just sat by and watched it happen. The state of knowledge about what 
is true or false in this story is very difficult. Politics decides. You have to bend to 
people’s will. It was a historical decision and so the Bundesbank had to agree.  
 
I think we should discontinue talking in terms of east and west. Other regions are 
also doing badly. The data doesn’t show that the East is doing worse relative to 
other problem regions. A way was found through supply side economics to 
address soft and hard location factors. A middle-Germany (Mitteldeutschland) has 
been developing. As an economist, I have to recognize that some regions in the 
East have never been densely settled. The GDR tried to create artificial industrial 
areas. Now things are simply reverting back to normal. It is not nice. I say this 
only as a ‘disinterested’ economist. Now things are returning to how they were 
before. It is too bad, but it is a very normal economic process.  
 
People stay where they are because Germany is more social. Equalizing the wages 
between west and east would be wrong. There are regional differences that 
depend upon different costs of living. These are very normal differences in an 
economy. The east/west difference simplifies but does not reflect economic 
reality.  
 
 
Accounting for the value conversions of the past 
 
 
 And yet, for many of the people I talked with in Leipzig, the process of 
naturalizing structural inequalities as the inevitable outcome of regional difference 
continued to be interrupted, sometimes necessitating the reminder of past boundaries and 
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territorial identities. Decisions in 1990 contributed to the reordering and yet 
intensification of power relations that had characterized ‘state difference.’ But it is also 
important to note that such interruptions drew on market models for their critique.  
For instance, Herr Peters emphasized that there are fewer growing businesses in 
the area. The large supermarket chains moved in right away in 1990. “I can’t even recall 
that there is still a carpentry workshop here in Leipzig. Most of the small businesses have 
been forced out. It was a great rupture. People no longer bought the East German 
products. I asked him whether he bought local products, those that are advertised in the 
store as, ‘from our region’ [aus unser Region]?” Linked with the rising prices attributed 
to the euro, he felt that he did not have the income to support small business. “If products 
from the area are similar or the same, then I buy from the region. But it is usually the case 
that behind those brands is outside capital [from the west]. But there are other reasons to 
buy since those products are not being transported across such large distances.” Likewise, 
the Ostalgie products, like the Ampelmänner, he saw as supporting western interests. 
“They only want to earn money. It has less to do with the east. They just want to earn 
money and there is no larger idea behind it.”  
Frau Bergmann attributed the lack of development in the region to poor EU 
politics. “No, I don’t think that the euro protects us from globalization. I don’t think this 
is the case. Many fields are unused because we are told that we are not allowed to 
produce because we are part of the EU. That crop is now being produced in Ireland or 
Portugal, we are told. A local mayor in a nearby town cultivated grapes for country wine. 
It was very successful and brought in money to the town. But then she was told that it 
was not allowed. There is a lottery which decides who can produce where in each EU 
country. The EU regulates production quotas and this means the EU decides what can be 
produced in Leipzig.” 
 Repeating her sentiments about the failures of unification to build up the 
productive industry, she complained that in general she was not happy with the situation, 
because she didn’t see any changes in the economy. “It really bothers me terribly, these 
big corporations. Here in the east we have become consumers—people who consume, 
and not producers. At first I thought, if I can use the example of solar technology, which 
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was developed here in the east, it was doing well. But then the production was moved to 
Asia, now they produce 80% of the solar technology. But it was developed here. … New 
things are developed here, but we are integrated into Germany, and the EU. Technology 
is developed here but then it doesn’t stay here.  Sachsen used to be a wealthy region, 
before the war. But many firms went to the FRG, like the book printing industry. The 
westerners think they invented everything.  We are still poor people. Many in the west act 
as if the east is like Russia. This unspeakable war! Before we were industrialized, but 
everything was destroyed. In 10 years, I thought, and now it is 20 years and still there is 
little change. No flourishing landscapes to be seen. I am sad to see this development. The 
western regions profited from all those who left here after the war. 
    
Reckoning accounts against 1990  
I visited Herr Werner at the Bundesbank in Leipzig again in 2010, just as the 
crisis in Greece was beginning to unfold, and European leaders were convening at the 
inter-governmental level about what should be done. This was also the 20-year 
anniversary of the 1990 currency union. I wondered at the time if it was just a 
coincidence that euro-zone was in crisis exactly twenty years after the end of the Cold 
War.     
Herr Werner felt that there was no better solution and that the currency union was 
necessary. Evoking the oft-used trope that people would have run away, otherwise, the 
currency union is here again tied to the force of mobility. Savings were so minimal, it did 
not matter, he repeated. There was no other solution. What is important to note here, 
again, is that this form of argument neither unambiguously embraces nor entirely rejects 
the decision to pursue the rushed currency union. If there had been nothing to lose, regret, 
or wish differently, why otherwise would the currency union be repeatedly invoked as 
‘no alternative’? What is at stake here is not simply a matter of the expense of this policy 
decision, but more importantly, how the GDR’s productive ‘potential’ was valued in this 
process. Was it treated in a future oriented mode that viewed it as a resource to be 
preserved, or was it simply a form of dispossession framed as something ‘without value’? 
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What ‘might have been’ had other modalities of re-valuation been pursued or demanded? 
In considering the effects of revaluation in 1990, retrospective narratives cling fast to no 
alternative convictions precisely because there were alternatives, but more to the point, 
because something more is at stake in rending power asymmetries locked in place 
invisible. 
Recent discussion on the occasion of the anniversary emphasized how those 
products that were good survived. “Lower prices and lower wages would have made no 
difference. East Germans wanted the West German products. Price made no difference, 
even if East German products cost less. On the other hand, so much has been built up, 
that has to be said. But because there are no big companies here, things will stay the way 
they are for some time.” 
When I asked him if companies could have invested more in the region, he 
responded in much the same vein as Frau Klein above, that after division many 
companies went to the West, and after 1990 they did not have a reason to return. There is 
no incentive (Anreiz) to come to the east. Why should they come, he asked? One had 
hoped that smaller firms would grow. But with the demographic decline, even that 
possibility is threatened.  
East German regions have more debt than western regions. That is the price we 
had to pay. With the solidarity pact coming to an end in 2019, we have to cut 
budgets. More than infrastructure is needed due to the demographic decline. 
Highly skilled workers continue to go the west. These are in fact threatening 
developments for some regions. Yes, there are economic lighthouses. But these 
are essentially markets on the Autobahn. All along these areas near the 
lighthouses, there are businesses, but 50 km further there is nothing, it is dead.” 
But the rest…no one could see ahead. During the first 10 years after the D-Mark, 
localities thought of everything. But they didn’t think of trying to attract 
productive industry. Only in 2000 did economic investment pick up. But 
unemployment is very high in Leipzig, higher than other cities. There are no jobs. 
100,000 jobs in industry were lost. That is a huge amount, it is too much to 
handle. You can’t replace what has broken away. No one thought about this, and 
these are the results. 
Many of the westerners who came here worked in public administration. They 
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were often young. They did not have a focus on economy. They were building a 
bureaucracy. There was a lot of confusion with land registers and property rights. 
All of this took up so much energy. Then they were gone. And the banks bore no 
risk and profited immensely. There was no interest in developing anything. Those 
were wild times.  
When I was fifteen or sixteen, I was interested in finance. Around the Wende time 
I got a visit from a relative, form the west. He was a bank director. He 
recommended that I do a bank apprenticeship. Then you have something. So 
that’s what I did, even if I am not now exactly at a bank. When I asked him what 
he thought then about the deindustrialization and privatization after unification. ‘I 
was too young then, I did not really see how things were. I did not have a business 
perspective then. Even with the massive employment, we had the nice new west 
money. People could buy a car. But then they found themselves in reduced hour 
positions, even zero hours, and then no work. My mother lost her job. My father 
was able to work until retirement. He worked in construction. He worked for 30 
years and was able to hold up through that whole time. But friends, and friends’ 
parents were what you might call the losers of unification. Many retrained but it 
often was not quite sufficient to secure a new job. Many never did regain their 
footing. It is always double-edged. It is wonderful to have freedom but, (trails 
off). 
Herr Werner characterized the technical training in the GDR to be very good. He knew an 
instructor who used books from the GDR because they were didactically better than in 
the west. “With technology there is no ideology. A society needs inventions, but also 
good business people.” In the GDR salesmanship was not cultivated. So one pillar 
essential in putting inventions to work fell away. The GDR invested a lot in technology, 
or at least placed great value on this through poly-technical and vocational schools. 
Students were required to work one day a week in the industry as part of their schooling. 
Herr Werner noted that an emphasis on technology was key means of compensating for 
the GDR’s standing relative to the west. Car prototypes were even built, but then the 
party leadership decided not to build them.  
The problem was that East Germans had a right to [west German] citizenship. 
Theoretically separate states could have worked. Many families would have used 
arbitrage, worked in the west and sent money back. A well-trained specialist 
could have lived better in the west than with lower wages in the east. People 
would have run away. But then you consider Slovenia and Austria. Slovenia did 
not share a language with Austria. Slovenia did not receive any transfers, but yet 
they now have the same living standards as here. It does make you think about 
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what could have been better or done differently here. Well, as Kurt Biedenkopf 
once said, at the next Unity, we will do everything better. All of the models that 
existed, they did not really help. 
With the recent developments in Greece, it was clear to me and to Herr Werner that the 
challenges of integrating radically different ‘regions’ in 1990 had relevance for the 
imbalances arising in the Eurozone: 
The euro (model) has also not really been tried before. The economist Hans 
Werner Sinn wrote a book, Jumpstart, back then (1991). He foresaw many 
developments. But he was attached. He suggested ideas about how to improve 
investment in the East, but the politics did not follow. No one really knew or 
could measure how high the productivity of the GDR was relative to the FRG. It 
was very difficult to measure. How can you compare a Wartburg to a BMW? 
What price do you take for comparison? Social assistance was more generous in 
the west than in the east. In the West they really did not know the state of things 
(conditions) in the GDR. In 1989 the GDR was considered to be the 10th largest 
industry in the world, and the GDR was certainly the best in the East-Block. The 
west really believed we were the 10th largest industry. But machines were old, and 
only poor models could be built. In 1990 only a few clever people could see 
ahead. Some in the GDR leadership, some knew, but they also did not know how 
to compare in precise terms. And in any case, no one wanted to listen to them. 
They were now the evil socialists from yesterday. The enterprise directors, many 
became insurance salesmen. They had no influence on politics.  
The economic ideology of measuring value and addressing the specific circumstance of 
diverse regions come into view. 
New Markets. But for whom?  
 
Herr Nord explained that the directors saw to it that many of the employees could 
stay on. He described the mill as very social, with childcare and hearty and cheap lunches 
for the workers. The mill consisted of three facilities, each of which had different 
ownership claims and which were separately privatized. The facility where Herr Nord 
had been the director was the only one to survive privatization. A joint-venture option 
with a western company was pursued. At first, 98% of the workforce was able to remain. 
He describes the devaluation of east German products before and after the 1990 currency 
union. People were now only buying West German rolls [Brötchen], which lead to a 
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collapse in the production at the mill. Herr Nord contrasts the East German rolls with the 
western ones in what some would call ‘nostalgic defiance’. But it should certainly also be 
possible to consider how these products reflected the autarchic aspects of production for 
the local market. “ Our rolls were made with very few chemicals, he explained. They 
were made relatively naturally, like the old-style German ‘Semmel.’ They were smaller 
and moister inside.” In contrast, West German rolls were like balloons, puffed up, 
attractive on the outside, but inside dry and crumbly. That always bothered me.” During 
GDR times, rolls were extremely cheap as it was considered a staple good and necessity, 
and thus heavily subsidized. The fact that rolls were bought up and used as feed for 
livestock is an oft-cited story. It suggests waste and inefficiency and highlights the 
irrationality of the party’s price politics as well as the ways in which the low-cost of 
products were taken for granted by the populace. Herr Nord suggests, though, that people 
did not buy into the ideology and in fact wondered about the real costs of things. Bread 
and rolls should have cost more, he maintained. A lot was thrown away because it was 
believed that these products had no value. So production fell dramatically as western 
providers came to sell their products in a new market.  
Herr Nord describes the period after the Modrow law allowed for the 
establishment of joint ventures with companies in West Germany. He explained that it 
was the Red Army that had expropriated his plant after the war. In the Unification treaty 
such expropriations would fall under the category of properties not subject to restitution 
to an original owner. The German Wehrmacht had used the facility for their food 
distribution program and much of the work was done by slave labor. The owners of the 
other plant facilities had fled to the west. This part of the mill was reduced to 30 people. 
They then established talks with large West German mills. Their first choice was the 
largest mill, located in Hamburg. With this company a joint-stock company was 
established, managed by the Treuhand (Trust). The western company seemed appealing 
because it was financially sound and its future prospects seemed secure. “We approached 
them because we had personal contacts already before 1989, and their references were 
good. But over time, it became clear that the western company was involved in a number 
of failed investments. They had bought other firms and spread themselves too thin across 
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different areas of specialization, from consulting, to the purchase of a chicken farm, to 
mushroom cultivation. When these ventures fizzled out and the company strapped for 
cash, they were forced to declare bankruptcy. The East German plant had no way of 
knowing this. Different parts of the company were then sold off, but this did not satisfy 
the creditors. They forced the western firm to settle its obligations. They descended on 
the dispersed facilities with a helicopter, as Herr Nord described it with a calm but 
dramatic flourish. ‘They thundered down and threw the workers onto the street,’ he 
shrugged. He described the logic of the parent company, ‘We will just do away with the 
eastern plants, because they are more likely to cost us money than bring in profits over 
the next ten years. So we had to go. We had been building things up until 1998. We were 
finally ready to face the market, millions had been invested, and we were almost at the 
point where we could raise our prices. But for the parent firm, we were not bringing in 
enough profits. It also had something to do with restructuring of this market nationally 
and globally. They looked for a new owner so that our plant could be dispensed with. 
With that we were finished.  
He book-ended this difficult story with a sigh, stretching back in his chair. “That 
is my professional story. So then in 2000 I became self-employed, and decided to start 
my own consulting business in alternative energy. So I have been here since 2001” I 
asked him if business was going well. “It is not bad,” he responded. “But last year there 
had been some problems, technical in nature. The sales tax or vat had been raised 3%. He 
ran into problems with the tax administration for listing this as a turnover tax and not a 
value-added tax in his billing correspondence. ‘I studied with a business professor who 
said he could not recognize any ‘value-added’ in this tax. For him, value-added tax is 
simply a turnover tax. And since I do not recognize the value-added (Mehrwert) in many 
things, I therefore call it a turnover tax  (Umsatzsteuer). Surplus value does not arise 
through taxation. So I have an iron will there. The term Umsatzsteuer is printed on all of 
my correspondence. My customers pay sales and not value-added tax. So where a 
German will put his foot down and has courage, he will. So in my field, I pay the value-
added tax but for my customers, I call it Umsatzsteuer. So my customer does not see it, 
and so I construct some harmony there.”   
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The historicity of value can be seen in this small gesture of defiance. 
 
Economic Futures 
 
No matter how much East Germans might insist upon ascribing value 
(economic or otherwise) to their lives, labor, and objects of production during 
socialism, all things economic remain in the negative, or have a non-identity. In the 
capitalist context, no matter how much some may insist that our economic means 
and ends are similarly confused, where the relentless priority of profit is literally 
eating away at the long-term foundations of any possible economic system of the 
future (Goodchild 2009), capitalism is the best we have, and what “works.” 
Meanwhile, within the (capitalist?) economic landscape of the present, questions 
about where the gaps between the substance of the Real economy and the competing 
economic theories that define policy and rhetoric might lie require new analytical 
purchase.   
It is more than an ironic twist that political elites’ efforts to make the 
European project contingent upon the single currency—in German Chancellor 
Angela Merkel’s recent plea, “if the euro fails, then the EU also fails”—reinstates 
the socialist desire to fix money within a rigid social political vision.  Thus, I 
believe that the question of what constitutes “qualitative difference” between 
socialism and capitalism remains an important one in contemporary debates about 
the “what” or “where “of the Real economy, and underscores why the ontological 
struggles that are part of the socialist experience are more relevant than ever.  On 
what terms exactly did socialism fail?  Is it appropriate to salvage everything 
possible from the socialist past, but the economic? And how is it that we come to 
use largely contradictory and opposed standards for evaluating the successes and 
failures of our present financial landscape?  
I want to end this chapter by thinking about the implications of this 
discussion for the euro, especially at the current moment of crisis.  With mounting 
debts across the euro-zone posing a significant threat to the stability and 
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sustainability of the currency union binding the 17-member nations that use the 
euro, calls for greater fiscal union are growing. The incomplete project of economic 
integration between West and East Germany haunts the problems facing the euro, 
ranging from terms like “transfer union” to proposals that the Treuhand43 might 
serve as an appropriate model for privatizing sectors of the Greek economy.  But 
how much fiscal union is possible, and how might substantial differences in the 
economies of members take root in new inequalities?  Let’s revisit the problem of 
equal wages.   
A recent Tagesschau44 report bore the title, “Gleiche Löhne in Ost und West ab 
2019. (Equal wages in East and West beginning 2019)”45 The article details a new and 
binding agreement between building cleaning staff and their union representation, 
beginning in January 2012, to begin raising the wages for East German workers by larger 
percentages over the next years, with an eventual Angleichung (harmonization) of pay 
rates between East and West by 2019.  Beginning in 2012, the minimum wage in this 
industry will be West 8,82 and East, 7,33.  However, the report ends by explaining that 
five rounds of negotiations almost came to a halt over the question of aligning East/West 
pay, and that both sides agreed to an option of termination in 2015. The farcical nature of 
this is not lost on a number of the readers who posted comments, some of which drive 
home the point of unfinished business “at home,” and the lingering problems with the 
euro to come.  As one reader put it,  
“Now we just need Germany bonds and can do away with the regional financial 
equalization scheme! It’s about time. It is already inconceivable how when 
tinkering around with the EU the critique is raised that German national interests 
are not being protected, although here in this State there is no recognizable 
Unification (Unity) (24. August 2011 - 12:38 — Hertha).46 
                                                 
43
 Treuhandanstalt: the institution that was given the legal mandate for privatizing the East 
German economy after Unification (1990-1994).   
44
 The name of the news show televised by the First Broadcasting Network in Germany 
45
 http://www.tagesschau.de/wirtschaft/gebaeudereiniger120.html ; 
http://meta.tagesschau.de/id/52250/gebaeudereiniger-gleiche-loehne-in-ost-und-west-ab-2019 
46
 Translations mine. “Jetzt brauchen wir nur noch Deutschlandbonds und können auf den 
Länderfinanzausgleich verzichten! ;-). Wird allmählich auch Zeit. Es ist sowieso manchmal nicht 
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Another refers ironically to the walls that refuse their constant relegation solely to East 
German heads (Mauer in den Köpfen/ Wall in the heads”): 
 
“How nice… a famous politician once said, “The Wall will stand, 50 even 100 
years from now” [this is a well-known quote from Erich Honecker]. … Well, we 
have reached 30 years” (24. August 2011 - 17:20 — Marco197) 47 
 
While the currency union of 1990 may have converted East German to West 
German wages at a rate of 1:1, the distinction (and difference) between West and 
East German wages remains.  This is another example of where East/West 
difference is folded into arguments about regional cost of living and lingering 
productivity. At the same time, policy makers argue that there will one day be a 
convergence between East and West.  But as some West and many East Germans 
point out, you don’t have to be an economist to see that according to this logic, 
either West German wages must decline for the “catching up” to be feasible, or the 
real economic differences between the old and new Länder will simply linger on as 
the cumulative effect of low wages, depopulation, lack of investment, etc. Almost 
30 years after German unification the possibility of receiving the same pay for what 
is already the same work may then be on the horizon!  What temporal scales might 
European economic convergence among 17(+) economies require?  What 
qualitative difference will the euro enable in making sense of the Real?  
                                                                                                                                                 
nachvollziehbar, wenn an einer EU gebastelt wird, Kritik kommt, dass D. Interessen nicht 
gewahrt werden als Nationalstaat, obwohl in just diesem Staat keine Einheit zur erkennen ist” 
47
 “Und wie schon......ein berühmter Politiker gesagt hat: "Die Mauer wird in 50 und in 100 
Jahren noch stehen" [this is a well-known quote from Erich Honecker]... Naja. 30 Jahre hätten wir 
ja dann schon” 
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Chapter 7: 
Re-reading the Socialism/Capitalism Divide: Currency Unions and the Circulation 
of Economic Alternatives in Germany. 
 
In this chapter I sketch in broad strokes the central problem that this dissertation has 
been tracking: how to think about the agency of money, and the economic system it both 
reflects and produces, in both socialist and capitalist contexts.  More precisely, I am 
searching for coordinates through which we might think about monetary or economic 
value in ways that open up space for East German experiences of economic rupture and 
transformation. The analytical register of indeterminacy in measuring economic value is 
largely missing from public and academic discussions of both German and European 
projects of currency union and economic integration.   
By indeterminacy I mean both money’s materiality (how currency is both a 
pragmatic quality and signifier) and the meanings money accumulates in different 
contexts (such that signifieds) may not be as easily translatable across historical/cultural 
divides).  Simply, there are as many, often contradictory, arguments about what money 
is, and how it should be understood as part of economic systems of exchange as there 
are different monies.  I suggest here the possibility of thinking about both capitalist and 
socialist money systems’ potential for efficacy and failure.  This approach might allow us 
to reflect on the potential as well as limits of the single currency, the euro, and the larger 
project of European integration. 
Importantly, what is at stake here is not only how one might view the socialist 
past on its own terms, but also the nature of critique and the posing of new 
economic visions in the present.  Are all economic alternatives bound to fail because 
they reinstate the terms of capitalist logics? This seems to be an implicit conclusion 
one might draw from framings of economic collapse in the GDR on the one hand 
(Zatlin 2007b), and from critical analyses of alternative currency initiatives in 
diverse contexts on the other (Maurer 2005; Peebles 2011). Alternately, a line of 
analysis I will pursue in subsequent chapters draws on Kant’s idea conception of 
transcendental illusion to consider money beyond both capitalist and socialist 
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systems. Kojin Karatani writes, “ The implication is…that money is a 
transcendental illusion that one cannot easily get rid of” (Karatani 2005). As will 
become clearer below, one lesson of real-existing Socialism’s ambivalence to 
money may well be that its complete illumination is not the basis upon which 
alternatives can take hold (Graeber 2011).48 For my purposes here, however, I focus 
on the question of substance in defining (and distinguishing) socialism in contrast to 
capitalism. 
As Benjamin Robinson has pointed out in his analysis of Franz Fühmann’s 
visions and ontological concerns, a project of enacting some qualitative difference 
must come to terms with the system logics to which it is Other (Robinson 2009). 
Robinson frames the dilemma as follows:  
“Capitalism, in principle as susceptible as socialism to the question of whether it 
is ‘the thing itself or its simulacrum,’ seems to be free of demon doubles. Never a 
ghost for itself, never suspected of being only a simulacrum of capitalism, really 
existing capitalism is now no longer haunted by a rival either. Spectral 
nonidentity turns out to have been a terminal problem only for real socialism, 
which was always its own scariest ghost. While the stake through socialism’s 
undead heart sent it firmly to the grave, for capitalism it meant only that its gaze 
in the mirror revealed a fleshier and more robust self” (Robinson 2009) 
 
Thus, how one explains the failure of real-existing socialism matters not only 
in terms of explaining the past, but also in interrogating questions of value in the 
present.  
  I examine money as part of a particularly intractable context that belies 
theoretical emphasis on empty signifiers alone: currency unions. A currency union 
implies a joining together of materially and theoretically distinct currency spheres 
(or separate economies, each represented by a particular currency). Thus, evaluating 
what value transformations occur in a currency union imply some kind of 
substantive difference about currency regimes that must be translated or reconciled 
in a project of integration. The analytical emphasis on money’s role as universal 
                                                 
48
 David Graeber takes yet another radical approach by arguing that human relationships are not 
reducible to relations of exchange.  He is bold enough to reclaim communism as a “baseline” 
human condition.   
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value would miss precisely that which is most crucial:  the violent measures that are 
part of these conversions. This is especially significant in the context of German 
Unification, in which not only economies, but also different economic systems were 
joined under a single monetary signifier.   
 I approach currency unions as an especially privileged site for excavating in 
the ruins and remainders of what later may emerge as a final and settled measure of 
value. A currency union acquires this apparently stable vision of value only by 
marking off its temporal agency as residing in a singular past moment. A conversion 
takes place, multiple equivalencies are worked out, and a “price” is settled.  But the 
effects of currency unions, despite prescient predictions, are understood fully only 
in hindsight, their impact ongoing and long lasting even as they are rendered 
something “past.” A currency union is a synchronic act of translation—it takes a 
snapshot of an image of some economic real, yet its causal effects reach back to the 
past while delimiting the future of economic possibility.49  Precisely such 
movements and multiple temporalities are missed by social analyses that emphasize 
one aspect of modern fiat currency (money): how lack of substance or content 
allows money to carry universal value. The efficacy of currency is dependent upon 
the substantial difference it produces and yet simultaneously erases (Robinson 
2009).50   In other words, money’s shifting identity as substantive one moment, 
empty the next captures something of the tension that underlies money’s legitimacy 
in economic experiences. 
A currency’s efficacy depends in large part on its claim to inevitability; people 
must trust in its backing (its value).  In monetary terms this is defined as a currency’s 
ability to function as a medium of exchange, a store of value, and a unit of account.  
Whether in substantive or ideal form, a currency’s efficacy lies in its very “taken for 
granted quality” in times of economic prosperity as well as hardship.  That a currency can 
also fail is nowhere more evident than in Germany, where family histories are marked by 
series of financial crises over the last 100 years.  No experience is more vivid than the 
                                                 
49
 This applies especially to the case of German Unification  
50
 This argument is informed by Benjamin Robinson’s ontology of socialism. 
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hyperinflation of the Weimar period after World War I, when stacks of currency notes 
signified not wealth, but a complete absence of monetary value (Widdig 2001a).  
However, the failure of socialist currency and the East German economy poses a 
new set of problems in understanding this relationship. Did socialist money “fail” on 
capitalist or on socialist terms? In Germany, judgments about a currency’s efficacy lie 
between two competing economic systems, in which economic failures can be cast 
outside the West German social market economy.  For this reason, my dissertation 
analyzes currency unions as one of the most contested, but also transformative sites for 
understanding problems of money and economic measures of social justice.  Long after 
the Cold War has ended, the ghostly presence of socialism intrudes and asserts its 
alternative visions while pointing to the limits of capitalist boundaries and models in 
redefining the social (Robinson 2009). 
In my discussion below I aim to convey something of the material and medial 
landscape in Germany through which economic evaluation is delimited and constrained.  
Precisely because the boundaries between capitalism and socialism are continually 
reinstated, the efficacy of grounding one’s critique in social (or socialist) alternatives is 
disrupted. My concern is less one of reclaiming a socialism past “as it truly was,” than it 
is one of prying open socialism, like capitalism, to further analytical reflection.  Money 
acquires powerful, even contradictory qualities in explanations of socialism’s collapse on 
the one hand, and capitalist dominance on the other.  Whether in scholarly analysis of 
post-socialist transformation, or heated political debates in unified Germany, experiences 
of real-existing socialism take on a schizophrenic circuit of signification, or drop out 
altogether.  I aim to make them re-appear.   
 
Money’s gaps 
 
Both West and East Germany tried to define which state was able to best meet the 
material needs of its citizens.  Many argue that socialism failed because it failed to meet 
inherent human needs.  In contrast, capitalism is seen as creating needs that did not exist 
before, with the promise and potential that essential needs will eventually be met.  Even 
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with considerable evidence of capitalism’s failures to conjure the market freedoms, 
wealth and stability it promises, socialism still seems to pale in comparison.  In this view, 
East Germans had nothing to lose and everything to gain with the collapse of their 
system. Alaina Lemon argues that capitalist and socialist states shared practices and 
beliefs surrounding cash and the role of money in society (Lemon 1998). One could just 
as well argue that socialist states failed because of capitalist problems just as much as 
they failed internally to meet the needs and hopes of their citizens.   
What is between these system boundaries?  How can the weightless alu chips, the 
object of East German derision as much as they were the grounds for West German 
pronouncements of superiority, nevertheless be understood as possessing economic 
value? In the presumed absent presence of economic alternatives, how can we think both 
inside and outside the capitalist system at the same time?   
Historian Jonathan Zatlin’s important study of monetary policy in the GDR 
(Zatlin 2007b) focuses on the economic policies of the Honecker era, the last 20 years of 
the GDR. Though there is not space to talk about it here, policies shaping money and 
consumption did undergo shifts and changes over the GDR’s existence.  Zatlin is one of a 
very few scholars (publishing in English or German) who has taken money and monetary 
policy in East Germany seriously as a critical object of inquiry.  The dearth of critical 
analyses on money and finance in the socialist context stands out all the more when 
compared with the overwhelming number of studies in the capitalist context (which I 
discuss in a broader sense below). I discuss his study at length for this very reason, and 
because it has provided a critical foundation for my arguments in the dissertation.   
Zatlin suggests that both Marxist-Leninist theory on the one hand and 
political elites’ incorporation of capitalist market practices on the other ultimately 
caused the GDR economy to break down on its own internal contradictions. Money 
is a key agent in his analysis. Using Marx’s concept of commodity fetishism, he 
argues that socialist economic policy, notably contra Marx, conflated money with 
the evils of capitalism, and so tried to eliminate it (or circumscribe its role in 
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economic processes).  Though placing much of the blame on Erich Honecker51 and 
SED party infighting and power struggles, the failure of the planned economy had 
everything to do with the Marxist-Leninist intellectual antipathy toward money.  
Eliminating some of money’s functions and imbuing it instead with socialist 
meaning would eliminate structures of capitalist exploitation.  
At the same time, however, the GDR political establishment embarked on 
economic measures of funding national consumption through foreign debt in hard 
currency, and foundered on a lack of complementarity in production, with the 
intrusion of the West German Mark into many market domains in the GDR 
becoming the proverbial nail on the coffin. The currency of the contested Other, in 
Zatlin’s analysis, both undermined and pre-determined the trajectory of German 
Unification and economic union with West Germany.  Before analyzing the 
implications of Zatlin’s argument for reading across the socialist/capitalist divide, I 
want to provide some further context for understanding the unusual interrelationship 
of West and East German currencies in the GDR.    
First, East Germany was, from the very beginning, in competition with a 
West German, capitalist counterpart. Many scholars have pointed out that both 
German states had to convince their citizens that they were the better, and more 
legitimate state.  Some scholars argue that this played a significant role in imbuing 
Germany’s social market economy (seen as not socialist and not capitalist, “a third 
way”) with a well-developed and generous welfare state.  East Germany, then, was 
always in a mutually defining relationship with the West and could never quite 
define, on its own terms, what a German socialist alternative might become in any 
true sense of the word. Similarly, despite the sense of victor’s justice felt by West 
Germans at embodying the better model of a social market democracy, many of the 
gains experienced by West German workers during 40 years of division would 
likely not have become reality were it not from the pressure to out-do the East 
German Sate. It is also important to note that East Germany started off with far 
worse economic conditions than did the West because of the Soviet policy of 
                                                 
51
 Erich Honecker was the “Head of State” in the GDR from 1976-1989. 
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extracting war reparations from East Germany. This included not only high taxes, 
but also the actual dismantling of the industrial base. Even train tracks were 
dismantled and shipped to Russia, where, paradoxically, they were stored and never 
used. East Germany also did not have the kind of assistance provided by the 
Marshall Plan in West Germany (though the offer of Marshall Plan assistance was 
extended to, but rejected by the East Germany/Soviet occupation authority.   
Second, after the building of the Berlin wall on August 13, 1961, most East 
Germans could not travel to West Germany, or anywhere in the West for that 
matter. There were different exceptions to this rule, and the rules changed over time.  
For example, seniors were allowed to visit the west, or part of the family could visit 
West German relatives for family events like funerals, or special birthday or 
wedding anniversaries. So, unlike the villagers in Francis Pine’s study of money in 
the polish highlands (Pine 2002), East Germans did not have the experience of 
fellow East Germans working in the west and returning home with hard currency. In 
East Germany, access to Deutsch Marks and West German goods came through 
family connections in the West, through gifts or through the famous “west 
packages.” And, though East Germans were limited in their ability to travel to West 
Germany, West German family members did visit East German family members. 
Importantly, most East Germans had (illegal) access to West German television, 
with the exception of the area around Dresden. Daphne Berdahl’s discussion of US 
television series, Dallas, and the significance television played in exposing East 
Germans to the world of consumer goods, is highly illuminating on this point 
(Berdahl 1999). Moreover, this became an important means of measuring the claims 
made by the socialist state in providing for its citizens. This was one important 
reason why the gap between East and West Germany became very visible.  Iconic in 
this regard is the car.  Not only the quality of the car was at stake, but also its 
accessibility (one had to wait for 10 years or more!). Here the gap between West 
Germany and East Germany could not be more visible. 
However, it is also important not to forget that while the East German 
consumer goods produced for East German consumption were viewed as being, in 
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part, sub-standard, and often not even available in the first place (shortage 
economy), many of my respondents remember working in factories which produced 
high quality goods for export to West Germany, sometimes under west German 
labels. For example, some Villeroy and Boch porcelain was produced in East 
German Kombinate and sold to the West. One respondent remembers her West 
German relatives looking for ways to spend their East German Marks (Even family 
members were required to exchange a set amount of money per day for the entirety 
of their stay). West Germans were often in a better position to buy high quality East 
German products that were unattainable for many East Germans (my respondents 
often use the phrase, “not for us mere mortals” to describe their own status). Books 
and woodcarvings and handicrafts were well known quality goods from East 
Germany. Meißener Porcelain was especially prized, but there were very strict rules 
about where it could be bought, and by whom. Dresdener Stolen even served as a 
form of currency.   
Though the quality of East German consumer goods could not, as a whole, 
compete with West German goods, it is also definitely not the case that East 
Germans produced nothing of value. In the post-socialist context, even 20 years 
later, not a few of my respondents still used items, like dishes, bed linen, even some 
appliances, that dated back to GDR times. In contemporary Germany, the quality 
and steadfastness of East German products, or their lack thereof, has become a kind 
of battlefield in which competing definitions of value continue to be fought over in 
the struggle to reclaim the right to self-definition (Ostalgie). But this battle is not 
just one between East and West Germans, but among East Germans themselves.  
Over the course of my research, I experienced the many ambivalent responses to the 
Ostalgie cult, and to politics of remembrance.   
To return to the question of money in the GDR, West German currency 
acquired significant agency, as different currencies circulated in GDR national 
space.  Honecker reversed the economic policy of his predecessor, Walter Ulbricht, 
by privileging consumption (at any cost, it would seem).  Shops for foreign tourists 
known as Intershops were created, where western goods could be bought with 
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western money. At first, only Western tourists were allowed to shop in these stores, 
but were later accessible by East Germans possessing the necessary hard currency.  
Other shops known as Delikat or Exquisit, were also created, where higher quality 
East German products and some western goods could be bought with East German 
Marks, but obviously at very high prices.  These different consumer spaces are 
significant for concretizing the ways in which different currencies were in 
competition with each other as these shops often required that East Germans first 
convert West German Marks into Forum Checks before they could buy a product in 
an Intershop. Change was also not given in West German marks, but in forum 
checks. Because the prices charged for the western goods did not correspond with 
bill and coin denominations, consumers had to make up the difference by spending 
more on a piece of chocolate or candy (Pine describes a similar phenomenon in her 
article mentioned above).  While these may seem like trivial inconveniences, East 
German consumers fortunate enough to have access to western money came to see 
the contradictions inherent in socialist attempts to redefine money as separate from 
capitalist market practices.  
Citizen petitions (mostly written by women) are one key source of 
documentation for East Germans’ growing frustrations with the growing 
contradictions between socialist ideology and practice. Zatlin’s analysis of the 
petitions ascribes a great deal of reflexive agency to East German consumers.  
Citizen petitions are a key element of resistance as letter-writers take ever-
increasing account of the growing and visible gap between the moral imperatives of 
socialist policy and the material realities and inequalities faced by ordinary citizens.  
 Indeed, the gap between ideas and material realities is central to Zatlin’s 
arguments. The mismatch between ideas and practice carve out a gap between 
socialist economic ideals and the material hardships and economy of decline that 
ended in the GDR’s collapse. Arguments in the petitions, though politically 
ineffective according to Zatlin because of their textual dependency and the counter-
intuitive measures used by party bureaucrats for representing the petitions’ 
implications, were nevertheless instrumental in making the public legible to the 
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SED. Moreover, citizens staked their counter-claims on precisely the terms through 
which socialist ideology sought to re-inscribe new meanings to money, production, 
and exchange. The difference that matters, then, if one follows Zatlin’s argument, is 
the space of competition between the Deutsch Mark and the Mark der DDR within 
socialist boundaries.  This approach resonates both with anthropological studies of 
alternative currencies and multiple-currency zones in Western and non-Western 
societies (Bloch and Parry 1989; Maurer 2005; Peebles 2011; Roitman 2005), and 
with historical research on black market activities during wartime, to name a few 
examples. Moreover, it certainly reflects on many levels East German experiences 
during the late years of the GDR.   
Nevertheless, one implication of this explanation for understanding whether 
and if there was a qualitative difference between capitalism and socialism is once 
again that money has efficacy then, when it corresponds to specifically capitalist 
logics that stand outside cultural and political contexts. Zatlin explains, for example, 
that money lost its informational quality, that is, the way in which money as “price” 
indexes supply and demand in the economy, or in other words, soft vs. hard budget 
constraints. The truly perfidious practices of Honecker and Co not only made little 
economic sense, but more importantly, they robbed the socialist alternative of any 
real economic consequence. Zatlin emphasizes this point less out of any sense of 
loss for socialism and more to make the point that the discrepancy between political 
claims and economic realities has causal force in explaining the economic failures 
of socialism.  
To summarize in overly simplistic terms, socialist economic failure is 
somehow reducible to the recognition of a gap between the ideal and the real with 
political consequences. The gap, which is ultimately sustained solely by coercion, 
eventually ends in real material collapse, but also somehow generates inner (and 
effective) resistance to the system, i.e. the Monday demonstrations in Leipzig and 
what is now known as the Peaceful Revolution (in the German case). This 
corresponds quite well to the dominant narratives we know, but also to 
philosophical efforts to think about the implications of real-existing socialism for 
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questions of being and transcendence. Here I am thinking of Robinson’s discussion 
of the sovereignty literature in which difference and other depends on a negative 
third-term (Robinson 2009), as well as A. Kiarina Kordella’s compelling analysis of 
surplus, which, however, also depends implicitly upon a diagnosis of real-existing 
socialism as a bad copy of capitalism that can only be maintained through coercion 
(Kordela 2007). 
The arguments above sound quite reasonable in explaining what everyone 
knows to be socialism’s economic failures until you begin to compare how critical 
scholars of capitalism and financial markets explain the agency of money, the 
efficacy of economic theory and models, and the causal relations enabled by the 
powerful ontological claims of capitalism. To generalize from otherwise diverse 
projects emerging out of various disciplinary spaces—from the anthropology of 
finance to science studies—economic models are produced and enacted in ways that 
make markets, and market actors, align their expectations and practices with said 
models (Ho 2009; Holmes 2014; MacKenzie 2007; Mitchell 2002).52 While 
economic models and technologies continually fail, exceed their boundaries 
(externalities both material and subjective), the models nevertheless work and create 
virtual economic realities from which we as subjects find it difficult to escape.  
Resistance, contestation, even transformation is possible. Yet virtual economic 
“scapes” continue their momentum, and however visible to citizens the gaps 
between market claims and some “economic real” may become, these discrepancies 
                                                 
52
 For a discussion of virtualism and debates about this in anthropology, see Karen Ho (2009). 
Arguments about virtualism are inherently about the relationship between theory and practice 
(economic reality). Within the capitalist context, analysts disagree about this relationship—that is, 
to what extent economic theory merely represents the real or whether it creates reality in its 
image.  If one brings into focus these same terms for analyzing the economic realities of 
socialism, then the predominant framing is one in which reality never corresponded to the ideal, 
indeed that this very gap undermined socialist economic legitimacy. It is very difficult to imagine 
socialist economic theory as creating the real, forcing it to correspond to the idea. Thus, it seems 
to me that one applies very different assumptions to questions of success, failure, and the 
correspondence to the real.  Do different systems generate new relationships between the ideal 
and the real, or is capitalism better at creating illusions that disguise the real?  When do theories 
work or not work, and why? Why is it that under capitalism theories are present that can neither 
be proven nor disproven, whereas the socialist economy can be proven without a doubt to be an 
unviable alternative?   
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seem to support rather than undermine larger claims about “what is working and 
what is needed” for economic stability. While most of these studies highlight the 
multiple and surprising means through which the meanings and practices of even 
expert economic practices become dissonant with, or escape the narrow 
significations contained by any one model (or statistical representation), the excess 
seems to disappear in the many other modalities of consumer behavior and 
economic desires.  
If we return to Zatlin’s analysis of the Deutsch Mark and East German Mark 
circulating in the same national economic space, with one enacting capitalist logics 
and the other arguably socialist alternatives, then the somewhat contradictory 
conclusion that must be drawn is that capitalist currency corresponds (is adequate 
to) its theory, whereas socialist currency is not.53  So, while each currency stands on 
its own terms in reflecting its respective economic contexts, socialist money is 
nevertheless defined by lack, capitalist money by plenitude. Here I index both 
Zatlin’s argument about what I would call the competing “substances” of capitalist 
vs. socialist currency, as well as larger anthropological discussions about how 
different currencies become tied to boundary-making or consumption practices.  
How money relates to the economy as a whole—its functions and capacity to 
represent the economy, is a subject of much theoretical debate.  More importantly in 
the context of Zatlin’s approach to socialist currency specifically, one is left with the 
unanswered question of why socialist plans necessarily fail to transform or “make” 
their economic space, whereas capitalist oriented market models enact and close the 
gap between theory and reality.  What is at stake in insisting upon the self-sameness 
of the real and the ideal in one, and the non-coincidence of difference in the other? 
East German citizens are accorded agency during socialism, whether in their 
petitions or consumption practices, in calling critical attention to the gap between 
material and ideal economic circumstances.  However, many years after the treaties 
                                                 
53
 My analysis of Zatlin’s argument is informed by Bill Maurer’s discussion of adequation: 
Maurer, Bill 
 2005 Mutual Life, Limited: Islamic Banking, Alternative Currencies, Lateral Reason. 
Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 
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were signed, conversions made, jobs and livelihoods lost but new challenges 
undertaken and mastered in post-unification Germany, East Germans, in Zatlin’s 
assessment, still somehow do not know the difference between money and wealth, 
and are enmeshed in a “subsidy mentality”: 
 
“…East Germans find themselves fighting old battles. The majority struggles to 
defend the expansive welfare state that the west wants to trim, while an 
entrepreneurial minority argues for drastic limits to state intervention in the 
market. Under the thumb of western cultural hegemony, East Germans retreat 
from history into memory—a commodified past available in stores and online” 
(Zatlin 2010) 
 
Efforts to call attention to gaps are no longer welcome and are presumably drained of 
efficacy in the capitalist moment of no alternative.  However, one might compare the 
assessment above with the words of East German journalist and author, Christoph 
Dieckmann: 
  
“What advantage might East Germans have over West Germans? —The 
experience of failure, the upheaval of every aspect of life. Having to start over in 
the middle of your life, could, for others mean the end of their professional 
lives”54 
 
In working through this parallel reading, a number of counter-arguments can 
and will be made. The first counter argument against a parallel reading of monetary 
practice in capitalist and socialist market contexts is that while one marks of the 
economic from the political (independent central banks), the other is governed by 
political corruption and interests. If one is analyzing similar issues in the capitalist 
context, however, such claims are far from certain for most critical theorists 
studying expert formations in financial institutions. A second argument is one that 
posits real-existing socialism as outside modernity or at least on some prior 
evolutionary stage. Benjamin Robinson offers a salient diagnosis of this problem in 
                                                 
54
 Presseclub, Im Osten was Neues, Nov 2009 “Was haben die Ostdeutschen den westdeutschen 
vorraus? Die Erfahrung des Scheiteterns,” des Umbruch alle Lebensverhältnisse.  Mitten im 
Leben noch mal anfangen zu müssen, können, für andere war das die Beendung ihres 
Berufslebens gewesen.” 
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the German case.  A third argument even more prevalent in the dominant discursive 
space of post-unification Germany is to conjure the GDR in terms of everything 
West Germany is and the GDR is not. Most striking in this regard is the view that 
the GDR was an Unrechtsstaat, or a “Not-Legal State.” (Bickford 2011). Thus, the 
GDR is allowed little positive difference in defining any shared terrain of value and 
meaning between the competing political systems.   
A particularly vivid example of this last argument, which highlights the 
impossible place from which East Germans are allowed to speak about the socialist 
past could be seen on the German talk show, Hart aber Fair (Hard, but Fair), with 
host Frank Plasberg, on the 20-year anniversary of the Fall of the Wall.  With the 
title: Einigkeit und Recht auf Fremdheit: Wann fällt die Mauer in den Köpfen (Unity 
and Right to Foreignness: When will the Wall in the Heads Fall) (air date: Nov 4, 
2009),55 two West German and three East German panelists, all public figures, were 
asked to provide commentary, a kind of “state of the nation.”  While there is much 
to be critical of in assessing how such talk shows are framed and organized, the 
panel discussion vividly reflected the open wounds that unfortunately always get 
relegated to the status of “different mentalities.” The East German cabaret artist 
from Dresden, Uwe Steimle, when pressed multiple times to speak to the question 
of whether the GDR was an “Unrechtsstaat,” was forced to say yes, but: 
“…natürlich war die DDR ein Unrechtsstaat—in dem es aber auch Gerechtigkeit 
gab.  Und wir hier leben in einem Rechtsstaat mit viel Ungerechtigkeit (… of course 
the GDR was a not-legal/unjust State—in which justice was also present. And we 
live here in this Rechtsstaat where there is much injustice).” 
For East Germans who lived in both “systems,” there is now a greater 
urgency to show that the same qualitative differences must belong to both systems. 
Yet the West German response of relegating ethical relations under socialism to the 
status of non-identity ironically re-inscribes a substantial difference to socialism 
after the fact.  There is a kind of inversion in insisting upon difference, where the 
policing of system boundaries has become the critical concern of the West, with the 
                                                 
55
 Transcriptions and translations mine 
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socialist Other—those who lived “real-existing socialism”—forced to both affirm 
the absolute difference of their past while aspiring to sameness in the present.   
Crucially, East Germans find little possibility for inhabiting an analytic voice of 
economic evaluation. To return to the panel discussion introduced above, the following 
exchange between West German author Wolfgang Herles and East German journalist 
Andrea Elis is illustrative of the way in which East German experiences of economy are 
disqualified.  Particularly striking for me was the toxic nature of the exchange, especially 
on the part of Wolfgang Herles, as both authors have worked together in the past on a 
book about West/East German stereotypes. The argument circles around the question of a 
“right to work” which the Round Table of the New Forum56 wished to add to a collective 
constitution between East and West Germany—had the formal route of political union 
been taken as outlined in the West German Grundgesetz. Instead, the accession option 
was used, and East Germans adopted the West German Basic Law.   
 
Herles: it is a good thing that we did not create a new collectively written 
constitution then, at least not with such demands that would have destroyed this 
(our) economic system, especially considering that it was the GDR that fell apart, 
and not the Bonn Republic.57 
Elis: Jetzt kommt es... (Here we go…) 
Herles: It was important that the Bonn Republic was the guiding model, not one 
to one, but still the guiding model.  You reinforce my point that there are 
differences in mentality, you have a completely different mentality than we do 
[referring to the other West German panelist], this is unfortunately observable).58 
…. 
                                                 
56
 The New Forum (Neues Forum) was the grass roots political movement of East German 
citizens that emerged out of protests against the socialist state in 1989. Former members who 
remained politically active after 1989 eventually became part of the Green party in Germany 
(Bündnis 90/die Grünen).   
57
 “es war gut das damals keine gemeinsame Verfassung gemacht würde,  jedenfalls nicht mit 
solchen Forderungen die dieses Wirtschaftssystem zerstört hätte,  und da   wo die DDR 
zusammengebrochen ist und nicht die Bonner Republik” 
58
 “war es wichtig das die Bonner Republik das Leitmotiv war, nicht eins zu eins aber doch das 
Leitmodell.  Sie bestätigen mich, es gibt Mentalitätunterschiede, eine ganz andere Mentalität als 
wir beide,  es ist leider festzustellen” 
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Elis: I think that a collectively agreed upon constitution would have given East 
Germans the sense that they were taken seriously in the unification process and I 
don’t believe-59 
Herles: -If you had begun the process of reform in the GDR before you smashed 
it at the feet of the West60 
(– A taken-aback exclamation from audience member in background) 
Elis: I don’t believe that [our contribution] would have only consisted of 
nonsense and I personally—and perhaps this does have something to do with my 
past in the GDR—find that a right to work and an obligation to do so not such a 
bad-61 
Herles: That is nonsense and has no place in a constitution. You have no clue 
about economics, sorry62 
Elis:  … in a third labor market that ensures that the unemployed do not sit 
neglected in front of the television and that they occupy themselves is a better 
option.  But what your stance shows is, true to the motto that these small, pokey63 
East German citizens should be happy they were even permitted the opportunity 
to accede to the West, and this is an attitude that is inacceptable 20 years after-64 
Herles: I didn’t mean- (so hab ich gar nicht) 
…. The discussion moves on, other panelists involved. But Andrea Elis returns to 
the subject discussed above: 
Elis: I would like to make a minor addendum, this is important to me, you said 
just now along the lines that the GDR was bankrupt and what more do you 
want—and this is a great problem, and why East Germans still feel frustrated or 
devalued (entwertet) because that means—the GDR was bankrupt, true, but all 
the people who lived and worked there are at the same time losers and those who 
                                                 
59
 “ich denke eine gemeinsame Verfassung hätte schon den ostdeutschen oder den ehemaligen 
DDR-Bürgern das Gefühl gegeben dass auch sie in diesen Vereinigungsprozess  ernstgenommen 
werden und ich glaube nicht-“ 
60
 -hätten sie doch die DDR erst mal reformiert bevor sie sich einfach so dem Westen vor die 
Füße geknallt haben wie sie es getan haben 
61
 “ich glaube nicht dass  nur  Unsinn darin  gestanden hätte  und ich persönlich— und das hat 
vielleicht mit meiner Vergangenheit in der DDR zu tun—finde ein Recht auf Arbeit und eine 
Verpflichtung dazu gar nicht so schlecht” 
62
 das ist doch Unsinn in einer Verfassung da haben Sie keine Ahnung von Marktwirtschaft, sorry 
63
 The term punzlig is used in conjunction with a Christmas saying about the Dresdner Christmas 
Market, and seems to be a word from the Saxony dialect. I have not been able to locate a direct 
translation of this yet.    
64
 “in einem dritten Arbeitsmarkt die dafür sorgt das man nicht vom Fernsehen verwahrlost und 
dass sie eben beschäftigt sind ist für mich die bessere Option aber was sich schon zeigt es zu 
dieser Haltung so nach dem Motto diesen kleinen punzligen DDR Bürger können mal froh sein 
das sie uns  irgendwie beitreten durften und dass ist eine Haltung wie finde ich geht überhaupt 
nicht 20 Jahre nach-” 
  311 
are clueless about the economy and so on, still this is how [your stance] comes 
across…65 
 
Andrea Elis’s use of the term entwertet (devalued) is telling here, especially in the 
context in which she uses it—to refer to the conflation of East Germans with economic 
bankruptcy and lack of economic value. The term is typically used when referring to 
stamping one’s ticket, but is also used in association with invalidating coins 
(cutting/marking them to show they are no longer legal tender).    
While this discussion on public television may give the impression that such 
sentiments are easily and often expressed in Germany, whether publicly or 
privately, this was definitely not the case during my fieldwork. That is what makes 
this interaction literally knife-like in its abandonment of political correctness and the 
far more typical state silence.  During my fieldwork and interviews, it was 
extremely difficult for East German respondents to articulate their sense of second-
class citizenship in terms that either completely embraced or entirely rejected 
dominant notions represented here about West German economic superiority.   
 To bring together once again the arguments about money’s gaps and how 
these are understood and analyzed differently in socialist and capitalist framings of 
economic agency, on what new grounds can critiques of capitalism take root?  This 
dissertation may likely not produce the definitive answer to this question.  I do, 
however, aim to make a case for arguing that the case is not yet settled, nor can it be 
if we continue to relegate the socialist project to a failed past.  In other words, (post) 
socialism is not a mere problem of area studies, but must be re-theorized in 
relationship to larger discussions of capitalism, liberal democracy, and modernity.   
                                                 
65
 “ich möchte eine kleine Ergänzung noch machen, es ist mir auch sehr wichtig, sie sagten eben 
so nebenbei nach dem Motto die DDR war bankrott und was wollten sie überhaupt und das ist ein 
großes Problem warum viele Ostdeutsche immer noch frustriert sind oder sich entwertet fühlen 
weil das nämlich heißt dass die DDR war bankrott richtig aber alle  die da gelebt und gearbeitet 
haben sind eben dann gleichzeitig die Verlierer  und diejenigen die keine Ahnung haben von 
Wirtschaft und soweiter, doch so kommt es an…”   
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 I end this section of by quoting at length A. Kiarina Kordela’s central 
argument in her book, Surplus. Spinoza, Lacan, which I believe is quite relevant for 
thinking through what alternatives might mean:66 
“If metaphysics, as Zizek rightly complains, is marked by the inability to 
make the transition from the epistemological deadlock to the ontological, this is 
precisely because, even after Marx’s analysis of the commodity and his 
articulation of commodity fetishism, metaphysics remains reluctant to draw the 
conclusion that Thought and Being share one and the same form. Thus, 
metaphysics has also always failed to understand that a formal restructuring in 
economy goes hand-in-hand with a formal epistemological and ontological 
restructuring  
 To be sure, at least since the Enlightenment, no political revolution ever 
omitted reference to a concomitant cultural revolution.  But I do not know of any 
revolution, however Marxist in its conception it may have claimed to be, that ever 
took into account the surplus–except, of course, for the resolute intention to 
eliminate it. But you can eliminate surplus-value only if you also eliminate 
surplus–enjoyment, which also means to substitute hegemony and ideologically 
based modes of noncoercive coercion for straightforward coercion. (Stalinism was 
a historically necessary consequence of the Bolshevist determination to eliminate 
the surplus).  Given that, as I have shown, capitalism is not an ontological 
necessity but one of the theoretically infinite manifestations of being and thought 
within the realm of the possible as determined by them, the only other alternative 
for Marxians, therefore, is to rethink communism as an economic, political, and 
cultural system that includes the surplus on all levels” (Kordela 2007). 
                                                 
66
 For now I leave to one side the question of “negative differential substance,” which may 
contradict the possibility of “positive substance” important to Benjamin Robinson’s analysis of 
socialist ontology. Kordela’s diagnosis of the problem also suggests that both capitalist and 
socialist systems have so far shared the same intellectual problem, and that socialism as it came to 
be manifested in a place like East Germany could not transcend the capitalist system, or truly 
become other, because it never relinquished capitalists practices, despite its ideological claims to 
the contrary. This is in fact Jonathan Zatlin’s argument, though in making it he ascribes an 
efficacy to liberal economic theories of money and economy that many anthropological analyses 
of economy call into question!   
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Capitalism’s new Crises: “Injunctions of Marx”67 
 
In the fall of 2010 the German broadcasting network ZDF aired the second of its 
popular history series, Die Deutschen (The Germans), with prominent host and resident 
historian, Guido Knopp.  It is not going too far to say that Guido Knopp has become the 
face of history on German television.  The series aims to reinforce both a factual 
engagement with history while also reinserting some elements of pride in key figures that 
have contributed to German history on a broad scale.  The largely unspoken subtext of 
the whole series is that now, finally, it is possible to revisit German history beyond the 
Holocaust.  Many Germans tend to feel ambivalent rather than celebratory of the German 
past.  Episode seven, Karl Marx und die Klassenkampf (Karl Marx and Class Conflict), 
was devoted to Germany’s arguably tmost controversial figure Karl Marx.  
 In my discussion below, I analyze the concluding five minutes of the episode, 
most of which is devoted to tracing Marx in his own time.  The entire episode warrants 
analysis.  Especially notable throughout the episode is a favorite German representative 
trope: Marx is a theorist of money who is himself always in debt, while Engels is the 
practical business man and benefactor of Marx and his family, making Marx’s work 
possible financially in the first place.  For my purposes here, however, I want to call 
attention to the absent presence of the GDR and its larger meaning for German 
experience (beyond dictatorship, Stasi, and a failing economy).   
Much as Derrida foresaw in his 1994 book, Specters of Marx, the series tries to 
separate Marx the philosopher and intellectual from the outcome of his ideas in real 
existing socialism.  At the same time, however, the suggestion is made that the horrible 
outcome of the Cold War is somehow immanent to Marx’s ideas.  The episode sums this 
up as follows:68  
 
                                                 
67
 This is also the title of a chapter in Derrida’s book, Specters of Marx, which anticipates 
precisely the kinds of narratives about Marx and Marxism analyzed here. Derrida, Jacques 
 1994 Specters of Marx: The State of the Debt, the Work of Mourning, and the New 
International. P. Kamuf, transl. New York and London: Routledge.  
68
 Transcriptions and translations are mine.  
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Narrator: ‘His name will live on across the centuries, and so too, his work,’ his 
friend Friedrch Engels writes in Marx’s obituary, and in this was correct. Long 
after the death of their creator, Marx’s words bear fruit, there where Marx least 
expected.  In the Russian agrarian province Marx’s admirer Lenin establishes in 
1917 his dictatorship of the proletariat.  Borrowing from Marx’s texts, of which 
he possesses little knowledge.  Fragments of theory become the seal of approval 
for a tyranny of which Marx would never have approved.69 
 
Here Marx is invoked as a German scholar worthy of respect whose ideas will (and have) 
outlive Marx himself.  Marx’s ideas are taken up piecemeal by others (Lenin) in 
problematic ways, but this is framed in terms of “bearing fruit,” and thus underscoring 
the immanence of totalitarianism in Marx’s ideas.  Marx biographer, Rolf Hosfeld, hints 
at this while also reclaiming Marx: 
 
Rolf Hosfeld: Marx is a figure of the European Worker’s Movements of the 19th 
century Soviet and Chinese communism are products of the great Catastrophe’s of 
the 20th century and if these had not found the Marx label, they would have found 
another.70 
Narrator: In the end the monstrous experiment fails that nevertheless bears 
Marx’s name.71 
Rolf Hosfeld: In Marx there are aspects that point in an undemocratic direction, 
but that doesn’t mean that certain questions raised by Marx and that preoccupy us 
even still and that is the question about the instability of our economic system, 
and it is this question that drove Marx and continues to drive us today.72  
 
                                                 
69
 German Text: “Sein Name wird durch die Jahrhunderte fortleben, und so auch sein Werk, ruft 
Friedrich Engels sein Freund nach und sollte damit Recht behalten.  Lange nach dem Tod des 
Urhebers geht die Saat seine Worte auf, dort wo Marx es am wenigsten erwartet hat.  Im 
russischen Agrarland errichtet sein Bewunderer Lenin 1917 eine Diktatur das Proletariats.  
Entlehnt von Marx dessen Schriften den er nur zum geringsten teil kennt.  Fragmente der Theorie 
werden  zum Gütesiegel für eine Gewaltherrschaft wie Marx sie niemals gebilligt hätte” 
70
 German Text: “Marx ist eine Figur der europäische Arbeiterbewegung des 19. Jahrhunderts.  
Der sowjetischen und auch chinesische Kommunismus sind Produkte der großen Katastrophen 
des 20. Jahrhunderts und wenn sie das Etikett Marx nicht gefunden hätten dann hätten sie 
wahrscheinlich ein anderes Etikett gefunden” 
71
 German Text: Am Ende scheitert das monströse Experiment dass gleichwohl seinen Namen 
trägt.  Ist es mit dem Fall von Mauern und Ideologien auch der Vordenker erledigt? 
72
 German Text: Es gibt Aspekte die in einer undemokratischen Richtung verweisen bei Marx 
was aber nicht heißt  das nicht bestimmte Fragen  die Marx gestellt hat uns heute nach wie vor 
beschäftigen und dass es in erster Linie die Frage nach der Instabilität unseres 
Wirtschaftssystems… das diese Frage ihn umgetrieben hat und sie treibt uns heute immer noch 
um.   
  315 
In between these remarks, the narrator has placed the socialist experiment in the context 
of the great regimes: 
 
Narrator: Follower and inhuman tyrant Stalin also understood himself as 
inheritor of Marx. After Mao’s rise to power in China half of humankind was 
governed by regimes that invoke Marx, who himself once said slyly, “I can only 
say one thing, that I am not a Marxist...’73 
 
Images of Stalin and Mao flash by, with some iconic images of the GDR mixed in, such 
as a sign of Marx with thumbs up pronouncing one of those ubiquitous socialist 
aphorisms, “Weiter so! Eure Bilanz ist gut. 1818-1978 (Keep it up! Your balance sheet is 
good. 1818-1978).”  An iconic image from the peaceful revolution in Leipzig flashes  by, 
where young demonstrators hold up a self-made transparency calling for ein offenes Land 
für freie Menschen (an open land for free people), only to have it brutally ripped away 
from plain-clothes Stasi agents.   
 In the documentary, the GDR is notably absent from the narration and the entire 
contextualization of Marx’s legacy, despite it very clearly comprising the sub-text for the 
narrative frame. For better or worse, the GDR is written out, a few images marking its 
absence.  No attempt is made to place Marx explicitly within the larger socialist project in 
the GDR.  The humorous quote from Marx, “I am not a Marxist,’ performs a double 
function; the philosopher is once again separated from the presumed historical outcome 
of his ideas, and more importantly, the contemporary concern with who (and what) is 
“left” is hinted at, can be read much in the same ambivalent way as the graffiti discussed 
above.  Economic critiques of capitalism in Germany, and of unification in particular, 
straddle this line of a shared intellectual legacy with Marx, yet are continually re-located 
within the left (especially the political left as embodied by the far-left German party, Die 
Linke).74 
                                                 
73
 German Text: Auch Nachfolger Stalin der Menschen verachtender Tyrann versteht sich als 
Erbe von Marx.  Nach Maos Machtantritt in China wird die Hälfte der Menschheit  von Regimen 
regiert  die sich auf den deutschen Denker berufen Doch der  Einmal listig vorgebeugt,  “Ich kann 
nur eins sagen ich bin kein Marxist…..” 
74
 The party, die Linke, is a union of the East and West German socialist parties. 
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Predictably, perhaps, the episode ends by invoking the ghosts of Marx (and the 
GDR?). The scholarly experts can’t dismiss Marx’s usefulness for the present, but remind 
us at the same time that Marx supplies no substantial answer to our crisis-ridden present.    
 
Rolf Hosfeld: Much of what Marx analyzed sounds more timely than ever.  [a 
quote from Marx: “Every stock market cheat knows that the storm will hit 
sometime, but each hopes it will only hit the head of his neighbor.”75 
Eva Weisweiller, (Historian): Marx has no answers to our crisis, but he shows 
us that it makes sense for us to fundamentally reflect on the problems of our 
crises—and Marx shows us how to do this.  Marx is the method, not the answer.76 
Narrator: And so it seems that Karl Marx will remain with us as explainer of the 
world and specter.77 
 
Taken on its own, this historical treatment of Marx engages with many of the 
important intellectual debates surrounding Marx’s critique of capitalism, and does so by 
arguing, even if ambivalently, for Marx’s continued relevance.  However, it does so by 
foreclosing any possibility that experiences of socialism in the GDR, or the economic 
ruptures caused by Unification, might contribute something meaningful to the analysis.78 
By now the reader might ask whether, and to what extent East German contributors were 
involved in the production of the documentary.  That is an important question for further 
investigation.  What I can say here, based on countless other such public panel 
discussions, exhibitions, and media representations I encountered during my fieldwork, 
East German involvement in the production would likely not preclude any nuanced East 
German inflections from ending up on the cutting room floor.     
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 German Text: Vieles was Marx analysiert hat klingt aktueller den je. [quoting Marx] ‘Jeder 
Aktienschwindler weist das das Unwetter einmal schlagen muss aber jeder hofft das es das Haupt 
seiner nächsten trifft.   Nach uns die Sintflut ist der Wahlspruch jedes Kapitalisten.’ 
76
 Marx hat keine Antworten auf unsere Krise  aber er zeigt uns dass es Sinn macht uns mit 
unseren Problemen mit unseren Krisen fundamental Auseinander zusetzen und Marx zeigt wie 
man sowas macht.   Marx ist die Methode, nicht die Antwort.    
77
 Und wie es aussieht wird Karl Marx uns weiterhin erhalten bleiben als Welterklärer und als 
Schreckgespenst. 
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 Also notable: Rolf Hosfeld and Eva Weisweiller are both West German scholars. I don’t want 
to belabor this point, or read more into it than necessary. However, it is a prevalent pattern in the 
German intellectual and academic contexts.   
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Chapter 8: Conclusion 
On being untimely: Accounting for Europe’s remainders 
 
Currency Anxiety (a view from 2012) 
In his recent book, Europe’s Unfinished Currency: The Political Economics of the 
Euro, former chief economist of Deutsche Bank, Thomas Mayer (Mayer 2012) highlights 
a certain paradox. The euro was supposed to bring and ensure peace in Europe. But peace 
had in fact already arrived long before the euro. For Mayer, the euro in its current form is 
bringing about the opposite. In other words, the logics have been overturned. “Peace 
arrived too early,” so to speak. Or did the euro arrive too late to the ‘end of history’? The 
end of the Cold War was thought to be such an end. Or was it? 
Mayer prefaces his discussion of the end of the Cold War with a quote made in 
1987 by French presidential advisor Jacques Attali, in response to German officials:  
‘Let us now talk about the German atom bomb.’ 
[German response]:’You know we don’t have the atomic bomb—what do you 
mean?’ 
‘I mean the D-Mark.79  
Mayer characterizes the end of German division as a “watershed event for the 
world [that] also fundamentally changed the nature of European integration.” One key 
reason, according to Mayer, is that “the prospect of re-unifying Germany opened the door 
for the country to give up its beloved D-Mark—a symbol of its post-World War II 
economic and political achievements.”80 Mayer deploys an oft-cited trope (for some, of 
mythic status), whereby the Deutsch Mark had to be bargained away in exchange for 
international permission to unify East and West Germany. Scholars have offered different 
assessments of this narrative. My concern here is not to establish the validity of the story 
so much as to mark the resonance of the story itself. It resonates in part, I think, because 
it reformulates the German national story as one of ‘becoming whole again’ while also 
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 from David Marsh 2009, cited in Mayer 2012: loc426 
80
 Mayer, loc426 
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undercutting that gesture by sacrificing the symbolic resource that made this most visibly 
possible. 
Similarly, historian Andreas Rödder also refers to Jacques Attali’s statement in 
his 2012 LSE lecture, ‘From Kaiser Wilhelm to Chancellor Merkel: The German 
Question on the European Stage.’ It sets the tone of European politics on the eve of the 
eastern European revolutions in 1989. In Rödder’s assessment, the German question in 
Europe has revolved fundamentally around (West) German economic strength. He notes: 
 
“…the German economy performed by far the strongest amongst European 
economies in the 80’s…while Germany managed to create economic prosperity 
without comparable social collateral damage, the Bundesbank fought the risk of 
inflation by applying high interest rates, thus putting pressure on other European 
economies. Kohl realized that German economic success revealed a formidable 
reverse, as he said in 1989, serious, very serious psychological dislocations. 
Francois Mitterand’s advisor Jacques Attali put it even more clearly. German 
power relies on its economy, Attali wrote, and the D-Mark is Germany’s nuclear 
bomb. Thus, the founding of the European monetary Union became a pivotal 
moment in the history of Germany and Europe.” (Rödder, LSE Lecture, 2012) 
 
At a time when the euro is in crisis, both Mayer and Rödder offer a symptomatic 
reading of German understandings of the euro project. The specter of German hegemony 
appears on the very scene that was supposed to banish it for good. By invoking Attali’s 
metaphoric link between West German currency and apocalyptic warfare, Mayer and 
Rödder therefore signal how German participation in the single currency project resides 
in the logic of the double bind: ‘doing too much may do as much harm as too little.’ The 
euro project oscillates between deferral of and insistence on German priorities in shaping 
it.   
German Unification is clearly crucial to the European project, both within and 
outside Germany. As is well known, Germany ‘becoming’ one again generated 
considerable anxiety among West Germany’s allies and co-participants in the European 
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project during the events of 1989/90. For them, German Unity equaled economic 
hegemony, while from the German perspective, I would argue that the immense costs of 
unification could be used to deflect resentment and demonstrate commitment to 
deepening integration within Europe.  
I would also like to add another dimension to this ‘national’ narrative, from the 
vantage point of the present, and grounded very much in my own research. In many 
descriptions of the effects of the 1990 currency union on the struggling East German 
economy, the force of the D-Mark is conveyed in similarly catastrophic terms: an atomic 
bomb, the big bang, a currency storm. It is as if the fears of Attali were visited upon ones’ 
own people. But in 1990 East Germans were effectively citizens of a different state and 
society. Economic collapse was the ‘collateral damage’ of altering the socio-monetary 
order of the GDR ‘overnight.’ This dimension of unification has often been blurred. It 
nonetheless could provide an important reference for understanding how the painful 
aspects of this social reordering and economic rupture were differently (and 
disproportionately) experienced in the former east and west.  
 
Hauntings 
 
A story recounted by the German investigative journalist Dirk Laabs in his recent 
book entitled, “The German Gold Rush: The Real Story of the Treuhand” resonates here 
(Laabs 2012)81 The place is East Berlin. The time is the 6th of October 1989 (a month 
before the fall of the Berlin Wall). A group of dissident scientists and citizen activists met 
to discuss where the German Democratic Republic might be headed, and what could be 
done to make necessary reforms. A banker in this group is reported as saying:  
"Let's see how long the Soviet soldiers would maintain order when a 100 Deutsch 
Mark note takes command. We imagine an army invasion. But it could also be that the 
soldiers are Deutschmark coins and the sergeants are 10-Mark notes. Then there are the 
Officers: they are the Fifty,- Hundred,- and Five Hundred notes. This army is already at 
the border and GDR citizens will call, 'come to us.' What if the Deutsch Mark army really 
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 Translations mine. 
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does take command? How do we protect ourselves against such an invasion?" (8) 
According to Dirk Laabs, the research group documents these observations in a 
report that "predicts exactly what would happen to the GDR in the next years." The group 
also comes up with the idea of an institution (a Treuhand) "that would protect the 
People's property in the GDR from the Deutsch Mark Invasion army."  
This story references and foreshadows the German currency union of 1990 and its 
unruly remainders, which, as I argue in my larger project, haunt the European monetary 
project. Questions of sovereignty, local sustainability, and the financial transfers that 
manage asymmetries between regions that share a common currency have been 
internalized as a project of national reconstruction because West Germany subsumed the 
East German state. As a threshold event, the currency union of 1990 and the setting of the 
exchange rate between west and east German currencies at the rate of 1:1 re-staged 
longstanding philosophical problems in thinking about money’s adequacy and its 
mediation of value. In a terribly ironic fashion it performed Marx’s insight about the 
equivalent form as also a relation of inequality. By overvaluing and suggesting an 
appreciation in value it paradoxically served as a form of devaluation and de-
legitimization at the same time.  
Moreover, the currency union is understood as a site of East German agency 
which, like a Greek tragedy, was its own undoing. It set into motion many other problems 
of setting a value to an entire economy that quite literally came to an end. It was a settling 
of accounts. It became caught up in the question of how a currency represents and enacts 
a particular value of what is understood as the “real economy.” It is this fraught 
relationship that the logics of currency unions presuppose and materialize.  
What is at stake here is not the familiar opposition of money to the social; rather it 
is how money is always already a basis from which the potential of local sustainability is 
part of a complex financial infrastructure made up of multiple agents and consequences. 
Like many other ironies, the Treuhand was an East German creation that, in a radical 
reversal, became the institution that (privatized) or auctioned off East German assets, 
leaving only 6% in East German ownership. How to understand the value of those assets 
exceeds narrow categories and distinctions between credit and debt, the temporality of 
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value as process.  
Why is this story relevant to the current euro crisis? German Unification in 1990 
ended the Cold War and propelled the European project of integration forward. The 
currency union that effectively joined Capitalist West and Socialist East German 
economies has been narrated as a singular event. Politically it signified Germany’s 
redemption and re-inclusion into the community of European nations. But from an 
economic standpoint, the 1990 currency union has been analyzed as Unification’s most 
profound failure. As many have noted about post-war West German identity, the West 
German Mark embodied economic stability and substituted for a discredited national 
identity. East German desire for the Deutsch Mark served as a powerful recognition of 
the West German success story and superior economic status. However, many in the 
West anticipated that the introduction of the Deutsch Mark to the East would be a 
destructive force, since it exposed a closed economy immediately to the world market. 
The currency union set into motion an economic shock from which the East has not 
recovered, more than 20 years later. It erased the very basis through which a locally 
sustainable recovery would be possible. Thus, the Deutsch Mark revalorized post-war 
German identity, but paradoxically it also repeated the history of monetary trauma in the 
East, for which it was understood as also the remedy.  
This story is absent from current discussions of the euro crisis and German elites 
responses to it. Let me now turn to what I view as re-stagings of these ambivalent 
histories as they are playing out in the German discursive landscape in which the euro 
crisis is debated.  
 
Euro re-stagings: Marking Monetary Crisis 
 
Since 2009 the euro sovereign debt crisis has dominated international news and 
the speculative energies of financial markets. How are the conflicts and tensions 
underlying experiences of German Unification mapped onto otherwise diverse economic 
problem spaces of other member states that use the euro? For elite proponents the euro is 
a project that must be ardently defended as the basis for future economic stability and 
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intra-European peace and cooperation. Elite detractors, and not a few economists, argue 
that the euro in its current form is undermining that very possibility. In the eyes of the 
European public at large, it seems as if the monetary logics are reversed. It is the euro, 
and not the human subjects who use it, that must be saved on a daily basis. Instead of 
subsuming and deflecting national differences, the euro is re-inscribing these into new 
discursive repertoires of particularizing money.   
Based on my earlier research, new explanatory modes of arguing about the euro 
are entangled in and constitutive of economic policy proposals and expert knowledge 
practices. For instance, Euro banknotes were supposed to materialize European and not 
nationally specific iconography. As subjects use monetary media, such iconography may 
be taken for granted, thus seeming irrelevant to monetary policy. Nonetheless, both 
European and German central banks design extensive communications campaigns to 
reach the broad public by building trust in the euro through the security features of 
banknotes, literally built in to the iconography of bridges and gates. Thomas Malaby 
made a related argument in his ethnographic study of the euro changeover in Greece: 
“The appearance of the euro necessitated particular practices of knowing, handling, and 
using the new currency, and these practices led to the proposals of certain truths” 
(Malaby 2003). Specifically, negotiating new prices denominated in euros led to a 
“refiguring of value” in relation to commodities. For Greeks, practices of indeterminacy 
(rounding up or down) in making change were replaced by precise reckoning in daily 
transactions. Malaby viewed this as a form of demonstrating euro competence, and 
thereby belonging in the EU. Situated practices such as these may now be met by some 
with skepticism given the media representations of Greek corruption and financial 
profligacy. Here I want to make the case, then, that in moments of crisis it is not 
surprising that the euro is a medium through which new rhetorical repertoires of marking 
difference might materialize. To paraphrase one German politician from the CDU/CSU 
coalition (Volker Kauder), who recently remarked in frustration, ‘we don’t refer to the 
US financial crisis as a dollar crisis, why are the sovereign debt problems in Europe a 
euro crisis?’ (Maybritt Illner, 13. 09. 2012) Below I trace some of the discursive 
repertoires through which monetary value is being marked and particularized in public 
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discourses in Germany. It should be noted that such tropes circulate within a well-worn 
terrain in which East Germany has become an object of accounting. 
Greece has the wrong money, it is said. It is now unlikely that its own strength 
can generate a repayment of debt. The debt grows exponentially by the day. What is the 
solution? Will a return to the Drachma return Greece to strength? Will it instead cripple 
the country even more? Tropes abound. ‘It is a choice between pest and cholera.’ ‘Better 
an end with terror, than terror with no end.’ Old stereotypes have been reanimated. 
Greeks want Germans to return the national wealth brutally expropriated by the Nazis. 
Germans must pay for Greeks who have lived beyond their means. Low wages and the 
social depreciation of Hartz IV are the wages of Germanness, applying pressure 
elsewhere, creating the new economic miracle at home. The solution to the euro crisis has 
an uncanny presence: the German model universalized to all. The euro is system-relevant. 
It is too big to fail. Saving the euro is a bank bailout in disguise. Aid packages do not 
reach the people, while austerity cuts like a knife. The public believes they are paying for 
the debts of foreign others. But are these credits, payments, or unending future 
obligations? It is a “cup without a bottom.” It is no longer a union of transformation, but 
of transfers. The language evokes an eastern Other that is strangely absent. Whether 
present or absent, the currency union of 1990 puts one in a double bind. New debts were 
changed into old ones. Potential value collapsed into its void. There was a surplus, but no 
one quite knows where it went. But westwards is the most probably direction.  
The euro is a currency ‘created out of nothing.’ It is without a past. Old national 
currencies in their anteriority entice. An untroubled unwinding of present monetary 
entanglements is imagined to shift the past into the future. The EU worked just fine 
before the euro, it is remembered. The EU can persist in a post-euro world. For others, 
though, the end of the euro is the end of Europe (does it coincide with the EU?). An exit 
from the euro bodes the unexpected, the incalculable, a financial collapse of 
unimaginable proportions. It was once said that plans were made to transform capitalism 
into socialism, but no one thought about how to turn socialism back into capitalism. 
Many plans have led to the euro, but no plans exist on how it might retreat. A currency 
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union unwound the socialist plan, but it posed uncomfortable questions of how capitalist 
value comes to be in the first place.  
Many outside Germany resent the dogmatic morality tales dispensed to member 
states perceived as resisting reform. Most have forgotten the troubled history 
inaugurating Aufbau Ost (building up the east). Then, order was unraveling and a 
currency union was the subject of intense debate. Asymmetries were evident and would 
only be intensified with the introduction of the Deutsch Mark to the East. The 1990 
currency union was undertaken without convergence. According to monetary logics, the 
GDR posed problems. Greece was not the first.    
Technical and legal measures such as the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) 
have recently captured lay and expert ponderings alike. Heated discussions about the 
obligations that lurk behind parliamentary language and macro-economic models create 
division even as new and unlikely alliances are formed. The broad public demands a 
voice in the crisis management. When asked if they understand the matters to be decided 
upon, language falters. Experts interpret the same data in different and contradictory 
readings. Expert critiques of the euro in Germany resound in uncanny repetition of old 
essentialisms that both frighten and compel (Hankel 2007; Sarrazin 2012)82. The 
economic arguments might be sound and exude disinterested intentions. Yet they also 
imagine an unproblematic severing of intra-European entanglements. Moreover, the 
trajectory of revitalizing East German regions is uncertain in these visions, even as a 
Unified Germany signifies its power and dominance externally. Those who wish to 
safeguard and preserve the euro at all costs trouble even more as austerity and morality 
are cloaked in the language of peace, security, and futurity. Might these future visions 
also reroute the European vision to the scarred terrain of the past? If saving the euro is a 
bank bailout in disguise, then it brings to the fore the non-neutrality of financial 
instruments as measures are resisted on national terms.    
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Ambiguous Debts, Temporal Conjunctures 
 
The euro debt crisis has reactivated visions of closer political and fiscal union 
between European member nations. Current tensions of national citizenry in EU member 
states highlight the crucial absence of a European public space. Topics like monetary 
policy or labor mobility are framed in largely national terms and explained to the public 
by national politicians and media venues. Thus, rather than leading to a decline of the 
nation state, the European Union has only served to reconfigure national sentiments and 
prejudices. Anti-German sentiments in Greece are growing, just as German frustrations 
about paying for other EU-member states must placed in the context of extreme social 
inequalities that have arisen within Germany, and between East and West German 
regions in particular. Precisely because of decreasing wages in relation to labor 
productivity in Germany, other EU member states have struggled to compete with 
Germany in the European single market. Germany’s export boom is the inverse of 
economic decline in countries like Greece, Spain and Portugal. The need for tighter fiscal 
and social union between member states to solve the debt crisis must therefore be 
critically and collaboratively unpacked.   
German proposals for Greece and Greek responses have (in my view) invoked 
intra-German debates about the costs of Unification. Given the complexities and dis-
junctures of integration within Germany, a comparative perspective on German and 
European monetary logics seems in order. While not losing sight of their historical and 
geographic particularity, analysis of the monetary visions that have animated such 
ambivalent inclusionary projects might illuminate competing visions of the euro’s future. 
The economic and monetary logics surrounding both the German Democratic 
Republic and Greece’s inclusion in currency regimes is believed by many analysts to 
have deepened rather than remedied existing asymmetries. For instance, it is often 
remarked that Greece should not have been allowed membership in the euro since it was 
only through accounting trickery that it appeared to meet the necessary criteria of 
convergence. However, East Germany’s accession to the Federal Republic of Germany 
offers an important parallel given that this also meant membership in the EU, and thus 
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immediate inclusion in a hard-currency regime for which no necessary steps of economic 
convergence had been met. As my historical and ethnographic research on German 
monetary union brought into focus, one of the few and deeply marginalized modes for 
reclaiming monetary value has been through the lens of moral arguments of equivalence 
(Bahrmann 2005; Laabs 2012; Most 2009; Wenzel 2006 (2000)). Precisely those domains 
that are felt to escape narrow accounting and the setting of exchange rates, such as 
reparations and external historical contexts in which some economies thrive and others 
decline, have been the basis of such arguments.  
 References to East German payments of reparations were already deployed in the 
1990 Monday demonstrations in Leipzig. As a moral argument about value it has 
generated critique and sympathy alike, in west and east. Whereas West Germany could 
rebuild in 1948 with the aid of the Marshall Plan, East Germany paid the entirety of 
German reparations to the Soviet Union, which included the dismantling, not 
reconstruction, of industrial infrastructure. Because East Germany’s economic failure is 
viewed primarily through the lens of socialism and dictatorship, such subaltern analyses, 
though supported by West German sources, tend to be minimized and dismissed. 
Whereas East German respondents have deployed reparations to revalorize their labors in 
the GDR, Greeks have called attention to unpaid reparations by Germany as a moral 
reminder of national asymmetries and their historical causes, paradoxically fracturing the 
post-war peace rhetoric in which the euro continues to be authorized. Reparations are a 
site of contestation and evidence precisely because they highlight the irrationality of 
capitalism, in which peace and war can be equally justified by monetary projects of 
inclusion. The shared currency regime has thus re-opened old wounds, as Greek anti-
German sentiments materialize.  
In both German and European projects, analysts have argued that a strong 
currency further intensifies existing divergence in the economic areas to be joined. In this 
sense, the relative value of currency is thought to reflect and index the “real” economy. In 
cases where a strong currency joins structurally strong and weak economic areas, 
currency becomes a destructive and inflexible agent of disequilibrium. While East 
Germany was unified with the West in the absence of any convergence (as mentioned 
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above), criteria for euro membership aimed, in theory, to prevent such cases. The 
presupposition was that convergence would remain stable if member countries followed 
the rules set out by the Maastricht treaty, thus creating what is called an “optimum 
currency area.” The sovereign debt crisis has been seen by some as the outcome of 
disavowal and manipulation of these rules. For many economists, the crisis brings to the 
fore the pragmatic difficulties of a one-size-fits-all monetary policy that fails to account 
for divergent internal developments within the currency regime. Proposed solutions to the 
crisis have been multiple and contradictory: expel weaker member states, form different 
euro-blocs (such as calls for a north or south euro), impose reform through ever more 
austerity measures (that only seem to accelerate the crisis), or to deepen integration 
through banking and fiscal harmonization. 
Where national currencies no longer index difference, expert commentators resort 
to new rhetorical strategies to qualify the euro. Exchange-rate risk has only resurfaced in 
the bond spreads of sovereign debt, where national differences are once again perceived 
as legible (rightly or wrongly) and subject to speculation. Experts argue that euro is 
undervalued in Germany and overvalued in Greece. Interest rates cannot be adjusted 
through revaluation of currency, thus the euro’s interest rate is appropriate to none. Such 
arguments are gaining efficacy by evoking the possibility of a return to prior national 
strength through a re-introduction of national currencies, or conversely, a potential shield 
from the imbalances within the euro-zone. Whatever the claims, an unwinding of the euro 
poses problems of knowledge; preservation or unraveling suggests an uncertain outcome.  
From an economic standpoint, many parallel arguments circulated in policy 
disagreements about the effects of a currency union on the East German economy. These 
were not only problems of conversion but also pragmatic concerns about future regional 
sustainability. Among other crucial factors, the currency union and the asymmetries it 
intensified undermined the very economic basis from which East Germans could have 
become participants in a shared German and European project. One of many crucial 
materializations of failed integration can be seen in wage differences between West and 
East German regions. More than 20 years after German unification, unions and 
companies still have the legal backing to determine pay-rates on an East/West basis. 
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Some argue that wage differences are necessary and reflect regional differences in cost of 
living. Others warn that wage inequalities will only inhibit any efforts to “catch up with 
the West” (Angleichung), and that cost of living differences are not so divergent. More 
importantly, low wages in the East will continue to reproduce elder poverty and the need 
for government assistance. East Germans have been forced to move to, or shuttle between 
jobs in the West German regions and beyond. Over twenty years of laments about the 
financial burdens of paying for the East have occluded how deindustrialization, 
dispossession, and demographic decline shape and also erase East German contributions, 
work biographies and economic futures. Many analysts have concluded that the economic 
project of creating equivalent standards between East and West German federal regions 
has failed. Recent studies suggest the goal may soon be abandoned with the end of 
special subsidies in 2019 (Ostdeutschland 2020, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung). Avenues for 
making structural differences between East and West an ongoing collective commitment 
seem few.  
 
Concluding Thoughts 
 
The euro and the single market have so far been envisioned and promoted by 
elites as a mere technical instrument that unites, but which simultaneously allows for 
national economic priorities and subjectivities to remain intact. Now, in the light of 
austerity measures and proposals for tighter fiscal union, national states must make policy 
decisions to save the euro, with diminishing avenues for addressing local economic 
imbalances. Citizens across Europe have turned to the streets to protest the growing 
undemocratic interventions that the unifying euro is now inscribing into the very fabric of 
the European projects. National stereotypes and historical traumas have been re-animated 
as moral commentaries on cultural economic Others. Greece’s continued membership in 
the euro is now at stake, with contradictory justifications being made for its exclusion, 
and for its necessary inclusion, so that the European project will remain in tact. Within 
member nations nests a similar dynamic as wealthier federal regions mobilize claims to 
autonomy in resistance of financial redistribution. Even within Germany, the region of 
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Bavaria has mounted a campaign for independence. Viewed widely as an electoral 
spectacle, it nonetheless underscores the difficulties with which a Europe-wide fiscal 
union would be met.  
The structural problems of German unification are covered over by the new 
financial instabilities emerging in Europe as a whole, even as new problem spaces of 
economic integration between West and East Germany foreshadow likely struggles to 
emerge between euro-member states and regions. Aimee Placas has been following 
consumer debt practices and the financialization of daily life in Greece since 2003.  She 
has recently drawn attention to a crucial interface between sovereign and consumer debt83 
Namely, proposed solutions that view a reduction in the so-called bloated public sector as 
the answer have neglected a crucial implication of such downsizing measures. Her 
analysis is worth quoting at length here: 
“Most press mentions the enormity of the sector, the issue of political hires, the 
trading of jobs for votes, the favorable retirement ages, and other “costly 
benefits.”  While I don't have room here to address why that image is problematic, 
I do need to point out one “privilege” that never gets talked about.  In the midst of 
the job cuts and wage reductions that austerity measures have required for this 
group, there's been no coverage of the time bomb caused by a lesser-known perk 
civil servants have had access to: namely, they've been considered low-risk 
borrowers.  In a credit market where credit scoring is brand new and still under 
formulation and where access to credit history only began in 2003, banks have 
relied on civil servants as the most stable category of “salaried” consumers, 
offering special loan products and remarkably large credit lines to this group.  I've 
met individuals who had been lent three times their annual salary in consumer 
loans and credit lines – that's unsecured debt, not mortgages on homes or 
property.  The nature of their employment was considered to be security enough.  
Austerity measures have eradicated any such notions of security; the debts, 
however, remain.” 
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 (Cultural Anthropology, Nov 31, 2011; http://www.culanth.org/?q=node/433). 
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Moralizing discourses within Germany that sharply distinguish between creditor and 
debtor nations risk creating the impression among the German public that further 
austerity measures in Greece, or its expulsion from the euro will un-problematically 
return Germany to stability and certainty. Another more complex issue is the status of 
“Target2 imbalances.”84 The intense discussions leading up to the German currency 
union on July 1990 should remind not only of transfers and payments, but the tangled 
web of unwinding what has been predominantly, though problematically viewed as a 
bankrupt socialist economy. Based upon my ethnographic and historical analysis of the 
German currency union, and notably, how competing monetary hierarchies of value 
continue to divide within Germany, the unanticipated consequences of either saving or 
discarding the euro project will remain for some time to come.   
 
Frank Plasberg: How likely is it that Greece will be able to ‘get back on its feet’ 
economically?  
Dirk Müller (otherwise known as ‘Mr. Dax’85): I would place the chances of 
Greece getting out of this mess at zero percent as long as they have this wrong 
currency. The currency that is legally valid in Greece right now is [valued] 100 
percent over the productive efficiency of the country. No country on this earth can 
establish a reasonable economic foundation that is self-sustaining on such terms. 
If we want to maintain this situation then we will have to be prepared to 
counterbalance the difference between Greece and its currency annually with 
transfer payments in the billions”  
German Talk Show, ‘Hard but Fair,’ 06. 08. 2012 
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  (http://seekingalpha.com/article/701601-why-everyone-should-pay-attention-to-target2-
imbalances). 
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 The DAX is the German Stock exchange, Deutscher Aktien IndeX. Dirk Müller is a well-
known, plain speaking stockbroker who regularly appears on news and media outlets to give 
commentary on current developments in the financial markets. His mission is to give the public a 
clear and honest assessment of global financial interconnections while also providing investment 
advice. He is widely respected as a financial professional who raises awareness about the need for 
developing a more sustainable financial system and speaks out, for instance, against exploitative 
commodity speculations on the markets of the global south. More recently, he made a 
documentary on the impact of austerity measures in Greece.  
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‘The Greek Elections’: Instead of an End with Terror, now Checks without 
End?’86 
 
In the example above, Dirk Müller attempts to make intelligible the dis-junctures 
arising from different economies sharing a single currency and monetary policy in the 
euro-zone. In the absence of separate currencies, he particularizes the euro by referring to 
it rhetorically as the ‘wrong currency’ and substantializing a relative value that he 
believes does not reflect Greece’s economic circumstances. Like other financial 
observers, he argues that Greece’s situation would improve if the country left the euro, 
returned to the drachma, and once again had the possibility to ‘devalue’ its currency. This 
leaves aside the question of Greece’s euro-denominated sovereign and private debts. It 
also suggests that an exit from the euro and a return to a former state of affairs is possible 
and desirable. That scenario animates multiple debates and positions about the nature of 
the euro crisis and proposed solutions to it. These include dismantling or reconfiguring 
euro-zone membership, as well as calls for a completion of the project’s ‘architecture,’ 
from minimal approaches such as a banking union to measures that would create a so-
called European ‘super-state’ with fiscal and political union. All of these suggestions 
pose immense challenges, multiple points of disagreement and resistance, and ultimately 
a limit to knowledge about the future of the project and its outcome. 
In my initial reading of the example above, I began to reflect on two dimensions 
emerging out of the euro crisis relevant for my own research and anthropological 
                                                 
86
 Frank Plasberg: Wie wahrscheinlich ist es, dass Griechenland wirtschaftlich auf die Beine 
kommt? 
Dirk Müller (“Mr. Dax”): Ich würde es bei null Prozent ansiedeln. Griechenland hat nicht einen 
Hauch von  Chance irgendwie wieder aus dem Schlamassel rauszukommen, solange sie diese 
falsche Währung haben. Die Währung die in Griechenland momentan gültig ist, ist um etwa 
100% über der Leistungsfähigkeit des Landes. Damit kann kein Land dieser Erde irgendwie auch 
nur eine halbwegs vernünftige wirtschaftliche Grundlage schaffen, um auf eigenen Beine zu 
stehen. Wenn wir das so erhalten wollen, dann müssen wir bereit sein, diese Differenz zwischen 
der Wirtschaftsleistung der Griechen und ihrer Währung auszugleichen mit hohen 
Milliardensummen, die wir jedes Jahr nach Griechenland überweisen. 
Hart aber Fair, ARD 8.06. 2012 
“Die Griechenwahl-statt Ende mit Schrecken jetzt Schecks ohne Ende?” 
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perspective on currency union projects. First, the above example is interesting in terms of 
the lingering horizon of nation-state-currency distinctions that the euro was imagined to 
transform and render unnecessary in the new monetary community of Europe. 
Rhetorically, then, financial experts must resort to new forms of marking and 
conceptualizing the interrelations of money, economy and persons in this new 
configuration of obligation between euro member states. 
The second is the way in which this form of explaining the harmful effects and 
imbalances created by a currency ‘mismatch’ are analogous to the dilemmas that 
animated debates in 1990 about the introduction of the D-Mark to East Germany. Not 
only did many at the time argue that the linking of very different ‘economies’ to the same 
currency pose immediate problems for the economic future of what would become the 
East German federal regions. In subsequent years a minority of scholars and analysts 
have reflected upon how the lingering structural differences between east and western 
regions, and hence the need for financial transfers to the regions of the former GDR, can 
be attributed in part to similar imbalances not unlike those emerging between euro-
member states. This is not explainable entirely as a regional difference but must also 
include its history as a separate and differently organized ‘state’ and economy as a 
pragmatic and symbolic problem-space. There is some consensus that the shock effect of 
introducing the D-Mark abruptly to the east contributed to the loss of its industrial base. 
However this aspect is often downplayed in the politics of attributing the majority of the 
decline to the problems of the socialist planned economy.  
What some scholars have tried to show, however, is that the monetary and fiscal 
policies designed for the West German economy did not properly target the specific 
economic circumstances in the East in the years that followed unification (Collier 2011; 
Collier 1997; Zatlin 2011). Instead of facilitating convergence and equalization, then, 
asymmetries between  ‘old’ and ‘new’ regions were conserved. The reasons for and 
explanations of the nature and extent of these asymmetries are complex and by no means 
a perfect analogy to the structural differences between euro-member states. But they do 
suggest how this form of integration through monetary union is reflected in the ‘real’ 
economic circumstances of regions, and that monetary and fiscal policies may intensify 
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rather than minimize these differences. Moreover, political union may provide a formal-
legal means of transferring resources between strong and weak regions, but these may 
continue to be politicized and contested if they are understood as transfers of wealth 
across different kinds of borders (financial, cultural, territorial). If such transfers are 
debated within ‘nation-states,’ then finding new ways of authorizing and imagining these 
relations between member-states may likely pose greater resistance, as the euro crisis has 
shown quite viscerally.  
What sets the European monetary ‘architecture’ apart from other state-money-
person relationships is the separation of money creation and governance from the fiscus 
or fiscal policies. Economists and political scientists refer to this split in terms of ‘levels’ 
of governance. That is, monetary policy is at a level above the state (an 
intergovernmental relationship) whereas fiscal and social policies remain at the state-
level). Member states are therefore not in a position to issue debt or coordinate fiscal 
policies through the management of separate currencies. According to the rules set in the 
1992 Maastricht Treaty on European Monetary Union, member-states were obliged to 
follow strict budgetary and fiscal discipline according to a set of key criteria. Along with 
a stability pact and no-bailout clause (no mutualization of debt across member-states), it 
was felt that if the rules were followed, the system would work without fiscal and 
political union. While many EU planners had in mind that fiscal and political union 
would follow and would indeed be forced upon member-states ‘organically’ through the 
pressures and constraints of a shared currency, others have been far more skeptical about 
how deep European unification should extend, or is feasible. 
The causes and implications of what has been called the ‘euro-debt’ crisis are the 
subject of ongoing debate, re-definition, and revising. A number of key elements should 
be teased out here for context, and as the basis for further revision. It is widely felt that 
the ‘origin’ of the crisis in Europe lies in the US financial crisis, beginning in 2007-08, 
and which significantly impacted industry and banking in Europe. As in the US, 
European states intervened to prevent key financial institutions and industries ‘exposed’ 
to the so-called US toxic assets from defaulting and bankruptcy. Just as in the US, 
European banks and sovereign states viewed membership in terms of a system ‘too-big-
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to-fail.’ With membership in the euro zone, the interest on sovereign bonds converged, 
with southern states like Greece and Spain able to borrow at interest rates like that of 
Germany. As many authors put this, the southern ‘periphery’ could borrow ‘as if ‘they 
were Germany. These new circumstances fuelled export-growth in the north and 
borrowing and consumption in the south. The reasons that countries from Ireland, 
(celebrated as the Celtic tiger) to Greece (seen from the beginning as having used 
accounting tricks to adopt the euro) became ‘crisis states’ differ in important ways, 
further highlighting the challenges and complexities of euro-zone membership. These 
will merit further unpacking and explanation as a way of highlighting some of the key 
logics of the euro currency union project, and the important ways in which the citizens of 
member states underwrite the system (Dodd 2010; Hall 2012).87  
For my purposes here, however, what I believe is significant is the way in which 
persons and states have become part of the logic of fixed exchange rate systems, a kind of 
‘currency reserves’ backing the project. For this reason, political elites are going to great 
lengths to prevent member states from exiting, even as states and citizens endure hopeless 
austerity programs effectively to save the currency. Both German and European currency 
union projects and histories highlight is the way in which money and society depend on 
                                                 
87
 To develop the arguments in this dissertation further for future publications, especially using 
the 1990 currency union project as a metaphor for thinking about the relations, logics and 
meanings of euro-membership, I would like to make use of the following scholarship. The work 
of Nigel Dodd on the euro offers a way to think about other forms of theorizing and describing 
the ‘systemic’ dilemmas of the euro architecture, predominantly analyzed in economics and 
political science. For instance, in 2010 conference paper, ‘ Money, Law, Sovereignty: Where 
does this crisis leave the State?’ Dodd draws on Agamben’s writings on the ‘state of exception’ 
(as do other international political economists), Balibar’s use of popular sovereignty and the 
fiscus, and Bataille’s theory of general economy (contrasted with restricted economy) to analyze 
the split between monetary and fiscal policy. Dodd makes a further distinction between money 
and finance. These are forms of addressing the tension between a unified monetary system and 
how debts should be circulated among member-states. This is the key argument animating 
policymakers, with Germany notably resistant to any form of debt sharing (such as euro-bonds). 
Those familiar with the details of financial crises in German history have explained German 
resistance to euro bonds in terms of war financing in the first and second world wars through 
selling bonds to the German public, many who lost their entire savings when the currency had to 
be reformed. Peter Hall’s (2012) work with a varieties-of-capitalism approach is also instructive 
for considering different histories of  “coordinating” economic, fiscal and monetary policy in 
northern and southern Europe. These different social traditions, he argues, are being targeted in 
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this suspension and trust. What we perceive to be objective and impenetrable structuring 
forces upon which we depend existentially and symbolically are fragile and can be 
thought and made ‘other.’ Money systems are ongoing attempts to think the potential of 
social justice and equity, just as these often produce the opposite, producing new 
inequalities and pragmatic tasks for the future.  
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